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  1. James Smith Allen (2003). Navigating the Social Sciences: A Theory for the Meta–History of Emotions. History and Theory 42 (1):82–93.
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  2. David L. Blank (1993). The Arousal of Emotion in Plato's Dialogues. Classical Quarterly 43 (02):428-.
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  3. Lisa Bortolotti (ed.) (2008). The Philosophy of Happiness. Palgrave.
    Philosophy and Happiness addresses the need to situate any meaningful discourse about happiness in a wider context of human interests, capacities and circumstances. How is happiness manifested and expressed? Can there be any happiness if no worthy life projects are pursued? How is happiness affected by relationships, illness, or cultural variants? Can it be reduced to preference satisfaction? Is it a temporary feeling or a persistent way of being? Is reflection conducive to happiness? Is mortality necessary for it? These are (...)
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  4. Frances Bottenberg (2012). The Self and Its Emotions. Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):480-484.
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  5. Giovanna Colombetti (2005). Appraising Valence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):8-10.
    ‘Valence’ is used in many different ways in emotion theory. It generally refers to the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ character of an emotion, as well as to the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ character of some aspect of emotion. After reviewing these different uses, I point to the conceptual problems that come with them. In particular, I dis- tinguish: problems that arise from conflating the valence of an emotion with the valence of its aspects, and problems that arise from the very idea that (...)
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  6. Anthony Cunningham (2005). Great Anger. The Dalhousie Review 85 (3).
    Anger has an undeniable hand in human suffering and horrific deeds. Various schools of thought call for eliminating or moderating the capacity for anger. I argue that the capacity for anger, like the capacity for grief, is at the heart of our humanity.
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  7. Tim Dalgleish (1997). Once More with Feeling: The Role of Emotion in Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):110-111.
    In an analysis of the role of emotion in self-deception is presented. It is argued that instances of emotional self-deception unproblematically meet Mele's jointly sufficient criteria. It is further proposed that a consideration of different forms of mental representation allows the possibility of instances of self-deception in which contradictory beliefs (in the form p and ~p) are held simultaneously with full awareness.
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  8. Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (2008). Facts and Values in Emotional Plasticity. In Louis Charland & Peter Zachar (eds.), Fact and Value in Emotion; Consciousness and Emotion Book Series. John Benjamins Publishing Company. 101--137.
    How much can we shape the emotions we experience? Or to put it another way, how plastic are our emotions? It is clear that the exercise of identifying the degree of plasticity of emotion is futile without a prior specification of what can be plastic, so we first propose an analysis of the components of emotions. We will then turn to empirical data that might be used to assess the degree of plasticity of emotions.
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  9. Irwin Goldstein (1981). Cognitive Pleasure and Distress. Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23.
    Explaining the "intentional object" some people assign pleasure, I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleasure. Bernard Williams, Gilbert Ryle, and Irving Thalberg, who reject this analysis, are discussed. Being pleased (or distressed) about something is a compound of pleasure (pain) and some thought or belief. Pleasure in itself does not have an "intentional object".
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  10. Robert M. Gordon (1986). The Passivity of Emotions. Philosophical Review 95 (July):339-60.
  11. Y. Gustafsson, L. Hertzberg, T. Kettunen, C. Kronqvist & M. McEachrane (eds.) (2005). Proceedings of the Conference “Emotions, Others and the Self”. Åbo Akademi University.
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  12. Rom Harré (1994). Emotion and Memory: The Second Cognitive Revolution. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 37:25-.
  13. Adam Knowles (2010). Real Context and the Emotional A Priori. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 31 (2):265-280.
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  14. Philip J. Koch (1987). Emotional Ambivalence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (2):257-279.
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  15. Anita Konzelmann Ziv (2011). « Beau à Vomir »: L’Écœurement Devant la Beauté Physique. In Christine Tappolet, Fabrice Teroni & Anita Konzelmann Ziv (eds.), Les ombres de l’âme: Penser les émotions négatives. Haller.
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  16. John A. Lambie (2009). Emotion Experience, Rational Action, and Self-Knowledge. Emotion Review 1 (3):272-280.
    This article examines the role of emotion experience in both rational action and self-knowledge. A key distinction is made between emotion experiences of which we are unaware, and those of which we are aware. The former motivate action and color our view of the world, but they do not do so in a rational way, and their nonreflective nature obscures self-understanding. The article provides arguments and evidence to support the view that emotion experiences contribute to rational action only if one (...)
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  17. M. Lebar (2001). Simulation, Theory, and Emotion. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):423 – 434.
    It seems that in interpreting others we sometimes simulate, sometimes apply theory. Josef Perner has suggested that a fruitful line of inquiry in folk psychology would seek "criteria for problems where we have to use simulation from those where we do without or where it is even impossible to use." In this paper I follow Perner with a suggestion that our understanding of our interpretive processes may benefit from considering their physiological bases. In particular, I claim that it may be (...)
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  18. Neil McLaughlin (1996). Nazism, Nationalism, and the Sociology of Emotions: Escape From Freedom Revisited. Sociological Theory 14 (3):241-261.
    The recent worldwide resurgence of militant nationalism, fundamentalist intolerance and right-wing authoritarianism has again put the issues of violence and xenophobia at the center of social science research and theory. German psychoanalyst and sociologist Erich Fromm's work provides a useful theoretical microfoundation for contemporary work on nationalism, the politics of identity, and the roots of war and violence. Fromm's analysis of Nasism in Escape from Freedom (1941), in particular, outlines a compelling theory of irrationality, and his later writings on nationalism (...)
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  19. Goldie Peter (ed.) (2010). Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion.
  20. Aaron Smuts, How Much Should We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?
    It is widely assumed that we can meaningfully talk about emotional reactions as being appropriate or inappropriate. Much of the discussion has focused on one kind of appropriateness, that of fittingness. An emotional response is appropriate only if it fits its object. For instance, fear only fits dangerous things. There is another dimension of appropriateness that has been relatively ignored — proportionality. For an emotional reaction to be appropriate not only must the object fit, the reaction should be of the (...)
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  21. Marco Solinas (2009). Sulle tracce della malinconia. Un approccio filosofico-sociale. Costruzioni Psicoanalitiche (17):83-102.
    The essay aims to analyse the gradual historical process of the partial overlap, replacement and expansion of the theoretical paradigm of depression with respect to that of melancholy. The first part is devoted to analysing some of the central features of the multivalent thematizations of melancholy drawn up during modernity, also with relation to the spirit of capitalism (in its Weberian acceptation). This is followed by an overview of the birth of the modern category of depression, and the process that (...)
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  22. Ronald De Sousa & Adam Morton (2002). Emotional Truth. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76:247 - 275.
    [Ronald de Sousa] Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; belief-like (...)
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  23. Achim Stephan (2012). Existentielle Gefühle und Emotionen: Intentionalität und Regulierbarkeit. In Sabine Marienberg & Jörg Fingerhut (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive / Gefühle des Lebendigseins. De Gruyter. 8--101.
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  24. Christine Tappolet (2006). Robert C. Roberts, Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Ethics 117 (1):143-147.
    A critical review of Robert C. Roberts' "Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology", Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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  25. Katherine Tullmann & Wesley Buckwalter (2013). Does the Paradox of Fiction Exist? Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Many philosophers have attempted to provide a solution to the paradox of fiction, a triad of sentences that lead to the conclusion that genuine emotional responses to fiction are irrational. We suggest that disagreement over the best response to this paradox stems directly from the formulation of the paradox itself. Our main goal is to show that there is an ambiguity regarding the word ‘exist’ throughout the premises of the paradox. To reveal this ambiguity, we display the diverse existential commitments (...)
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  26. Edoardo Zamuner (2011). A Theory of Affect Perception. Mind and Language 26 (4):436-451.
    What do we see when we look at someone's expression of fear? I argue that one of the things that we see is fear itself. I support this view by developing a theory of affect perception. The theory involves two claims. One is that expressions are patterns of facial changes that carry information about affects. The other is that the visual system extracts and processes such information. In particular, I argue that the visual system functions to detect the affects of (...)
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  27. Edoardo Zamuner (2008). “Face Value. Perception and Knowledge Others’ Happiness”. In Lisa Bortolotti (ed.), The Philosophy of Happiness. Palgrave.
    Happiness, like other basic emotions, has visual properties that create the conditions for happiness to be perceived in others. This is to say that happiness is perceivable. Its visual properties are to be identified with those facial expressions that are characteristic of happiness. Yet saying that something is perceivable does not suffice for us to conclude that it is perceived. We therefore need to show that happiness is perceived. Empirical evidence suggests that the visual system functions to perceive happiness as (...)
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  28. Edoardo Zamuner (2008). Knowledge and Self-Knowledge of Emotions. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    This thesis addresses two questions. One concerns the metaphysics of emotions and asks what kinds of mental states emotions are. The other asks how the metaphysics of emotions bears on first and third-personal knowledge of emotions. There are two prevailing views on the nature of emotions. They are the perception and cognitive views. The perception view argues that emotions are bodily feelings. The cognitive view, by contrast, contends that emotions are some sorts of evaluative judgments. I show that both views (...)
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  29. Edoardo Zamuner (2005). The Content of Emotions. In Y. Gustafsson, L. Hertzberg, T. Kettunen, C. Kronqvist & M. McEachrane (eds.), Proceedings of the Conference “Emotions, Others and the Self”. Åbo Akademi University.
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