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  1. Tofig Ahmadov (2008). Svasamvittih/Svasamvedana In the Light of Sartre's Philosophy. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 8:55-61.
    Sartre posited a (nondual), nonreflexive, nonthetic, nonpositional awareness which makes all consciousness possible, and which underlies dualistic, thetic, positional consciousness of object. Though his description assumes dualistic, thetic, positional consciousness of object to be inherent in nondual, nonreflexive,nonthetic, nonpositional awareness and hence to be ineradicable, with some modifications it can explain the view of rdzogs-chen that the sems-sde series of teachings illustrate in nonphilosophical terms with the example of the primordial mirror in which both dualistic consciousness and its objects manifest (...)
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  2. Miri Albahari (2009). Witness-Consciousness: Its Definition, Appearance and Reality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):62-84.
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  3. Adrian Alsmith (forthcoming). Eric Schwitzgebel: Perplexities of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-5.
  4. Ciano Aydin (forthcoming). The Artifactual Mind: Overcoming the 'Inside–Outside' Dualism in the Extended Mind Thesis and Recognizing the Technological Dimension of Cognition. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    This paper explains why Clark’s Extended Mind thesis is not capable of sufficiently grasping how and in what sense external objects and technical artifacts can become part of our human cognition. According to the author, this is because a pivotal distinction between inside and outside is preserved in the Extended Mind theorist’s account of the relation between the human organism and the world of external objects and artifacts, a distinction which they proclaim to have overcome. Inspired by Charles S. Peirce’s (...)
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  5. Bernard Baars, Glossary and Guide to Theoretical Claims.
    absorbed state. (7.7) Empirically, a state like fantasy, selective attention, absent-minded day-dreaming and probably hypnosis, in which conscious experience is unusually resistant to distraction. Theoretically, a case in which access to the Global Workspace (GW) is controlled by a coherent context hierarchy , giving little opportunity for outside information to compete for conscious access (4.32). See als ideomotor theory, access, and options context.
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  6. Talis Bachmann (1998). Is Conscious Experience Established Instantaneously? Commentary on J.G. Taylor. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):149-156.
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  7. M. Bitbol & C. Petitmengin (2013). A Defense of Introspection From Within. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):269-279.
    Context: We are presently witnessing a revival of introspective methods, which implicitly challenges an impressive list of in-principle objections that were addressed to introspection by various philosophers and by behaviorists. Problem: How can one overcome those objections and provide introspection with a secure basis? Results: A renewed definition of introspection as “enlargement of the field of attention and contact with re-enacted experience,” rather than “looking-within,” is formulated. This entails (i) an alternative status of introspective phenomena, which are no longer taken (...)
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  8. Ned Block (2002). Concepts of Consciousness. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. OUP. 206-218.
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  9. Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly (2009). Do Humans Have Two Systems to Track Beliefs and Belief-Like States? Psychological Review 116 (4):953-970.
    The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans’ capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Non-human animals also fail critical tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behaviour (e.g., (...)
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  10. Monima Chadha (forthcoming). Meditation and Unity of Consciousness: A Perspective From Buddhist Epistemology. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    The paper argues that empirical work on Buddhist meditation has an impact on Buddhist epistemology, in particular their account of unity of consciousness. I explain the Buddhist account of unity of consciousness and show how it relates to contemporary philosophical accounts of unity of consciousness. The contemporary accounts of unity of consciousness are closely integrated with the discussion of neural correlates of consciousness. The conclusion of the paper suggests a new direction in the search for neural correlates of state consciousness (...)
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  11. Valérie de Prycker (2011). Unself-Conscious Control: Broadening the Notion of Control Through Experiences of Flow and Wu-Wei. Zygon 46 (1):5-25.
    Abstract. This paper both clarifies and broadens the notion of control and its relation to the self. By discussing instances of skillful absorption from different cultural backgrounds, I argue that the notion of control is not as closely related to self-consciousness as is often suggested. Experiences of flow and wu-wei exemplify a nonself-conscious though personal type of control. The intercultural occurrence of this type of behavioral control demonstrates its robustness, and questions two long-held intuitions about the relation between self-consciousness and (...)
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  12. John Bovee Dods (1850/1982). The Philosophy of Electrical Psychology. Da Capo Press.
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  13. Serguei Fokine (2008). The Singing Consciousness. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:69-76.
