What is the relation between time and change? Does time depend on the mind? Is the present always the same or is it always different? Aristotle tackles these questions in the Physics. In the first book in English exclusively devoted to this discussion, Ursula Coope argues that Aristotle sees time as a universal order within which all changes are related to each other. This interpretation enables her to explain two striking Aristotelian claims: that the now is like a moving thing, (...) and that time depends for its existence on the mind. (shrink)

The Nicomachean Ethics announces itself as a treatise on the highest human good, the “end” (t°low) of human life—eÈdaiµon€a or happiness. In the last chapter of the work (X 9) Aristotle makes it clear that the study of the happy lives of contemplation and political leadership, the virtues, friendship, and pleasure that has by then been carried out in investigating that good—these are the leading themes of the Ethics that he mentions there (1179a33-35)— leaves the treatise’s objectives not yet completely (...) achieved. He began the work by saying (I 1- 2) that the study it contains is intended as a contribution to “political knowledge” (politikØ §pistƵh) or the political capacity or power (dÊnaµiw).1 Its work will not be complete, he now says, until a successful reader (or hearer) has been brought actually to possess that knowledge or power—political knowledge, that is, the fully accomplished capacity for expert political engagement in affairs of state. In effect, the reader of the Nicomachean Ethics needs now to learn, further, the subjects of study to which Aristotle’s own Politics is devoted. Before the aim announced at the beginning of the Ethics can be achieved—that is, before we can fully define and explain in the right sort of way the highest human good, or eÈdaiµon€a (I’ll say more in just a moment about what this right sort of way is)—we need, as he puts it in NE X 9 (1180a32 ff.), to become expert in the establishment of good laws (noµoyetikÆ) and good constitutions (polite›ai, cf. 1181b14, 19, 21). One might find this a surprising claim. As Aristotle himself is in no doubt, eÈdaiµon€a is a feature of the lives of individual persons. On his account it is an activity, or a unified set of ac-. (shrink)

I Deliberation, Practical Syllogisms , and Intuition. Introduction Aristotle's views on moral reasoning are a difficult and much disputed subject. ...

"The central theme of the De interpretatione is the nature of contradiction between assertions. This is a crucially important theme for dialectic, whose regular tasks include that of establishing the contradictory of a proposed thesis, and that of replying to a dilemmatic question by choosing between the affirmation and the negation of a given thesis.(4) The inquiry into language as such, which occupies the first four chapters, is subordinated to this goal. One apparent obstacle to such a view of the (...) treatise is the (highly suspect). (shrink)

"However that may be, Aristotelian syllogistic concerned itself exclusively with monadic predicates. Hence it could not begin to investigate multiple quantification. And that is why it never got very far. None the less, the underlying grammar of Aristotle's logic did not in itself..

This paper discusses Aristotle's notion of the practical syllogism. It is argued that the notion of ‘practical’ reasoning in the sense of reasoning which implies motion in one sense or the other is alien to Aristotle's philosophy of nature. All (at least in type) the relevant passages will be discussed. The outcome is that there are three different contexts in which it would be justified to speak of practical syllogisms: (i) human deliberation, (ii) the illustration of the triggering cause of (...) animal motion, and (iii) the teleological ex post explanationof human action. (i) is genuine, but non-deductive reasoning which does not immediately result in action/motion, whereas (ii) is not genuine reasoning, but an analogy with deductive reasoning. Finally, the relation between (i) and (ii) in Aristotle's theory of animal motion will be discussed. (shrink)

Prior Analytics by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384 – 322 BCE) and Laws of Thought by the English mathematician George Boole (1815 – 1864) are the two most important surviving original logical works from before the advent of modern logic. This article has a single goal: to compare Aristotle’s system with the system that Boole constructed over twenty-two centuries later intending to extend and perfect what Aristotle had started. This comparison merits an article itself. Accordingly, this article does not discuss (...) many other historically and philosophically important aspects of Boole’s book, e.g. his confused attempt to apply differential calculus to logic, his misguided effort to make his system of ‘class logic’ serve as a kind of ‘truth-functional logic’, his now almost forgotten foray into probability theory, or his blindness to the fact that a truth-functional combination of equations that follows from a given truth-functional combination of equations need not follow truth-functionally. One of the main conclusions is that Boole’s contribution widened logic and changed its nature to such an extent that he fully deserves to share with Aristotle the status of being a founding figure in logic. By setting forth in clear and systematic fashion the basic methods for establishing validity and for establishing invalidity, Aristotle became the founder of logic as formal epistemology. By making the first unmistakable steps toward opening logic to the study of ‘laws of thought’—tautologies and laws such as excluded middle and non-contradiction—Boole became the founder of logic as formal ontology. (shrink)

When is an exchange a fair exchange? And when is a deal (an agreement to make an exchange) a fair deal? These questions are undeniably central to the philosophical understanding of value issues in business. In this paper I analyze Aristotle's account of fairness (justice) in such matters and attempt a critical extension.

