Hayek’s Challenge is subtitled ‘an intellectual biography’ of Hayek, and the publisher describes it as ‘the first full intellectual biography’ of Hayek (front flap). But Caldwell himself appears to disagree: it was ‘never my goal’ to write ‘a comprehensive intellectual biography’ (177, note 10). Further, the book has a ‘secret title’: Caldwell’s Challenge (4). To assess what Caldwell has done, it is important to be very clear about what he was trying to do. Caldwell spells out in detail, in engaging (...) autobiographical passages, that his own interest is very much in the area of methodology; and.. (shrink)

This paper explores the main motivations behind new Keynesian macroeconomics in the last 15 years. It focuses on the two central issues of nominal rigidity and involuntary unemployment. It argues that the Walrasian paradigm is inherently incapable of making sense of these issues except in an ad hoc manner. Both of these issues require the adoption of a framework with price and wage making agents to be properly modelled. Even if the Walrasian approach might fit the facts in a superficial (...) way, it will be badly wrong about welfare effects of output fluctuations. The importance of imperfect competition from a methodological perspective is that it enables us to solve several anomalies simultaneously. (shrink)

Underlying the analytical framework of Keynes's General Theory is a comparison of capitalism and socialism in terms of risks and consequent rates of interest, rates of investment and capital accumulation, and levels of employment and output. Keynes's social philosophy and corresponding vision of macroeconomic reality biases his comparison in favor of socialism, or, more precisely, in favor of ?a comprehensive socialisation of investment.? Recognizing the significant influence of Keynes's early social philosophy on his subsequent macroeconomics? which is firmly established by (...) Allan Meltzer's ?different? interpretation of Keynes?refocuses criticism of Keynes's analytics, provides a basis for assessing other interpretations of the General Theory, and helps account for the absence of reconciliation among the modern recastings of Keynesian macroeconomics. (shrink)

Can human social cognitive processes and social motives be grasped by the methods of experimental economics? Experimental studies of strategic cognition and social preferences contribute to our understanding of the social aspects of economic decisions making. Yet, papers in this issue argue that the social aspects of decision-making introduce several difficulties for interpreting the results of economic experiments. In particular, the laboratory is itself a social context, and in many respects a rather distinctive one, which raises questions of external validity.

Comparative perspectives in development economics make extensive use of qualitative and quantitative induction together with deduction, and some-times a narrative, to bring ?facts? together in an interrelated whole. It is a method of inquiry not allied to any single ?world view? though some development economists believe that comparative perspectives (or analytical economic history) are most representative of the classical tradition in development economics. Pattern modeling which is strongly associated with the inductive approach can take account of complexity and diversity, as (...) well as uniformities, in the development experience. (shrink)

More than 25 years after the discovery that the equilibrium point of a general equilibrium model is not necessarily either unique or stable, there is still a need for an intuitively comprehensible explanation of the reasons for this discovery. Recent accounts identify two causes of the finding of instability: the inherent difficulties of aggregation, and the individualistic model of consumer behaviour. The mathematical dead end reached by general equilibrium analysis is not due to obscure or esoteric aspects of the model, (...) but rather arises from intentional design features, present in neoclassical theory since its beginnings. Modification of economic theory to overcome these underlying problems will require a new model of consumer choice, nonlinear analyses of social interactions, and recognition of the central role of institutional and social constraints. (shrink)

As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity in the complete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper proposes a notion of partial Additivity in this context, to be called µ-additivity. We find that µ-additivity, together with two quite compelling axioms, anonymity and continuity, identify the Minimal Overlap rule, introduced by Neill (1982).

This paper analyses and explicates the explanatory characteristics of Schelling's checkerboard model of segregation. It argues that the explanation of emergence of segregation which is based on the checkerboard model is a partial potential (theoretical) explanation. Yet it is also argued that despite its partiality, the checkerboard model is valuable because it improves our chances to provide better explanations of particular exemplifications of residential segregation. The paper establishes this argument by way of examining the several ways in which the checkerboard (...) model has been explored in the literature. The examination of the checkerboard model also supports the view that the relation between the real world and models is complex, and models should be considered as mediators, or as instruments of investigation. (shrink)

This paper responds to the argument, made by many heterodox economists, that equilibrium theory should be abandoned in favor of theories that pay more attention to history. It considers some of the main ways in which the concept of equilibrium has been understood in economics, and the reasons why there has been confusion in discussions of equilibrium. The conclusion is drawn that the focus should be less on equilibrium as a concept than on equilibrium analysis as a method, and limited (...) defense of this method is offered. (shrink)

