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  1. Gilead Bar-Elli (2010). Analyticity and Justification in Frege. Erkenntnis 73 (2):165 - 184.
    That there are analytic truths may challenge a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Unlike standard conceptions, in which analyticity is couched in terms of "truth in virtue of meanings", Frege's notions of analytic and a priori concern justification, respecting a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Where there is no justification these notions do not apply, Frege insists. Basic truths and axioms may be analytic (or a priori), though unprovable, which means there is a form of justification which is (...)
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  2. Nuel Belnap (2005). Under Carnap's Lamp: Flat Pre-Semantics. Studia Logica 80 (1):1 - 28.
    “Flat pre-semantics” lets each parameter of truth (etc.) be considered sepa-rately and equally, and without worrying about grammatical complications. This allows one to become a little clearer on a variety of philosophical-logical points, such as the use fulness of Carnapian tolerance and the deep relativity of truth. A more definite result of thinking in terms of flat pre-semantics lies in the articulation of some instructive ways of categorizing operations on meanings in purely logical terms in relation to various parame- ters (...)
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  3. Jonathan Bennett (1961). A Myth About Logical Necessity. Analysis 21 (3):59 - 63.
    In these few pages I shall try to demonstrate the emptiness of the most cumbersome piece of unexamined intellectual baggage at present being hauled about by English philosophers. I here cite one example to be going on with, at the end of the paper I shall give a handful more, and it would be easy to multiply the number by ten from the writings of reputable philosophers. The outstanding philosophical achievement of the ha1f-century which has just drawn to a close (...)
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  4. Ned Block (1993). Holism, Hyper-Analyticity and Hyper-Compositionality. Mind and Language 8 (1):1-26.
  5. Alex Blum (1983). Analyticity and Truth in All Possible Worlds. Noûs 17 (2):281-289.
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  6. Alex Blum (1983). Errata: Analyticity and Truth in All Possible Worlds. Noûs 17 (4):730.
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  7. Stephen E. Braude'S. (1976). Errata: Tenses, Analyticity and Time's Eternity. Philosophia 6 (3-4).
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  8. Stephen E. Braude (1976). Tenses, Analyticity and Time's Eternity - Erratum. Philosophia 6 (3-4):544.
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  9. Stephen E. Braude (1976). Tenses, Analyticity, and Time's Eternity. Philosophia 6 (1):39-48.
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  10. Anthony L. Brueckner (2002). Anti-Individualism and Analyticity. Analysis 62 (1):87-91.
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  11. Tyler Burge (2003). Logic and Analyticity. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):199-249.
    The view that logic is true independently of a subject matter is criticized—enlarging on Quine's criticisms and adding further ones. It is then argued apriori that full reflective understanding of logic and deductive reasoning requires substantial commitment to mathematical entities. It is emphasized that the objectively apriori connections between deductive reasoning and commitment to mathematics need not be accepted by or even comprehensible to a given deductive reasoner. The relevant connections emerged only slowly in the history of logic. But they (...)
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  12. H. G. Callaway (1981). Semantic Theory and Language: A Perspective (Reprinted in Callaway 2008, Meaning Without Analyticity). Proceedings of the Southwestern Philosophical Association; Philosophical Topics 1981 (summer):93-103.
    Chomsky’s conception of semantics must contend with both philosophical skepticism and contrary traditions in linguistics. In “Two Dogmas” Quine argued that “...it is non-sense, and the root of much non-sense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of any individual statement.” If so, it follows that language as the object of semantic investigation cannot be separated from collateral information. F. R. Palmer pursues a similar contention in his recent survey of issues in semantic theory: (...)
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  13. Manuel Campos (2003). Analyticity and Incorrigibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):689-708.
    The traditional point of view on analyticity implies that truth in virtue only of meaning entails a priori acceptability and vice versa. The argument for this claim is based on the idea that meaning as it concerns truth and meaning as it concerns competence are one and the same thing. In this paper I argue that the extensions of these notions do not coincide. I hold that truth in virtue of meaning— truth for semantic reasons—doesn't imply a priori acceptability, and (...)
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  14. Cesare Cozzo (2008). On the Copernican Turn in Semantics. Theoria 74 (4):295-317.
    Alberto Coffa used the phrase "the Copernican turn in semantics" to denote a revolutionary transformation of philosophical views about the connection between the meanings of words and the acceptability of sentences and arguments containing those words. According to the new conception resulting from the Copernican turn, here called "the Copernican view", rules of use are constitutive of the meanings of words. This view has been linked with two doctrines: (A) the instances of meaning-constitutive rules are analytically and a priori true (...)
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  15. Louis deRosset (forthcoming). Analyticity and Ontology. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.
    /Analyticity theorists/, as I will call them, endorse the /doctrine of analyticity in ontology/: if some truth P analytically entails the existence of certain things, then a theory that contains P but does not claim that those things exist is no more ontologically parsimonious than a theory that also claims that they exist. Suppose, for instance, that the existence of a table in a certain location is analytically entailed by the existence and features of certain particles in that location. The (...)
