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  1. Barry Allen (1997). The Chimpanzee's Tool. Common Knowledge 6:34-51.
  2. Colin Allen, Conditioned Anti-Anthropomorphism.
    How should scientists react to anthropomorphism (defined for the purposes of this paper as the attribution of mental states or properties to nonhuman animals)? Many thoughtful scientists have attempted to accommodate some measure of anthropomorphism in their approaches to animal behavior. But Wynne will have none of it. We reject his argument against anthropomorphism and argue that he does not pay sufficient attention to the historical facts or to the details of alternative approaches.
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  3. Colin Allen (2006). Transitive Inference in Animals: Reasoning or Conditioned Associations? In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press
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  4. Colin Allen (1997). Animal Cognition and Animal Minds. In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press
    Psychology, according to a standard dictionary definition, is the science of mind and behavior. For a major part of the twentieth century, (nonhuman) animal psychology was on a behavioristic track that explicitly denied the possibility of a science of animal mind. While many comparative psychologists remain wedded to behavioristic methods, they have more recently adopted a cognitive, information-processing approach that does not adhere to the strictures of stimulus-response explanations of animal behavior. Cognitive ethologists are typically willing to go much further (...)
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  5. Colin Allen & Marc Bekoff (1997). Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology. MIT Press.
    The heart of this book is the reciprocal relationship between philosophical theories of mind and empirical studies of animal cognition.
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  6. Colin Allen & Marc Bekoff (1995). Cognitive Ethology and the Intentionality of Animal Behavior. Mind and Language 10 (4):313-328.
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  7. Rita E. Anderson (1986). Cognitive Explanations and Cognitive Ethology. In William Bechtel (ed.), Integrating Scientific Disciplines. 323--336.
  8. Kristin Andrews, Confronting Language, Representation, and Belief: A Limited Defense of Mental Continuity.
    According to the mental continuity claim (MCC), human mental faculties are physical and beneficial to human survival, so they must have evolved gradually from ancestral forms and we should expect to see their precursors across species. Materialism of mind coupled with Darwin’s evolutionary theory leads directly to such claims and even today arguments for animal mental properties are often presented with the MCC as a premise. However, the MCC has been often challenged among contemporary scholars. It is usually argued that (...)
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  9. Kristin Andrews, Animal Cognition. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Entry for the Stanford Encylcopedia of Philosophy.
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  10. Kristin Andrews (2009). Politics or Metaphysics? On Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals. Biology and Philosophy 24 (1):51-63.
    Biology and Philosophy, forthcoming. Following recent arguments that there is no logical problem with attributing mental or agential states to animals, I address the epistemological problem of how to go about making accurate attributions. I suggest that there is a two-part general method for determining whether a psychological property can be accurately attributed to a member of another species: folk expert opinion and functionality. This method is based on well-known assessments used to attribute mental states to humans who are unable (...)
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  11. Caroline T. Arruda & Daniel J. Povinelli (forthcoming). Chimps as Secret Agents. Synthese:1-30.
    We provide an account of chimpanzee-specific agency within the context of philosophy of action. We do so by showing that chimpanzees are capable of what we call reason-directed action, even though they may be incapable of more full-blown action, which we call reason-considered action. Although chimpanzee agency does not possess all the features of typical adult human agency, chimpanzee agency is evolutionarily responsive to their environment and overlaps considerably with our own. As such, it is an evolved set of capacities (...)
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  12. A. Avarguès-Weber, N. Deisig & M. Giurfa (2011). Visual Cognition in Social Insects. Annu. Rev. Entomol 56:423-443.
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  13. Fareed Awan (2004). The Current State of the “Question of the Animal”. [REVIEW] Janus Head 7 (2).
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  14. Elizabeth Baeten (2014). Steps Toward a Zoology of Mind. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 28 (2):107-129.
    Much of twentieth- and twenty-first-century theorizing about cognitive processes, whether in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, cognitive psychology, or related disciplines, spins accounts of cognition totally devoid of any consideration of cognition as an attribute of animals making a living (or not) in various habitats. A significant shift in discussions of mind and cognition follows if we take seriously the fact that humans are animals, products of evolutionary processes and situated squarely within suites of ecosystems. Ignoring evolutionary history is an (...)
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  15. Dorit Bar-on (2013). Origins of Meaning: Must We 'Go Gricean'? Mind and Language 28 (3):342-375.
