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  1. Bruce Aune (1963). Is There an Analytic a Priori? Journal of Philosophy 60 (11):281-291.
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  2. A. J. Ayer (1987). The a Priori. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), A Priori Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
  3. Ben Baker (2012). Boghossian's Implicit Definition Template. In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis. Ontos-Verlag. 15.
    In Boghossian's 1997 paper, 'Analyticity' he presented an account of a prioriknowledge of basic logical principles as available by inference from knowledge of their role in determining the meaning of the logical constants by implicit definitiontogether with knowledge of the meanings so-determined that we possess through ourprivileged access to meaning. Some commentators (e.g. BonJour (1998), Glüer (2003),Jenkins (2008)) have objected that if the thesis of implicit definition on which he relieswere true, knowledge of the meaning of the constants would presuppose (...)
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  4. Paul A. Boghossian (2008). Content and Justification: Philosophical Papers. OUP Oxford.
    Content and Justification presents a series of essays by Paul Boghossian on the theory of content and on its relation to the phenomenon of a priori knowledge. -/- Part one comprises essays on the nature of rule-following and its relation to the problem of mental content; on the intelligibility of eliminativist views of the mental; on the prospects for a naturalistic reduction of mental content; and on the currently influential view that meaning is a normative notion. -/- Part two includes (...)
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  5. Paul A. Boghossian (2003). Epistemic Analyticity: A Defense. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):15-35.
    The paper is a defense of the project of explaining the a priori via the notion of meaning or concept possession. It responds to certain objections that have been made to this project—in particular, that there can be no epistemically analytic sentences that are not also metaphysically analytic, and that the notion of implicit definition cannot explain a priori entitlement. The paper goes on to distinguish between two different ways in which facts about meaning might generate facts about entitlement—inferential and (...)
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  6. Paul A. Boghossian (1994). Analyticity and Conceptual Truth. Philosophical Issues 5:117-131.
  7. Paul Artin Boghossian (1996). Analyticity Reconsidered. Noûs 30 (3):360-391.
    This is what many philosophers believe today about the analytic/synthetic distinction: In his classic early writings on analyticity -- in particular, in "Truth by Convention," "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," and "Carnap and Logical Truth" -- Quine showed that there can be no distinction between sentences that are true purely by virtue of their meaning and those that are not. In so doing, Quine devastated the philosophical programs that depend upon a notion of analyticity -- specifically, the linguistic theory of necessary (...)
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  8. Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.) (2000). New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford University Press.
    A stellar line-up of leading philosophers from around the world offer new treatments of a topic which has long been central to philosophical debate, and in ...
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  9. H. G. Callaway (1993). Context for Meaning and Analysis, A Critical Study in the Philosophy of Language. Rodopi.
    This book provides a concise overview, with excellent historical and systematic coverage, of the problems of the philosophy of language in the analytic tradition. Howard Callaway explains and explores the relation of language to the philosophy of mind and culture, to the theory of knowledge, and to ontology. He places the question of linguistic meaning at the center of his investigations. The teachings of authors who have become classics in the field, including Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, and Putnam are (...)
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  10. H. G. Callaway (1992). Logic Acquisition, Usage and Semantic Realism (Reprinted in Callaway 2008, Meaning Without Analyticity). Erkenntnis 37 (1):65 - 92.
    A chief aim of this paper is to provide common ground for discussion of outstanding issues between defenders of classical logic and contemporary advocates of intuitionistic logic. In this spirit, I draw upon (and reconstruct) here the relationship between dialogue and evidence as emphasized in German constructivist authors. My approach depends upon developments in the methodology of empirical linguistics. As a preliminary to saying how one might decide between these two versions of logic (this issue is most closely approached in (...)
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  11. Manuel Campos (2003). Analyticity and Incorrigibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):689-708.
    The traditional point of view on analyticity implies that truth in virtue only of meaning entails a priori acceptability and vice versa. The argument for this claim is based on the idea that meaning as it concerns truth and meaning as it concerns competence are one and the same thing. In this paper I argue that the extensions of these notions do not coincide. I hold that truth in virtue of meaning— truth for semantic reasons—doesn't imply a priori acceptability, and (...)
