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  1. Selim Berker (2009). The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience. Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (4):293-329.
    It has been claimed that the recent wave of neuroscientific research into the physiological underpinnings of our moral intuitions has normative implications. In particular, it has been claimed that this research discredits our deontological intuitions about cases, without discrediting our consequentialist intuitions about cases. In this paper I demur. I argue that such attempts to extract normative conclusions from neuroscientific research face a fundamental dilemma: either they focus on the emotional or evolved nature of the psychological processes underlying deontological intuitions, (...)
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  2. Tim Christie (2009). Natural Separateness: Why Parfit's Reductionist Account of Persons Fails to Support Consequentialism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2):178-195.
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  3. Andrew Gleeson (2005). Pettit on Consequentialism and Universalizability. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (3):261-275.
    Philip Pettit has argued that universalizability entails consequentialism. I criticise the argument for relying on a question-begging reading of the impartiality of universalization. A revised form of the argument can be constructed by relying on preference-satisfaction rationality, rather than on impartiality. But this revised argument succumbs to an ambiguity in the notion of a preference (or desire). I compare the revised argument to an earlier argument of Pettit’s for consequentialism that appealed to the theoretical virtue of simplicity, and I raise (...)
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  4. Frances Howard-Snyder (1996). A New Argument for Consequentialism? A Reply to Sinnott-Armstrong. Analysis 56 (2):111–115.
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  5. Leonard Kahn (2013). Rule Consequentialism and Disasters. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):219-236.
    Rule consequentialism (RC) is the view that it is right for A to do F in C if and only if A's doing F in C is in accordance with the the set of rules which, if accepted by all, would have consequences which are better than any alternative set of rules (i.e., the ideal code). I defend RC from two related objections. The first objection claims that RC requires obedience to the ideal code even if doing so has disastrous (...)
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  6. Leonard Kahn (2010). Review of "Essays on Derek Parfit's ON WHAT MATTERS&Quot;. [REVIEW] Metapsychology 14 (24).
  7. Whitley R. P. Kaufman (1999). The Lion's Den, Othello, and the Limits of Consequentialism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):539-557.
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  8. Joel J. Kupperman (1981). A Case For Consequentialism. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (October):305-313.
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  9. Tim Mawson (2002). Mill's Proof. Philosophy 77 (3):375-405.
    This paper constitutes a suggested route through the well-trodden minefield that is Mill's proof of Utilitarianism. A deductive course—tramping gamely straight across from an egoistic psychological hedonism to a disinterested ethical hedonism—would seemingly be the most hazardous route across the terrain. Thus, it has become standard policy amongst guides to advise readers of Utilitarianism that this is a route which Mill neither needs nor attempts to take. I shall argue that in travelling down this route one can avoid the dangers (...)
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  10. Dale E. Miller (2004). On Millgram on Mill. Utilitas 16 (1):96-108.
    In a recent article in Ethics, Elijah Millgram presents a novel reconstruction of J. S. Mill's ‘proof’ of the principle of utility. Millgram's larger purpose is to critique instrumentalist approaches to practical reasoning. His reading of the proof makes Mill out to be an instrumentalist, and Millgram thinks that the ultimate failure of Mill's argument usefully illustrates an inconsistency inherent in instrumentalism. Yet Millgram's interpretation of the proof does not succeed. Mill is not an instrumentalist. Millgram may be right that (...)
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  11. Robert Noggle (2003). Resisting the Seductive Appeal of Consequentialism: Goals, Options, and Non-Quantitative Mattering. Utilitas 15 (03):279-.
    Impartially Optimizing Consequentialism (IOC) requires agents to act so as to bring about the best outcome, as judged by a preference ordering which is impartial among the needs and interests of all persons. IOC may seem to be only rational response to the recognition that one is only one person among many others with equal intrinsic moral status. A person who adopts a less impartial deontological alternative to IOC may seem to fail to take seriously the fact that other persons (...)
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  12. Daniel Nolan (2009). Consequentialism and Side Constraints. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (1):5-22.
