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  1. J. Almog (2005). 'What Am I?' Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem - Reply. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):717-734.
    In his Meditations, René Descartes asks, "what am I?" His initial answer is "a man." But he soon discards it: "But what is a man? Shall I say 'a rational animal'? No: for then I should inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one question would lead down the slope to harder ones." Instead of understanding what a man is, Descartes shifts to two new questions: "What is Mind?" and "What is Body?" These questions develop (...)
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  2. William P. Alston & Thomas W. Smythe (1994). Swinburne's Argument for Dualism. Faith and Philosophy 11 (1):127-33.
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  3. Jonny Anomaly (2012). Is Obesity a Public Health Problem? Public Health Ethics 5 (3):216-221.
    It is often claimed that there is an obesity epidemic in affluent countries, and that obesity is one of the most serious public health threats in the developed world. I will argue that obesity is not an 'epidemic' in any useful sense of the word, and that classifying it as a public health problem requires us to make fairly controversial moral and empirical assumptions. While evidence suggests that the prevalence of obesity is on the rise, and that obesity can lead (...)
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  4. Andrew R. Bailey, Consciousness and the Embodied Self.
    This paper deals with the relationship between the embodied cognition paradigm and two sets of its implications: its implications for the ontology of selves, and its implications for the nature and extent of phenomenal consciousness. There has been a recent wave of interest within cognitive science in the paradigm variously called ‘embodied,’ ‘extended,’ ‘situated’ or ‘distributed’ cognition. Although ideas applied in the embodied cognition research program can be traced back to the work of Heidegger, Piaget, Vygotsky, Merleau-Ponty, and Dewey, the (...)
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  5. B. L. Blose (1981). Materialism and Disembodied Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (September):59-74.
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  6. Wesley Buckwalter & Mark Phelan (2014). Phenomenal Consciousness Disembodied. In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. Bloomsbury. 45-74.
    We evaluate the role of embodiment in ordinary mental state ascriptions. Presented are five experiments on phenomenal state ascriptions to disembodied entities such as ghosts and spirits. Results suggest that biological embodiment is not a central principle of folk psychology guiding ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness. By contrast, results continue to support the important role of functional considerations in theory of mind judgments.
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  7. Stephen Burwood (2008). The Apparent Truth of Dualism and the Uncanny Body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):263-278.
    It has been suggested that our experiences of embodiment in general appear to constitute an experiential ground for dualist philosophy and that this is particularly so with experiences of dissociation, in which one feels estranged from one’s body. Thus, Drew Leder argues that these play “a crucial role in encouraging and supporting Cartesian dualism” as they “seem to support the doctrine of an immaterial mind trapped inside an alien body”. In this paper I argue that as dualism does not capture (...)
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  8. L. S. Carrier (1974). Definitions and Disembodied Minds. Personalist Forum 55:334-43.
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  9. David J. Cole & F. Foelber (1984). Contingent Materialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65:74-85.
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  10. Kevin Corcoran (ed.) (2001). Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Cornell University Press.
    This collection brings together cutting-edge research on the metaphysics of human nature and soul-body dualism.Kevin Corcoran's collection, Soul, Body, and ...
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  11. Kevin J. Corcoran (1998). Persons and Bodies. Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):324-340.
    Defenders of a priori arguments for dualism assume that the Cartesian thesis that possibly, I exist but no bodies exist and the physicalist thesis that I am identical with my body, are logically inconsistent. Trenton Merricks offers an argument for the compatibility of those theses. In this paper I examine several objections to Merricks’ argument. I show that none is ultimately persuasive. Nevertheless I claim that Merricks’ argument should not be accepted. I next propose a view of persons that is (...)
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  12. George F. Englebretsen (1974). More on Disembodied Minds. Philosophical Papers 3 (May):48-50.
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  13. George F. Englebretsen (1972). Armstrong on Disembodied Minds. Dialogue 11 (December):576-579.
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  14. David Estes (2006). Evidence for Early Dualism and a More Direct Path to Afterlife Beliefs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):470-+.
    Ample evidence for dualism in early childhood already exists. Young children have explicit knowledge of the distinction between mental and physical phenomena, which provides the foundation for a rapidly developing theory of mind. Belief in psychological immortality might then follow naturally from this mentalistic conception of human existence and thus require no organized cognitive system dedicated to producing it.
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  15. Nicholas Everitt (2000). Substance Dualism and Disembodied Existence. Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):333-347.
    Substance dualism, that most unpopular of current theories of mind, continues to find interesting and able defenders.1 I shall focus on one set of arguments supplied by one of the current defenders, and I shall argue that these arguments fail. That in itself is a matter of some interest, since it is always reassuring to be able to demonstrate that unpopular doctrines are rightly unpopular. But I hope that a further interest will attach to the refutation, in that it will (...)
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  16. Grant R. Gillett (1986). Disembodied Persons. Philosophy 61 (July):377-386.
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  17. Stewart C. Goetz (2001). Modal Dualism: A Critique. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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  18. Philip Goff (2010). Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have More to Fear From Ghosts Than Zombies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):119-139.
    Zombies are bodies without minds: creatures that are physically identical to actual human beings, but which have no conscious experience. Much of the consciousness literature focuses on considering how threatening philosophical reflection on such creatures is to physicalism. There is not much attention given to the converse possibility, the possibility of minds without bodies, that is, creatures who are conscious but whose nature is exhausted by their being conscious. We can call such a ‘purely conscious’ creature a ghost.
