About this topic
Summary The topic of Animal Cognition is a broad interdisciplinary area with contributions by philosophers, psychologists, behavioral biologists, and neuroscientists. Because the definition of "cognition" is itself contested, the exact range of capacities attributable to animals and capable of empirical investigation is also contested, but these capacities include general reasoning, reasoning in specific domains such as causal inference or social hierarchies, tool use, problem solving, communicative and proto-linguistic abilities, episodic and semantic memory, spatial navigation (including cognitive maps), metacognition, self-recognition and self-awareness, and so-called "mind reading" or "theory of mind".  Questions about the existence, distribution and forms of animal consciousness are also raised in the context of animal cognition.
  Show all references
Related categories
Subcategories:See also:
236 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 236
Material to categorize
  1. Pieter R. Adriaens & Andreas de Block (eds.) (2011). Maladapting Minds: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Evolutionary Theory. Oxford University Press.
    Maladapting Minds discusses a number of reasons why philosophers of psychiatry should take an interest in evolutionary explanations of mental disorders and, more generally, in evolutionary thinking. First of all, there is the nascent field of evolutionary psychiatry. Unlike other psychiatrists, evolutionary psychiatrists engage with ultimate, rather than proximate, questions about mental illnesses. Being a young and youthful new discipline, evolutionary psychiatry allows for a nice case study in the philosophy of science. Secondly, philosophers of psychiatry have engaged with evolutionary (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Colin Allen (2004). Is Anyone a Cognitive Ethologist? Biology and Philosophy 19 (4):589-607.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Colin Allen (2002). A Skeptic's Progress. Biology and Philosophy 17 (5):695-702.
    Seven chimpanzees in twenty-seven experiments run over the course of five years at his University of Louisiana laboratory in New Iberia, Louisiana, are at the heart of Daniel Povinelli’s case that chimpanzee thinking about the physical world is not at all like that of humans. Chimps, according to Povinelli and his coauthors James Reaux, Laura Theall, and Steve Giambrone, are phenomenally quick at learning to associate visible features of tools with specific uses of those tools, but they appear to lack (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Kristin Andrews (2005). Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places? Mind and Language 20 (5):521-536.
    I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide whether chimpanzees have the ability to reason about mental states. I argue that Povinelli and Vonk’s proposed experiment is subject to their own criticisms and that there should be a more radical shift away from experiments that ask subjects to predict behavior. Further, I argue that Povinelli and Vonk’s theoretical commitments should lead them to accept (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Marc Bekoff (1999). Social Cognition: Exchanging and Sharing Information on the Run. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 51 (1):617-632.
    In this essay I consider various aspects of the rapidly growing field of cognitive ethology, concentrating mainly on evolutionary and comparative discussion of the notion of intentionality. I am not concerned with consciousness, per se, for a concentration on consciousness deflects attention from other, and in many cases more interesting, problems in the study of animal cognition. I consider how, when, where, and (attempt to discuss) why individuals from different taxa exchange social information concerning their beliefs, desires, and goals. My (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Marc Bekoff & Dale W. Jamieson (eds.) (1996). Readings in Animal Cognition. MIT Press.
    This collection of 24 readings is the first comprehensive treatment of important topics by leading figures in the rapidly growing interdisciplinary field of...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. José Luis Bermúdez (2011). The Force-Field Puzzle and Mindreading in Non-Human Primates. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):397-410.
    What is the relation between philosophical theorizing and experimental data? A modest set of naturalistic assumptions leads to what I term the force-field puzzle. The assumption that philosophy is continuous with natural science, as captured in Quine’s force-field metaphor, seems to push us simultaneously towards thinking that there have to be conceptual constraints upon how we interpret experimental data and towards thinking that there cannot be such conceptual constraints, because all theorizing must be accountable to data and observation. The key (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Jose Luis Bermudez (2006). Animal Reasoning and Proto-Logic. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Jose Luis Bermudez (2003). Ascribing Thoughts to Non-Linguistic Creatures. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):313-34.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (1987). Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity, and Consciousness. Blackwell.
  11. Stefano Borgo, Noemi Spagnoletti, Laure Vieu & Elisabetta Visalberghi (2013). Artifact and Artifact Categorization: Comparing Humans and Capuchin Monkeys. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):375-389.
    We aim to show that far-related primates like humans and the capuchin monkeys show interesting correspondences in terms of artifact characterization and categorization. We investigate this issue by using a philosophically-inspired definition of physical artifact which, developed for human artifacts, turns out to be applicable for cross-species comparison. In this approach an artifact is created when an entity is intentionally selected and some capacities attributed to it (often characterizing a purpose). Behavioral studies suggest that this notion of artifact is not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Francesca M. Bosco & Maurizio Tirassa (1998). Sharedness as an Innate Basis for Communication in the Infant. In M. A. Gernsbacher & S. J. Derry (eds.), Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. 162-166.