Compare two conceptions of validity: under an example of a modal conception, an argument is valid just in case it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false; under an example of a topic-neutral conception, an argument is valid just in case there are no arguments of the same logical form with true premises and a false conclusion. This taxonomy of positions suggests a project in the philosophy of logic: the reductive analysis of the modal conception (...) of logical consequence to the topic-neutral conception. Such a project would dispel the alleged obscurity of the notion of necessity employed in the modal conception in favour of the clarity of an account of logical consequence given in terms of tractable notions of logical form, universal generalization and truth simpliciter. In a series of publications, John Etchemendy has characterized the model-theoretic definition of logical consequence as truth preservation in all models as intended to provide just such an analysis. In this paper, I will argue that Aristotle intends to provide an account of a modal conception of logical consequence in topic-neutral terms and so is engaged in a project comparable to the one described above. That Aristotle would be engaged in this sort of project is controversial. Under the standard reading of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle does not and cannot provide an account of logical consequence. Rather, he must take the validity of the first figure syllogisms (such as the syllogism known by its medieval mnemonic ‘Barbara’: A belongs to all B; B belongs to all C; so A belongs to all C) as obvious and not needing justification; he then establishes the validity of the other syllogisms by showing that they stand in a suitable relation to the first figure syllogisms. I will argue that Aristotle does attempt to provide an account of logical consequence—namely, by appeal to certain mereological theorems. For example, he defends the status of Barbara as a syllogism by appeal to the transitivity of mereological containment. There are, as I will discuss, reasons to doubt the success of this account. But the attempt is not implausible given certain theses Aristotle holds in semantics, mereology and the theory of relations. (shrink)

A predicate logic typically has a heterogeneous semantic theory. Subject terms and predicates have distinct semantic roles: subject terms refer; predicates characterize. And a sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject term refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. Traditional term logic, by contrast, has a homogeneous theory: both subject terms and predicates refer; a sentence is true if the subject term and predicate name one and the same thing. There is evidence that Aristotle holds that (...) subject terms and predicates refer. If this is correct, then it seems that Aristotle, like the traditional term logician, problematically conflates predication and identity claims. I will argue that we can ascribe to Aristotle the view that both subjects and predicates refer, while holding that he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In particular, I will argue that Aristotle’s core semantic notion is not identity but the weaker relation of constitution. For example, the predication ‘All men are mortal’ expresses a true thought, in Aristotle’s view, just in case the mereological sum of humans is a part of the mereological sum of mortals. (shrink)

Much of the last fifty years of scholarship on Aristotle’s syllogistic suggests a conceptual framework under which the syllogistic is a logic, a system of inferential reasoning, only if it is not a theory or formal ontology, a system concerned with general features of the world. In this paper, I will argue that this a misleading interpretative framework. The syllogistic is something sui generis: by our lights, it is neither clearly a logic, nor clearly a theory, but rather exhibits certain (...) characteristic marks of logics and certain characteristic marks of theories. In what follows, I will present a debate between a theoretical and a logical interpretation of the syllogistic. The debate centers on the interpretation of syllogisms as either implications or inferences. But the significance of this question has been taken to concern the nature and subject-matter of the syllogistic, and how it ought to be represented by modern techniques. For one might think that, if syllogisms are implications, propositions with conditional form, then the syllogistic, in so far as it is a systematic taxonomy of syllogisms, is a theory or a body of knowledge concerned with general features of the world. Furthermore, if the syllogistic is a theory, then it ought to be represented by an axiomatic system, a system deriving propositional theorems from axioms. On the other hand, if syllogisms are inferences, then the syllogistic is a logic, a system of inferential reasoning. And furthermore, it ought to be represented as a natural deduction system, a system deriving valid arguments by means of intuitively valid inferences. I will argue that one can disentangle these questions—are syllogisms inferences or implications, is the syllogistic a logic or a theory, is the syllogistic a body of worldly knowledge or a system of inferential reasoning, and ought we to represent the syllogistic as a natural deduction system or an axiomatic system—and that we must if we are to have a historically accurate understanding of Aristotle. (shrink)