    Many people are inclined to think that consequences of actions, or perhaps reasonably expected consequences of those actions, have moral weight. Firing off shotguns in crowded areas is typically wrong, at least in part, because of the people who get maimed and killed. Committed consequentialists think that consequences (either actual consequences, or expected consequences, or intended consequences, or reasonably expected consequences, or maybe some other different shade) are all that matters, morally speaking. Lying and stealing are wrong, when they are (...)
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  13. Philip Pettit (2000). Non-Consequentialism and Universalizability. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):175-190.
    If non-consequentialists are to embrace the requirement of universalizability, then they will have to adopt a surprisingly relativistic stance. Not only will they say, in familiar vein, that the premises adduced in moral argument may be only agent-relative in force, that is, may involve the use of an indexical – as in the consideration that this or that option would advance my commitments, discharge my duty, or benefit my children – and may provide reasons only for the indexically relevant agent, (...)
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  14. Douglas W. Portmore, Consequentializing Commonsense Morality.
    This is Chapter 4 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that that any plausible nonconsequentialist theory can be consequentialized, which is to say that, for any plausible nonconsequentialist theory, we can construct a consequentialist theory that yields the exact same set of deontic verdicts that it yields.
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  15. Douglas W. Portmore (2011). Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. Oxford University Press.
    This is a book on morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, I defend a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons.
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  16. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Bertil Strömberg (1996). What If I Were in His Shoes? On Hare's Argument for Preference Utilitarianism. Theoria 62 (1-2):95-123.
    This paper discusses the argument for preference utilitarianism proposed by Richard Hare in Moral Thinking(Hare, 1981). G. F. Schueler (1984) and Ingmar Persson (1989) identified a serious gap in Hare’s reasoning, which might be called the No-Conflict Problem. The paper first tries to fill the gap. Then, however, starting with an idea of Zeno Vendler, the question is raised whether the gap is there to begin with. Unfortunately, this Vendlerian move does not save Hare from criticism. Paradoxically, it instead endangers (...)
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  17. D. D. Raphael (1994). J. S. Mill's Proof of the Principle of Utility. Utilitas 6 (01):55-.
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  18. Michael Ridge (1998). How to Avoid Being Driven to Consequentialism: A Comment on Norcross. Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1):50–58.
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  19. Samuel Scheffler (ed.) (1988). Consequentialism and its Critics. Oxford University Press.
    In this anthology, distinguished scholars--Thomas Nagel, T.M. Scanlon, John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Samuela Scheffler, Conrad D. Johnson, Bernard Williams, Peter Railton, Amartya Sen, Philippa Foot, and Derek Parfit-- debate arguments for and against the moral doctrine of consequentialism to present a complete view of this important topic in moral philosophy.
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  20. Kieran Setiya (forthcoming). Wrong-Making Reasons. In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Reading Parfit: On What Matters. Routledge.
    Argues that there is a problem of redundancy for Kantian Contractualism in light of plausible claims about the reason-giving force of wrong-making facts.
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  21. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2009). How Strong is This Obligation? An Argument for Consequentialism From Concomitant Variation. Analysis 69 (3):438-442.
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  22. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1992). An Argument for Consequentialism. Philosophical Perspectives 6:399-421.
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  23. David Sosa (1993). Consequences of Consequentialism. Mind 102 (405):101-122.
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  24. Beckett Sterner (2012). Agent-Based Computer Simulation and Ethics. [REVIEW] Metascience 21 (2):403-407.
    Agent-based computer simulation and ethics Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11016-012-9660-7 Authors Beckett Sterner, Conceptual and Historical Studies of Science, The University of Chicago, Social Sciences Building 205, 1126 E 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  25. Anne Stubbs (1981). The Pros and Cons of Consequentialism. Philosophy 56 (218):497 - 516.
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  26. Alan Thomas, Consequentialism and the Subversion of Pluralism.
    This paper critically analyses Brad Hooker's attempt to undercut pluralism by arguing that any plausible set of prima facie duties can be derived from a more fundamental rule consequentialist principle. It is argued that this conclusion is foreshadowed by the rationalist and epistemologically realist interpretation that Hooker imposes on his chosen methodology of reflective equilibrium; he is not describing pluralism in its strongest and most plausible version and a more plausible version of pluralism is described and defended.
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