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  19. William D. Hart (1988). The Engines of the Soul. Cambridge University Press.
    Dr Hart sets out to answer this question by showing that the issue is as much about the nature of causation as it is about the natures of mind and matter.
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  20. Max O. Hocutt (1974). Armstrong and Strawson on 'Disembodied Existence'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (September):46-59.
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  21. Robert A. Jaeger (1978). Brain/Body Dualism. Philosophical Studies 34 (November):427-435.
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  22. J. Jones (2004). Cartesian Conceivings. Metaphysica 5 (1):135-50.
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  23. C. Lewy (1943). Is the Notion of Disembodied Existence Self-Contradictory? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 43:59-78.
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  24. Douglas C. Long (1977). Disembodied Existence, Physicalism, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Studies 31 (May):307-316.
    The idea that we may continue to exist in a bodiless condition after our death has long played an important role in beliefs about immortality, ultimate rewards and punishments, the transmigration of souls, and the like. There has also been long and heated disagreement about whether the idea of disembodied existence even makes sense, let alone whether anybody can or does survive dissolution of his material form. It may seem doubtful that anything new could be added to the debate at (...)
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  25. Douglas C. Long (1969). Descartes' Argument for Mind-Body Dualism. Philosophical Forum 1:259-273.
    [p. 259] After establishing his own existence by the Cogito argument, Descartes inquires into the nature of the self that he claims to know with certainty to exist. He concludes that he is a res cogitans, an unextended entity whose essence is to be conscious. Although a considerable amount of critical effort has been expended in attempts to show how he thought he could move to this important conclusion, his reasoning has remained quite unconvincing. In particular, his critics have insisted, (...)
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  26. Trenton Merricks (1994). A New Objection to A Priori Arguments for Dualism. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1):81-85.
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  27. Douglas Odegard (1970). Disembodied Existence and Central State Materialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (August):256-60.
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  28. D. Pecnjak (1995). Remarks on Disembodied Existence. Acta Analytica 10 (13):209-13.
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  29. Alvin Plantinga (2006). Against Materialism. Faith and Philosophy 23 (1):3-32.
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  30. Sydney Shoemaker (1983). On an Argument for Dualism. In Carl A. Ginet & Sydney Shoemaker (eds.), Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
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  31. Brian J. Smart (1971). Can Disembodied Persons Be Spatially Located? Analysis 31 (March):133-138.
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  32. Thomas W. Smythe (1989). Disembodied Minds and Personal Identity. Philosophy Research Archives 14:415-423.
    Discussion of the human soul has bulked large in the literature of philosophy and religion. I defend the possibility of disembodied Cartesian minds by examining the criticisms of three philosophers who argue that there are serious difficulties about any attempt to account for the identity of such Cartesian minds through time. I argue that their criticisms of the possibility of disembodied minds are damaging but not fatal. I hold that the central issue behind their criticisms of Cartesian minds is whether (...)
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  33. David A. Spieler (1974). Central State Materialism, Dualism, and Disembodied Existence. Personalist 55:354-355.
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  34. Galen Strawson (2006). Panpsychism? Reply to Commentators with a Celebration of Descartes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):184-280.
  35. Eleonore Stump & Norman Kretzmann (1996). An Objection to Swinburne's Argument for Dualism. Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):405-412.
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  36. Richard Swinburne (1997). The Modal Argument for Substance Dualism. In The Evolution of the Soul. (Revised Edition).
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  37. Richard Swinburne (1986). The Evolution of the Soul. Oxford University Press.
    This is a revised and updated version of Swinburne's controversial treatment of the eternal philosophical problem of the relation between mind and body. He argues that we can only make sense of the interaction between the mental and the physical in terms of the soul, and that there is no scientific explanation of the evolution of the soul.
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  38. Charles Taliaferro (1997). Possibilities in the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):127-37.
    This paper seeks to overturn the claim that Cartesian arguments for dualism based on the conceivable separation of person and body lack warrant, since it is just as conceivable that persons are identical with their bodies as it is that persons and their bodies are distinct. If the thesis of the paper is cogent, then it is not as easy to imagine person-body identity as many anti-Cartesians suppose.
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  39. Charles Taliaferro (1986). A Modal Argument for Dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):95-108.
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  40. Paul Tidman (1994). Conceivability as a Test for Possibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (4):297-309.
  41. Michael Tye (1983). On the Possibility of Disembodied Existence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (September):275-282.
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  42. James van Cleve (1983). Conceivability and the Cartesian Argument for Dualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):35-45.
  43. Stephen Yablo (1993). Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1-42.
  44. D. Zimmerman (1991). Two Cartesian Arguments for the Simplicity of the Soul. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (July):127-37.
    The most well-known arguments for the simplicity of the soul - i.e., for the thesis that the subject of psychological states must be an unextended substance -are based upon the logical possibility of disembodiment. Descartes introduced this sort of argument into modern philosophy, and a version of it has been defended recently by Richard Swinburne. Some of the underlying assumptions of both arguments are examined and defended, but a closer look reveals that each depends upon unjustified inferences from the conceivability (...)
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