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  1. Maria Magoula Adamos (2012). Mental Pictures, Imagination and Emotions. In P. Hanna (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies, vol. 6. ATINER 83-91.
    Although cognitivism has lost some ground recently in the philosophical circles, it is still the favorite view of many scholars of emotions. Even though I agree with cognitivism's insight that emotions typically involve some type of evaluative intentional state, I shall argue that in some cases, less epistemically committed, non-propositional evaluative states such as mental pictures can do a better job in identifying the emotion and providing its intentional object. Mental pictures have different logical features from propositions: they are representational, (...)
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  2. Maria Magoula Adamos (2007). The Unity of Emotion: An Unlikely Aristotelian Solution. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):101-114.
    Most researchers of emotions agree that although cognitive evaluations such as beliefs, thoughts, etc. are essential for emotion, bodily feelings and their behavioral expressions are also required. Yet, only a few explain how all these diverse aspects of emotion are related to form the unity or oneness of emotion. The most prevalent account of unity is the causal view, which, however, has been shown to be inadequate because it sees the relations between the different parts of emotion as external and (...)
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  3. Maria Magoula Adamos (2006). Emotions as Unities of Form and Matter. The Emotion Researcher 22 (1-2):09-10.
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  4. Maria Magoula Adamos (2002). How Are the Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Aspects of Emotion Related? Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):183-195.
    Most scholars of emotions concede that although cognitive evaluations are essential for emotion, they are not sufficient for it, and that other elements, such as bodily feelings, physiological sensations and behavioral expressions are also required. However, only a few discuss how these diverse aspects of emotion are related in order to form the unity of emotion. In this essay I examine the co-presence and the causal views, and I argue that neither view can account for the unity of emotions. In (...)
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  5. James Smith Allen (2003). Navigating the Social Sciences: A Theory for the Meta–History of Emotions. History and Theory 42 (1):82–93.
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  6. David L. Blank (1993). The Arousal of Emotion in Plato's Dialogues. Classical Quarterly 43 (02):428-.
    In Aeschines' dialogue Alcibiades, Socrates sees his brilliant young partner's haughty attitude towards the great Themistocles. Thereupon he gives an encomium of Themistocles, a man whose wisdom and arete, great as they were, could not save him from ostracism by his own people. This encomium has an extraordinary effect on Alcibiades: he cries and in his despair places his head upon Socrates' knee, realizing that he is nowhere near as good a man as Themistocles . Aeschines later has Socrates say (...)
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  7. Lisa Bortolotti (ed.) (2008). The Philosophy of Happiness. Palgrave.
    Philosophy and Happiness addresses the need to situate any meaningful discourse about happiness in a wider context of human interests, capacities and circumstances. How is happiness manifested and expressed? Can there be any happiness if no worthy life projects are pursued? How is happiness affected by relationships, illness, or cultural variants? Can it be reduced to preference satisfaction? Is it a temporary feeling or a persistent way of being? Is reflection conducive to happiness? Is mortality necessary for it? These are (...)
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  8. Frances Bottenberg (2012). The Self and Its Emotions. Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):480-484.
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  9. Giovanna Colombetti (2005). Appraising Valence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):8-10.
    ‘Valence’ is used in many different ways in emotion theory. It generally refers to the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ character of an emotion, as well as to the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ character of some aspect of emotion. After reviewing these different uses, I point to the conceptual problems that come with them. In particular, I dis- tinguish: problems that arise from conflating the valence of an emotion with the valence of its aspects, and problems that arise from the very idea that (...)
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  10. Giovanna Colombetti & Joel Krueger (2015). Scaffoldings of the Affective Mind. Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1157-1176.
    In this paper we adopt Sterelny's framework of the scaffolded mind, and his related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the extended-mind view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines, and develop phenomenological (...)
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  11. Florian Cova & Fabrice Teroni (forthcoming). Is the Paradox of Fiction Soluble in Psychology? Philosophical Psychology:1-13.
    If feeling a genuine emotion requires believing that its object actually exists, and if this is a belief we are unlikely to have about fictional entities, then how could we feel genuine emotions towards these entities? This question lies at the core of the paradox of fiction. Since its original formulation, this paradox has generated a substantial literature. Until recently, the dominant strategy had consisted in trying to solve it. Yet, it is more and more frequent for scholars to try (...)
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  12. Florian Cova & Fabrice Teroni, Le paradoxe de la fiction: le retour. L'expression des Émotions: Mélanges En l'Honneur de Patrizia Lombardo.
    Tullmann et Buckwalter (2014) ont récemment soutenu que le paradoxe de la fiction tenait plus de l’illusion que de la réalité. D’après eux, les théories contemporaines des émotions ne fourniraient aucune raison d’adopter une interprétation du terme « existence » qui rende les prémisses du paradoxe incompatibles entre elles. Notre discussion a pour but de contester cette manière de dissoudre le paradoxe de la fiction en montrant qu’il ne prend pas sa source dans les théories contemporaines des émotions. Bien plutôt, (...)