    The task of explaining language evolution is often presented by leading theorists in explicitly Gricean terms. After a critical evaluation, I present an alternative, non-Gricean conceptualization of the task. I argue that, while it may be true that nonhuman animals, in contrast to language users, lack the ‘motive to share information’ understood à la Grice, nonhuman animals nevertheless do express states of mind through complex nonlinguistic behavior. On a proper, non-Gricean construal of expressive communication, this means that they show to (...)
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  16. Jacob Beck (2013). Why We Can't Say What Animals Think. Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):520–546.
    Realists about animal cognition confront a puzzle. If animals have real, contentful cognitive states, why can’t anyone say precisely what the contents of those states are? I consider several possible resolutions to this puzzle that are open to realists, and argue that the best of these is likely to appeal to differences in the format of animal cognition and human language.
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  17. Jacob Beck (2012). Do Animals Engage in Conceptual Thought? Philosophy Compass 7 (3):218-229.
    This paper surveys and evaluates the answers that philosophers and animal researchers have given to two questions. Do animals have thoughts? If so, are their thoughts conceptual? Along the way, special attention is paid to distinguish debates of substance from mere battles over terminology, and to isolate fruitful areas for future research.
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  18. Colin G. Beer (1999). Marc Bekoff and Dale Jamieson, Eds., Readings in Animal Cognition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996, XV + 379 Pp., $30.00 (Paper), ISBN 0-262-52208-X. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 9 (1):156-160.
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  19. R. Beers (1997). Expressions of Mind in Animal Behavior. In R. Mitchell, Nicholas S. Thompson & H. L. Miles (eds.), Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals. Suny Press 198--209.
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  20. Marc Bekoff & Dale W. Jamieson (eds.) (1996). Readings in Animal Cognition. MIT Press.
    This collection of 24 readings is the first comprehensive treatment of important topics by leading figures in the rapidly growing interdisciplinary field of...
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  21. Jose Luis Bermudez (2003). Thinking Without Words. Oxford University Press.
    In Thinking without Words I develop a philosophical framework for treating some animals and human infants as genuine thinkers. This paper outlines the aspects of this account that are most relevant to those working in animal ethics. There is a range of different levels of cognitive sophistication in different animal species, in addition to limits to the types of thought available to non- linguistic creatures, and it may be important for animal ethicists to take this into account in exploring issues (...)
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  22. Olle Blomberg (1st ed. 2015). An Account of Boeschian Cooperative Behaviour. In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer International Publishing
    Philosophical accounts of joint action are often prefaced by the observation that there are two different senses in which several agents can intentionally perform an action Φ, such as go for a walk or capture the prey. The agents might intentionally Φ together, as a collective, or they might intentionally Φ in parallel, where Φ is distributively assigned to the agents, considered as a set of individuals. The accounts are supposed to characterise what is distinctive about activities in which several (...)
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  23. Margaret Boden (2001). 2 Life and Cognition. In João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press 11.
  24. Lisa Bortolotti (2008). What Does Fido Believe? Think 7 (19):7-15.
    Lisa Bortolotti introduces the arguments about whether dogs can have beliefs.
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  25. Kerry E. Jordan & Brannon & M. Elizabeth (2009). A Comparative Approach to Understanding Human Numerical Cognition. In Bruce M. Hood & Laurie R. Santos (eds.), The Origins of Object Knowledge. OUP Oxford
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  26. Tom Burke (2005). The Role of Abstract Reference in Mead's Account of Human Origins. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (3):567-601.
    This paper addresses issues regarding human origins, drawing particularly on George Herbert Mead 's account of the emergence of self consciousness as a product of social and physical evolution. Some of John Dewey's ideas on the nature of thought and language are added to that account. The so called "great leap" in human evolution that occurred some 50,000 years ago is attributed not just to the emergence of symbols or language but to the development of fully recursive languages suited for (...)
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  27. Ann B. Butler, Paul R. Manger, B. I. B. Lindahl & Peter Århem (2005). Evolution of the Neural Basis of Consciousness: A Bird-Mammal Comparison. Bioessays 27 (9):923-936.
    The main objective of this essay is to validate some of the principal, currently competing, mammalian consciousness-brain theories by comparing these theories with data on both cognitive abilities and brain organization in birds. Our argument is that, given that multiple complex cognitive functions are correlated with presumed consciousness in mammals, this correlation holds for birds as well. Thus, the neuroanatomical features of the forebrain common to both birds and mammals may be those that are crucial to the generation of both (...)
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  28. Richard W. Byrne (1999). Primate Cognition: Evidence for the Ethical Treatment of Primates. In Francine L. Dolins (ed.), Attitudes to Animals: Views in Animal Welfare. Cambridge University Press 114--125.