    From a cognitive perspective, intentional communication may be viewed as an agent's activity overtly aimed at modifying a partner's mental states. According to standard Gricean definitions, this requires each party to be able to ascribe mental states to the other, i.e., to entertain a so-called theory of mind. According to the relevant experimental literature, however, such capability does not appear before the third or fourth birthday; it would follow that children under that age should not be viewed as communicating agents. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Sarah T. Boysen (2006). Effects of Symbols on Chimpanzee Cognition. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Cameron Buckner (forthcoming). The Semantic Problem(s) with Research on Animal Mindreading. Mind and Language.
    Philosophers have worried that research on animal mind-reading faces a “logical problem”: the difficulty of experimentally determining whether animals represent mental states (e.g. seeing) or merely the observable evidence for those states (e.g. line-of-gaze). The most impressive attempt to confront this problem has been mounted recently by Robert Lurz (2009, 2011). However, Lurz’ approach faces its own logical problem, revealing this challenge to be a special case of the more general problem of distal content. Moreover, participants in this debate do (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Cameron Buckner (2013). A Property Cluster Theory of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology:1-30.
    Our prominent definitions of cognition are too vague and lack empirical grounding. They have not kept up with recent developments, and cannot bear the weight placed on them across many different debates. I here articulate and defend a more adequate theory. On this theory, behaviors under the control of cognition tend to display a cluster of characteristic properties, a cluster which tends to be absent from behaviors produced by non-cognitive processes. This cluster is reverse-engineered from the empirical tests that comparative (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Cameron Buckner (2013). Morgan's Canon, Meet Hume's Dictum: Avoiding Anthropofabulation in Cross-Species Comparisons. Biology and Philosophy 28 (5):853-871.
    How should we determine the distribution of psychological traits—such as Theory of Mind, episodic memory, and metacognition—throughout the Animal kingdom? Researchers have long worried about the distorting effects of anthropomorphic bias on this comparative project. A purported corrective against this bias was offered as a cornerstone of comparative psychology by C. Lloyd Morgan in his famous “Canon”. Also dangerous, however, is a distinct bias that loads the deck against animal mentality: our tendency to tie the competence criteria for cognitive capacities (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Richard W. Burkhardt (1999). Ethology, Natural History, the Life Sciences, and the Problem of Place. Journal of the History of Biology 32 (3):489 - 508.
    Investigators of animal behavior since the eighteenth century have sought to make their work integral to the enterprises of natural history and/or the life sciences. In their efforts to do so, they have frequently based their claims of authority on the advantages offered by the special places where they have conducted their research. The zoo, the laboratory, and the field have been major settings for animal behavior studies. The issue of the relative advantages of these different sites has been a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Frances D. Burton (1977). Ethology and the Development of Sex and Gender Identity in Non-Human Primates. Acta Biotheoretica 26 (1).
    The current view that behaviour which is manifest in non-human primates forms a baseline for human behaviours is examined with special reference to the development of gender determination. A review of 21 non-human primate societies suggests that the behaviour of the sexes relates to assumption and occupation of societal roles defined by the local group. The significance of these findings for the human condition is discussed.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Josep Call (2006). Descartes' Two Errors: Reason and Reflection in the Great Apes. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Nick Chater & Cecilia M. Heyes (1994). Animal Concepts: Content and Discontent. Mind and Language 9 (3):209-246.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Stephen R. L. Clark (2003). Minds and Persons: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Stephen R. L. Clark (2003). Non-Personal Minds. In Minds and Persons: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 185-209.
    Persons are creatures with a range of personal capacities. Most known to us are also people, though nothing in observation or biological theory demands that all and only people are persons, nor even that persons, any more than people, constitute a natural kind. My aim is to consider what non-personal minds are like. Darwin's Earthworms are sensitive, passionate and, in their degree, intelligent. They may even construct maps, embedded in the world they perceive around them, so as to be able (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Roger Crisp (1996). Evolution and Psychological Unity. In Marc Bekoff & Dale W. Jamieson (eds.), Readings in Animal Cognition. MIT Press. 309--321.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Stephen J. Crowley & Colin Allen (2008). Animal Behavior. In Michael Ruse (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology. Oxford University Press. 327--348.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Gregory Currie (2006). Rationality, Decentring, and the Evidence for Pretence in Nonhuman Animals. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Donald Davidson (1982). Rational Animals. Dialectica 36 (4):317-28.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Marian S. Dawkins (1990). From an Animal's Point of View: Motivation, Fitness, and Animal Welfare. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):1-9.