The discovered preference hypothesis appears to insulate expected utility theory (EU) from disconfirming experimental evidence. It asserts that individuals have coherent underlying preferences, which experiments may not reveal unless subjects have adequate opportunities and incentives to discover which actions best satisfy their preferences. We identify the confounding effects to be expected in experiments, were that hypothesis true, and consider how they might be controlled for. We argue for a design in which each subject faces just one distinct choice task for (...) real. We review the results of some tests of EU which have used this design. These tests reveal the same violations of the independence axiom as other studies have found. We conclude that the discovered preference hypothesis does not justify scepticism about the reality of these effects. (shrink)

In this paper I ponder upon the meaning of the perfect information assumption, and argue that a distinction should be drawn between the Walrasian and Marshallian conceptions of perfect information. I show that the Marshallian conception is more demanding than the Walrasian, due to the absence of the auctioneer figure. Next, I examine a few modern imperfect information models (Friedman's expectations?augmented Phillips Curve model, Lucas' neutrality of money model, Shapiro and Stiglitz' efficiency wage model) in order to assess whether the (...) perfect information conception they depart from is the Walrasian or the Marshallian. The finding is that the first and the third are Marshallian while the second is Walrasian. Finally, I reflect on how models of general equilibrium with imperfect competition fare with respect to the Marshall?Walras divide. (shrink)

The thesis of methodological individualism in social science is commonly divided into two different claims—explanatory individualism and ontological individualism. Ontological individualism is the thesis that facts about individuals exhaustively determine social facts. Initially taken to be a claim about the identity of groups with sets of individuals or their properties, ontological individualism has more recently been understood as a global supervenience claim. While explanatory individualism has remained controversial, ontological individualism thus understood is almost universally accepted. In this paper I argue (...) that ontological individualism is false. Only if the thesis is weakened to the point that it is equivalent to physicalism can it be true, but then it fails to be a thesis about the determination of social facts by facts about individual persons. Even when individualistic facts are expanded to include people’s local environments and practices, I shall argue, those still underdetermine the social facts that obtain. If true, this has implications for explanation as well as ontology. I first consider arguments against the local supervenience of social facts on facts about individuals, correcting some flaws in existing arguments and affirming that local supervenience fails for a broad set of social properties. I subsequently apply a similar approach to defeat a particularly weak form of global supervenience, and consider potential responses. Finally, I explore why it is that people have taken ontological individualism to be true. (shrink)

Models treating the simple properties of social groups have a common shortcoming. Typically, they focus on the local properties of group members and the features of the world with which group members interact. I consider economic models of bureaucratic corruption, to show that (a) simple properties of groups are often constituted by the properties of the wider population, and (b) even sophisticated models are commonly inadequate to account for many simple social properties. Adequate models and social policies must treat certain (...) factors that are not local to individual members of the group, even if those factors are not causally connected to those individuals. Key Words: individualism • corruption • supervenience • model • cause. (shrink)

This essay explores the detailed argument of the Coase Theorem, as found in Ronald Coase’s “The Problem of Social Cost” and subsequently defended by Coase in The Firm, the Market, and the Law. Fascination with the Coase Theorem arises over its apparently unassailable counterintuitive conclusion that the imposition of legal liability has no effect on which of two competing uses of land prevails, and also over the general difficulty in tying down an unqualified statement of the theorem. Instead of entering (...) the debate over what exactly the theorem holds, this article suggests that the core of Coase’s reasoning is flawed and to the extent that any version of the theorem relies upon this reasoning it can be disproved. It is further suggested that a version of the theorem which avoided the need for Coase’s core argument by focusing on “the efficiency thesis” at the expense of “the invariance thesis” would be insufficiently significant to merit the status of a theorem; and that, in any event, Coase’s reasoning does not sustain an efficient outcome. The heart of the essay comprises the allegation of an error made by Coase when he transferred his core argument to the context of economic rents. The essay commences by considering and modelling the nature of the counter-intuitive thrust to the Coase Theorem, which is used to trace the development of Coase’s reasoning, and ultimately to expose the flaw it contains. Ancillary observations are made on the relationship between the Coasean analysis of characteristically legal problems and the conditions of general market equilibrium, and the theoretical status of law-and-economics. (shrink)

The neglect and misinterpretation of Marshall's treatment of time led many of his followers and critics to overlook the significance of the qualifications and criticisms of equilibrium analysis in his Principles. This misinterpretation arises from a failure to fully understand the purpose and method of Marshall's analysis. Marshall's methodological struggles in Principles did not arise from an attempt to preserve the concept of competitive equilibrium in a world where increasing returns are pervasive. Rather, they emanated from an attempt at providing (...) analytical tools capable of contributing to an understanding of the process of economic development that is continuous in time. Marshall was unable to resolve the conflict arising from ?biological? and ?mechanical? representations of such processes. The later critics of Marshall developed their analysis in terms of comparative static analysis of competitive equilibrium positions. The element of time had no role to play in such a setting. (shrink)