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  12. Albert Casullo (2012). Analyticity, Apriority, Modality. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Continuum International Pub.. 228.
  13. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Is Intuition Based On Understanding? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):42-67.
    According to the most popular non-skeptical views about intuition, intuitions justify beliefs because they are based on understanding. More precisely: if intuiting that p justifies you in believing that p it does so because your intuition is based on your understanding of the proposition that p. The aim of this paper is to raise some challenges for accounts of intuitive justification along these lines. I pursue this project from a non-skeptical perspective. I argue that there are cases in which intuiting (...)
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  14. Cesare Cozzo (2002). Does Epistemological Holism Lead to Meaning Holism? Topoi 21 (1-2):25-45.
    There are various proposals for a general characterization of holism1. In this paper I propose the following: a variety of holism is the view that every X of an appropriate kind, which is part of a relevant whole W, cannot be legitimately separated or taken in isolation from W. Then, I distinguish two general kinds of holism, depending on two different reasons which can debar us from taking X in isolation from W. One reason can be that separating X from (...)
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  15. Cesare Cozzo (2002). Olismo epistemologico senza olismo linguistico. In Massimo Dell'Utri (ed.), Olismo. Quodlibet. 179-230.
  16. Lieven Decock (2010). Review of Callaway, Meaning Without Analyticity. [REVIEW] Revue Internationale de Philosophie 251 (1):127-130.
    The volume assembles thirteen essays on logic, language and meaning, and is preceded by an introduction by Paul Gochet. Most of the papers were published between 1981 and 2000 in European journals such as Dialectica, Logique et Analyse, and Erkenntnis. The papers stand alone, yet throughout the book an overarching view of the relationship between pragmatics and semantics transpires clearly. Callaway defends a midway position between American analytic philosophy and American pragmatism. The result is a blend of Quine's scientific philosophy (...)
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  17. Michael Devitt (1993). Localism and Analyticity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):641-646.
    In their discussion of semantic holism, Fodor and Lepore claim that Quine showed that any inferential properties constituting a meaning cannot be distinguished on epistemic grounds like apriority. But they often write as if Quine showed that such properties cannot be distinguished at all. The paper argues that Quine did not show the latter. It goes on to propose a criterion for distinguishing the constitutive properties: they are the ones that determine reference. Fodor is not in a position to reject (...)
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  18. Daniel Dohrn (2011). Are There a Posteriori Conceptual Necessities? Philosophical Studies 155 (2):181-197.
    I critically assess Stephen Yablo’s claim that cassinis are ovals is an a posteriori conceptual necessity. One does not know it simply by mastering the relevant concepts but by substantial empirical scrutiny. Yablo represents narrow content by would have turned out -conditionals. An epistemic reading of such conditionals does not bear Yablo’s claim. Two metaphysically laden readings are considered. In one reading, Yablo’s conditionals test under what circumstances concepts remain the same while their extensions diverge. As an alternative, I develop (...)
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  19. Philip A. Ebert (2005). Transmission of Warrant-Failure and the Notion of Epistemic Analyticity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):505 – 521.
    In this paper I will argue that Boghossian's explanation of how we can acquire a priori knowledge of logical principles through implicit definitions commits a transmission of warrant-failure. To this end, I will briefly outline Boghossian's account, followed by an explanation of what a transmission of warrant-failure consists in. I will also show that this charge is independent of the worry of rule-circularity which has been raised concerning the justification of logical principles and of which Boghossian is fully aware. My (...)
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  20. Hartry Field (2000). A Priority as an Evaluative Notion. In Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press.
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  21. Hans-Johann Glock (2010). Necessity, a Priority and Analyticity: A Wittgensteinian Perspective. In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave Macmillan.
  22. Kathrin Glüer (2003). Analyticity and Implicit Definition. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):37-60.