    To study animal welfare empirically we need an objective basis for deciding when an animal is suffering. Suffering includes a wide range ofunpleasant emotional states such as fear, boredom, pain, and hunger. Suffering has evolved as a mechanism for avoiding sources ofdanger and threats to fitness. Captive animals often suffer in situations in which they are prevented from doing something that they are highly motivated to do. The an animal is prepared to pay to attain or to escape a situation (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Marian S. Dawkins (1987). Minding and Mattering. In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell. 297-304.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Grace A. de Laguna (1919). Dualism and Animal Psychology: A Rejoinder. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (11):296-300.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Grace A. de Laguna (1918). Dualism in Animal Psychology. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (23):617-627.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Daniel C. Dennett (1995). Do Animals Have Beliefs? In H. Roitblat & Jean-Arcady Meyer (eds.), Comparative Approaches to Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
    In Herbert Roitblat, ed., _Comparative Approaches to Cognitive Sciences_ , MIT Press, 1995. Daniel C. Dennett <blockquote> Do Animals Have Beliefs? </blockquote> According to one more or less standard mythology, behaviorism, the ideology and methodology that reigned in experimental psychology for most of the century, has been overthrown by a new ideology and methodology: cognitivism. Behaviorists, one is told, didn't take the mind seriously. They ignored--or even denied the existence of--mental states such as beliefs and desires, and mental processes such (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Daniel C. Dennett (1989). Cognitive Ethology. In Goals, No-Goals and Own Goals. Unwin Hyman.
    The field of Artificial Intelligence has produced so many new concepts--or at least vivid and more structured versions of old concepts--that it would be surprising if none of them turned out to be of value to students of animal behavior. Which will be most valuable? I will resist the temptation to engage in either prophecy or salesmanship; instead of attempting to answer the question: "How might Artificial Intelligence inform the study of animal behavior?" I will concentrate on the obverse: "How (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Daniel C. Dennett (1989). Goals, No-Goals and Own Goals. Unwin Hyman.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Daniel C. Dennett (1983). Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The 'Panglossian Paradigm' Defended. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):343-90.
    Ethologists and others studying animal behavior in a spirit are in need of a descriptive language and method that are neither anachronistically bound by behaviorist scruples nor prematurely committed to particular Just such an interim descriptive method can be found in intentional system theory. The use of intentional system theory is illustrated with the case of the apparently communicative behavior of vervet monkeys. A way of using the theory to generate data - including usable, testable data - is sketched. The (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Derek Denton (2006). The Primordial Emotions: The Dawning of Consciousness. OUP Oxford.
    To understand what is happening in the brain in the moment you decide, at will, to summon to consciousness a passage of Mozart's music, or decide to take a deep breath, is like trying to "catch a phantom by the tail". Consciousness remains that most elusive of all human phenomena - one so mysterious, one that even our highly developed knowledge of brain function can only partly explain. This book is unique in tracing the origins of consciousness. It takes the (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. F. Dreckmann (1999). Animal Beliefs and Their Contents. Erkenntnis 51 (1):597-615.
    This paper investigates whether, or not, the behavior of animals without speech can manifest beliefs and desires. Criteria for the attribution of such beliefs and desires are worked out with reference to Jonathan Bennett's theory of cognitive teleology: A particular ability for learning justifies attributing such beliefs and desires. The conceptual analysis is illustrated by examinations of cognitive ethology and considers higher-order intentionality. It is argued that the behavioral evidence only supports the attribution of first order beliefs and that languageless (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Jane Duran (2007). Canine Minds, Human Minds. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (1):109-115.
    Sheldrake’s work on canine cognition is examined from more than one standpoint. His use of the terms “social field” and “morphic field” is delineated, and in addition recent work on ethology and cognition, done by Allen and Bekoff, is set out and contrasted with Sheldrake’s theorizing. The importance of the allusion to a number of comparatively unexamined concepts, including some borrowed from research on extrasensory perception, is analyzed and it is concluded that Sheldrake has yet to establish his case in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Jonathan St BT Evans (2010). Thinking Twice: Two Minds in One Brain. OUP Oxford.
    Common sense would suggest that we are in complete control of the actions we perform - that all our actions are the result of considered and conscious preparation. Yet, there are countless examples of this control breaking down, for example, in the case of phobias and compulsive actions. We can all recall those times when, in the 'heat of the moment', our actions have been very different to those that would have resulted from calm and considered reflection. In extreme moments (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Mirko Farina (2012). Louise Barrett, Beyond the Brain: How Body and Environment Shape Animal and Human Minds. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):415-421.