It would be very difficult to discuss the question concerning the hypothesis of omniscience in microeconomics without relating this hypothesis to the more fundamental hypothesis of rationality (usually referred to as rationality principle or postulate) which is at the base of the very idea of an economic theory and even social sciences. Indeed omniscience is a quality which was typically attributed to homo oeconomicus whose essential characteristic is to be perfectly "rational". This association between omniscience and rationality goes back to (...) the marginalist revolution which progressively brought economists to model economic agents as rational calculators who make each decision by systematically maximizing their utility through the standard application of more or less sophisticated mathematical methods. But since the very idea of such a maximization has no meaning if all relevant parameters and variables are not carefully taken into account, it became relatively common to associate omniscience (the required knowledge of such parameters and variables) and rationality (the disposition to make decisions which tend to maximize the degree of success in reaching a goal). (shrink)

The term neoclassical economics delineates a distinct and relatively homogenous school of thought in economic theory that became prominent in the late nineteenth century and that now dominates mainstream economics. The term was originally introduced by Thorstein Veblen to describe developments in the discipline (of which Veblen did not entirely approve) associated with the work of such figures as William Jevons, Carl Menger, and Leon Walras. The ambition of these figures, the first neoclassicists, was to formalize and mathematize the subject (...) in the aftermath of the so-called marginalist revolution. Economics is, according to one definition, the science that studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means that have alternative uses. Neoclassical economics pursues this study by means of supply and demand models that determine prices based on the subjective preferences of producers and consumers. Neoclassical economics relies on subjective preferences for determining prices in order to escape from the so-called objective value theory of classical economics, according to which the value of goods could be established by reference to some basic commodity (usually corn) or the labor input required to produce a good. Neoclassicists hoped that by jettisoning objective value, economics could be placed on a more scientific basis as an essentially descriptive and predictive theory of human behavior. Political theory, by contrast, involves both positive and normative elements. It is a positive science to the extent to which it aims to describe and predict political behavior. It is a normative science to the extent to which it prescribes how agents should behave in the political arena and what the best political institutions are. Neoclassical economics is relevant to both of these elements. (shrink)

The relations between rationality and optimization have been widely discussed in the wake of Herbert Simon's work, with the common conclusion that the rationality concept does not imply the optimization principle. The paper is partly concerned with adding evidence for this view, but its main, more challenging objective is to question the converse implication from optimization to rationality, which is accepted even by bounded rationality theorists. We discuss three topics in succession: (1) rationally defensible cyclical choices, (2) the revealed preference (...) theory of optimization, and (3) the infinite regress of optimization. We conclude that (1) and (2) provide evidence only for the weak thesis that rationality does not imply optimization. But (3) is seen to deliver a significant argument for the strong thesis that optimization does not imply rationality. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between modern theories of microeconomics and macroeconomics and, more generally, it evaluates the prospects of theoretically reducing macroeconomics to microeconomics. Many economists have shown strong interest in providing "microfoundations" for macroeconomics and much of their work is germane to the issue of theoretical reduction. Especially relevant is the work that has been done on what is called The Problem of Aggregation. On some accounts, The Problem of Aggregation just is the problem of reducing macroeconomics to (...) microeconomics. I show how to separate these problems and then try to determine to what extent particular kinds of solutions to The Problem of Aggregation succeed in reducing macroeconomics to microeconomics as well. I argue that reduction is not possible by this means given the current state of microeconomics. I also describe how reduction may be possible by means of (dis)aggregation if microeconomics is supplemented in a certain way with the results of experimental research on individual economic agents. (shrink)

Brief cases written as multiple choice questions can provide the basis for a classroom game based on business ethics. This teaching note describes the organization of such a game and provides five sample cases.

Economic theory has tended to reduce all social bonds and relations to forms of contract, whereas social theory has seen contracts as opposed to, and destructive of, genuine social bonds. Bruni sees these contrapositions as ideological (‘left’ against ‘right’, p. xi). His main goal is to overcome them; to show that three forms of reciprocity, covering the ideological spectrum from left to right, are complementary and simultaneously required in a healthy society. These three forms are, in his words: ‘(1) the (...) reciprocity of contract or ‘cautious’; (2) the reciprocity of friendship or philia and (3) the ‘unconditional’ reciprocity, the one more controversial . . .’ (p. x). (shrink)