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  29. Francisco Calvo Garzón (2008). On the Cognitive Architecture of Insects and Other Information-Processing Systems. Análisis Filosófico 28 (1):13-33.
    According to Carruthers ants and bees have minds. This claim is to be understood realistically. We do not interpret the overt behaviour of ants and bees by ascribing to them beliefs and desires in an instrumental manner. They rather possess minds in the relevant cognitive sense. In this paper, I propose to pave the way for a reductio against such a polemic view. In particular, I shall argue that if ants and bees have minds, by the same token, plants do (...)
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  30. Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.) (1997). Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.
  31. C. M. Cox (1928). Comparative Behavior in Solving a Series of Maze Problems of Varying Difficulty. Journal of Experimental Psychology 11 (3):202.
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  32. Daniel C. Dennett (1996). Kinds of Minds. Basic Books.
  33. Simon Fitzpatrick (2009). The Primate Mindreading Controversy : A Case Study in Simplicity and Methodology in Animal Psychology. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press 224--246.
  34. Simon Fitzpatrick (2008). Doing Away with Morgan’s Canon. Mind and Language 23 (2):224–246.
    Morgan’s Canon is a very widely endorsed methodological principle in animal psychology, believed to be vital for a rigorous, scientific approach to the study of animal cognition. In contrast I argue that Morgan’s Canon is unjustified, pernicious and unnecessary. I identify two main versions of the Canon and show that they both suffer from very serious problems. I then suggest an alternative methodological principle that captures all of the genuine methodological benefits that Morgan’s Canon can bring but suffers from none (...)
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  35. Christopher Gauker (1990). How to Learn Language Like a Chimpanzee. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):139-46.
    This paper develops the hypothesis that languages may be learned by means of a kind of cause-effect analysis. This hypothesis is developed through an examination of E. Sue Savage-Rumbaugh's research on the abilities of chimpanzees to learn to use symbols. Savage-Rumbaugh herself tends to conceive of her work as aiming to demonstrate that chimpanzees are able to learn the "referential function" of symbols. Thus the paper begins with a critique of this way of viewing the chimpanzee's achievements. The hypothesis that (...)
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  36. Gary Hatfield (2014). Cartesian Psychology of Antoine Le Grand. In Mihnea Dobre & Tammy Nyden (eds.), Cartesian Empiricisms. Springer 251-274.
    In the Aristotelian curriculum, De anima or the study of the soul fell under the rubric of physics. This area of study covered the vital (“vegetative”), sensitive, and rational powers of the soul. Descartes’ substance dualism restricted reason or intellect, and conscious sensation, to human minds. Having denied mind to nonhuman animals, Descartes was required to explain all animal behavior using material mechanisms possessing only the properties of size, shape, position, and motion. Within the framework of certainty provided by the (...)
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  37. Gary Hatfield (2012). Mechanizing the Sensitive Soul. In Gideon Manning (ed.), Matter and Form in Early Modern Science and Philosophy. Brill 151–86.
    Descartes set for himself the ambitious program of accounting for the functions of the Aristotelian vegetative and sensitive souls without invoking souls or the faculties or powers of souls in his explanations. He rejects the notion that the soul is hylomorphically present in the organs of the body so as to carry out vital and sensory functions. Rather, the body’s organs operate in a purely mechanical fashion. That is what is involved in “mechanizing” these phenomena. The role of the soul (...)
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  38. Gary Hatfield (2008). Animals. In John Carriero & Janet Broughton (eds.), Companion to Descartes. Blackwell 404–425.
    This chapter considers philosophical problems concerning non-human (and sometimes human) animals, including their metaphysical, physical, and moral status, their origin, what makes them alive, their functional organization, and the basis of their sensitive and cognitive capacities. I proceed by assuming what most of Descartes’s followers and interpreters have held: that Descartes proposed that animals lack sentience, feeling, and genuinely cognitive representations of things. (Some scholars interpret Descartes differently, denying that he excluded sentience, feeling, and representation from animals, and I consider (...)
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  39. Bryce Huebner (2011). Minimal Minds. In Tom L. Beauchamp R. G. Frey (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics.
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  40. Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.) (2006). Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
    To what extent can animal behaviour be described as rational? What does it even mean to describe behaviour as rational? -/- This book focuses on one of the major debates in science today - how closely does mental processing in animals resemble mental processing in humans. It addresses the question of whether and to what extent non-human animals are rational, that is, whether any animal behaviour can be regarded as the result of a rational thought processes. It does this with (...)
