Ancient Greek and Roman Epistemology

In one of his earliest dialogues, the Soliloquia, Augustine identifies the liberal arts (disciplinae) with truth (veritas), and employs this somewhat puzzling identification as a premise in his infamous proof of the immortality of the soul (Sol. 2.24). In this paper, I examine Augustine’s argument for this peculiar identification. Augustine maintains both (1) that the constituent propositions of the liberal arts are true, and (2) that the liberal art of dialectic (disciplina disputandi) is the “truth through which all disciplines are (...) true” (Sol. 2.21). I argue that Augustine identifies the liberal arts with truth because (1) the constituent propositions of the liberal arts are learned, and (2) dialectic’s structure is essential to the liberal arts. I further suggest that the subject matter of each liberal art reflects a distinct segment of intelligible reality, that is, the realm of the intelligible Forms. (shrink)

This paper examines an ancient debate over the rationality of perception. What leads the Stoics to affirm, and the Epicureans to deny, that to form a sense-impression is an activity of reason? The answer, we argue, lies in a disagreement over what is required for epistemic success. For the Stoics, epistemic success consists in believing the right propositions, and only rational states, in virtue of their predicational structure, put us in touch with propositions. Since they identify some sense-impressions as criteria (...) of truth and thus as the basis for epistemic success, the Stoics maintain that sense-impressions must be rational. The Epicureans agree with the Stoics that sense-impressions function as criteria of truth, and also agree broadly on what it means for a state to be rational, but deny that sense-impressions are rational because (1) they think that epistemic success must be supported by a state that is necessarily error-free and (2) accept that rational states can be false. In reconstructing this debate, we refine the standard interpretation of the fundamental difference between Epicurean and Stoic epistemology and also develop parallels with epistemological debates today. One upshot is a more nuanced appreciation of the merits of Epicurean epistemology vis-à-vis the Stoics. (shrink)

The focus of this paper will be on the earliest Greek treatments of impulse, motivation, and self-animation – a cluster of concepts tied to the hormē-conatus concept. I hope to offer a plausible account of how the earliest recorded views on this subject in mythological, pre-Socratic, and Classical writings might have inspired later philosophical developments by establishing the foundations for an organic, wholly naturalized approach to human inquiry. Three pillars of that approach which I wish to emphasize are: practical intelligence (...) (i.e., a continuity between knowing and doing), natural normativity (i.e., a continuity between human norms and the environment), and an ontology of philosophical dialectic (i.e., a continuity between the growth of human understanding and the growth of physis). (shrink)

I begin this paper with a puzzle: why is Plato’s Parmenides replete with references to Gorgias? While the Eleatic heritage and themes in the dialogue are clear, it is less clear what the point would be of alluding to a well-known sophist. I suggest that the answer has to do with the similarities in the underlying methods employed by both Plato and Gorgias. These similarities, as well as Plato’s recognition of them, suggest that he owes a more significant philosophical and (...) methodological debt to sophists like Gorgias than is often assumed. Further evidence from Plato and Xenophon suggest that Socrates used this very same method, which I call ‘exploring both sides’. I distinguish this Socratic method and its sophistic counterpart in terms of structure, internal aim, and external aim. Doing so allows for a more nuanced understanding of their similarities and differences. It also challenges the outsized role that popular caricatures of philosophical and sophistic method have had on our understanding of their relationship. (shrink)

I offer an examination of a core element in the reflectiveness of Heraclitus’ thought, namely, his rebuke of polymathy . In doing so, I provide a response to a recent claim that Heraclitus should not be considered to be a philosopher, by attending to his paradigmatically philosophical traits. Regarding Heraclitus’ attitude to that naïve form of ‘wisdom’, i.e., polymathy, I argue that he does not advise avoiding experience of many things, rather, he advises rejecting experience of things as merely many (...) independent things in their manifoldness , and, instead, to understand their unity and thereby to unify our knowledge of them. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Cicero’s oft-neglected De Divinatione, a dialogue investigating the legitimacy of the practice of divination. First, I offer a novel analysis of the main arguments for divination given by Quintus, highlighting the fact that he employs two logically distinct argument forms. Next, I turn to the first of the main arguments against divination given by Marcus. Here I show, with the help of modern probabilistic tools, that Marcus’ skeptical response is far from the decisive, proto-naturalistic assault (...) on superstition that it is sometimes portrayed to be. Then, I offer an extended analysis of the second of the main arguments against divination given by Marcus. Inspired by Marcus’ second main argument, I formulate, explicate, and defend a substantive principle of scientific methodology that I call the “Ciceronian Causal-Nomological Requirement” (CCR). Roughly, this principle states that causal knowledge is essential for relying on correlations in predictive inference. Although I go on to argue that Marcus’ application of the CCR in his debate with Quintus is dialectically inadequate, I conclude that De Divinatione deserves its place in Cicero’s philosophical corpus, and that ultimately, its significance for the history and philosophy of science ought to be recognized. (shrink)