    Paul Boghossian advocates a version of the analytic theory of a priori knowledge. His defense of an "epistemic" notion of analyticity is based on an implicit definition account ofthe meaning of the logical constants. Boghossian underestimates the power of the classical Quinean criticisms, however; the challenge to substantiate the distinction between empirical and non-empirical sentences, as forcefully presented in Two Dogmas, still stands, and the regress from Truth by Convention still needs to be avoided. Here, Quine also showed that there (...)
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  23. Glen Hoffmann (2011). Two Kinds of A Priori Infallibility. Synthese 181 (2):241-253.
    On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified (or absolutely warranted), i.e., justified to a degree that entails their truth and precludes their falsity. Though rationalist infallibilism is indisputably running its course, adherence to at least one of the two species of infallible a priori justification refuses to disappear from mainstream epistemology. Among others, Putnam (1978) still professes the a priori infallibility of some category (i) propositions, while Burge (...)
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  24. John Horden (forthcoming). Devious Stipulations. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.
    Recent attempts to answer ontological questions through conceptual analysis have been controversial. Nonetheless, contemporary metaphysicians mostly agree that if the existence of certain things analytically follows from sentences we already accept, then there is no further ontological commitment involved in affirming the existence of those things. More generally, it is plausible that whenever a sentence analytically entails another, the conjunction of those sentences requires nothing more of the world for its truth than the former sentence alone. In his ‘Analyticity and (...)
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  25. Juraj Hvorecký (2006). Appropriating A Priori. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):113-120.
    The paper criticizes the novel approach of Mišcevic to apriority and analyticity. In a nutshell, it aims to show that Mišcevic has failed to appreciate the power and impact of semantic atomism in the theory of concepts. He simply assumes a clean distinction between concept-analyzing propositions and those that do not analyze concepts, misconstrue the way atomists understand concept-analyzing propositions, namely epistemically and not semantically, and fails to provide an answer to atomistic considerations. Finally, I analyze his examples of alleged (...)
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  26. C. S. Jenkins (2008). Boghossian and Epistemic Analyticity. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):113-127.
    Boghossian claims that we can acquire a priori knowledge by means of a certain form of argument, our grasp of whose premises relies on the existence of implicit definitions. I discuss an objection to his ‘analytic theory of the a priori’. The worry is that in order to employ this kind of argument we must already know its conclusion. Boghossian has responded to this type of objection in recent work, but I argue that his responses are unconvincing. Along the way, (...)
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  27. Alessia Marabini (2014). La concezione epistemica dell'analiticità. Aracne editrice.
    La rinascita negli ultimi decenni di un nutrito dibattito intorno alla nozione di analiticità dopo le critiche a suo tempo mosse da Quine alla batteria di nozioni utilizzate da Rudolf Carnap (ad esempio, postulati di significato, regole semantiche, definizioni implicite, convenzioni e stipulazioni esplicite) prende le mosse da una riflessione critica sulle argomentazioni di Quine e tenta, da un lato, di approfondire meglio il legame fra analiticità e conoscenza a priori, e, dall’altro, di capire meglio il ruolo che la definizione (...)
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  28. Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2001). Boghossian on Analyticity. Analysis 61 (4):293–302.
    In an important recent discussion of analyticity, Paul Boghossian (1997)1 argues for the following three claims: (i) While Quine’s well-known arguments against analyticity do undermine one type of analyticity (what Boghossian calls metaphysical analyticity), they fail to undermine another type (what he calls epistemic analyticity). (ii) Epistemic analyticity explains the a prioricity of logic and perhaps even the a prioricity of conceptual truths.
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  29. Nenad Miscevic, Deep and Superficial Apriori.
    The paper challenges the entrenched equation of conceptual with apriori. It develops the idea of at least dual justification of a single piece of belief, at a deep, ultimate level and at the surface, immediately accessible to the thinker. Apriori justification then also admits of different degrees of depth. A proposition is deeply apriori for a cognizer if its ultimate ground is apriori, otherwise it is only superficially apriori . In the case of empirically applicable concepts, some of their concept-analyzing (...)
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  30. Nenad Miščević (2006). Devitt's Shocking Idea and Analyticity Without Apriority. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):69-95.
