This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
6 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Katalin Balog (2007). Comments on Ned Block's Target Article “Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4):499-500.
    Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I’ll argue that while Block’s thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Alexandre Billon (2011). Does Consciousness Entail Subjectivity? The Puzzle of Thought Insertion. Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.
    (2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 291-314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625117.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intellectual Gestalts. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. 174.
    Phenomenal holism is the thesis that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. The first aim of this paper is to defend phenomenal holism. I argue, moreover, that there are complex intellectual experiences (intellectual gestalts)—such as experiences of grasping a proof—whose parts instantiate holistic phenomenal characters. Proponents of cognitive phenomenology believe that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are not purely sensory. The second aim of this paper is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Anders Nes (2012). Thematic Unity in the Phenomenology of Thinking. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):84-105.
    Many philosophers hold that the phenomenology of thinking (also known as cognitive phenomenology) reduces to the phenomenology of the speech, sensory imagery, emotions or feelings associated with it. But even if this reductionist claim is correct, there is still a properly cognitive dimension to the phenomenology of at least some thinking. Specifically, conceptual content makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenology of at least some thought episodes, in that it constitutes what I call their thematic unity. Often, when a thought (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. John Peacocke (2012). Conscious Awareness and Behaviour: What Distinguishes Conscious Experience From Unconscious Processes? Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (20):37 - 56.
    This paper considers the concept of conscious awareness. The activity of the brain can generally be divided into two categories: unconscious processes and those that contribute to building conscious experience. That which we are consciously aware of and experiencing, and that which we are not. -/- An understanding of consciousness requires an understanding of what criteria separate the two. I argue a role for behaviour in the distinction. I suggest a means of separating out conscious experience by considering the sort (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Ernest Sosa (1983). &Quot;consciousness of the Self and the Present&Quot;. In James Tomberlin (ed.), Agent, Language and the Structure of the World. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 131-47.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation