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  1. Colin Allen (2013). Fish Cognition and Consciousness. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 26 (1):25-39.
    Questions about fish consciousness and cognition are receiving increasing attention. In this paper, I explain why one must be careful to avoid drawing conclusions too hastily about this hugely diverse set of species.
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  2. Colin Allen, Animal Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  3. Colin Allen (2005). Deciphering Animal Pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    In this paper we1 assess the potential for research on nonhuman animals to address questions about the phenomenology of painful experiences. Nociception, the basic capacity for sensing noxious stimuli, is widespread in the animal kingdom. Even rel- atively primitive animals such as leeches and sea slugs possess nociceptors, neurons that are functionally specialized for sensing noxious stimuli (Walters 1996). Vertebrate spinal cords play a sophisticated role in processing and modulating nociceptive signals, providing direct control of some motor responses to noxious (...)
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  4. Colin Allen (2004). Animal Pain. Noûs 38 (4):617-43.
    Which nonhuman animals experience conscious pain?1 This question is central to the debate about animal welfare, as well as being of basic interest to scientists and philosophers of mind. Nociception—the capacity to sense noxious stimuli—is one of the most primitive sensory capacities. Neurons functionally specialized for nociception have been described in invertebrates such as the leech Hirudo medicinalis and the marine snail Aplysia californica (Walters 1996). Is all nociception accompanied by conscious pain, even in relatively primitive animals such as Aplysia, (...)
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  5. Colin Allen (1997). The Discovery of Animal Consciousness: An Optimistic Assessment. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 10 (3):217-225.
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  6. Colin Allen & Marc Bekoff (1997). Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology. MIT Press.
    The heart of this book is the reciprocal relationship between philosophical theories of mind and empirical studies of animal cognition.
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  7. Colin Allen & Mark Bekoff (2007). Animal Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
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  8. Garland E. Allen (1987). Materialism and Reductionism in the Study of Animal Consciousness. In G. Greenberg & E. Tobach (eds.), Cognition, Language, and Consciousness: Integrative Levels. Lawrence Erlbaum. 137--160.
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  9. Keith Allen (2009). Inter-Species Variation in Colour Perception. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):197 - 220.
    Inter-species variation in colour perception poses a serious problem for the view that colours are mind-independent properties. Given that colour perception varies so drastically across species, which species perceives colours as they really are? In this paper, I argue that all do. Specifically, I argue that members of different species perceive properties that are determinates of different, mutually compatible, determinables. This is an instance of a general selectionist strategy for dealing with cases of perceptual variation. According to selectionist views, objects (...)
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  10. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2014). Strong Neurophilosophy and the Matter of Bat Consciousness: A Case Study. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    In “What is it like to be boring and myopic?” Kathleen Akins offers an interesting, empirically driven, argument for thinking that there is nothing that it is like to be a bat. She suggests that bats are “boring” in the sense that they are governed by behavioral scripts and simple, non-representational, control loops, and are best characterized as biological automatons. Her approach has been well received by philosophers sympathetic to empirically informed philosophy of mind. But, despite its influence, her work (...)
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  11. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2010). Blindsight in Monkeys: Lost and (Perhaps) Found. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (1-2): 47-71.
    Stoerig and Cowey’s work is widely regarded as showing that monkeys with lesions in the primary visual cortex have blindsight. However, Mole and Kelly persuasively argue that the experimental results are compatible with an alternative hypothesis positing only a deficit in attention and perceptual working memory. I describe a revised procedure which can distinguish these hypotheses, and offer reasons for thinking that the blindsight hypothesis provides a superior explanation. The study of blindsight might contribute towards a general investigation into animal (...)
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  12. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2008). Insects and the Problem of Simple Minds: Are Bees Natural Zombies? Journal of Philosophy 105 (8): 389-415.
    This paper explores the idea that many “simple minded” invertebrates are “natural zombies” in that they utilize their senses in intelligent ways, but without phenomenal awareness. The discussion considers how “first-order” representationalist theories of consciousness meet the explanatory challenge posed by blindsight. It would be an advantage of first-order representationalism, over higher-order versions, if it does not rule out consciousness in most non-human animals. However, it is argued that a first-order representationalism which adequately accounts for blindsight also implies that most (...)
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  13. Kristin Andrews, Confronting Language, Representation, and Belief: A Limited Defense of Mental Continuity.
