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  1. James R. Anderson (1995). Self-Recognition in Dolphins: Credible Cetaceans; Compromised Criteria, Controls, and Conclusions. Consciousness and Cognition 4 (2):239-243.
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  2. Kristin Andrews, The First Step in the Case for Great Ape Equality: The Argument for Other Minds.
    A defense of equality for great apes must begin with an understanding of the opposition and an acknowledgement of the most basic point of disagreement. For great apes to gain status as persons in our community, we must begin by determining what the multitude of different definitions of "person" have in common. Finding that great apes fulfill the requirements of any one specific theory of personhood is insufficient, for these theories are highly controversial, and a critique of the theory will (...)
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  3. Stephen Asma, Jaak Panksepp, Rami Gabriel & Glennon Curran (2012). Philosophical Implications of Affective Neuroscience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (3-4):6-48.
    These papers are based on a Symposium at the COGSCI Conference in 2010. 1. Naturalizing the Mammalian Mind (Jaak Panksepp) 2. Modularity in Cognitive Psychology and Affective Neuroscience (Rami Gabriel) 3. Affective Neuroscience and the Philosophy of Self (Stephen Asma and Tom Greif) 4. Affective Neuroscience and Law (Glennon Curran and Rami Gabriel).
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  4. Kim A. Bard, Brenda K. Todd, Chris Bernier, Jennifer Love & David A. Leavens (2006). Self-Awareness in Human and Chimpanzee Infants: What is Measured and What is Meant by the Mark and Mirror Test? Infancy 9 (2):191-219.
  5. Tom L. Beauchamp (1999). The Failure of Theories of Personhood. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (4):309-324.
    : The belief persists in philosophy, religion, science, and popular culture that some special cognitive property of persons like self-consciousness confers a unique moral standing. However, no set of cognitive properties confers moral standing, and metaphysical personhood is not sufficient for either moral personhood or moral standing. Cognitive theories all fail to capture the depth of commitments embedded in using the language of "person." It is more assumed than demonstrated in these theories that nonhuman animals lack a relevant form of (...)
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  6. Marc Bekoff (2003). Consciousness and Self in Animals: Some Reflections. Zygon 38 (2):229-245.
    In this essay I argue that many nonhuman animal beings are conscious and have some sense of self. Rather than ask whether they are conscious, I adopt an evolutionary perspective and ask why consciousness and a sense of self evolved---what are they good for? Comparative studies of animal cognition, ethological investigations that explore what it is like to be a certain animal, are useful for answering this question. Charles Darwin argued that the differences in cognitive abilities and emotions among animals (...)
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  7. Derek Browne (2004). Do Dolphins Know Their Own Minds? Biology and Philosophy 19 (4):633-53.
    Knowledge of one's own states of mind is one of the varieties of self-knowledge. Do any nonhuman animals have the capacity for this variety of self-knowledge? The question is open to empirical inquiry, which is most often conducted with primate subjects. Research with a bottlenose dolphin gives some evidence for the capacity in a nonprimate taxon. I describe the research and evaluate the metacognitive interpretation of the dolphin's behaviour. The research exhibits some of the difficulties attached to the task of (...)
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  8. R. W. Byrne & Andrew Whiten (1988). Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans. Oxford University Press.
    This book presents an alternative to conventional ideas about the evolution of the human intellect.
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  9. Peter Carruthers (2007). Meta-Cognition in Animals: A Skeptical Look. Mind and Language 22 (1):58–89.
    This paper examines the recent literature on meta-cognitive processes in non-human animals, arguing that in each case the data admit of a simpler, purely first-order, explanation. The topics discussed include the alleged monitoring of states of certainty and uncertainty, the capacity to know whether or not one has perceived something, and the capacity to know whether or not the information needed to solve some problem is stored in memory. The first-order explanations advanced all assume that beliefs and desires come in (...)
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  10. Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer (1993). A Declaration of Great Apes. In Peter Singer & Paola Cavalieri (eds.), The Great Ape Project. St. Martin's Griffin. 4--7.
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  11. Rodney M. J. Cotterill (2000). Did Consciousness Evolve From Self-Paced Probing of the Environment, and Not From Reflexes? Brain and Mind 1 (2):283-298.
    It is suggested that the anatomical structures whichmediate consciousness evolved as decisiveembellishments to a (non-conscious) design strategypresent even in the simplest monocellular organisms.Consciousness is thus not the pinnacle of ahierarchy whose base is the primitive reflex, becausereflexes require a nervous system, which the monocelldoes not possess. By postulating that consciousness isintimately connected to self-paced probing of theenvironment, also prominent in prokaryotic behavior,one can make mammalian neuroanatomy amenable todramatically simple rationalization.
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  12. Lawrence H. Davis (1989). Self-Consciousness in Chimps and Pigeons. Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):249-59.