  40. Roger Fellows (2000). Animal Belief. Philosophy 75 (294):587-599.
    Non language-using animals cannot have beliefs, because believing entails the ability to distinguish true from false beliefs and also the ability to distinguish changes in belief from changes in the world. For these abilities we need both the fixation of belief and counter-factual thought, for both of which language is necessary. The argument of the paper extends Davidson's argument to the same conclusion (which is found wanting). But denying beliefs to animals has no moral implications.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Ramon Ferrer‐I.‐Cancho, Antoni Hernández‐Fernández, David Lusseau, Govindasamy Agoramoorthy, Minna J. Hsu & Stuart Semple (2013). Compression as a Universal Principle of Animal Behavior. Cognitive Science 37 (8):1565-1578.
    A key aim in biology and psychology is to identify fundamental principles underpinning the behavior of animals, including humans. Analyses of human language and the behavior of a range of non-human animal species have provided evidence for a common pattern underlying diverse behavioral phenomena: Words follow Zipf's law of brevity (the tendency of more frequently used words to be shorter), and conformity to this general pattern has been seen in the behavior of a number of other animals. It has been (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Margaret Floy Washburn (1919). Dualism in Animal Psychology. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (2):41-44.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Roger Fouts & Erin McKenna (2011). Chimpanzees and Sign Language: Darwinian Realities Versus Cartesian Delusions. The Pluralist 6 (3):19-24.
    Dr. Fouts began his lecture with the story of how he and his wife Deborah became involved with Washoe—the first non-human to acquire the signs of American Sign Language (ASL). Project Washoe began in 1966 with Drs. Allen and Beatrix Gardner in Reno, Nevada. There had been other experiments that attempted to get chimpanzees to speak. These experiments were not successful due to anatomical and neurological differences between humans and chimpanzees. (Fouts showed some video of the chimpanzee Vicki trying to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Raimond Gaita (1992). Animal Thoughts. Philosophical Investigations 15 (3):227-44.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Peter Gärdenfors (2008). The Role of Intersubjectivity in Animal and Human Cooperation. Biological Theory 3 (1):51-62.
  46. R. Allen Gardner (2005). Animal Cognition Meets Evo-Devo. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):699-700.
    Sound comparative psychology and modern evolutionary and developmental biology (often called evo-devo) emphasize powerful effects of developmental conditions on the expression of genetic endowment. Both demand that evolutionary theorists recognize these effects. Instead, Tomasello et al. compares studies of normal human children with studies of chimpanzees reared and maintained in cognitively deprived conditions, while ignoring studies of chimpanzees in cognitively appropriate environments.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Emmanuel Gilissen (2007). Cognitive Achievements with a Miniature Brain: The Lesson of Jumping Spiders. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):94-95.
    The observation that an animal's behavior is largely unaltered even after profound modifications of sizeable brain portions, suggests a large flexibility in the relationships between species-specific brain structures and species-specific behavior. In this perspective, a fascinating example is given by the comparison of jumping spiders and felids, where similar predatory behaviors are achieved with totally different brain substrates. (Published Online May 1 2007).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. H. J. Glock (2000). Animals, Thoughts and Concepts. Synthese 123 (1):35-104.
    There are three main positions on animalthought: lingualism denies that non-linguistic animalshave any thoughts; mentalism maintains that theirthoughts differ from ours only in degree, due totheir different perceptual inputs; an intermediateposition, occupied by common sense and Wittgenstein,maintains that animals can have thoughts of a simplekind. This paper argues in favor of an intermediateposition. It considers the most important arguments infavor of lingualism, namely those inspired byDavidson: the argument from the intensional nature ofthought (Section 1); the idea that thoughts involveconcepts (Sections (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Hans-Johann Glock (2010). Can Animals Judge? Dialectica 64 (1):11-33.
    This article discusses the problems which concepts pose for the attribution of thoughts to animals. It locates these problems within a range of other issues concerning animal minds ( section 1 ), and presents a 'lingualist master argument' according to which one cannot entertain a thought without possessing its constituent concepts and cannot possess concepts without possessing language ( section 2 ). The first premise is compelling if one accepts the building-block model of concepts as parts of wholes – propositions (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2003). Folk Psychology Under Stress: Comments on Susan Hurley's Animal Action in the Space of Reasons. Mind and Language 18 (3):266-272.
    My commentary on Hurley is concerned with foundational issues. Hurley's investigation of animal cognition is cast within a particular framework—basically, a philosophically refined version of folk psychology. Her discussion has a complicated relationship to unresolved debates about the nature and status of folk psychology, especially debates about the extent to which folk psychological categories are aimed at picking out features of the causal organization of the mind.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 236