About this topic
Summary

Anomalous monism is the name of Donald Davidson’s theory of the mind body relation. It holds that (1) there can be no strict laws governing mental events qua mental events, but that (2) every event is governed by strict laws of physics. Thus anomalous monism adverts to mental-physical token identity. Critics of anomalous monism argue that while mental events could be causes of physical events they were causes in virtue of the physical properties, thus leaving the mental properties epiphenomenal.  

Key works Key works about anomalous monism and mental causation include the articles by Davidson wherein the theory is expounded, including  Mental Events;  Psychology as Philosophy; and  Actions, Reasons and Causes. Key works in the epiphenomenalist criticism of anomalous monism are Kim's  The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism, and Can Supervenience and 'Non-strict Laws' Save Anomalous Monism? as well as McLaughlin's On Davidsons's Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism.   
Introductions Anomalous Monism by Julie Yoo in the Oxford Handbook to Philosophy of Mind. Anomalous Monism by Steven Yalowitz in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
58 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 58
  1. Louise M. Antony (1989). Anomalous Monism and the Problem of Explanatory Force. Philosophical Review 98 (April):153-87.
    Concern about two problems runs through the work of davidson: the problem of accounting for the "explanatory force" of rational explanations, and the problem posed for materialism by the apparent anomalousness of psychological events. davidson believes that his view of mental causation, imbedded in his theory of "anomalous monism," can provide satisfactory answers to both questions. however, it is argued in this paper that davidson's program contains a fundamental inconsistency; that his metaphysics, while grounding the doctrine of anomalous monism, makes (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Renée Bilodeau (2002). Intention Et Faiblesse de la Volonté. Dialogue 41 (01):27-44.
    Akrasia is both an intentional and an irrational phenomenon. These two characteristics can be reconciled by a careful reconstruction of practical reasoning. I undertake this task along Davidsonian lines, arguing against his critics that the notion of unconditional judgment is the key to an adequate account of akrasia. Unless akrasia is conceived as a failure of the agent to form an unconditional judgment that conforms to her best judgment "all things considered," the intentionality of akrasia is lost. Likewise, I show (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Renée Bilodeau (1993). L'inertie du Mental. Dialogue 32 (03):507-525.
    This paper addresses two objections raised against anomalous monism. Firstly, on the basis of Davidson's assertion that all causal relations fall under strict laws, many critics conclude mental properties are causally inert since they are non-nomic. I argue that this conclusion follows only on the further assumption that all causally efficacious properties are nomic properties. It is perfectly consistent, however, to hold that there is a law covering each causal relation without each causal statement being the instantiation of a law. (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Neil Campbell (2003). Causes and Causal Explanations: Davidson and His Critics. Philosophia 31 (1-2):149-157.
  5. Neil Campbell (1998). Anomalous Monism and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 52 (1):23-39.
  6. Neil Campbell (1997). The Standard Objection to Anomalous Monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):373-82.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Donald Davidson (1995). Could There Be a Science of Rationality? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (1):1-16.
  8. Donald Davidson (1987). Problems in the Explanation of Action. In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality. Blackwell.
  9. Donald Davidson (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press.
  10. Donald Davidson (1976). Hempel on Explaining Action. Erkenntnis 10 (3):239 - 253.
  11. Donald Davidson (1970). Events and Particulars. Noûs 4 (1):25-32.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Donald Davidson (1967). Causal Relations. Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):691-703.
  13. Donald Davidson (1963). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685-700.
    What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did? We may call such explanations rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the action. In this paper I want to defend the ancient - and common-sense - position that rationalization is a species of ordinary causal explanation. The defense no doubt requires some redeployment, but not more or less complete abandonment of the position, as (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. M. de Pinedo (2006). Anomalous Monism: Oscillating Between Dogmas. Synthese 148 (1):79-97.
    Davidson’s anomalous monism, his argument for the identity between mental and physical event tokens, has been frequently attacked, usually demanding a higher degree of physicalist commitment. My objection runs in the opposite direction: the identities inferred by Davidson from mental causation, the nomological character of causality and the anomaly of the mental are philosophically problematic and, more dramatically, incompatible with his famous argument against the third dogma of empiricism, the separation of content from conceptual scheme. Given the anomaly of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Fred Dretske (1989). Reasons and Causes. Philosophical Perspectives 3:1-15.