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  13. Anthony Cunningham (2005). Great Anger. The Dalhousie Review 85 (3).
    Anger has an undeniable hand in human suffering and horrific deeds. Various schools of thought call for eliminating or moderating the capacity for anger. I argue that the capacity for anger, like the capacity for grief, is at the heart of our humanity.
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  14. Tim Dalgleish (1997). Once More with Feeling: The Role of Emotion in Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):110-111.
    In an analysis of the role of emotion in self-deception is presented. It is argued that instances of emotional self-deception unproblematically meet Mele's jointly sufficient criteria. It is further proposed that a consideration of different forms of mental representation allows the possibility of instances of self-deception in which contradictory beliefs (in the form p and ~p) are held simultaneously with full awareness.
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  15. Eva-Maria Engelen (2007). Gefühle. Reclam.
    Nach Erläuterung der wesentlichen Begriffe wie „Emotion“ und „Gefühl“ stellt Eva-Maria Engelen die wichtigsten theoretischen Ansätze vor. Dabei spielen sowohl Theorien aus der Philosophie, der Psychologie als auch aus den Neurowissenschaften eine wichtige Rolle. Geklärt wird in weiteren Kapiteln das Verhältnis von Gefühlen und Emotionen zum Verstand, zum Bewusstsein und zu Werten.
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  16. Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (2008). Facts and Values in Emotional Plasticity. In Louis Charland & Peter Zachar (eds.), Fact and Value in Emotion; Consciousness and Emotion Book Series. John Benjamins Publishing Company 101--137.
    How much can we shape the emotions we experience? Or to put it another way, how plastic are our emotions? It is clear that the exercise of identifying the degree of plasticity of emotion is futile without a prior specification of what can be plastic, so we first propose an analysis of the components of emotions. We will then turn to empirical data that might be used to assess the degree of plasticity of emotions.
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  17. Irwin Goldstein (1981). Cognitive Pleasure and Distress. Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23.
    Explaining the "intentional object" some people assign pleasure, I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleasure. Bernard Williams, Gilbert Ryle, and Irving Thalberg, who reject this analysis, are discussed. Being pleased (or distressed) about something is a compound of pleasure (pain) and some thought or belief. Pleasure in itself does not have an "intentional object".
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  18. Robert M. Gordon (1986). The Passivity of Emotions. Philosophical Review 95 (July):339-60.
  19. Y. Gustafsson, L. Hertzberg, T. Kettunen, C. Kronqvist & M. McEachrane (eds.) (2005). Proceedings of the Conference “Emotions, Others and the Self”. Åbo Akademi University.
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  20. Rom Harré (1994). Emotion and Memory: The Second Cognitive Revolution. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 37:25-.
  21. Christoph Jäger & Eva Bänninger-Huber (2015). Looking Into Meta-Emotions. Synthese 192 (3):787-811.
    There are many psychic mechanisms by which people engage with their selves. We argue that an important yet hitherto neglected one is self-appraisal via meta-emotions. We discuss the intentional structure of meta-emotions and explore the phenomenology of a variety of examples. We then present a pilot study providing preliminary evidence that some facial displays may indicate the presence of meta-emotions. We conclude by arguing that meta-emotions have an important role to play in higher-order theories of psychic (...)
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  22. Adam Knowles (2010). Real Context and the Emotional A Priori. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 31 (2):265-280.
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  23. Philip J. Koch (1987). Emotional Ambivalence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (2):257-279.
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  24. Anita Konzelmann Ziv (2011). « Beau À Vomir »: L’Écœurement Devant la Beauté Physique. In Christine Tappolet, Fabrice Teroni & Anita Konzelmann Ziv (eds.), Les ombres de l’âme: Penser les émotions négatives. Haller
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  25. Joel Krueger (2014). Emotions and the Social Niche. In Christian von Scheve & Mikko Salmela (eds.), Collective Emotions. Oxford University Press 156-171.
  26. Joel Krueger (2014). Varieties of Extended Emotions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):533-555.
    I offer a preliminary defense of the hypothesis of extended emotions (HEE). After discussing some taxonomic considerations, I specify two ways of parsing HEE: the hypothesis of bodily extended emotions (HEBE), and the hypothesis of environmentally extended emotions (HEEE). I argue that, while both HEBE and HEEE are empirically plausible, only HEEE covers instances of genuinely extended emotions. After introducing some further distinctions, I support one form of HEEE by appealing to different streams of empirical research—particularly work on music and (...)
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  27. Joel Krueger (2014). Dewey's Rejection of the Emotion/Expression Distinction. In Tibor Solymosi & John Shook (eds.), Neuroscience, Neurophilosophy and Pragmatism: Understanding Brains at Work in the World. Palgrave Macmillan 140-161.