Individual substances are the ground of Aristotle’s ontology. Taking a liberal approach to existence, Aristotle accepts among existents entities in such categories other than substance as quality, quantity and relation; and, within each category, individuals and universals. As I will argue, individual substances are ontologically independent from all these other entities, while all other entities are ontologically dependent on individual substances. The association of substance with independence has a long history and several contemporary metaphysicians have pursued the connection. In this (...) chapter, I will discuss the intersection of these notions of substance and ontological dependence in Aristotle. I will canvass a few contemporary formulations of ontological dependence and discuss some of the interpretative difficulties in ascribing any of these formulations to Aristotle’s characterization of individual substances as ontologically independent. My aim is not to resolve fully these difficulties but to locate the topics of substance and independence relative to certain other controversies in Aristotle studies. However, I will sketch a position. In particular, elsewhere I have speculated that Aristotle is both a primitivist and a pluralist with respect to ontological dependence, and I will develop this line of interpretation a bit further later in the chapter. (shrink)

Both literalism, the view that mathematical objects simply exist in the empirical world, and fictionalism, the view that mathematical objects do not exist but are rather harmless fictions, have been both ascribed to Aristotle. The ascription of literalism to Aristotle, however, commits Aristotle to the unattractive view that mathematics studies but a small fragment of the physical world; and there is evidence that Aristotle would deny the literalist position that mathematical objects are perceivable. The ascription of fictionalism also faces a (...) difficult challenge: there is evidence that Aristotle would deny the fictionalist position that mathematics is false. I argue that, in Aristotle's view, the fiction of mathematics is not to treat what does not exist as if existing but to treat mathematical objects with an ontological status they lack. This form of fictionalism is consistent with holding that mathematics is true. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper, I’ll rehearse an argument that perceiving that we see and hear isn’t a special case of perception in Aristotle but is rather a necessary condition for any perception whatsoever: the turning of one’s attention to the affection of the sense organs. In the second part of the paper, I’ll consider the thesis that the activity of the active intellect is analogous to perceiving that we see and hear.

As a first stab, call a property recurrent if it can be possessed by more than one object, and nonrecurrent if it can be possessed by at most one object. The question whether Aristotle holds that there are nonrecurrent properties has spawned a lively and ongoing debate among commentators over the last forty-five years. One source of textual evidence in the Categories, drawn on in this debate, is Aristotle’s claim that certain properties are inseparable from what they are in. Here (...) the point of contention is whether this commits Aristotle to holding that these properties are inseparable from individuals, since it is commonly held that a property is nonrecurrent, if it is inseparable from an individual. I argue that this evidence is neutral on the question whether there are nonrecurrent properties in Aristotle. One of my aims here is to disentangle the question of recurrence from local issues of individuality and universality in the Categories. But another aim is to turn from the textual considerations, which have dominated the debate, to broader methodological considerations. It is a shared assumption among all those who look to textual evidence from the Categories, so to decide whether Aristotle believes there are nonrecurrent properties, that in this work Aristotle is engaged in a project where the question of recurrence is relevant. I argue that Aristotle’s concerns in the Categories are disjoint from the question of recurrence, and so this shared assumption is false. (shrink)

Aristotle holds that individual substances are ontologically independent from non-substances and universal substances but that non-substances and universal substances are ontologically dependent on substances. There is then an asymmetry between individual substances and other kinds of beings with respect to ontological dependence. Under what could plausibly be called the standard interpretation, the ontological independence ascribed to individual substances and denied of non-substances and universal substances is a capacity for independent existence. There is, however, a tension between this interpretation and the (...) asymmetry between individual substances and the other kinds of entities with respect to ontological independence. I will propose an alternative interpretation: to weaken the relevant notion of ontological independence from a capacity for independent existence to the independent possession of a certain ontological status. (shrink)

This paper explores the anatomical foundations of Aristotle's natural philosophy. Rather than simply looking at the body, he contrives specific procedures for revealing unmanifest phenomena. In some cases, these interventions seem extensive enough to qualify as experiments. At the work bench, one can observe the parts of animals in the manner Aristotle describes, even if his descriptions seem at odds with 20th century textbooks. Manipulating animals allows us to recover his teleological thought more fully. This consideration of Aristotle as a (...) sophisticated biologist helps our reading of his writings in other areas of philosophy. (shrink)