    Chimpanzee behaviour with mirrors makes it plausible that they can recognise themselves as themselves in mirrors, and so have a 'self-concept'. I defend this claim, and argue that roughly similar behaviour in pigeons, as reported, does not in fact make it equally plausible that they also have this mental capacity. But for all that it is genuine, chimpanzee self-consciousness may differ significantly from ours. I describe one possibility I believe consistent with the data, even if not very plausible: that the (...)
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  13. David DeGrazia (2009). Self-Awareness in Animals. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. 201--217.
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  14. Derek A. Denton (1993/1994). The Pinnacle of Life: Consciousness and Self-Awareness in Humans and Animals. Harpersanfrancisco.
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  15. John C. Eccles (1982). Animal Consciousness and Human Self-Consciousness. Experientia 38:1384-91.
  16. Robert Epstein, R. P. Lanza & B. F. Skinner (1981). "Self-Awareness" in the Pigeon. Science 212 (4495):695-96.
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  17. Erica Fudge (2011). The Human Face of Early Modern England. Angelaki 16 (1):97 - 110.
    This essay traces out the context that allowed numerous early modern thinkers to deny that animals had faces. Using early- to mid-seventeenth-century writing by, among others, John Milton, John Bulwer and Ben Jonson, it shows that faces were understood to be sites of meaning, and were thus, like gestural language and the capacity to perform a dance, possessed by humans alone. Animals, this discourse argued, have no ability to communicate meaningfully because they have no bodily control, and as such they (...)
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  18. Gordon G. Gallup Jr, James R. Anderson & Daniel J. Shillito (2002). The Mirror Test. In Marc Bekoff, Colin Allen & Gordon M. Burghardt (eds.), The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition. Mit Press.
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  19. G. G. Gallup (1994). Self-Recognition: Research Strategies and Experimental Design. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.
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  20. G. G. Gallup (1991). Toward a Comparative Psychology of Self-Awareness: Species Limitations and Cognitive Consequences. In G. Goethals & J. Strauss (eds.), The Self: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. Springer-Verlag.
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  21. G. G. Gallup (1987). Self-Awareness. In G. Mitchell (ed.), Comparative Primate Biology, Volume 2. Liss.
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  22. G. G. Gallup (1982). Self-Awareness and the Emergence of Mind in Primates. American Journal of Primatology 2:237-48.
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  23. G. G. Gallup (1979). Self-Recognition in Chimpanzees and Man: A Developmental and Comparative Perspective. In M. Lewis & M. Rosenblum (eds.), Genesis of Behavior, Volume 2. Plenum Press. 107–126.
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  24. G. G. Gallup (1977). Self-Recognition in Primates: A Comparative Approach to the Bidirectionalproperties of Consciousness. American Psychologist 32:329-38.
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  25. G. G. Gallup (1975). Toward an Operational Definition of Self-Awareness. In R. Tuttle (ed.), Socioecology and the Psychology of Primates. Mouton.
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  26. G. G. Gallup (1970). Chimpanzees: Self-Recognition. Science 167:86-87.
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  27. Rocco J. Gennaro (2009). Animals, Consciousness, and I-Thoughts. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. 184--200.
    I argue that recent developments in animal cognition support the conclusion that HOT theory is consistent with animal consciousness. There seems to be growing evidence that many animals are indeed capable of having I-thoughts, including episodic memory, as well as have the ability to understand the mental states of others.
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  28. G. Goethals & J. Strauss (eds.) (1991). The Self: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. Springer-Verlag.
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  29. Daniel Hart & M. P. Karmel (1996). Self-Awareness and Self-Knowledge in Humans, Apes, and Monkeys. In A. Russon, Kim A. Bard & S. Parkers (eds.), Reaching Into Thought: The Minds of the Great Apes. Cambridge University Press.
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  30. Cecilia M. Heyes (1994). Reflections on Self-Recognition in Primates. Animal Behaviour 47:909-19.
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  31. Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.) (2006). Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
    To what extent can animal behaviour be described as rational? What does it even mean to describe behaviour as rational? -/- This book focuses on one of the major debates in science today - how closely does mental processing in animals resemble mental processing in humans. It addresses the question of whether and to what extent non-human animals are rational, that is, whether any animal behaviour can be regarded as the result of a rational thought processes. It does this with (...)
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  32. C. W. Hyatt & W. Hopkins (1994). Self-Awareness in Bonobos and Chimpanzees: A Comparative Perspective. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.
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  33. Jean Kazez (2013). We Should Prohibit the Use of Chimpanzees and Other Great Apes in Biomedical. In Arthur L. Caplan & Robert Arp (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Bioethics. John Wiley & Sons. 25--271.
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  34. Edward J. Kempf (1916). Did Consciousness of Self Play a Part in the Behavior of This Monkey? Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (15):410-412.
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  35. Stan Klein (2013). The Complex Act of Projecting Oneself Into the Future. WIREs Cognitive Science 4:63-79.
    Research on future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT) is highly active yet somewhat unruly. I believe this is due, in large part, to the complexity of both the tasks used to test FMTT and the concepts involved. Extraordinary care is a necessity when grappling with such complex and perplexing metaphysical constructs as self and time and their co-instantiation in memory. In this review, I first discuss the relation between future mental time travel and types of memory (episodic and semantic). I then (...)