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  16. Theodore J. Everett (2002). Analyticity Without Synonymy in Simple Comparative Logic. Synthese 130 (2):303 - 315.
    In this paper I provide some formal schemas for the analysis of vague predicates in terms of a set of semantic relations other than classical synonymy, including weak synonymy (as between "large" and "huge"), antonymy (as between "large" and "small"), relativity (as between "large" and "large for a dog"), and a kind of supervenience (as between "large" and "wide" or "long"). All of these relations are representable in the simple comparative logic CL, in accordance with the basic formula: the more (...)
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  17. Gregory W. Fitch (1979). Analyticity and Necessity in Leibniz. Journal of the History of Philosophy 17 (1):29-42.
  18. Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
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  19. Newton Garver (1967). Analyticity and Grammar. The Monist 51 (3):397-425.
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  20. M. Giaquinto (1996). Non-Analytic Conceptual Knowledge. Mind 105 (418):249-268.
  21. Hans-Johann Glock (2003). The Linguistic Doctrine Revisited. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):143-170.
    At present, there is an almost universal consensus that the linguistic doctrine of logical necessity is grotesque. This paper explores avenues for rehabilitating a limited version of the doctrine, according to which the special status of analytic statements like 'All vixens are female' is to be explained by reference to language. Far from being grotesque, this appeal to language has a respectable philosophical pedigree and chimes with common sense, as Quine came to realize. The problem lies in developing it in (...)
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  22. R. A. Goodrich (1996). Analyticity, Meaning, and Education: A Critique of a Quinean Dogma. Educational Philosophy and Theory 28 (2):27–41.
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  23. Susan Haack (1977). Analyticity and Logical Truth in The Roots of Reference. Theoria 43 (2):129-143.
  24. Volker Halbach (2001). Disquotational Truth and Analyticity. Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (4):1959-1973.
    The uniform reflection principle for the theory of uniform T-sentences is added to PA. The resulting system is justified on the basis of a disquotationalist theory of truth where the provability predicate is conceived as a special kind of analyticity. The system is equivalent to the system ACA of arithmetical comprehension. If the truth predicate is also allowed to occur in the sentences that are inserted in the T-sentences, yet not in the scope of negation, the system with the reflection (...)
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  25. Lucas P. Halpin, Analyticity, Identity and Presupposition.
    First, I will sketch an account of identity sentences according to which identity is a device for achieving semantic change. Specifically, it changes which sentences are analytic. Second, I will sketch an account of presupposition according to which presupposition triggers are devices for logical change. More precisely, they change the logic of the language (not the logical form of the sentences in which they occur). The purpose is to sketch a general strategy of appealing to change within a language to (...)
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  26. James F. Harris (1976). Indeterminacy of Translation and Analyticity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):239-243.
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  27. James F. Harris (1969). Quine on Analyticity and Logical Truth. Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):249-255.
    Quine claims that the analytic-synthetic distinction lacks a proper characterization of a notion to be used to reduce analytic statements "depending upon essential predication" to logically true statements. the author shows that the same arguments used by quine against analyticity can also be used against logical truth; if one notion is "given up", the other must be also. notions such as "filling blanks alike" and "identical propositions" presupposed by logical truth have the same deficiencies as does analyticity. logical truth is (...)
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  28. Alexander Hieke (2007). Pragmatische Widersprüchlichkeit Und Pragmatische Analytizität: Begriffsklärung Und Anwendung. Academia.
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  29. Robert A. Imlay (1970). Searle on Analyticity. Philosophical Studies 21 (5):78 - 80.
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  30. Anssi Korhonen (2003). Logical Semantics—Truth and Analyticity. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 80 (1):135-177.
    Finland is internationally known as one of the leading centers of twentieth century analytic philosophy. This volume offers for the first time an overall survey of the Finnish analytic school. The rise of this trend is illustrated by original articles of Edward Westermarck, Eino Kaila, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Jaakko Hintikka. Contributions of Finnish philosophers are then systematically discussed in the fields of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, ethics and social philosophy. Metaphilosophical reflections on (...)
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  31. Sue Larson (1966). Analyticity and Impropriety. Journal of Philosophy 63 (20):640-642.
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  32. Sebastian Lutz, Choosing the Analytic Component of Theories.
    I provide a compact reformulation of Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for the analytic and the synthetic component of a theory and show that, contrary to arguments by Winnie and Demopoulos, Carnap’s conditions of adequacy need not be supplemented by another condition. This has immediate implications for the analytic component of reduction sentences.
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  33. Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2003). Should We Trust Our Intuitions? Deflationary Accounts of the Analytic Data. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):299-323.
    At least since W. V. O. Quine's famous critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction, philosophers have been deeply divided over whether there are any analytic truths. One line of thought suggests that the simple fact that people have 'intuitions of analyticity' might provide an independent argument for analyticities. If defenders of analyticity can explain these intuitions and opponents cannot, then perhaps there are analyticities after all. We argue that opponents of analyticity have some unexpected resources for explaining these intuitions and that, (...)
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  34. Brian P. McLaughlin (1992). Systematicity, Conceptual Truth, and Evolution. Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences 34:217-234.