    According to the mental continuity claim (MCC), human mental faculties are physical and beneficial to human survival, so they must have evolved gradually from ancestral forms and we should expect to see their precursors across species. Materialism of mind coupled with Darwin’s evolutionary theory leads directly to such claims and even today arguments for animal mental properties are often presented with the MCC as a premise. However, the MCC has been often challenged among contemporary scholars. It is usually argued that (...)
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  14. Tim Appleton (1976). Consciousness in Animals. Zygon 11 (December):337-345.
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  15. Bernard J. Baars (2005). Subjective Experience is Probably Not Limited to Humans: The Evidence From Neurobiology and Behavior. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):7-21.
  16. Bernard J. Baars (2001). There Are No Known Differences in Brain Mechanisms of Consciousness Between Humans and Other Mammals. Animal Welfare Supplement 10:31- 40.
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  17. Christiane Bailey (2007). La vie végétative des animaux : la destruction heideggérienne de l'animalité. Phaenex 2 (2):81-123.
    La déconstruction heideggérienne de l’animalité qui a lieu dans les Concepts fondamentaux de la métaphysique va jusqu’à faire disparaître l’idée même d’une vie animale , d’une vie propre aux animaux. La vie, comme le disait déjà Heidegger dans Être et temps , est « un mode d’être propre », ce qui veut dire, comme le confirmera le cours de 1929-1930, que la vie est « le mode d’être de l’animal et de la plante ». D’emblée conçus comme « organismes », (...)
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  18. M. Balls (1991). The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and Science. Journal of Medical Ethics 17 (2):109-109.
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  19. P. P. G. Bateson & P. H. Klopfer (1991). Perspectives in Ethology, Volume 9: Human Understanding and Animal Awareness. Plenum Press.
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  20. Patrick Bateson (2011). Ethical Debates About Animal Suffering and the Use of Animals in Research. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):9-10.
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  21. Michael Bavidge & Ian Ground (2009). Do Animals Need a Theory of Mind? In Ivan Leudar & Alan Costall (eds.), Against Theory of Mind. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  22. William Bechtel (1992). Studying the Thinking of Non-Human Animals. Biology and Philosophy 7 (2):209-215.
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  23. Marc Bekoff (2006). The Public Lives of Animals: A Troubled Scientist, Pissy Baboons, Angry Elephants, and Happy Hounds. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (5):115-131.
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  24. Marc Bekoff (2006). Animal Passions and Beastly Virtues: Cognitive Ethology as the Unifying Science for Understanding the Subjective, Emotional, Empathic, and Moral Lives of Animals. Zygon 41 (1):71-104.
  25. Marc Bekoff (2003). Considering Animals--Not Higher Primates. Zygon 38 (2):229-245.
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  26. Marc Bekoff (1992). Scientific Ideology, Animal Consciousness, and Animal Protection: A Principled Plea for Unabashed Common Sense. New Ideas in Psychology 10:79-94.
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  27. Marc Bekoff, Colin Allen & Gordon M. Burghardt (eds.) (2002). The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition. MIT Press.
    The fifty-seven original essays in this book provide a comprehensive overview of the interdisciplinary field of animal cognition.
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  28. Marc Bekoff & Dale W. Jamieson (eds.) (1996). Readings in Animal Cognition. MIT Press.
    This collection of 24 readings is the first comprehensive treatment of important topics by leading figures in the rapidly growing interdisciplinary field of...
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  29. B. Bermond (2001). A Neuropsychological and Evolutionary Approach to Animal Consciousness and Animal Suffering. Animal Welfare Supplement 10:47- 62.
  30. Majid Beshkar (2008). Animal Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (3):5-33.
    There are several types of behavioural evidence in favour of the notion that many animal species experience at least some simple levels of consciousness. Other than behavioural evidence, there are a number of anatomical and physiological criteria that help resolve the problem of animal consciousness, particularly when addressing the problem in lower vertebrates and invertebrates. In this paper, I review a number of such behavioural and brain- based evidence in the case of mammals, birds, and some invertebrate species. Cumulative evidence (...)
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  31. R. H. Bradshaw (1998). Consciousness in Nonhuman Animals: Adopting the Precautionary Principle. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (1):108-14.
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  32. Manuel Bremer (2006). Animal Consciousness, Anthromorphism and Heterophenomenology. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 113 (2):397-410.
  33. Manuel Bremer (2005). Animal Consciousness as a Test Case of Cognitive Science. In Bewusstsein: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven.