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  41. Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). The Emergence of the Drive Concept and the Collapse of the Animal/Human Divide. In Peter Adamson & G. Fay Edwards (eds.), Oxford Philosophical Concepts: Animals.
    In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, philosophers including Kant and Hegel draw a sharp distinction between the human and the animal. The human is self-conscious, the animal is not; the human has moral worth, the animal does not. By the mid to late nineteenth century, these claims are widely rejected. As scientific and philosophical work on the cognitive and motivational capacities of animals increases in sophistication, many philosophers become suspicious of the idea that there is any divide between (...)
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  42. Nazim Keven (forthcoming). Events, Narratives and Memory. Synthese:1-21.
    Whether non-human animals can have episodic memories remains the subject of extensive debate. A number of prominent memory researchers defend the view that animals do not have the same kind of episodic memory as humans do, whereas others argue that some animals have episodic-like memory—i.e., they can remember what, where and when an event happened. Defining what constitutes episodic memory has proven to be difficult. In this paper, I propose a dual systems account and provide evidence for a distinction between (...)
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  43. Andrew McAninch, Grant Goodrich & Colin Allen (2009). Animal Communication and Neo-Expressivism. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press 128--144.
    One of the earliest issues in cognitive ethology concerned the meaning of animal signals. In the 1970s and 1980s this debate was most active with respect to the question of whether animal alarm calls convey information about the emotional states of animals or whether they “refer” directly to predators in the environment (Seyfarth, Cheney, & Marler 1980; see Radick 2007 for a historical account), but other areas, such as vocalizations about food and social contact, were also widely discussed. In the (...)
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  44. Tom McClelland (2013). Review of Mark Rowlands, Can Animals Be Moral? [REVIEW] Metapsychology Online 17 (29).
  45. Christophe Menant, Introduction to a Systemic Theory of Meaning (Jan 2010 Update).
    Information and Meaning are present everywhere around us and within ourselves. Specific studies have been implemented in order to link information and meaning: - Semiotics - Phenomenology - Analytic Philosophy - Psychology No general coverage is available for the notion of meaning. We propose to complement this lack by a systemic approach to meaning generation.
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  46. Christophe Menant (2011). Computation on Information, Meaning and Representations. An Evolutionary Approach (2011). World Scientific.
    Understanding computation as “a process of the dynamic change of information” brings to look at the different types of computation and information. Computation of information does not exist alone by itself but is to be considered as part of a system that uses it for some given purpose. Information can be meaningless like a thunderstorm noise, it can be meaningful like an alert signal, or like the representation of a desired food. A thunderstorm noise participates to the generation of meaningful (...)
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  47. Christophe Menant (2005). Information and Meaning in Life, Humans and Robots (2005). Dissertation, Paris Foundations of Information Sciences
    Information and meaning exist around us and within ourselves, and the same information can correspond to different meanings. This is true for humans and animals, and is becoming true for robots. We propose here an overview of this subject by using a systemic tool related to meaning generation that has already been published (C. Menant, Entropy 2003). The Meaning Generator System (MGS) is a system submitted to a constraint that generates a meaningful information when it receives an incident information that (...)
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  48. Christophe Menant (2003). Information and Meaning (2003). [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)] 5:193-204.
    We propose here to clarify some of the relations existing between information and meaning by showing how meaningful information can be generated by a system submitted to a constraint. We build up definitions and properties for meaningful information, a meaning generator system and the domain of efficiency of a meaning (to cover cases of meaningful information transmission). Basic notions of information processing are used.
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  49. Christophe Menant (2002). From Biosemiotics to Semiotics (2002). Dissertation, Tartu Biosemiotics 2
    Biosemiotics and Semiotics have similarities and differences. Both deal with signal and meaning. One difference is that Biosemiotics covers a domain (life) that is less complex that the one addressed by Semiotics (human). We believe that this difference can be used to have Biosemiotics bringing added value to Semiotics. This belief is based on the fact that a theory of meaning is easier to build up for living elements than for humans, and that the results obtained for life can make (...)
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  50. Susana Monsó (forthcoming). Morality Without Mindreading. Mind and Language.
    Could animals behave morally if they can’t mindread? Does morality require mindreading capacities? Moral psychologists believe mindreading is contingently involved in moral judgements. Moral philosophers argue that moral behaviour necessarily requires the possession of mindreading capacities. In this paper, I argue that, while the former may be right, the latter are mistaken. Using the example of empathy, I show that animals with no mindreading capacities could behave on the basis of emotions that possess an identifiable moral content. Therefore, at least (...)
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