While there is general agreement on the need to teach ethics in the MBA classroom, there are great difficulties in completely integrating such material within the confines of an actual MBA program. This paper attempts to address these difficulties by focusing on the teaching of such issues in one particular class — MBA macroeconomics.Ethical dilemmas often arise due to failures of the market place or due to inappropriate assumptions regarding the market model. Thus, specific suggestions are offered in regard to (...) the integration of ethical issues into the traditional macroeconomic curriculum. Suggestions are even offered as how to scale back the basic macro material so that the additional material may be accommodated. (shrink)

This paper examines the experiment in macroeconometrics, the different forms it has taken and the rules that have been proposed for its proper conduct. Here an ?experiment? means putting a question to a model and getting an answer. Different types of experiment are distinguished and the justification that can be provided for a particular choice of experiment is discussed. Three types of macroeconometric modelling are considered: the Cowles (system of equations) approach, the vector autoregressive model approach and the computational experiment. (...) JEL Classifications: B41, C5, E37. (shrink)

This paper illustrates the interplay between theory development and data analysis by considering the ability of the rational expectations hypothesis to explain the empirical cointegration structure found in the term structure. It finds that although a standard no-arbitrage theory that incorporates rational expectations can explain some of the properties of Treasury Bill yields, this theoretical explanation is incomplete. A broader-based explanation that accounts for government debt and time-varying risk premia can improve predictions of yield movements, relative to those predictions based (...) solely on a bill yield spread. (shrink)

This paper outlines some of the main methodological issues to arise in macroeconomics, making the case that the methodological issues arising in macroeconomics are just as important as those arising in microeconomics and that they merit more attention. Focusing on the symposium to which it forms the Introduction, the paper discusses three such issues: can macroeconomic theories be tested? Do macroeconomic theories change in response to evidence? Is contemporary macroeconomics in good methodological shape?

The models Feldstein and Rothschild, on the hand, and Jorgenson on the other adopted in 1974 to highlight the replacement ratio are identical. Yet, the authors reached opposite conclusions and the latter's view prevailed, which is weaker in terms of theoretical and empirical foundations. This paper argues that both puzzles may be resolved by reference to the differences in the methodological preconceptions of the authors involved, the operational advantages of the theorem of proportionality, the accumulated data that facilitate research, the (...) inertia of the status quo, the lack of a model leading to a more useful theorem, the lack of communication among economists and their aversion toward complex solutions and policy prescriptions. In this light it is concluded that the time has come for research efforts to be directed towards constructing and testing models in which the useful life of capital is determined endogenously in the presence of embodied technological change. (shrink)

Methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP), model-building and actor-network-theory (ANT) are woven together to provide a layered study of the Leontief paradox. Neil De Marchi's Lakatosian account examined the paradox within an Ohlin-Samuelson research program. A model-building approach rather highlights the ability of Leontief's input-output model to mediate between international trade theory and the world by facilitating an empirical application of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem. The epistemological implications of this model-building approach provide an alternative explanation of why Samuelson and other prominent (...) economists ignored the paradox. By focusing on the network in which input-output analysis evolved, Bruno Latour's ANT further explains the response of international trade theorists. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Cavusoglu and Tebaldi (2006) provided an evaluation of neoclassical and endogenous growth theories according to Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes. This paper offers three criticisms of their contribution as well as a rival Lakatosian appraisal of growth theories. First, we hold that Cavusoglu and Tebaldi do not provide a proper structure of theory comparison in their contribution. Second, we argue that they use an inadequate version of Lakatos's appraisal criterion. Third, against the claim (...) of the authors, we show that there are seminal endogenous growth models, which predict income convergence among countries. Finally, in contrast to Cavusoglu and Tebaldi, our analysis suggests that by Lakatos's standards, Schumpeterian variant of endogenous growth theory is both theoretically and empirically progressive over neoclassical growth theory. (shrink)

Understanding the factors determining economic growth has been a major concern for economists and governing bodies for many years. The Solow growth model and the endogenous growth models are the main theories tested and used in the growth literature. This paper discusses the main contributions to economic methodology and uses Lakatos's scientific research program framework to evaluate the main theoretical contributions to growth theory. Based on Lakatos's ideas, Solovian models are both empirically and theoretically progressive. Endogenous growth models, on the (...) other hand, are not empirically corroborated, and thus not progressive in Lakatosian sense. However, there are many reasons for rational growth economists to continue working in this field, even facing empirical refutations of an important theoretical prediction. Endogenous growth models are promising in terms of generating enormous gains that will help us better understand the mechanisms of economic growth. (shrink)

