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  1. Murat Aydede (2000). Emotions or Emotional Feelings? (Commentary on Rolls' The Brain and Emotion). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):192-194.
    It turns out that Rolls’s answer to Nagel’s (1974) question, "What is it like to be a bat?" is brusque: there is nothing it is like to be a bat . . . provided that bats don’t have a linguistically structured internal representational system that enables them to think about their first-order thoughts which are also linguistically structured. For phenomenal consciousness, a properly functioning system of higher-order linguistic thought (HOLT) is necessary (Rolls 1998, p. 262). By this criterion, not only (...)
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  2. Christiane Bailey (2007). La vie végétative des animaux : la destruction heideggérienne de l'animalité. Phaenex 2 (2):81-123.
    La déconstruction heideggérienne de l’animalité qui a lieu dans les Concepts fondamentaux de la métaphysique va jusqu’à faire disparaître l’idée même d’une vie animale , d’une vie propre aux animaux. La vie, comme le disait déjà Heidegger dans Être et temps , est « un mode d’être propre », ce qui veut dire, comme le confirmera le cours de 1929-1930, que la vie est « le mode d’être de l’animal et de la plante ». D’emblée conçus comme « organismes », (...)
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  3. Marc Bekoff (2006). Animal Passions and Beastly Virtues: Cognitive Ethology as the Unifying Science for Understanding the Subjective, Emotional, Empathic, and Moral Lives of Animals. Zygon 41 (1):71-104.
  4. Marc Bekoff (2001). The Evolution of Animal Play, Emotions, and Social Morality: On Science, Theology, Spirituality, Personhood, and Love. Zygon 36 (4):615-655.
  5. Irene Berra (2014). An Evolutionary Ockham's Razor to Reciprocity. Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 5:01258.
    Reciprocal altruism implies delayed payoffs by definition. It might therefore seem logical to assume that limited memory, calculation, and planning capacities have constrained the evolution of reciprocity in non-human animals. Here I will argue that this is not the case. First, I will show that the emotional track of past interactions is enough to motivate and maintain reciprocity over longer timespans. Second, I will propose a developmental pathway of this system of emotional bookkeeping. In particular, the neuropeptide modulation underlying mother-infant (...)
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  6. Victoria A. Braithwaite, Felicity Huntingford & Ruud den Bos (2013). Variation in Emotion and Cognition Among Fishes. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 26 (1):7-23.
    Increasing public concern for the welfare of fish species that human beings use and exploit has highlighted the need for better understanding of the cognitive status of fish and of their ability to experience negative emotions such as pain and fear. Moreover, studying emotion and cognition in fish species broadens our scientific understanding of how emotion and cognition are represented in the central nervous system and what kind of role they play in the organization of behavior. For instance, (...)
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  7. S. Campbell (1997). Emotion as an Explanatory Principle in Early Evolutionary Theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (3):453-473.
  8. Stephen R. L. Clark (1987). The Description and Evaluation of Animal Emotion. In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell
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  9. David Cockburn (1994). Human Beings and Giant Squids (on Ascribing Human Sensations and Emotions to Non-Human Creatures). Philosophy 69 (268):135-50.
    A television nature programme a year or two ago contained a striking sequence in which a giant squid was under threat from some other creature . The squid responded in a way which struck me immediately and powerfully as one of fear. Part of what was striking in this sequence was the way in which it was possible to see in the behaviour of a creature physically so very different from human beings an emotion which was so unambiguously and specifically (...)
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  10. Beth Dixon (2001). Animal Emotion. Ethics and the Environment 6 (2):22-30.
    : Recent work in the area of ethics and animals suggests that it is philosophically legitimate to ascribe emotions to nonhuman animals. Furthermore, it is sometimes argued that emotionality is a morally relevant psychological state shared by humans and nonhumans. What is missing from the philosophical literature that makes reference to emotions in nonhuman animals is an attempt to clarify and defend some particular account of the nature of emotion, and the role that emotions play in a characterization of human (...)
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  11. S. Benjamin Fink (2010). Review of Victoria Braithwaite's „Do Fish Feel Pain?“. [REVIEW] Metapsychology 14 (34).
