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Summary The topic of Animal Cognition is a broad interdisciplinary area with contributions by philosophers, psychologists, behavioral biologists, and neuroscientists. Because the definition of "cognition" is itself contested, the exact range of capacities attributable to animals and capable of empirical investigation is also contested, but these capacities include general reasoning, reasoning in specific domains such as causal inference or social hierarchies, tool use, problem solving, communicative and proto-linguistic abilities, episodic and semantic memory, spatial navigation (including cognitive maps), metacognition, self-recognition and self-awareness, and so-called "mind reading" or "theory of mind".  Questions about the existence, distribution and forms of animal consciousness are also raised in the context of animal cognition.
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  1. H. A. (2003). Animal Psychology and Ethology in Britain and the Emergence of Professional Concern for the Concept of Ethical Cost [Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 33c/2 (2002), 235-261]. [REVIEW] Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 34 (1):201-201.
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  2. H. A. (2002). Animal Psychology and Ethology in Britain and the Emergence of Professional Concern for the Concept of Ethical Cost. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 33 (2):235-262.
    It has been argued that if an animal is psychologically like us, there may be more scientific reason to experiment upon it, but less moral justification to do so. Some scientists deny the existence of this dilemma, claiming that although there are scientifically valuable similarities between humans and animals that make experimentation worthwhile, humans are at the same time unique and fundamentally different. This latter response is, ironically, typical of pre-Darwinian beliefs in the relationship between human and non-human animals. Another (...)
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  3. Ikuma Adachi (2009). Cross-Modal Representations in Primates and Dogs A New Framework of Recognition of Social Objects. Interaction Studies 10 (2):225-251.
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  4. David Adams (1982). Defense Motivational System: Issues of Emotion, Reinforcement, and Neural Structure. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):675.
  5. David B. Adams (1980). Motivational Systems: Fear or Defense? Pain or Recuperation? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (2):301.
  6. Elsa Addessi, Francesca Bellagamba, Alexia Delfino, Francesca De Petrillo, Valentina Focaroli, Luigi Macchitella, Valentina Maggiorelli, Beatrice Pace, Giulia Pecora, Sabrina Rossi, Agnese Sbaffi, Maria Isabella Tasselli & Fabio Paglieri (2014). Waiting by Mistake: Symbolic Representation of Rewards Modulates Intertemporal Choice in Capuchin Monkeys, Preschool Children and Adult Humans. Cognition 130 (3):428-441.
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  7. Elsa Addessi, Fabio Paglieri & Valentina Focaroli (2011). The Ecological Rationality of Delay Tolerance: Insights From Capuchin Monkeys. Cognition 119 (1):142-147.
  8. Pieter R. Adriaens & Andreas de Block (eds.) (2011). Maladapting Minds: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Evolutionary Theory. Oxford University Press.
    Maladapting Minds discusses a number of reasons why philosophers of psychiatry should take an interest in evolutionary explanations of mental disorders and, more generally, in evolutionary thinking. First of all, there is the nascent field of evolutionary psychiatry. Unlike other psychiatrists, evolutionary psychiatrists engage with ultimate, rather than proximate, questions about mental illnesses. Being a young and youthful new discipline, evolutionary psychiatry allows for a nice case study in the philosophy of science. Secondly, philosophers of psychiatry have engaged with evolutionary (...)
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  9. Mariela Aguilera (2010). Animales sin lenguaje en el espacio de los conceptos. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):25-38.
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  10. Colin Allen (2004). Is Anyone a Cognitive Ethologist? Biology and Philosophy 19 (4):589-607.
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  11. Colin Allen (2002). A Skeptic's Progress. Biology and Philosophy 17 (5):695-702.
    Seven chimpanzees in twenty-seven experiments run over the course of five years at his University of Louisiana laboratory in New Iberia, Louisiana, are at the heart of Daniel Povinelli’s case that chimpanzee thinking about the physical world is not at all like that of humans. Chimps, according to Povinelli and his coauthors James Reaux, Laura Theall, and Steve Giambrone, are phenomenally quick at learning to associate visible features of tools with specific uses of those tools, but they appear to lack (...)
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  12. Colin Allen (1998). Animal Concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):66-66.
    Millikan's account of concepts is applicable to questions about concepts in nonhuman animals. I raise three questions in this context: (1) Does classical conditioning entail the possession of simple concepts? (2) Are movement property concepts more basic than substance concepts? (3) What is the empirical content of claiming that concept meanings do not necessarily change as dispositions change?