In my 1983 book, Macroeconomics after Keynes, I claimed that much that was original in Keynes was to be found not at the level of theory but in his method. Shortly afterwards, Sheila Dow's book Macroeconomic Thought (1985) introduced those of us who are not specialist methodologists to what she called the ?mode of thought?. In that book, and subsequently, it has become clear that differences in approach between those who take their inspiration from Keynes and Kalecki and those I (...) shall loosely describe as neoclassicists lie at the level of mode of thought. Almost all post?Keynesians say that Keynes's General Theory is founded on a concern with time, uncertainty and organicism ? features of Keynes's mode of thought. Yet, as far as I know, no one has shown precisely what the relationships are between the identifiable aspects of Keynes's mode of thought and his method and theory. This is the task that this paper sets itself. I identify four key theoretical contributions and their corollaries, and show how they are related to the deeper levels of method and mode of thought. This exercise is contrasted with the three?level structure of typical neoclassical macroeconomic theory. The underlying purpose is to help modern theory develop in a fruitful way. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to explore the potential for using fuzzy logic to analyse economic decision?making under Keynesian uncertainty, and in particular in circumstances where variety of opinion is important. Fuzzy logic is shown to apply where expectations may differ because the nature of the subject matter impedes any ?crisp? way of describing the underlying variables. The particular case of the speculative demand for money is considered, since it explicitly reflects variety of opinion as to whether interest rates (...) are ?high? or ?low? (shrink)

Monetary authorities have been implicated in the financial crisis of 2007?2008. John Muellbauer, for example, has blamed what he thought was initially inadequate policy responses by central banks to the crisis on their models, which are, in his words, ?overdue for the scrap heap?. This paper investigates the role of monetary policy models in the crisis and finds that (i) it is likely that monetary policy contributed to the financial crisis; and (ii) that an inappropriately narrow suite of models made (...) this mistake easier. The core models currently used at prominent central banks were not designed to discover emergent financial fragility. In that respect John Muellbauer is right. But the implications drawn here are less dramatic than his: while the representative agent approach to micro-foundations now seems indefensible, other aspects of modern macroeconomics are not similarly suspect. The case made here is rather for expanding the suite of models used in the regular deliberations of monetary authorities, with new models that give explicit roles to the financial sector, to money and to the process of exchange. Recommending a suite of models for policy making entails no methodological innovation. That is what central banks do; though, of course, how they do it is open to improvement. The methodological innovation is the inclusion of a model that would be sensitive to financial fragility, a sensitivity that was absent in the run-up to the current financial crisis. (shrink)

The book under review is critiqued with regard to its adherence, modification, and departure from John Maynard Keynes’s position. This review is weighted to emphasizing the role of "expectation" in Keynes’s work and its role in the book under review. The review seeks to develop an interpretation of the "psychology of society" or "structural rationality" in Keynes’s work and contrasts this with the positions of the authors in the book under review. Following this Keynes’s work is advocated as being highly (...) malleable and a corpus that can illuminate further research and policy prescription. (shrink)

This paper examines some economic forecasts made in late 1930 that were intended to predict economic activity in the United States in order to shed light on several methodological issues. We document that these forecasts were extremely optimistic, predicting that the recession in the US would soon end, and that 1931 would show a recovery. These forecasts displayed egregious errors, because 1931 witnessed the largest negative growth rate for the US economy in any year in the twentieth century. A specific (...) question is what led forecasters to make such serious and substantial empirical errors. A second more general issue involves the methodology of forecasting. The 1930 forecasts were sometimes based on explicit analogies with previous serious business cycles. Modern forecasting approaches are based on techniques that may not be recognized as analogies. Using the 1930 forecasts, we examine the implicit?analogy content of forecasts, and what might render such implicit analogies valid or invalid. This 1930 forecast example also resonates beyond the confines of economic methodology because forecasts about the Great Depression are of continuing interest to the profession at large, and we produce a forecast series not previously available. (shrink)

The dominant view among macroeconomists is that macroeconomics reduces to microeconomics - both in the sense that all macroeconomic phenomena arise out of microeconomic phenomena and in the sense that macroeconomic theory - to the extent that it is correct - can be derived from microeconomic theory. More than that the dominant view believes that macroeconomics should in practice used the reduced microeconomic theory: this is the program of microfoundations for macroeconomics to which the vast majority of macroeconomists adhere. The (...) "microfoundational" models that they actually employ are, however, characterized by another feature: they are highly idealized, even when they are applied as direct characterizations of actual data, which itself consists of macroeconomic aggregates. This paper explores the interrelationship between reductionism and idealization in the microfoundational program and the role of idealization in empirical modeling. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between modern theories of microeconomics and macroeconomics and, more generally, it evaluates the prospects of theoretically reducing macroeconomics to microeconomics. Many economists have shown strong interest in providing "microfoundations" for macroeconomics and much of their work is germane to the issue of theoretical reduction. Especially relevant is the work that has been done on what is called The Problem of Aggregation. On some accounts, The Problem of Aggregation just is the problem of reducing macroeconomics to (...) microeconomics. I show how to separate these problems and then try to determine to what extent particular kinds of solutions to The Problem of Aggregation succeed in reducing macroeconomics to microeconomics as well. I argue that reduction is not possible by this means given the current state of microeconomics. I also describe how reduction may be possible by means of (dis)aggregation if microeconomics is supplemented in a certain way with the results of experimental research on individual economic agents. (shrink)