  12. Bennett W. Helm (1994). Significance, Emotions, and Objectivity: Some Limits of Animal Thought. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Rationality is the constitutive ideal of the mental. Therefore it is important to understand the sort of rationality at issue here. It is often assumed that rationality just is instrumental rationality, but this leaves us with too thin a notion of desire: Desires centrally involve the notion of things mattering or being significant, for their objects must normally be worth pursuing to the subject. Such significance is simply unintelligible in terms of instrumental rationality. Consequently, understanding significance and its rational connections (...)
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  13. Simon Killcross (2000). Reinforcement and Punishment: Dissociable Systems for Action and Emotion? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):205-205.
    Rolls presents a theory of emotion based on the premise that emotions are evoked by events that are capable of being instrumental reinforcers and punishers. As support for this theory is drawn almost entirely from experiments in non-human primates, valuable insights into the relationship between punishment and reinforcement systems, and the nature of instrumentality, may have been overlooked.
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  14. Hans J. Markowitsch (2009). Emotions: The Shared Heritage of Animals and Humans. In Birgitt Röttger-Rössler & Hans Markowitsch (eds.), Emotions as Bio-Cultural Processes. Springer 95--109.
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  15. Tom McClelland (2013). Review of Mark Rowlands, Can Animals Be Moral? [REVIEW] Metapsychology Online 17 (29).
  16. M. Mendl & E. S. Paul (2004). Consciousness, Emotion and Animal Welfare: Insights From Cognitive Science. Animal Welfare 13:17- 25.
  17. Susana Monsó (forthcoming). Morality Without Mindreading. Mind and Language.
    Could animals behave morally if they can’t mindread? Does morality require mindreading capacities? Moral psychologists believe mindreading is contingently involved in moral judgements. Moral philosophers argue that moral behaviour necessarily requires the possession of mindreading capacities. In this paper, I argue that, while the former may be right, the latter are mistaken. Using the example of empathy, I show that animals with no mindreading capacities could behave on the basis of emotions that possess an identifiable moral content. Therefore, at (...)
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  18. Susana Monsó (2015). Empathy and Morality in Behaviour Readers. Biology and Philosophy 30 (5):671-690.
    It is tempting to assume that being a moral creature requires the capacity to attribute mental states to others, because a creature cannot be moral unless she is capable of comprehending how her actions can have an impact on the well-being of those around her. If this assumption were true, then mere behaviour readers could never qualify as moral, for they are incapable of conceptualising mental states and attributing them to others. In this paper, I argue against such an assumption (...)
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  19. Leon Niemoczynski & Stephanie Theodorou (eds.) (2014). Animal Experience: Consciousness and Emotions in the Natural World. Open Humanities Press.
    Open Humanities Press, Living Books About Life Series.
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  20. Jaak Panksepp (2005). Affective Consciousness: Core Emotional Feelings in Animals and Humans. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):30-80.
    The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain–mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill (...)
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  21. Robert J. Richards (2003). 4 Darwin on Mind, Morals and Emotions. In J. Hodges & Gregory Radick (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Darwin. Cambridge University Press 92.
  22. Robert C. Roberts (1996). Propositions and Animal Emotion. Philosophy 71 (275):147-56.
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  23. Mark Rowlands & Susana Monsó (forthcoming). Animals as Reflexive Thinkers: The Aponoian Paradigm. In Linda Kalof (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Animal Studies. Oxford University Press
    The ability to engage in reflexive thought—in thought about thought or about other mental states more generally—is regarded as a complex intellectual achievement that is beyond the capacities of most nonhuman animals. To the extent that reflexive thought capacities are believed necessary for the possession of many other psychological states or capacities, including consciousness, belief, emotion, and empathy, the inability of animals to engage in reflexive thought calls into question their other psychological abilities. This chapter attacks the idea that reflexive (...)
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  24. Isaac Wiegman, Evidential Criteria of Homology for Comparative Psychology.
    While the homology concept has taken on importance in thinking about the nature of psychological kinds, no one has shown how comparative psychological and behavioral evidence can distinguish between competing homology claims. I adapt the operational criteria of homology to accomplish this. I consider two competing homology claims that compare human anger with putative aggression systems of nonhuman animals, and demonstrate the effectiveness of these criteria in adjudicating between these claims.
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