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  13. Colin Allen (1996). Comparative Cognitive Studies, Not Folk Phylogeny, Please. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):122.
  14. Colin Allen (1992). Monkeys Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):147.
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  15. James R. Anderson (1991). Making the Best Use of Primate Tool Use? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):551-552.
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  16. James R. Anderson (1989). On the Contents of Capuchins' Cognitive Toolkit. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):588.
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  17. John R. Anderson (1991). Is Human Cognition Adaptive? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):471-485.
  18. Michael L. Anderson & Tim Oates (2003). Prelinguistic Agents Will Form Only Egocentric Representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):284-285.
    The representations formed by the ventral and dorsal streams of a prelinguistic agent will tend to be too qualitatively similar to support the distinct roles required by PREDICATE(x) structure. We suggest that the attachment of qualities to objects is not a product of the combination of these separate processing streams, but is instead a part of the processing required in each. In addition, we suggest that the formation of objective predicates is inextricably bound up with the emergence of language itself, (...)
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  19. R. J. Andrew (1993). Behavioural Constraints on Social Communication Are Not Likely to Prevent the Evolution of Large Social Groups in Nonhuman Primates. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):694.
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  20. R. J. Andrew (1985). Questions About the Evolution of Bird Song. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):100-100.
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  21. R. J. Andrew (1979). Avian Data on Aggression. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (2):213-214.
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  22. Kristin Andrews (2014). The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition. Routledge.
    The study of animal cognition raises profound questions about the minds of animals and philosophy of mind itself. Aristotle argued that humans are the only animal to laugh, but in recent experiments rats have also been shown to laugh. In other experiments, dogs have been shown to respond appropriately to over two hundred words in human language. In this introduction to the philosophy of animal minds Kristin Andrews introduces and assesses the essential topics, problems and debates as they cut across (...)
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  23. Kristin Andrews (2011). Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals. In Tom L. Beauchamp R. G. Frey (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics. Oxford University Press 469--494.
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  24. Kristin Andrews (2007). Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk Psychology. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press 191--209.
  25. Kristin Andrews (2005). Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places? Mind and Language 20 (5):521-536.
    I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide whether chimpanzees have the ability to reason about mental states. I argue that Povinelli and Vonk’s proposed experiment is subject to their own criticisms and that there should be a more radical shift away from experiments that ask subjects to predict behavior. Further, I argue that Povinelli and Vonk’s theoretical commitments should lead them to accept (...)
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  26. Kristin Andrews & Brian Huss (2014). Anthropomorphism, Anthropectomy, and the Null Hypothesis. Biology and Philosophy 29 (5):711-729.
    We examine the claim that the methodology of psychology leads to a bias in animal cognition research against attributing “anthropomorphic” properties to animals . This charge is examined in light of a debate on the role of folk psychology between primatologists who emphasize similarities between humans and other apes, and those who emphasize differences. We argue that while in practice there is sometimes bias, either in the formulation of the null hypothesis or in the preference of Type-II errors over (...)
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  27. Alejandro Arango (forthcoming). Animal Groups and Social Ontology: An Argument From the Phenomenology of Behavior. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    Through a critical engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the concepts of nature, life, and behavior, and with contemporary accounts of animal groups, this article argues that animal groups exhibit sociality and that sociality is a fundamental ontological condition. I situate my account in relation to the superorganism and selfish individual accounts of animal groups in recent biology and zoology. I argue that both accounts are inadequate. I propose an alternative account of animal groups and animal sociality through a Merleau-Pontian inspired (...)
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  28. Michael A. Arbib (2003). Protosign and Protospeech: An Expanding Spiral. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):209-210.
    The intriguing observation that left-cerebral dominance for vocalization is ancient, occurring in frogs, birds, and mammals, grounds Corballis's argument that the predominance of right-handedness may result from an association between manual gestures and vocalization in the evolution of language. This commentary supports the general thesis that language evolved “From hand to mouth” (Corballis 2002), while offering alternatives for some of Corballis's supporting arguments.
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  29. Pamela Asquith (1980). The Origins and Rise of Ethology: The Science of the Natural Behaviour of Animals. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Science 13 (3):273-274.