The implications for how teach macroeconomics at the undergraduate level of the emergence of the multidisciplinary study of nonlinear complex dynamics are examined. A definition of complex dynamics is presented and a broad review of various applications in macroeconomics is made. Some particular implications are emphasized such as how complex dynamics raise serious doubts about the rational expectations assumption. Several models and approaches are suggested that can be used to make these ideas accessble to students.

This survey of the symposium papers argues that the problem of data mining should be of interest to both practicing econometricians and specialists in economic methodology. After summarizing some of the main points to arise in the symposium, it draws on recent work in the philosophy of science to point to parallels between data mining and practices engaged in routinely by experimental scientists. These suggest that data mining might be seen in a more positive light than conventional doubts about it (...) imply. (shrink)

Cartwright (1989) and Humphreys (1989) have suggested theories of probabilistic causation for singular events, which are based on modifications of traditional causal linear modelling. On the basis of her theory, Cartwright offered an allegedly local, and non-factorizable, common-cause model for the EPR experiment. In this paper I consider Cartwright's and Humphrey's theories. I argue that, provided plausible assumptions obtain, local models for EPR in the framework of these theories are committed to Bell inequalities, which are violated by experiment.

Methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP), model-building and actor-network-theory (ANT) are woven together to provide a layered study of the Leontief paradox. Neil De Marchi's Lakatosian account examined the paradox within an Ohlin-Samuelson research program. A model-building approach rather highlights the ability of Leontief's input-output model to mediate between international trade theory and the world by facilitating an empirical application of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem. The epistemological implications of this model-building approach provide an alternative explanation of why Samuelson and other prominent (...) economists ignored the paradox. By focusing on the network in which input-output analysis evolved, Bruno Latour's ANT further explains the response of international trade theorists. (shrink)

Davis argues that Suppe's semantic conception provides a better understanding of the problem of theory?data confrontations. Applying his semantic methodology to the LSE (London School of Economics) approach of econometrics, he concludes that the LSE approach fails to address the issue of bridging the theory?data gap. This paper suggests two other versions of the semantic view of theories in the philosophy of science, due to Suppes and van Fraassen, and argues that the LSE approach can be construed under these two (...) versions of the semantic view in terms of structure and representation. (shrink)

While there exist numerous applications of Kuhn's analysis of scientific revolutions to economics, there is yet to be an application to econometrics. The present paper addresses this via an analysis of the often-documented transition between the textbook and LSE methodologies witnessed in British time series econometrics. This exercise allows a number of issues to be raised. First, it will be questioned whether the observed transition in econometrics is an appropriate subject for analysis within the Kuhnian framework. This is the primary (...) concern of the paper. Second, the adoption of Kuhn's approach will allow the witnessed transition in econometric methodology to be viewed from a different perspective to that permitted by more conventional historical accounts. This is seen to lead a number of interesting conclusions. Third, implications of the present study for Kuhn's analysis will be discussed. (shrink)

A positive view of data-mining has been recently presented in a Journal of Economic Methodology ( JEM ) symposium. This is in stark contrast to the stance normally taken. In this note consideration of the Bayesian philosophy of science literature and the impact of data revision extends the analysis of data-mining. Introduction of these issues is seen to provide support for the arguments presented in the JEM symposium.

The philosophy of science literature has played an increasing role in discussion of econometric methodology in recent years, and the Hendry methodology in particular has received much attention. Despite this, the encompassing principle has been overlooked in the methodological literature. This paper addresses this by examining the major methodological implications of the principle.

The reply by Cook and comment by Chao demonstrate Kuhn's thesis that different scientists place different values on different components of their common discipline. This fact is demonstrated by first succinctly summarizing Cook's and my original points within the framework of a simple choice model. I then respond to Cook and Chao. I close by offering some suggestions on how the Textbook/LSE debate could be moved forward.

In a recent article, Cook conducted a Kuhnian analysis of the difference between the Textbook and LSE econometric approaches. This paper uses a semantic conception of theories (Suppe 1989) and a finer gradation of the theory of reduction process to clarify the apparent puzzle that exist between the Textbook and LSE approaches to econometrics. The paper demonstrates that a Kuhnian analysis in isolation can be more misleading than realized.