  16. Jerry A. Fodor (1989). Making Mind Matter More. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):59-79.
  17. Brian J. Garrett (1999). Davidson on Causal Relevance. Ratio 12 (1):14-33.
    Davidson argues that mental properties are causally relevant properties. I argue that Davidson cannot appeal to ceteris paribus causal laws to ensure that these properties are causally relevant, if he wishes to retain his argument for anomalous monism. Second, I argue that the appeal to supervenience cannot, by itself, give us an account of the causal relevancy of mental properties. I argue that, while mental properties may indeed 'make a difference' to the causally efficacious properties of events, this is not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Sophie Gibb (2006). Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.
    Despite the fact that Davidson's theory of the causal relata is crucial to his response to the problem of mental causation - that of anomalous monism - it is commonly overlooked within discussions of his position. Anomalous monism is accused of entailing property epiphenomenalism, but given Davidson's understanding of the causal relata, such accusations are wholly misguided. There are, I suggest, two different forms of property epiphenomenalism. The first understands the term 'property' in an ontological sense, the second in a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Sophie C. Gibb (2009). Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion. Erkenntnis 71 (2):205 - 221.
    Given Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE), it follows that in addition to the problem of mental causation, dualism faces a problem of mental explanation. However, the plausibility of EE rests upon the acceptance of a further principle concerning the individuation of explanation (EI). The two methods of defending EI—either by combining an internal account of the individuation of explanation with a semantical account of properties or by accepting an external account of the individuation of explanation—are both metaphysically implausible. This (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. G. C. Goddu (1999). Is Anomalous Monism Inconsistent After All? Philosophia 27 (3-4):509-519.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Rew A. Godow (1979). Davidson and the Anomalism of the Mental. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):163-174.
    In two of his more recent papers, Donald davidson has argued for the "a priori" truth of what he calls "the principle of the anomalism of the mental." my concern in this paper is with examining that principle and davidson's defense of it. After clarifying the principle, I discuss three considerations which davidson gives in its defense and argue that they are not persuasive. Then I argue that although the principle of the anomalism of the mental cannot be known "a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. John Heil (2002). Mental Causation. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. 29--52.
    This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, including Donald Davidson, Ted Honderich, and Philip Pettit, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. John Heil & Alfred Mele (eds.) (1993). Mental Causation. Clarendon Press.
    I argue that the two standard models of mental causation fail to capture the crucial causal relevance of the reason-giving relations involved. Their common error is an exclusively mechanical conception of causation, on which any justification is bound to be independent of the causal process involved, based upon a general rule from which the correctness of the particular case follows only by subsumption. I establish possibility of an alternative model, by sketching an account of the causal dependence of perceptual knowledge (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. G. L. Herstein (2005). Davidson on the Impossibility of Psychophysical Laws. Synthese 145 (1):45-63.
    Donald Davidsons classic argument for the impossibility of reducing mental events to physicallistic ones is analyzed and formalized in relational logic. This makes evident the scope of Davidsons argument, and shows that he is essentially offering a negative transcendental argument, i.e., and argument to the impossibility of certain kinds of logical relations. Some final speculations are offered as to why such a move might, nevertheless, have a measure of plausibility.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Peter H. Hess (1981). Actions, Reasons and Humean Causes. Analysis 41 (March):77-81.
  26. Ted Honderich (1984). Smith and the Champion of Mauve. Analysis 44 (2):86-89.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Ted Honderich (1983). Anomalous Monism: Reply to Smith. Analysis 43 (June):147-149.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Ted Honderich (1982). The Argument for Anomalous Monism. Analysis 42 (January):59-64.
  29. Daniel D. Hutto (1998). Davidson's Identity Crisis. Dialectica 52 (1):45-61.
    Professor Davidson's anomalous monism has been subject to the criticism that, despite advertisements to the contrary, if it were true mental properties would be epiphenomenal. To this Davidson has replied that his critics have misunderstood his views concerning the extensional nature of causal relations and the intensional character of causal explanations. I call this his 'extension reply'. This paper argues that there are two ways to read Davidson's 'extension reply'; one weaker and one stronger. But the dilemma is that: (i) (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Jaegwon Kim (2000). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.