A renewed concern with Aristotle’s thought about the economic aspects of human life and society can be observed. Aristotle dealt with the economic issues in his practical philosophy. He thus considered ‘the economic’ within an ethical and political frame. This vision is coherent with a specific ontology of ‘the economic’ according to Aristotle. In a recent paper, I analysed this ontology and left its consequences, especially for Ethics and Politics, for another paper. In this article, I firstly summarise the reasoning (...) and conclusions of the aforementioned paper. Then, I extract the ethical and political “lessons” of the Aristotelian conception. I finally add a section with epistemological “lessons”, and consequences for the teaching of Economics. (shrink)

The only passage from Aristotle's works that seemsto discuss the paradox of the liar is within chapter 25 of Sophistici Elenchi (180a34–b7). This passage raises several questions: Is it really about the paradox of the liar? If it is, is it addressing a strong version of the paradox or some weak strain of it? If it is addressing a strong version of the paradox, what solution does it propose? The conciseness of the passage does not enable one to answer these (...) questions beyond doubt, and commentators have offered very different replies. However, a reasonable case can be made for claiming, first, that the passage in question is about the paradox of the liar, second, that it addresses a strong version of the paradox, and, third, that it attempts to solve it by assuming that someone uttering 'I am speaking falsely' (or whatever sentence-type the paradox turns on) is neither speaking truly nor speaking falsely absolutely. (shrink)

Aristotle's theory of truth, which has been the most influential account of the concept of truth from Antiquity onwards, spans several areas of philosophy: philosophy of language, logic, ontology, and epistemology. In this book, the first dedicated to this topic, Paolo Crivelli discusses all the main aspects of Aristotle's views on truth and falsehood. He analyses in detail the main relevant passages, addresses some well-known problems of Aristotelian semantics, and assesses Aristotle's theory from the point of view of modern analytic (...) philosophy. In the process he discusses most of the literature on Aristotle's semantic theory to have appeared in the last two centuries. His book vindicates and clarifies the often repeated claim that Aristotle's is a correspondence theory of truth. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers working in both ancient philosophy and modern philosophy of language. (shrink)

According to Scotus, an intelligible species with universal content, inherent in the mind, is a partial cause of an occurrent cognition whose immediate object is the self-same species. I attempt to explain how Scotus defends the possibility of this causal activity. Scotus claims, generally, that forms are causes, and that inherence makes no difference to the capacity of a form to cause an effect. He illustrates this by examining a case in which an accident is an instrument of a substance (...) in the production of a certain sort of effect. All that is required is that the accident is relevantly joined to the substance, whether or not it inheres in the substance. Since intelligible species are bearers of semantic content, it follows that non-inherent objects of thought can also be the bearers of such content. Such objects are included in the mind without inherence, and the boundary between the mind and external reality is to this extent broken down. (shrink)

Aristotle's use of the phrase τα καλουμενα στοιχεια is usually taken as evidence that he does not really think that the things to which this phrase refers, namely, fire, air, water, and earth, are genuine elements. In this paper I question the linguistic and textual grounds for taking the phrase τα καλουμενα στοιχεια in this way. I offer a detailed examination of the significance of the phrase, and in particular I compare Aristotle's general use of the Greek participle καλουμενοζiot (-η, (...) -ον) in other contexts. I conclude that his use of the phrase τα καλουμενα στοιχεια does not carry ironical or sceptical connotations, and that it ought to be understood as a neutral report of a contemporary opinion that the elements of bodies are fire, air, water, and earth. I leave aside the question as to whether or not Aristotle himself endorses this opinion. (shrink)

Nine leading scholars of ancient philosophy from Europe, the UK, and North America offer a systematic study of Book Beta of Aristotle's Metaphysics. The work takes the form of a series of aporiai or 'difficulties' which Aristotle presents as necessary points of engagement for those who wish to attain wisdom. The topics include causation, substance, constitution, properties, predicates, and generally the ontology of both the perishable and the imperishable world. Each contributor discusses one or two of these aporiai in sequence: (...) the result is a discursive commentary on this seminal text of Western philosophy. (shrink)

A constructive interpretation of the Confucian conception of shame is offered here. Xunzi's discussion is considered the locus classicus of the Confucian conception of shame as contrasted with honor. In order to show his conception as an articulation and development of the more inchoate attitudes of Confucius and Mencius, and excursion is made into the Lunyu and the Mengzi. Aristotle's conception of shame is used as a sort of catalyst, an opening for appreciating Xunzi's complementary insights.