A fascinating epistemology of science book, to be read alongside contemporary accounts.

In his Exhortation to Philosophy (Protrepticus), the Neoplatonic philosopher Iamblichus famously preserves material culled from lost works of ancient philosophy, including dialogues of Aristotle. He also preserves a work entitled On Wisdom and ascribed to the Pythagorean philosopher Archytas of Tarentum, who was a friend and challenger of Plato. The text On Wisdom is a later Hellenistic production, probably written in the 1st century BCE, but it presents an important piece in the puzzle of reconstructing Pythagoreanism for the Hellenistic and (...) Post-Hellenistic periods. On Wisdom provides ps-Archytas' views on the nature, pursuit, and purposes of philosophy, as well as the division of the parts of knowledge. This article presents the first complete modern translation into English and analysis of this work, whilst also explaining the precise ways in which its first critic, Iamblichus, appropriates its content to Neoplatonic theories. (shrink)

The paper offers a running commentary on ps-Archytas’ On Intellect and Sense Perception (composed ca. 80 BCE), with the aim to provide a clear description of Hellenistic/post-Hellenistic Pythagorean epistemology. Through an analysis of the process of knowledge and of the faculties that this involves, ps-Archytas presents an original epistemological theory which, although grounded in Aristotelian and Platonic theories, results in a peculiar Pythagorean criteriology that accounts for the acquisition and production of knowledge, as well as for the specific competences of (...) each cognitive faculty. (shrink)

The philosophical practices undertaken in Plato's Academy remain, in the words of Cherniss, a 'riddle'. Yet surviving accounts of the views of the first two scholarchs of Plato's Academy after his death, Speusippus and Xenocrates, reveal a sophisticated engagement with their teacher's ideas concerning the pursuit of knowledge and the ends of philosophy. Speusippus and Xenocrates transform Plato's views on epistemology and happiness, and thereby help to lay the groundwork for the transformation of philosophy in the Hellenistic era.

This is not a long book—but it is surprising that it is as long as it is. The Cyrenaics are one of a number of more or less shadowy philosophical schools which emerged in the Greek world in the 4th century BC and later. Well known are Plato’s Academy and Aristotle’s Lyceum; and relatively well served by the tradition are the Stoics and the Epicureans, as well as the various later varieties of sceptic; while the Cynics are remembered at least (...) by reputation and anecdote. The Cyrenaics are altogether murkier. No text composed by a Cyrenaic philosopher of any period survives. Our knowledge of them rests on a handful of sources, almost all of them reports of doctrine rather than genuine fragments, none of them detailed, most of them late, generally from the works of commentators, at best neutral, at worst positively hostile, all with their own axes to grind. The best testimony consists of a mere three pages in Sextus Empiricus’s invaluable doxography of different accounts of the criterion of truth in adversus Mathemticos 7. (shrink)

Seneca asserts in Letter 121 that we mature by exercising self-care as we pass through successive psychosomatic “constitutions.” These are babyhood (infantia), childhood (pueritia), adolescence (adulescentia), and young adulthood (iuventus). The self-care described by Seneca is 'self-affiliation' (oikeiōsis, conciliatio) the linchpin of the Stoic ethical system, which defines living well as living in harmony with nature, posits that altruism develops from self-interest, and allows that pleasure and pain are indicators of well-being while denying that happiness consists in pleasure and that (...) pain is misery. Augustine divides the narrative of his own development into the stages of babyhood (infantia), childhood (pueritia), adolescence (adulescentia), and young adulthood (iuventus) in the Confessions, a text wherein he claims familiarity with more than a few works of Seneca (Conf. 5.6.11). Furthermore, he had access to Stoic accounts of affiliation not only in Seneca’s Letter 121, but also in Cicero’s On Goals, and in non-extant sources of Stoic ethical theory. After pointing out that Augustine endorsed the notion of self-affiliation outside of the Confessions, I raise the question of whether he also makes the notion of affiliation thematic in his philosophical autobiography. I argue that he does indeed present himself and some of his primary relationships – with his mother and his long-term girlfriend – in terms of personal and social oikeiōsis. In addition, his self-critiques in the early books of the Confessions can be more fully understood if compared to Stoic developmental theory. He depicts himself as failing to progress intellectually, socially, and morally: although he passed through the successive constitutions, becoming physically larger and cognitively capable, he did not mature correctly by the standards of his Stoic sources. (shrink)