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  30. Michael Bavidge & ian Ground (2009). Do Animals Need a Theory of Mind? In I. Leudar & A. Costall (eds.), Against Theory of Mind‎. Palgrave 167--188.
    This book brings together disparate strands of ToM research, lays out historical roots of the idea, and indicates better alternatives.
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  31. Marc Bekoff (1999). Social Cognition: Exchanging and Sharing Information on the Run. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 51 (1):617-632.
    In this essay I consider various aspects of the rapidly growing field of cognitive ethology, concentrating mainly on evolutionary and comparative discussion of the notion of intentionality. I am not concerned with consciousness, per se, for a concentration on consciousness deflects attention from other, and in many cases more interesting, problems in the study of animal cognition. I consider how, when, where, and (attempt to discuss) why individuals from different taxa exchange social information concerning their beliefs, desires, and goals. My (...)
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  32. Marc Bekoff & Dale W. Jamieson (eds.) (1996). Readings in Animal Cognition. MIT Press.
    This collection of 24 readings is the first comprehensive treatment of important topics by leading figures in the rapidly growing interdisciplinary field of...
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  33. José Luis Bermúdez (2011). The Force-Field Puzzle and Mindreading in Non-Human Primates. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):397-410.
    What is the relation between philosophical theorizing and experimental data? A modest set of naturalistic assumptions leads to what I term the force-field puzzle. The assumption that philosophy is continuous with natural science, as captured in Quine’s force-field metaphor, seems to push us simultaneously towards thinking that there have to be conceptual constraints upon how we interpret experimental data and towards thinking that there cannot be such conceptual constraints, because all theorizing must be accountable to data and observation. The key (...)
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  34. José Luis Bermúdez (2009). Mindreading in the Animal Kingdom. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press
    ven a cursory look at the extensive literature on mindreading in nonhuman animals reveals considerable variation both in what mindreading abilities are taken to be, and in what is taken as evidence for them. Claims that seem to contradict each other are often not inconsistent with each other when examined more closely. And sometimes theorists who seem to be on the same side are actually talking at cross-purposes. The first aim of this paper is to tackle some important framework questions (...)
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  35. Jose Luis Bermudez (2006). Animal Reasoning and Proto-Logic. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press
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  36. Jose Luis Bermudez (2003). Ascribing Thoughts to Non-Linguistic Creatures. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):313-34.
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  37. Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (1987). Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity, and Consciousness. Blackwell.
  38. Stefano Borgo, Noemi Spagnoletti, Laure Vieu & Elisabetta Visalberghi (2013). Artifact and Artifact Categorization: Comparing Humans and Capuchin Monkeys. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):375-389.
    We aim to show that far-related primates like humans and the capuchin monkeys show interesting correspondences in terms of artifact characterization and categorization. We investigate this issue by using a philosophically-inspired definition of physical artifact which, developed for human artifacts, turns out to be applicable for cross-species comparison. In this approach an artifact is created when an entity is intentionally selected and some capacities attributed to it (often characterizing a purpose). Behavioral studies suggest that this notion of artifact is not (...)
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  39. Francesca M. Bosco & Maurizio Tirassa (1998). Sharedness as an Innate Basis for Communication in the Infant. In M. A. Gernsbacher & S. J. Derry (eds.), Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. 162-166.
    From a cognitive perspective, intentional communication may be viewed as an agent's activity overtly aimed at modifying a partner's mental states. According to standard Gricean definitions, this requires each party to be able to ascribe mental states to the other, i.e., to entertain a so-called theory of mind. According to the relevant experimental literature, however, such capability does not appear before the third or fourth birthday; it would follow that children under that age should not be viewed as communicating agents. (...)
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  40. Paul Boyle, Sarah Gruber, Thomas Webler, Heidi Lyn, Jessica Sickler, Diana Reiss, John Fraser & Katherine Lemcke (2006). Social Narratives Surrounding Dolphins: Q Method Study. Society and Animals 14 (4):351-382.
    In preparation for development of an exhibit on the cognitive abilities of dolphins, the Wildlife Conservation Society sought to determine potential visitor's social perspectives about dolphin intelligence, and how these beliefs might influence acceptance of scientific information. The study reported here used Q methodology to identify these underlying social perspectives. The study of adults and the study of children each revealed three distinct perspectives. While consensus emerged among adults on points about dolphins' high intelligence and communication abilities, the three perspectives (...)