Trygve Haavelmo's 1944 article ‘The Probability Approach in Econometrics’ is considered by most to have provided the foundations for present day econometrics (Morgan, 1990, Chapters 8 and 9). Since Haavelmo (1944), extraordinary advances have been made in econometrics. However, over the last two decades the efficacy and scientific status of econometrics has become questionable. Not surprisingly, the growing discontent with econometrics has been accompanied by a growing interest in econometric methodology.

This paper argues that econometricians' explicit adoption of identification conditions in structural equation modelling commits them to read the functional form of their equations in a strong, nonmathematical way. This content, which is implicitly attributed to the functional form of structural equations, is part of what makes equation structural. Unfortunately, econometricians are not explicit about the role functional form plays in signifying structural content. In order to remedy this, the second part of this paper presents an interpretation of the functional (...) form based on Herbert Simon's definition of causal order. This begins to set out just what the functional form of structural equations represents. ‡I would like to thank Nancy Cartwright and attendants at UCSD Graduate Seminar 2006 for helpful comments. I also want to thank the AHRC for supporting the research for this paper. †To contact the author, please write to: Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom; e-mail: d.j.fennell@lse.ac.uk. (shrink)

This paper examines some economic forecasts made in late 1930 that were intended to predict economic activity in the United States in order to shed light on several methodological issues. We document that these forecasts were extremely optimistic, predicting that the recession in the US would soon end, and that 1931 would show a recovery. These forecasts displayed egregious errors, because 1931 witnessed the largest negative growth rate for the US economy in any year in the twentieth century. A specific (...) question is what led forecasters to make such serious and substantial empirical errors. A second more general issue involves the methodology of forecasting. The 1930 forecasts were sometimes based on explicit analogies with previous serious business cycles. Modern forecasting approaches are based on techniques that may not be recognized as analogies. Using the 1930 forecasts, we examine the implicit?analogy content of forecasts, and what might render such implicit analogies valid or invalid. This 1930 forecast example also resonates beyond the confines of economic methodology because forecasts about the Great Depression are of continuing interest to the profession at large, and we produce a forecast series not previously available. (shrink)

This paper argues classical statistics and standard econometrics are based on a desire to meet scientific standards for accumulating reliable knowledge. Science requires two inputs, mining of existing data for inspiration and new or 'out-of-sample' data for predictive testing. Avoidance of data-mining is neither possible nor desirable. In economics out-of-sample data is relatively scarce, so the production process should intensively exploit the existing data. But the two inputs should be thought of as complements rather than substitutes. And we neglect the (...) importance of out-of-sample testing in the production of reliable knowledge. Avoidance of data-mining is not a substitute for tests conducted in new samples. The problem is not that data-mining corrupts the process, the problem is our collective neglect of out-of-sample encompassing, stability and forecast tests. So the data-mining issue diverts us from the crucial margin. (shrink)

The New Institutional Economics (NIE) occupies an important space in the rapidly expanding theory of organization. Traditional testing techniques have only been applied to less complex parts of the NIE. A rich body of evidence generated by the experiences of firms and other organizations lies fallow. The limited domain of traditional testing will persist because of the nature of the central concepts of the NIE, the difficulty posed for integrating transaction cost into an optimizing framework by self-reference, and the particularly (...) wicked manifestations of the Duhem-Quine problem. Experimental economics may add credibility to some components of the NIE but is unlikely to fill the current void. The catchy title, the telling anecdote, and the creative 'fact' have played a disproportionate role in determining the composition of the canonical literature in the NIE. Catalytic steps for developing professional norms governing the marshalling of data generated by different organizations and institutions are discussed in the concluding section. (shrink)

This paper examines the experiment in macroeconometrics, the different forms it has taken and the rules that have been proposed for its proper conduct. Here an ?experiment? means putting a question to a model and getting an answer. Different types of experiment are distinguished and the justification that can be provided for a particular choice of experiment is discussed. Three types of macroeconometric modelling are considered: the Cowles (system of equations) approach, the vector autoregressive model approach and the computational experiment. (...) JEL Classifications: B41, C5, E37. (shrink)

This paper argues that Isaac Levi's account of preference reversals is only a limited success. Levi succeeds in showing that an agent acting in accord with his theory may exhibit reversals. Nevertheless, the specific account that Levi presents in order to accommodate the behavior of experimental subjects appears to be disconfirmed by available evidence.

Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) argue that neuroeconomics is evidentially and explanatorily irrelevant to economics, because neuroeconomics and economics ask different questions and utilize different abstractions. They suggest neuroeconomics is only relevant as a source of inspiration for economists. The present paper accepts their basic premise and asks whether the fact that neuroeconomics and economics ask different questions implies that neuroeconomics is irrelevant. The paper argues that Gul and Pesendorfer overlook some important respects in which neuroeconomics is relevant for economics. First, (...) neuroeconomics can improve singular explanations in economics. Second, and more importantly, it improves our understanding of economic phenomena. And finally, it helps us assess the plausibility of our conjectures concerning economic phenomena. It may be true that neuroeconomics will not revolutionize economics (at least in the short run), but it is more than a source of inspiration. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that experimental economists do not have to worry about external validity so long as the design sticks closely to a theoretical model. This position mistakes the model for the theory. As a result, applied economics designs often study phenomena distinct from their stated objects of inquiry. Because the implemented models are abstract, they may provide improbable analogues to their stated subject matter. This problem is exacerbated by the relational character of the social world, which also sets (...) epistemic limits for the social science laboratory more generally. (shrink)

A neglected critique of social science laboratories alleges that they implement phenomena different to those supposedly under investigation. The critique purports to be conceptual and so invulnerable to a technical solution. I argue that it undermines some economics designs seeking to implement features of real societies, and counsels more modesty in experimental write?ups. It also constitutes a plausible argument that laboratory economics experiments are necessarily less demonstrative than natural scientific ones. More radical sceptical conclusions are unwarranted.

Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding (...) the punishment of distrusting behavior in a trust game. Our results show that people do not behave as though trust is a norm. Our participants expected that most people would not punish untrusting investors, regardless of whether the potential trustee was a stranger or a friend. In contrast, our participants behaved as though being trustworthy is a norm. Most participants believed that most people would punish someone who failed to reciprocate a stranger’s or a friend’s trust. We conclude that, while we were able to reproduce previous results establishing that there is a norm of reciprocity, we found no evidence for a corresponding norm of trust, even among friends. (shrink)

University of Pennsylvania, USA, el322{at}nyu.edu ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> One of the most consistent findings in experimental studies of social dilemmas is the positive influence of face-to-face communication on cooperation. The face-to-face `communication effect' has been recently explained in terms of a `focus theory of norms': successful communication focuses agents on pro-social norms, and induces preferences and expectations conducive to cooperation. 1 Many of the studies that point to a communication effect, however, do not (...) further explore whether and to what extent the communication medium affects cooperative behavior. In this article, we ask if pro-social behavior can emerge and survive in computer-mediated environments. We show that, like face-to-face communication, computer-mediated communication also positively affects cooperation in social dilemmas, but cooperation is more difficult to establish and maintain. We argue that the discrepancy between the computer-mediated and the face-to-face communication effects is a consequence of the distinct capabilities of different media to focus agents on pro-social norms and to allow them to develop mutual expectations about future behavior. Key Words: social dilemmas • laboratory experiments • communication • social norms • cooperation • computer-mediated communication. (shrink)

Where should experimental economics go next? This paper uses the literature on inequity aversion as a case study in suggesting that we could profit from tightening up our act.

Our paper “Experimental Economics: Where Next?” contains a case study of Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt’s work in which it is shown that the claims they make for the theory of inequity aversion are not supported by their data. The current issue of JEBO contains two replies, one from Fehr and Schmidt1 themselves, and the other from Catherine Eckel and Herb Gintis. Neither reply challenges any claims we make about matters of fact in our critique of Fehr and Schmidt on (...) inequity aversion, although it is clear that if they could have refuted any single factual sentence then they would have done so. Both replies therefore implicitly concede that the facts quoted in our case study are correct. All the other issues raised in the two replies are just so much dust kicked up to distract attention from the only question that matters: Is it scientific to proceed like Fehr and Schmidt or is it not? Fehr and Schmidt say yes. So do Eckel and Gintis. The implications are quite far-reaching for those like us who think it is obvious that the answer is no. What other claims asserted by the school of Gintis et al can we trust? (shrink)

The contest between rational and behavioral finance is poorly understood as a contest over 'testability' and 'predictive success.' In fact, neither rational nor behavioral finance offer much in the way of testable predictions of improving precision. Researchers in the rational paradigm seem to have abandoned testability and prediction in favor of a scheme of ex post 'rationalizations' of observed price behavior. These rationalizations, however, have an unemphasized relevance for behavioral finance. While behavioral finance advocates may justly criticize rationalizations as unlikely (...) to lead to a science of financial economics with improving predictive power, rational finance's explanatory power plays a key role supporting the limits of arbitrage arguments that make behavioral finance possible. (shrink)