    Consciousness has been and will continue to be one of the central problems of philosophy. In written works the fact that the consciousness can sing is presented as one of the most interesting and enigmatic properties of consciousness. That consciousness can sing, and in fact does so, and to prove that this is the case is relatively easy. It is enough to say that “one is singing within oneself”, not loudly and only one or various simple sounds in a way (...)
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  14. T. Froese, C. Gould & A. Barrett (2011). Re-Viewing From Within: A Commentary on First- and Second-Person Methods in the Science of Consciousness. Constructivist Foundations 6 (2):254-269.
    Context: There is a growing recognition in consciousness science of the need for rigorous methods for obtaining accurate and detailed phenomenological reports of lived experience, i.e., descriptions of experience provided by the subject living them in the “first-person.” Problem: At the moment although introspection and debriefing interviews are sometimes used to guide the design of scientific studies of the mind, explicit description and evaluation of these methods and their results rarely appear in formal scientific discourse. Method: The recent publication of (...)
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  15. Lorna Green, Introduction to All My Works 2012.
    I am proposing a new Copernican revolution, that Consciousness and not matter is the true basis of the universe. Here is an account of my graduate student days at the Rockefeller University as a woman pioneer in science, and a sense of what I am really about in all of my works. I am giving a woman's take on the universe.
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  16. Lorna Green (ed.) (2004). Guiding Principles for the Planet, The New Paradigms: Medatations on Cartesian Themes. iUniverse.
    Consciousness is the true basis of the universe, I offer new principles for connection with the Earth, the Earth is a living conscious spiritual being, interconnected, interdependent and One, in which we human beings are a small part.
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  17. Paweł Gładziejewski (2010). Neurophenomenology: An Invitation to Discussion. Avant 1 (1):179–189.
    No more than a few years ago could open an article concerning neurophenomenology with a statement describing recent rediscovery of the problem of consciousness by the cognitive sciences and pointing to the fact that right now, explaining conscious experience in neuroscientific or computational terms poses the greatest challenge for those sciences. Today however, constatations of this sort start to sound like trivial descriptions of a universally recognized state of affairs. The question of “how the water of the physical brain is (...)
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  18. Michel Henry (1975). Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body. Nijhoff.
    INTRODUCTION THE SEEMING CONTINGENCY OF THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE BODY AND THE NECESSITY FOR AN ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BODY When we disclose and ...
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  19. Bryce Huebner (2013). Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):315 - 318.
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  20. Lois Isenman (2013). Understanding Unconscious Intelligence and Intuition: &Quot;blink" and Beyond. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 56 (1):148-166.
    The importance of unconscious cognition is seeping into popular consciousness. A number of recent books bridging the academic world and the reading public stress that at least a portion of decision-making depends not on conscious reasoning, but instead on cognition that occurs below awareness. However, these books provide a limited perspective on how the unconscious mind works and the potential power of intuition. This essay is an effort to expand the picture. It is structured around the book that has garnered (...)
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  21. Samuel H. LiPuma & Joseph P. DeMarco (2013). Reviving Brain Death: A Functionalist View. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 10 (3):383-392.
    Recently both whole brain death (WBD) and higher brain death (HBD) have come under attack. These attacks, we argue, are successful, leaving supporters of both views without a firm foundation. This state of affairs has been described as “the death of brain death.” Returning to a cardiopulmonary definition presents problems we also find unacceptable. Instead, we attempt to revive brain death by offering a novel and more coherent standard of death based on the permanent cessation of mental processing. This approach (...)
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  22. Josef Perner & Zoltan Dienes (1999). Higher Order Thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):164-165.
    O'Brien & Opie's position is consistent with the existence of implicit learning and subliminal perception below a subjective threshold but it is inconsistent with various other findings in the literature. The main problem with the theory is that it attributes consciousness to too many things. Incorporating the higher order thought theory renders their position more plausible.
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  23. Galen Strawson (2013). Self-Intimation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-31.
    (1) Aristotle, Dignāga, Descartes, Arnauld, Locke, Brentano, Sartre and many others are right about the nature of conscious awareness: all such awareness comports—somehow carries within itself—awareness of itself . (2) This is a necessary condition of awareness being awareness at all: no ‘higher-order’ account of what makes conscious states conscious can be correct. (3) But (2) is very paradoxical: it seems to require that awareness be somehow already present, in such a way as to be available to itself as object (...)