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  41. Sarah T. Boysen (2006). Effects of Symbols on Chimpanzee Cognition. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press
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  42. Manuel Bremer (2007). Methodologische Überlegungen Zu Tierischen Überzeugungen. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (2):347-355.
    A theory of the beliefs of non-human animals is not closed to us, only because we do not have beliefs of their kind. Starting from a theory of human beliefs and working on a building block model of propositional attitudes a theory of animal beliefs is viable. Such a theory is an example of the broader conception of a heterophenomenological approach to animal cognition. The theory aims at outlining the crucial differences between human and animal beliefs as well as the (...)
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  43. Manuel Bremer (2007). Methodologische Überlegungen zu tierischen Überzeugungen / Methodological Reflections on Exploring Beliefs in Animals. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (2):347 - 355.
    A theory of the beliefs of non-human animals is not closed to us, only because we do not have beliefs of their kind. Starting from a theory of human beliefs and working on a building block model of propositional attitudes a theory of animal beliefs is viable. Such a theory is an example of the broader conception of a heterophenomenological approach to animal cognition. The theory aims at outlining the crucial differences between human and animal beliefs as well as the (...)
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  44. Herbert Brewer (1966). Men and Apes. The Eugenics Review 58 (3):162.
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  45. Anderson Graham Brown (1996). The Minds of Animals: Theoretical Foundations of Comparative Psychology. Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder
    The use of intentional terms in the explanation of many animals is defended. Contemporary cognitive psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience posit mediums of representation in models of cognition. Representations are a form of content-bearing intentional states. Modular models of cognition provide a foundation for comparative psychology within the context of a representational theory of mind. ;The argument is supported with reviews of data from avian and primate research.
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  46. Cameron Buckner (2014). The Semantic Problem(s) with Research on Animal Mind‐Reading. Mind and Language 29 (5):566-589.
    Philosophers and cognitive scientists have worried that research on animal mind-reading faces a ‘logical problem’: the difficulty of experimentally determining whether animals represent mental states (e.g. seeing) or merely the observable evidence (e.g. line-of-gaze) for those mental states. The most impressive attempt to confront this problem has been mounted recently by Robert Lurz. However, Lurz' approach faces its own logical problem, revealing this challenge to be a special case of the more general problem of distal content. (...)
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  47. Cameron Buckner (2013). A Property Cluster Theory of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-30.
    Our prominent definitions of cognition are too vague and lack empirical grounding. They have not kept up with recent developments, and cannot bear the weight placed on them across many different debates. I here articulate and defend a more adequate theory. On this theory, behaviors under the control of cognition tend to display a cluster of characteristic properties, a cluster which tends to be absent from behaviors produced by non-cognitive processes. This cluster is reverse-engineered from the empirical tests that comparative (...)
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  48. Cameron Buckner (2013). Morgan's Canon, Meet Hume's Dictum: Avoiding Anthropofabulation in Cross-Species Comparisons. Biology and Philosophy 28 (5):853-871.
    How should we determine the distribution of psychological traits—such as Theory of Mind, episodic memory, and metacognition—throughout the Animal kingdom? Researchers have long worried about the distorting effects of anthropomorphic bias on this comparative project. A purported corrective against this bias was offered as a cornerstone of comparative psychology by C. Lloyd Morgan in his famous “Canon”. Also dangerous, however, is a distinct bias that loads the deck against animal mentality: our tendency to tie the competence criteria for cognitive capacities (...)
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  49. Richard W. Burkhardt (1999). Ethology, Natural History, the Life Sciences, and the Problem of Place. Journal of the History of Biology 32 (3):489 - 508.
    Investigators of animal behavior since the eighteenth century have sought to make their work integral to the enterprises of natural history and/or the life sciences. In their efforts to do so, they have frequently based their claims of authority on the advantages offered by the special places where they have conducted their research. The zoo, the laboratory, and the field have been major settings for animal behavior studies. The issue of the relative advantages of these different sites has been a (...)
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  50. Frances D. Burton (1977). Ethology and the Development of Sex and Gender Identity in Non-Human Primates. Acta Biotheoretica 26 (1):1-18.
    The current view that behaviour which is manifest in non-human primates forms a baseline for human behaviours is examined with special reference to the development of gender determination. A review of 21 non-human primate societies suggests that the behaviour of the sexes relates to assumption and occupation of societal roles defined by the local group. The significance of these findings for the human condition is discussed.
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