Review of Ancient Concepts of Philosophy by William Jordan.

In this paper I argue that the Stoic theory of signs as reported by Sextus Empiricus in AM and in PH belongs to Stoic logicians which precede Chrysippus. I further argue that the PH-version of this theory presupposes the version in AM and is an attempt to improve the older theory. I tentatively attribute the PH-version to Cleanthes and the AM-version to Zeno. I finally argue that the origin of this Stoic theory is to be found in the Dialectical school (...) (probably Philo of Megara) whose theory of signs has been preserved in Pseudo-Galen, Historia philosopha cap. 9. (shrink)

This article is about the terms used in the works traditionally ascribed to Alexander of Aphrodisias to mean the process of abstraction through which intellect separates form and matter. The passages are studied in order to identify what nouns and verbs are used. Since in two works of dubious authorship aphaireô and aphairesis are found, the usage of these terms in the works that can be ascribed with certainty to Alexander is studied. The results obtained are examined in the light (...) of the hypotheses about the authorship and chronology of the cited works formulated by scholars so far. (shrink)

This essay argues for the value of teaching a unit that questions what it is that philosophers teach as a way of encouraging students to reflect on the nature of philosophy. I show how using ancient philosophy to frame this unit makes it especially urgent, since an important (and often overlooked) consequence of Socrates’s demarcation of philosophy from oratory is that philosophers are not in a position to teach anything. I have found that students are eager to engage the challenge (...) that this seems to pose for the contemporary philosophy classroom. Further, they can self-reflectively employ philosophical analysis to identify and critique ways of justifying what they learn from teachers of philosophy. (shrink)

Heraclitus and Parmenides, far from being polar opposites, convey the same message: all is one, objects and entities are man made distinctions. Only God knows the whole truth, says Heraclitus, and the most learned man can only guess. For Parmenides the knowledge of being identifies with being itself, and things that mortals posit are only names given by men. Zeno apparent paradoxes give us an insight about the topics discussed in Parmenides entourage, but it was Melisso’s absurd version of Eleatism (...) that posterity regarded as the central tenet of the school. (shrink)

Method in Ancient Philosophy brings together fifteen new, specially written essays by leading scholars on a broad subject of central importance. The ancient Greeks recognized that different forms of human activity are guided by different methods of reasoning; examination of how they reasoned, and how they thought about their own reasoning, helps us to see how they came to hold the views they did, and how our own methods of enquiry have developed under their influence. Contributors include Terence Irwin, Patricia (...) Curd, Ian Mueller, Robert Bolton, A.A. Long, Gail Fine, Constance C. Meinwald, Lesley Brown, Gisela Striker, C.D.C. Reeve, Charlotte Witt, Richard Kraut, Sarah Broadie, James Allen, and G.E.R. Lloyd. (shrink)

A close reading of what Plato writes about DOXA, misleadingly translated as ‘belief’, reveals that DOXA exhibits the logical form of what it is now referred to as “de re belief.” A DOXA makes a claim on the nature of reality, not a claim about the speaker’s thoughts about that reality. Consequently a doxastic claim is either true or meaningless when it fails of reference to the portion of reality it is naming. This insight has deep implications for Plato’s epistemology (...) in general and his “Meno,” “Republic, ” and “Theaetetus” in particular. (shrink)