    Natural kind terms don’t have descriptive meanings, Devitt claims. The paper argues that this claim is tantamount to denying the existence of natural kind concepts, in the usual sense of “concept”, since concepts are predicate meanings. The denial is counterintuitive, and has bad epistemological consequences, since natural kind concepts are among the building blocks of our understanding of the world. The paper ends with a positive proposal, featuring a bold claim: if the standard Kripke-Putnam, line on semantics of natural kind (...)
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  31. Nenad Miščević (2005). Is Apriority Context-Sensitive? Acta Analytica 20 (1):55-80.
    The paper argues that the use of epistemic terms, prominently “… knows” and even “… knows a priori/a posteriori” is context-sensitive along several dimensions. Besides the best known dimension of quality of evidence (lower quality for less demanding context, and higher one for more demanding), there is a dimension of depth (shallow justification for superficial evaluation, and deeper justification for deeper probing evaluation contexts). This claim is illustrated by context-dependent ascription of apriority and aposteriority. The argument proposed here focuses upon (...)
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  32. Nenad Miščević (2005). Empirical Concepts and A Priori Truth. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):289-315.
    Merely conceptual knowledge, not based on specific sensitivity to the referential domain, is not seriously a priori. It is argued here that it is either weakly and superficially a priori, or downright a posteriori. This is done starting from the fact that many of our definitions (or concepts) are recognizably empirically established, and pointing out that recognizably empirical grounding yields superficial apriority. Further, some (first-order) concept analyzing propositions are empirically false about their referents and thus empirically refutable. Therefore, our empirical (...)
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  33. Joe Morrison (2010). Just How Controversial is Evidential Holism? Synthese 173 (3):335-352.
    This paper is an examination of evidential holism, a prominent position in epistemology and the philosophy of science which claims that experiments only ever confirm or refute entire theories. The position is historically associated with W.V. Quine, and it is at once both popular and notorious, as well as being largely under-described. But even though there’s no univocal statement of what holism is or what it does, philosophers have nevertheless made substantial assumptions about its content and its truth. Moreover they (...)
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  34. Anders Öberg (2011). Hilary Putnam on Meaning and Necessity. Dissertation, Uppsala University
    In this dissertation on Hilary Putnam's philosophy, I investigate his development regarding meaning and necessity, in particular mathematical necessity. Putnam has been a leading American philosopher since the end of the 1950s, becoming famous in the 1960s within the school of analytic philosophy, associated in particular with the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. Under the influence of W.V. Quine, Putnam challenged the logical positivism/empiricism that had become strong in America after World War II, with influential exponents such (...)
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  35. Carlo Penco (2010). The Influence of Einstein on Wittgenstein's Philosophy. Philosophical Investigations 33 (4):360-379.
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  36. Hilary Putnam (1979). Analyticity and Apriority: Beyond Wittgenstein and Quine. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):423-441.
  37. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2010). Analyticity and Possible-World Semantics. Erkenntnis 72 (3):295 - 314.
    Standard approaches to possible-world semantics allow us to define necessity and logical truth, but analyticity is considerably more difficult to account for. The source of this difficulty lies in the received model-theoretical conception of a language interpretation. In intuitive terms, analyticity amounts to truth in virtue of meaning alone, i.e. solely in virtue of the interpretation of linguistic expressions. In other words, an analytic sentence should remain true under all variations of ‘extralinguistic reality’ as long as the interpretation is kept (...)
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  38. Gurpreet Rattan (2010). Indeterminacy, a Priority, and Analyticity in the Quinean Critique. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):203-226.
  39. Nathan Salmon (1993). Analyticity and Apriority. Philosophical Perspectives 7:125-133.
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  40. Ori Simchen (2003). Meaningfulness and Contingent Analyticity. Noûs 37 (2):278–302.
    That expressions should have their contents can seem paradigmatically contingent. But it can also seem a priori that expressions in one's own language should have their contents to the extent that instances of disquotation, such as "Socrates" refers to Socrates' and "cat" refers to cats', are trivially true. I attempt to reconcile these conflicting intuitions about meaningfulness by examining semantic and metasemantic details of linguistic reflexivity. I argue that instances of disquotation are contingent analytic in Kaplan's sense, and bring this (...)