    In our dealings with animals at least most of us see them as conscious beings. On the other hand the employment of human categories to animals seems to be problematic. Reflecting on the details of human beliefs, for example, casts serious doubt on whether the cat is able to believe anything at all. These theses try to reflect on methodological issues when investigating animal minds. Developing a theory of animal mentality seems to be a <span class='Hi'>test</span> case of the interdisciplinary (...)
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  34. Gordon M. Burghardt (1985). Animal Awareness: Current Perceptions and Historical Perspective. American Psychologist 40:905-919.
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  35. Werner Callebaut & R. Pinxten (eds.) (1987). Evolutionary Epistemology: A Multiparadigm Program. Reidel.
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  36. Peter Carruthers (2005). Why the Question of Animal Consciousness Might Not Matter Very Much. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):83-102.
    According to higher-order thought accounts of phenomenal consciousness it is unlikely that many non-human animals undergo phenomenally conscious experiences. Many people believe that this result would have deep and far-reaching consequences. More specifically, they believe that the absence of phenomenal consciousness from the rest of the animal kingdom must mark a radical and theoretically significant divide between ourselves and other animals, with important implications for comparative psychology. I shall argue that this belief is mistaken. Since phenomenal consciousness might be almost (...)
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  37. Peter Carruthers (2005). Consciousness Might Matter Very Much - Reply. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):113-122.
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  38. Peter Carruthers (2005). Reply to Shriver and Allen. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):113-122.
    Shriver and Allen (this volume, this journal; hereafter S&A) make three unconnected criticisms of my views concerning phenomenal consciousness and the question of animal consciousness. First, they claim that my dispositional higher-order thought theory of consciousness has much greater significance for ethics than I recognize. Second, they claim that, in the course of attempting to motivate that theory, I have presented inadequate criticisms of first-order theories (according to which phenomenal consciousness may well be rampant in the animal world). And third, (...)
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  39. Peter Carruthers (2004). Suffering Without Subjectivity. Philosophical Studies 121 (2):99-125.
    This paper argues that it is possible for suffering to occur in the absence of phenomenal consciousness – in the absence of a certain sort of experiential subjectivity, that is. (Phenomenal consciousness is the property that some mental states possess, when it is like something to undergo them, or when they have subjective feels, or possess qualia.) So even if theories of phenomenal consciousness that would withhold such consciousness from most species of non-human animal are correct, this neednt mean that (...)
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  40. Peter Carruthers (2004). On Being Simple Minded. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (3):205-220.
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  41. Peter Carruthers (1999). Sympathy and Subjectivity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):465-82.
    This paper shows that even if the mental states of non-human animals lack phenomenological properties, as some accounts of mental-state consciousness imply, this need not prevent those states from being appropriate objects of sympathy and moral concern. The paper argues that the most basic form of mental (as opposed to biological) harm lies in the existence of thwarted agency, or thwarted desire, rather than in anything phenomenological.
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  42. Peter Carruthers (1998). Animal Subjectivity. Psyche.
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  43. Peter Carruthers (1989). Brute Experience. Journal of Philosophy 86 (May):258-269.
  44. K. P. Chandroo, S. Yue & R. D. Moccia (2004). An Evaluation of Current Perspectives on Consciousness and Pain in Fishes. Fish and Fisheries 5:281-95.
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  45. Dorothy L. Cheney & Robert M. Seyfarth (1990). How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species. University of Chicago Press.
    "This reviewer had to be restrained from stopping people in the street to urge them to read it: They would learn something of the way science is done,...
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  46. Arthur W. Collins (1998). Beastly Experience. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):375-380.
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  47. J. H. Crook (1983). On Attributing Consciousness to Animals. Nature 303:11-14.
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  48. Marian S. Dawkins (2001). Who Needs Consciousness? Animal Welfare Supplement 10:19- 29.
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  49. Marian S. Dawkins (1993). Through Our Eyes Only: The Search for Animal Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
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  50. Manuel de Pinedo-Garcia & Jason Noble (2008). Beyond Persons: Extending the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction to Non-Rational Animals and Artificial Agents. Biology and Philosophy 23 (1):87-100.
    The distinction between personal level explanations and subpersonal ones has been subject to much debate in philosophy. We understand it as one between explanations that focus on an agent’s interaction with its environment, and explanations that focus on the physical or computational enabling conditions of such an interaction. The distinction, understood this way, is necessary for a complete account of any agent, rational or not, biological or artificial. In particular, we review some recent research in Artificial Life that pretends to (...)
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