: A constructive interpretation of the Confucian conception of shame is offered here. Xunzi's discussion is considered the locus classicus of the Confucian conception of shame as contrasted with honor. In order to show his conception as an articulation and development of the more inchoate attitudes of Confucius and Mencius, an excursion is made into the Lunyu and the Mengzi. Aristotle's conception of shame is used as a sort of catalyst, an opening for appreciating Xunzi's complementary insights.

Journalism and media ethics texts commonly invoke Aristotle's Golden Mean as a principal ethical theory that models such journalistic values as balance, fairness, and proportion. Working from Aristotle's text, this article argues that the Golden Mean model, as widely understood and applied to media ethics, seriously belies Aristotle's intent. It also shortchanges the reality of our moral agency and epistemic responsibility. A more authentic rendering of Aristotle's theory of acting rightly, moreover, has profound implications for communication ethicists and media practitioners.

The title of this paper is meant to be provocative. The issue is not whether Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings, who are usually credited with originating the ethics of care, build explicitly upon AristotleÕs work, or even whether Aristotle is a source of inspiration for them.1 Instead, the issue is whether Aristotle is an earlier advocate, perhaps the earliest advocate, of the ethics of care. Aristotle cannot be an ethics of care advocate without a concept of care, but Aristotle does (...) have a concept of care. Although the Greek terms phil" esis and its infinitive version to philein are typically translated as ‘‘love,’’ or ‘‘friendly feeling,’’ or ‘‘friendly affection’’ by AristotleÕs translators, Aristotle uses phil" esis and to philein to mean approximately what advocates of the ethics of care mean by ‘‘caring’’ and ‘‘care.’’ Aristotle defines to philein in the following way. ‘‘We may describe to philein towards anyone as wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about.’’2 Furthermore, Aristotle contrasts phil" esis with mere goodwill. He says that goodwill, ‘‘does not involve intensity or desire, whereas these accompany phil" esis; and phil" esis implies intimacy while goodwill may arise of a sudden.’’3 Hence, phil" esis is no shallow whim, but a deep desire for the wellbeing of another person sought not merely as a means to the wellbeing of the agent, but for the sake of the other person. The interests of the other person are sought because of the character of the person. Moreover, phil" esis includes substantial familiarity with the other person gained through meaningful personal interactions with the person. This is compassion and sympathy, core components of care. Aristotle says little about phil". (shrink)

Xiahui. While Confucius’ actions are intermediate between the actions of these three sages, the sages’ character traits do not bracket Confucius’ character traits. Instead, the failings of the three sages are skew to each other. Boyi lacks righteousness; Y i Yin lacks benevolence; and L iu Xiahui lacks wisdom. The comparison of the sages centers on the question of when to resign an advisory position. According to Mencius, one should resign only if one’s advice will not be heeded, or if (...) declining to resign would somehow lead to wrongdoing. Associating with wrongdoers and benefiting from the wrongdoing of others might lead to wrongdoing. Wrong motives might distort one’s advice. Insults from the advisee might be evidence of the futility of giving advice. But in themselves, fastidiousness, non-benevolent motives, and mistreatment by the advisee are not legitimate reasons to resign. (shrink)

The article argues that Aristotle takes the mean to be relative neither to character nor to social role, but simply to the agent’s situation. The “character relativity” interpretation arises from the contemporary common-sense impulse to hold people who must overcome obstacles to a lower standard than people who easily act and feel rightly. However, character relativity vitiates Aristotle’s distinction between what moral people should do and what people should do to become moral. It also clashes with Aristotle’s principle that the (...) virtuous person is the measure of which actions and passions are virtuous. The “role relativity” interpretation arisesfrom the contemporary common-sense impulse to hold people in different social roles to different standards. However, role relativity vitiates Aristotle’s distinctionbetween the good person, on the one hand, and the good ruler, subject, doctor, soldier, and citizen, on the other. It also clashes with his claim that children, natural slaves, and women are inferior to adult, naturally free men. (shrink)

FOR ARISTOTLE, THE GOAL OF MORAL development is, of course, to become virtuous. Aristotle provides a partial description of the virtuous person in the following familiar passage. The virtuous person performing virtuous acts.