    Smolensky's (1995) proposal for a connectionist explanation of systematicity doesn't work.
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  35. Brendan P. Minogue (1976). Quine on Analyticity and Translation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):233-238.
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  36. Martin Montminy (2010). Analyticity and Translation. Principia 7 (1-2):147-170.
    Quine’s negative theses about meaning and analyticity are well known, but he also defends a positive account of these notions. I explain what his nega-tive and positive views are, and argue that Quine’s positive account of meaning entails that two of his most famous doctrines, namely the claim that there are no analytic statements and the indeterminacy of translation thesis, are false. But I show that the falsity of these doctrines doesn’t affect his criti-cisms of traditional conceptions of meaning. This (...)
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  37. Edgar Morscher (1997). Bolzano's Method of Variation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 53:139-165.
    Bernard Bolzano's most fruitful invention was his method of variation. He used it in defining such fundamental logical concepts as logical consequence, analyticity and probability. The following three puzzles concerning this method of variation seem particularly worth considering, (i) How can we define the range of variation of an idea or the categorial conformity of two ideas without already using the concept of variation? This question was raised by Mark Siebel in his M. A. thesis, (ii) Why must we define (...)
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  38. Olaf L. Müller (2002). From Within and From Without. Two Perspectives on Analytic Sentences. In Wolfram Hinzen & Hans Rott (eds.), Belief and meaning: Essays at the interface. Deutsche Bibliothek der Wissenschaften.
    The analytic/synthetic distinction can be conceived from two points of view: from within or from without; from the perspective of one's own language or from the perspective of the language of others. From without, the central question is which sentences of a foreign language are to be classified as analytic. From within, by contrast, the question concerning the synthetic and the analytic acquires a normative dimension: which sentences am I not permitted to reject—if I want to avoid talking nonsense? Both (...)
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  39. M. E. Olds (1958). Ostension and Analyticity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 18 (3):359-367.
  40. Carlos A. OLLER (1999). Paraconsistency and Analyticity. Logic and Logical Philosophy 7 (1):91-99.
    William Parry conceived in the early thirties a theory of entail-
    ment, the theory of analytic implication, intended to give a formal expression to the idea that the content of the conclusion of a valid argument must be included in the content of its premises. This paper introduces a system of analytic, paraconsistent and quasi-classical propositional logic that does not validate the paradoxes of Parry’s analytic implication. The interpretation of the expressions of this logic will be given in terms of a (...)
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  41. Paul M. Pietroski (2003). Small Verbs, Complex Events: Analyticity Without Synonymy. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing. 179--214.
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  42. Charles Pigden (forthcoming). Hume On Is and Ought: Logic, Promises and the Duke of Wellington. In Paul Russell (ed.), Oxford Handbook on David Hume. Oxford University Press.
    Hume seems to contend that you can’t get an ought from an is. Searle professed to prove otherwise, deriving a conclusion about obligations from a premise about promises. Since (as Schurz and I have shown) you can’t derive a substantive ought from an is by logic alone, Searle is best construed as claiming that there are analytic bridge principles linking premises about promises to conclusions about obligations. But we can no more derive a moral obligation to pay up from the (...)
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  43. John L. Pollock (1965). Implication and Analyticity. Journal of Philosophy 62 (6):150-157.
  44. Consuelo Preti (1992). Opacity, Belief and Analyticity. Philosophical Studies 66 (3):297 - 306.
    Contrary to appearances, semantic innocence can be claimed for a Fregean account of the semantics of expressions in indirect discourse. Given externalism about meaning, an expression that refers to its ordinary sense in an opaque context refers, ultimately, to its "references"; for, on this view, the reference of an expression directly determines its meaning. Externalism seems to have similar consequences for the truth-conditions of analytic sentences. If reference determines meaning, how can we distinguish a class of sentences as true in (...)
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  45. Marian Przełęcki & Ryszard Wójcicki (1969). The Problem of Analyticity. Synthese 19 (3-4):374 - 399.
  46. Hilary Putnam (1979). Analyticity and Apriority: Beyond Wittgenstein and Quine. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):423-441.
  47. Setsuo Saito (1962). Circular Definitions and Analyticity. Inquiry 5 (1-4):158 – 162.
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  48. T. W. Schick Jr (1986). Kant, Analyticity, and the Paradox of Analysis. Idealistic Studies 16 (2):125-131.
  49. Thomas Schwartz (1979). Necessary Truth as Analyticity, and the Eliminability of Monadic de Re Formulas. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (2):336-340.
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  50. Ori Simchen (2003). Meaningfulness and Contingent Analyticity. Noûs 37 (2):278–302.
    That expressions should have their contents can seem paradigmatically contingent. But it can also seem a priori that expressions in one's own language should have their contents to the extent that instances of disquotation, such as "Socrates" refers to Socrates' and "cat" refers to cats', are trivially true. I attempt to reconcile these conflicting intuitions about meaningfulness by examining semantic and metasemantic details of linguistic reflexivity. I argue that instances of disquotation are contingent analytic in Kaplan's sense, and bring this (...)
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