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  1. Katalin Balog (2007). Comments on Ned Block's Target Article “Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4):499-500.
    Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I’ll argue that while Block’s thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of (...)
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  2. Alexandre Billon (2016). Making Sense of the Cotard Syndrome: Insights From the Study of Depersonalisation. Mind and Language 31 (3):356-391.
    Patients suffering from the Cotard syndrome can deny being alive, having guts, thinking or even existing. They can also complain that the world or time have ceased to exist. In this article, I argue that even though the leading neurocognitive accounts have difficulties meeting that task, we should, and we can, make sense of these bizarre delusions. To that effect, I draw on the close connection between the Cotard syndrome and a more common condition known as depersonalisation. Even though they (...)
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  3. Alexandre Billon (2011). Does Consciousness Entail Subjectivity? The Puzzle of Thought Insertion. Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.
    (2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 291-314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625117.
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  4. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intellectual Gestalts. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press 174.
    Phenomenal holism is the thesis that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. The first aim of this paper is to defend phenomenal holism. I argue, moreover, that there are complex intellectual experiences (intellectual gestalts)—such as experiences of grasping a proof—whose parts instantiate holistic phenomenal characters. Proponents of cognitive phenomenology believe that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are not purely sensory. The second aim of this paper is (...)
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  5. Tim Klaassen, On Gilbert Harman's The Intrisic Quality of Experience.
    I propose that there are two kind's of qualia realism, and that Harman's observations about the transparency of experience pose a threat to only one of these.
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  6. Anders Nes (2012). Thematic Unity in the Phenomenology of Thinking. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):84-105.
    Many philosophers hold that the phenomenology of thinking (also known as cognitive phenomenology) reduces to the phenomenology of the speech, sensory imagery, emotions or feelings associated with it. But even if this reductionist claim is correct, there is still a properly cognitive dimension to the phenomenology of at least some thinking. Specifically, conceptual content makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenology of at least some thought episodes, in that it constitutes what I call their thematic unity. Often, when a thought (...)
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  7. Contzen Pereira & J. Shashi Kiran Reddy (2016). First-Hand Experience of the Self Through Imagination. Scientific GOD Journal 7 (1):51-52.
    Imagination is the art of exploring beyond the depths of one’s body. Imagination allows one to peek into the void to realize the true existence of its self and feel the existence of eternity. The experience of imagination is a subjective experience of one’s own consciousness and it is this experience makes the experiencer worthy. Creation and creativity are the end aspects of imagination and unfold the hidden mysteries of the cosmos. This essay is a trip across the cosmic energy (...)
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  8. Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). Embodiment, Consciousness, and Neurophenomenology: Embodied Cognitive Science Puts the (First) Person in Its Place. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
  9. Ernest Sosa (1983). Consciousness of the Self and the Present. In James Tomberlin (ed.), Agent, Language and the Structure of the World. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 131-47.
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  10. Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel (2015). For-Me-Ness: What It is and What It is Not. In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology. Routledge 36-53.
    The alleged for-me-ness or mineness of conscious experience has been the topic of considerable debate in recent phenomenology and philosophy of mind. By considering a series of objections to the notion of for-me-ness, or to a properly robust construal of it, this paper attempts to clarify to what the notion is committed and to what it is not committed. This exercise results in the emergence of a relatively determinate and textured portrayal of for-me-ness as the authors conceive of it.
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