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  41. Jim Stone (1994). Games and Family Resemblances. Philosophical Investigations 17 (No. 2): 435-443.
    An account of the feature all games share in virtue of which they are games.
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  42. R. G. Swinburne (1975). Analyticity, Necessity and Apriority. Mind 84 (334):225-243.
    THE PAPER BEGINS BY CONSIDERING THREE ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF "ANALYTIC," ONE IN TERMS OF LOGICAL TRUTH, ONE IN TERMS OF THE MEANINGS OF WORDS, AND ONE IN TERMS OF SELF-CONTRADICTION OR INCOHERENCE. NEXT, FIVE DEFINITIONS OF "NECESSARY" ARE CONSIDERED, ONE IN TERMS OF ANALYTICITY, AND ONE PICKING OUT THE BROADER KIND OF LOGICAL NECESSITY DISCUSSED BY KRIPKE AND PLANTINGA. FINALLY, THREE DEFINITIONS OF "A PRIORI" ARE CONSIDERED. ONLY ON A FEW OF THESE DEFINITIONS DO THE CATEGORIES OF ANALYTIC, NECESSARY, AND (...)
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  43. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2010). Putnam's Account of Apriority and Scientific Change: Its Historical and Contemporary Interest. Synthese 176 (3):429-445.
    In the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam articulated a notion of relativized apriority that was motivated to address the problem of scientific change. This paper examines Putnam’s account in its historical context and in relation to contemporary views. I begin by locating Putnam’s analysis in the historical context of Quine’s rejection of apriority, presenting Putnam as a sympathetic commentator on Quine. Subsequently, I explicate Putnam’s positive account of apriority, focusing on his analysis of the history of physics and geometry. In (...)
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  44. Daniel von Wachter (1996). Weshalb analytische Urteile kontingent und a posteriori sind. In A. Schramm (ed.), Philosophie in Österreich 1996. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. 227-230.
    Analytic judgements are contingent and a posteriori.
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  45. Åsa Maria Wikforss (2003). An a Posteriori Conception of Analyticity? Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):119-139.
    At the time that Quine wrote "Two Dogmas" an attack on analyticity was considered a simultaneous attack on the very idea of necessary truth. This all changed with Kripke's revival of a non-epistemic, non-linguistic notion of necessity. My paper discusses the question whether we can take Kripke one step further and free analyticity from its epistemic ties, thereby reinstating a notion of analyticity that is immune to Quine's attack, and compatible with his epistemic holism. I discuss this question by examining (...)
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  46. Paul Yu (1984). Analyticity and Apriority: The Quine-Putnam Dispute. Philosophia 14 (1-2):41-63.
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  47. Paul Yu (1983). Analyticity and Apriority: Beyond Wittgenstein and Quine. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3. Cambridge University Press.
  48. Edward N. Zalta (1988). Logical and Analytic Truths That Are Not Necessary. Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):57-74.
    The author describes an interpreted modal language and produces some clear examples of logical and analytic truths that are not necessary. These examples: (a) are far simpler than the ones cited in the literature, (b) show that a popular conception of logical truth in modal languages is incorrect, and (c) show that there are contingent truths knowable ``a priori'' that do not depend on fixing the reference of a term.
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  49. Wojciech Żełaniec (1992). Fathers, Kings, and Promises: Husserl and Reinach on the a Priori. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 9 (3):147-177.
  50. Zsófia Zvolenszky (2012). Searle on Analyticity, Necessity, and Proper Names. Organon F 19 (2):109-136.
    My aim is to show that once we appreciate how Searle (1958) fills in the details of his account of proper names – which I will dub the presuppositional view – and how we might supplement it further, we are in for a twofold discovery. First, Searle’s account is crucially unlike the so-called cluster-of-descriptions view, which many philosophers take Searle to have held. Second, the presuppositional view he did hold is interesting, plausible, and worthy of serious reconsideration. The idea that (...)
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