Which are "innate" but "unnoticed" point–as is usually held–to the platonic doctrine of recollection or to some other source? my argument is two- pronged: negatively i argue that aristotle is not describing his hearers as impeded by plato's notion of recollection; the other, positive, that he is describing a misunderstanding of his own quite different doctrine of nous in the minds of his hearers. I show that the two elements of the aporia fit the teaching of aristotle on nous found (...) in "de an." Iii, 5, 430a15 and the "generation of animals" b, 3, 736b27-28. Names mentioned: merlan, jaeger, nuyens, h.d.p. Lee, ross, robinson, grene, randall, mckeon, aubenque, klein, and j. Owens. (shrink)

In fragment B 18 (DK) Xenophanes asserts that ‘Not from the outset did the gods reveal all things to mortals’ but that ‘in time, as they seek, men discover better.’ The remark has been understood in different ways but is usually read as a rejection of the view of the gods as the givers of all good things and an expression of faith in the capacity of human beings to make progress through their own efforts. I argue that the ‘hymn (...) to progress’ reading of B 18 is unjustified by any other aspect of Xenophanes’ thought and at odds with his generally dour view of the intelligence and character of his fellow citizens. A detailed analysis of the fragment supports the view that Xenophanes is here rejecting belief in divine revelation through natural signs and affirming the value of historiê or inquiry in the form of travel and direct observation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS Shadow History tl9 Richard Watson's essay looks as if it is breaking new ground, but on re-re-reading it, it seems to me that several incommensurable and unrelated problems and phenomena are being treated together. If separated into constituent parts, there may be less here than meets the eye. First of all, the phenomenon of "shadow history," and its role as foundation for a philosophy or a (...) philosophical position goes back, I think, at least to Aristotle's account of his predecessors, especially of his teacher, and beyond that perhaps to Plato's account of the Sophists. It appears in Maimonides's account of Arabic occasionalism, which was used to justify medieval Aristotelianism (and this account was accepted uncritically by Leibniz, Malebranche, and others in the seventeenth century). Bacon's, Descartes's, and Locke's presentation of Scholasticism is definitely "shadow history" that was used as the start of the "new" way of ideas, and as its justification.. Hegel's view of the history of philosophy is another major "shadow history." Hence the fact that Russell, Ayer, Ryle and Rorty adopted similar strategies of using a spurious or dubious history of their predecessors is not so strange. Any historian of philosophy worth her or his salt is aware that historical philosophical personnages have used their own views of their predecessors' philosophies as ways of making their own "original" philosophical views more exciting or important or credible. We have learned long ago how to separate the alleged past from the historical past, and even to see that the alleged past plays a significant role in the writings of various philosophers. Watson has put it neatly in his four examples, but these are only intriguing because so litde history of analytic philosophy has been written up to this time. We have much, maybe too much, literature about how Kant misrepresented Hume, Hume misrepresented Berkeley, etc. In the decades to come we may have much about Russell, Ayer, Ryle and Rorty as misrepresenters. Then, Watson's point can help separate the charge that they were poor historians from the realization that they used history creatively as "shadow history." And we may even have historical evidence from the Russell papers and other archives that they knew full well what they were doing, and were not pretending to be good historians, or, on the other hand, that they themselves did not realize they were writing "shadow history," but thought they were actually real historians. Watson tries to make the activity of creating "shadow history" a challenge to historians of philosophy, and a plus for the creative philosophers. In the cases he discusses the "shadow histories" have had great influence on the development of twentiethcentury philosophy in England and America. Even though I am a sceptic, I have no doubt that historians of Anglo-American philosophy will explore his points, and distinguish the "shadow histories" from the best available historical interpretations of what previous philosophers said and meant. Both interpreting and understanding the "shadow histories" and the best available histories will change and develop depending on future interests and information. Watson uses "historians" without really making clear who he is talking about. Only three people are mentioned: Gregor Sebba, Etienne Gilson and Paul Oskar Kristeller. 120 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 31 : 1 JANUARY 1993 There are many others who consider themselves historians of philosophy, or are considered as such in the profession; I doubt that they are all as objectivist as Watson thinks, believing that they can ascertain exactly what happened in the past. But I think most of us share a view that we can do better or worse at this, depending on materials and techniques used, perspectives employed, etc. Almost all of us would contend that being able to read the basic source material in the original language and being able to understand it in context, yields a better understanding of what a historical philosopher said and meant. Watson appears to agree, but then says this does not matter, because a "shadow history" may be longer remembered and used in creative philosophy than a historian's history. The example he offers is that of Yolton's Locke... (shrink)