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  24. Naotsuga Tsuchiya, Ned Block & Christof Koch (2012). Top-Down Attention and Consciousness: Comment on Cohen, Et.Al. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (11):527.
  25. Vlastimil Zuska (2008). Implicit Assumptions in Weed's Reflections on the Implicit Assumptions of Neuroaesthetics. Estetika 45 (2):198-201.
    A critical comment on Weed‘s Looking for Beauty in the Brain from Estetika 1/2008.
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The Unity of Consciousness
  1. Torin Alter, What Do Split-Brain Cases Show About the Unity of Consciousness?
    The startling empirical data that concern us here are well known. Severing the corpus callosum produces a kind of mental bifurcation (Sperry 1968). In one experiment, a garlic smell is presented to a patient.
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  2. Torin Alter (2010). A Defense of the Necessary Unity of Phenomenal Consciousness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):19-37.
    Some argue that split-brain cases undermine the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is necessarily unified. This paper defends the phenomenal unity thesis against Michael Tye's (2003 ) version of that argument. Two problems are identified. First, his argument relies on a questionable analysis of the split-brain data. Second, his analysis leads to the view that in experimental situations split-brain patients are not single subjects – a result that would render the analysis harmless to the phenomenal unity thesis.
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  3. Felix Arnold (1905). The Unity of Mental Life. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (18):487-493.
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  4. Kent Bach (1988). Critical Notice. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press.
    As philosophical topics go, self-deception has something for everyone. It raises basic questions about the nature of belief and the relation of belief to thought, desire, and the will. It provokes further questions on such topics as reasoning, attention, self-knowledge, the unity of the self, intentional action, motivation, self-esteem, psychic defenses, the unconscious, personal character, and interpersonal relations. There are two basic questions about self-deception itself, which each take a familiar philosophical form: What is it? How is it possible? These (...)
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  5. Andrew R. Bailey (1999). Beyond the Fringe: William James on the Transitive Parts of the Stream of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):141-53.
    One of the aspects of consciousness deserving of study is what might be called its subjective unity - the way in which, though conscious experience moves from object to object, and can be said to have distinct ‘states', it nevertheless in some sense apparently forms a singular flux divided only by periods of unconsciousness. The work of William James provides a valuable, and rather unique, source of analysis of this feature of consciousness; however, in my opinion, this component of James’ (...)
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  6. Kent Baldner (1996). Subjectivity and the Unity of the World. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):333-346.
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  7. Peter Baumann (2007). Experiencing Things Together: What is the Problem? [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):9 - 26.
    Suppose someone hears a loud noise and at the same time sees a yellow flash. It seems hard to deny that the person can experience loudness and yellowness together. However, since loudness is experienced by the auditory sense whereas yellowness is experienced by the visual sense it also seems hard to explain how.
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  8. Tim Bayne, The Unity of Consciousness: A Cartography.
    theorists insist that consciousness is essentially unified. Other theorists assert that the unity of consciousness is an illusion, and that consciousness is often, if not invariably, disunified. Unfortunately, it is rare for proponents of either side of the debate to explain what the unity of consciousness might involve. What would it mean for consciousness to be unified? In this chapter I provide a brief cartography of the unity of consciousness. In the next section I introduce a number of unity relations (...)
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  9. Tim Bayne (2010). The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford ;Oxford University Press.
    Foundations. The phenomenal field ; Phenomenal unity : mereology ; Phenomenal unity : closure -- Consciousness unified?. Motivating the unity thesis ; How to evaluate the unity thesis ; Fragments of consciousness? ; Anosognosia, schizophrenia, and multiplicity ; Hypnosis ; The split-brain syndrome -- Implications. The quilt of consciousness ; The body ; The self.
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  10. Tim Bayne (2008). The Unity of Consciousness and the Split-Brain Syndrome. Journal of Philosophy 105 (6):277-300.
    According to conventional wisdom, the split-brain syndrome puts paid to the thesis that consciousness is necessarily unified. The aim of this paper is to challenge that view. I argue both that disunity models of the split-brain are highly problematic, and that there is much to recommend a model of the split-brain—the switch model—according to which split-brain patients retain a fully unified consciousness at all times. Although the task of examining the unity of consciousness through the lens of the split-brain syndrome (...)
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  11. Tim Bayne (2007). Hypnosis and the Unity of Consciousness. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. 93-109.