    This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Jaegwon Kim (1993). Mental Causation in a Physical World. In Villanueva, E. (1993). Science and Knowledge. Ridgeview. 27-50.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Jaegwon Kim (1989). Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion. Philosophical Perspectives 3:77-108.
  33. Jaegwon Kim (1989). The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63 (3):31-47.
    Somewhat loose arguments that non-reductive physicalist realism is untenable. Anomalous monism makes the mental irrelevant, functionalism is compatible with species-specific reduction, and supervenience is weak or reductive.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Jaegwon Kim (1973). Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event. Journal of Philosophy 70 (8):217-236.
  35. James C. Klagge (1990). Davidson's Troubles with Supervenience. Synthese 85 (November):339-52.
  36. Robert Klee (1992). Anomalous Monism, Ceteris Paribus, and Psychological Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):389-403.
    Davidson has argued that there can be no laws linking psychological states with physical states. I stress that this argument depends crucially on there being no purely psychological laws. All of this has to do with the holism and indeterminacy of the psychological domain. I criticize this claim by showing how Davidson misconstrues the role of ceteris paribus clauses in psychological explanation. Using a model of how ceteris paribus clauses operate derived from Lakatos, I argue that if Davidson is correct, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Noa Latham (1999). Davidson and Kim on Psychophysical Laws. Synthese 118 (2):121-44.
    Nearly 30 years have passed since Donald Davidson first presented his ar- gument against the possibility of psychophysical laws in “Mental Events”. The argument applies to intentional rather than phenomenal properties, so whenever I refer to mental properties and to psychophysical laws it should be understood that I mean intentional properties and laws relating them to physical properties. No consensus has emerged over what the argument actually is, and the subsequent versions of it presented by Davidson show significant differences. But (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. C. Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (1986). Mental Causes and the Explanation of Action. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):145-158.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (2010). Emergence and Downward Causation. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press.
  40. Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (2006). The Metaphysics of Mental Causation. Journal of Philosophy 103 (11):539-576.
    A debate has been raging in the philosophy of mind for at least the past two decades. It concerns whether the mental can make a causal difference to the world. Suppose that I am reading the newspaper and it is getting dark. I switch on the light, and continue with my reading. One explanation of why my switching on of the light occurred is that a desiring with a particular content (that I continue reading), a noticing with a particular content (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Brian P. McLaughlin (1992). On Davidson's Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
    [Why Davidson's Anomalous Monism Would Lead to Type Epiphenomenalism]: 1. According to Davidson, events can cause other events only in virtue of falling under physical types cited in strict laws; 2. But no mental event-type is a physical event-type cited in a strict law, since the mental is anomalous. 3. Therefore, under Davidson's theory, type epiphenomenalism is true.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Alexander Miller (1993). Some Anomalies in Kim's Account of Davidson. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):335-44.
  43. Dwayne Moore (2010). Reconciling Anomalous Monism with Scheme-Content Dualism: A Reply to Manuel de Pinedo. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 29 (1):51-62.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. N. M. L. Nathan (1981). On an Argument of Peacocke's About Physicalism and Counterfactuals. Analysis 41 (3):124-125.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. David Robb & John Heil, Mental Causation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Worries about mental causation are prominent in contemporary discussions of the mind and human agency. Originally, the problem of mental causation was that of understanding how a mental substance (thought to be immaterial) could interact with a material substance, a body. Most philosophers nowadays repudiate immaterial minds, but the problem of mental causation has not gone away. Instead, focus has shifted to mental properties. How could mental properties be causally relevant to bodily behavior? How could something mental qua mental cause (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Howard M. Robinson (2001). Davidson and Nonreductive Materialism: A Tale of Two Cultures. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
  47. Constantine Sandis & Giuseppina D'Oro (2013). Reasons and Causes. Palgrave Macmillan.
  48. William E. Seager (1981). The Anomalousness of the Mental. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):389-401.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Peter Smith (1984). Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism: A Reply to Honderich. Analysis 44 (2):83-86.
  50. Peter Smith (1982). Bad News for Anomalous Monism? Analysis 42 (October):220-4.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 58