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  36. Andy Lamey (2012). Primitive Self-Consciousness and Avian Cognition. The Monist 95 (3):486-510.
    Recent work in moral theory has seen the refinement of theories of moral standing, which increasingly recognize a position of intermediate standing between fully self-conscious entities and those which are merely conscious. Among the most sophisticated concepts now used to denote such intermediate standing is that of primitive self-consciousness, which has been used to more precisely elucidate the moral standing of human newborns. New research into the structure of the avian brain offers a revised view of the cognitive abilities of (...)
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  37. K. Marten & S. Psarakos (1994). Evidence for Self-Awareness in the Bottlenose Dolphin. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.
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  38. K. Marten & S. Psarakos (1992). Using Self-View Television to Distinguish Between Self-Examination and Social Behavior in the Bottlenose Dolphin. Consciousness and Cognition 4 (2):205-24.
    In mirror mark tests dolphins twist, posture, and engage in open-mouth and head movements, often repetitive. Because postures and an open mouth are also dolphin social behaviours, we used self-view television as a manipulatable mirror to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior. Two dolphins were exposed to alternating real-time self-view and playback of the same to determine if they distinguished between them. The adult male engaged in elaborate open-mouth behaviors in mirror mode, but usually just watched when playing back the (...)
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  39. H. J. McCloskey (1979). Moral Rights and Animals. Inquiry 22 (1-4):23 – 54.
    In Section I, the purely conceptual issue as to whether animals other than human beings, all or some, may possess rights is examined. This is approached via a consideration of the concept of a moral right, and by way of examining the claims of sentience, consciousness, capacities for pleasure and pain, having desires, possessing interests, self-consciousness, rationality in various senses. It is argued that only beings possessed actually or potentially of the capacity to be morally self-determining can be possessors of (...)
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  40. H. L. Miles (1994). Me Chantek: The Development of Self-Awareness in a Signing Orangutan. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.
  41. Murray Miles (1994). Leibniz on Apperception and Animal Souls. Dialogue 33 (04):701-.
  42. R. Mitchell, Nicholas S. Thompson & H. L. Miles (eds.) (1997). Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals. SUNY Press.
    This is the first book to evaluate the significance and usefulness of the practices of anthropomorphism and anecdotalism for understanding animals.
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  43. M. H. Moynihan (1997). Self-Awareness, with Specific References to Coleoid Cephalopods. In R. Mitchell, Nicholas S. Thompson & H. L. Miles (eds.), Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals. SUNY Press.
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  44. Kristina Musholt (forthcoming). Thinking About Oneself. MIT Press.
  45. María G. Navarro (2012). Critical Notice of 'Expression and the Inner' by David H. Finkelstein. [REVIEW] Polis 32.
    La obra del filósofo estadounidense David H. Finkelstein, Expression and the Inner, publicada originariamente en 2003 por Harvard University Press (2ª ed. 2008) puede ahora leerse en la versión española de Lino San Juan, editada por la ovetense KRK Ediciones con el título: La expresión y lo interno. Finkelstein propone en La expresión y lo interno un análisis expresivista del autoconocimiento. Podría parecer cuando menos sorprendente y aún más admirable que con tan sólo dos capítulos (“Detectivismo y constitutivismo” y “Expresión”) (...)
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  46. Barbara Noske (1993). Great Apes as Anthropological Subjects–Desconstructing Anthropocentrism. In Peter Singer & Paola Cavalieri (eds.), The Great Ape Project. St. Martin's Griffin. 258--268.
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  47. S. T. Parker (1991). A Developmental Approach to the Origins of Self-Recognition in Great Apes. Human Evolution 6:435-49.
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  48. S. T. Parker, R. M. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (1994). Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.
  49. Sue Taylor Parker (1997). A General Model for the Adaptive Function of Self-Knowledge in Animals and Humans. Consciousness and Cognition 6 (1):75-86.
    This article offers a general definition of self-knowledge that embraces all forms and levels of self-knowledge in animals and humans. It is hypothesized that various levels of self-knowledge constitute an ordinal scale such that each species in a lineage displays the forms of self-knowledge found in related species as well as new forms it and its sister species may have evolved. Likewise, it is hypothesized that these various forms of levels of self-knowledge develop in the sequence in which they evolved. (...)
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  50. Paweł Pasieka (2012). Kartezjańska koncepcja zwierzęcia-maszyny. Filo-Sofija 12 (17):51-64.
    ESCARTES’S CONCEPTION OF BEAST-MACHINE According to standard interpretations, Descartes asserted that animals were mere automata and did not feel pain. This interpretation is based on his notion of the beast-machine. In this article, I revise John Cottingham’s sevenfold analysis of that thesis. In Cottingham’s view, Descartes did insist that animals were automata and denied them consciousness and self-consciousness but it did not involve that animals do not feel. I support this view with some new arguments. I also point to the (...)
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