    Hypnosis appears to generate unusual—and sometimes even astonishing—changes in the contents of consciousness. Hypnotic subjects report perceiving things that are not there, they report not perceiving things that are there, and they report unusual alterations in the phenomenology of agency. In addition to apparent alterations in the contents of consciousness, hypnosis also appears to involve alterations in the structure of consciousness. According to many theorists—most notably Hilgard—hypnosis demonstrates that the unity of consciousness is an illusion (Hilgard 1977).
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  12. Tim Bayne (2007). Hypnosis and the Unity of Consciousness. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.
    Hypnosis appears to generate unusual—and sometimes even astonishing—changes in the contents of consciousness. Hypnotic subjects report perceiving things that are not there, they report not perceiving things that are there, and they report unusual alterations in the phenomenology of agency. In addition to apparent alterations in the contents of consciousness, hypnosis also appears to involve alterations in the structure of consciousness. According to many theorists—most notably Hilgard—hypnosis demonstrates that the unity of consciousness is an illusion (Hilgard 1977).
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  13. Tim Bayne (2005). Divided Brains and Unified Phenomenology: A Review Essay on Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):495-512.
    In Consciousness and persons, Michael Tye (Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to (...)
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  14. Timothy J. Bayne (forthcoming). Unified Phenomenology and Divided Brains: Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Philosophical Psychology.
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  15. Timothy J. Bayne (2005). Divided Brains and Unified Phenomenology: A Review Essay on Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):495-512.
    In Consciousness and persons, Michael Tye (Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to (...)
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  16. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Self-Consciousness and the Unity of Consciousness. The Monist 87 (2):219-236.
    Consciousness has a number of puzzling features. One such feature is its unity: the experiences and other conscious states that one has at a particular time seem to occur together in a certain way. I am currently enjoying visual experiences of my computer screen, auditory experiences of bird-song, olfactory experiences of coffee, and tactile experiences of feeling the ground beneath my feet. Conjoined with these perceptual experiences are proprioceptive experiences, experiences of agency, affective and emotional experiences, and conscious thoughts of (...)
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  17. Timothy J. Bayne (2001). Co-Consciousness: Review of Barry Dainton's Stream of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):79-92.
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  18. Timothy J. Bayne (2000). The Unity of Consciousness: Clarification and Defence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):248-254.
    In "The Disunity of Consciousness," Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opie argue that human consciousness is not synchronically unified. They suggest that the orthodox conception of the unity of consciousness admits of two readings, neither of which they find persuasive. According to them, "a conscious individual does not have a single consciousness, but several distinct phenomenal consciousnesses, at least one for each of the senses, running in parallel." They call this conception of consciousness the _multi-track account. I make three points in (...)
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  19. Timothy J. Bayne & David J. Chalmers (2003). What is the Unity of Consciousness? In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing (...)
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  20. J. O. Beahrs (1983). Co-Consciousness: A Common Denominator in Hypnosis, Multiple Personality, and Normalcy. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 26:100-13.
  21. J. O. Beahrs (1982). Unity and Multiplicity: Multilevel Consciousness of Self in Hypnosis, Psychiatric Disorder, and Mental Health. Brunner/Mazel.
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  22. Kathy Behrendt (2003). The New Neo-Kantian and Reductionist Debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):331-350.
    Has Derek Parfit modified his views on personal identity in light of Quassim Cassam’s neo-Kantian argument that to experience the world as objective, we must think of ourselves as enduring subjects of experience? Both parties suggest there is no longer a serious dispute between them. I retrace the path that led to this truce, and contend that the debate remains open. Parfit’s recent work reveals a re-formulation of his ostensibly abandoned claim that there could be impersonal descriptions of reality. I (...)
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  23. David Bennett & Chris Hill (eds.) (forthcoming). Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  24. Alexandre Billon (2011). Have We Vindicated the Motivational Unconscious Yet? A Conceptual Review. Frontiers in Psychoanalysis and Neuropsychoanalysis 2.
    Motivationally unconscious (M-unconscious) states are unconscious states that can directly motivate a subject’s behavior and whose unconscious character typically results from a form of repression. The basic argument for M-unconscious states claims that they provide the best explanation to some seemingly non rational behaviors, like akrasia, impulsivity or apparent self-deception. This basic argument has been challenged on theoretical, empirical and conceptual grounds. Drawing on recent works on apparent self-deception and on the ‘cognitive unconscious’ I assess those objections. I argue that (...)
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  25. Franz Brentano (1944). Psychologie du Point de Vue Empirique. Montaigne.
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