  28. John A. Lambie (2009). Emotion Experience, Rational Action, and Self-Knowledge. Emotion Review 1 (3):272-280.
    This article examines the role of emotion experience in both rational action and self-knowledge. A key distinction is made between emotion experiences of which we are unaware, and those of which we are aware. The former motivate action and color our view of the world, but they do not do so in a rational way, and their nonreflective nature obscures self-understanding. The article provides arguments and evidence to support the view that emotion experiences contribute to rational action only if one (...)
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  29. M. Lebar (2001). Simulation, Theory, and Emotion. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):423 – 434.
    It seems that in interpreting others we sometimes simulate, sometimes apply theory. Josef Perner has suggested that a fruitful line of inquiry in folk psychology would seek "criteria for problems where we have to use simulation from those where we do without or where it is even impossible to use." In this paper I follow Perner with a suggestion that our understanding of our interpretive processes may benefit from considering their physiological bases. In particular, I claim that it may be (...)
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  30. Neil McLaughlin (1996). Nazism, Nationalism, and the Sociology of Emotions: Escape From Freedom Revisited. Sociological Theory 14 (3):241-261.
    The recent worldwide resurgence of militant nationalism, fundamentalist intolerance and right-wing authoritarianism has again put the issues of violence and xenophobia at the center of social science research and theory. German psychoanalyst and sociologist Erich Fromm's work provides a useful theoretical microfoundation for contemporary work on nationalism, the politics of identity, and the roots of war and violence. Fromm's analysis of Nasism in Escape from Freedom (1941), in particular, outlines a compelling theory of irrationality, and his later writings on nationalism (...)
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  31. Goldie Peter (ed.) (2010). Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion.
  32. Carolyn Price (2015). Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, by Michael S. Brady. Mind 124 (496):1240-1244.
    A review of Michael Brady's book Emotional Insight.
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  33. Jennifer Primmer (2013). Understanding the Dimensional Nature of Alexithymia. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (9-10):9-10.
    In this paper, I explore how best to conceptualize the nature of alexithymia. I argue that the condition is best understood as a dimensional construct; as such, it is likely that there exist various degrees of alexithymia. Moreover, I explore the merits of two analogies that others have used to try to understand the nature of alexithymia: one characterizes the condition as an analogue of associative visual object agnosia, and the other characterizes it as the emotional equivalent of blindsight. I (...)
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  34. Rainer Reisenzein (2007). What is a Definition of Emotion? And Are Emotions Mental-Behavioral Processes? Social Science Information 7:26-29.
    [I argue that a precise definition of emotions is neither necessary nor possible prior to empirical research on emotions. It is not necessary because all that is needed for for fruitful research and successful communication is a working definition of emotions, a description that allows to roughly demarcate the class of emotions. It is not possible because precise emotion definitions are real definitions, empirical claims about the essence of emotions. These claims about the nature of emotion are always formulated against (...)
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  35. Rainer Reisenzein & Martin Junge (2012). Language and Emotion From the Perspective of the Computational Belief-Desire Theory of Emotion. In Emiliano Lorini & Andreas Herzig (eds.), Dynamicity in Emotion Concepts. Springer International Publishing
    The relationship between language and emotion is discussed from the perspective of CBDTE, a computational (C) explication of the belief-desire theory of emotion (BDTE). Three claims are defended: First, natural language, humans’ main medium of communication, plays a highly important role in the process of emotion generation; second, natural language is of central importance for the communication of emotions and emotion-related information; third, a language of thought (a language-like mental representation system) is required to explain human emotions.
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  36. Aaron Smuts, How Much Should We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?
    It is widely assumed that we can meaningfully talk about emotional reactions as being appropriate or inappropriate. Much of the discussion has focused on one kind of appropriateness, that of fittingness. An emotional response is appropriate only if it fits its object. For instance, fear only fits dangerous things. There is another dimension of appropriateness that has been relatively ignored — proportionality. For an emotional reaction to be appropriate not only must the object fit, the reaction should be of the (...)
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  37. Ronald De Sousa & Adam Morton (2002). Emotional Truth. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76:247-275.
    [Ronald de Sousa] Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; belief-like (...)
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  38. Achim Stephan (2012). Existentielle Gefühle und Emotionen: Intentionalität und Regulierbarkeit. In Sabine Marienberg & Jörg Fingerhut (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive / Gefühle des Lebendigseins. De Gruyter 8--101.
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  39. Christine Tappolet (forthcoming). La vertu. In Emma Dayer-Tieffenbach & Julien Deonna (eds.), Dictionnaire des valeurs. Edition D’Ithaque
    I argue on the basis of a discussion of Aristotelian and Humean accounts of virtue that virtue is fundamentally a disposition to undergo appropriate emotions.
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  40. Christine Tappolet (2006). Robert C. Roberts, Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Ethics 117 (1):143-147.
    A critical review of Robert C. Roberts' "Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology", Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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  41. Katherine Tullmann & Wesley Buckwalter (2014). Does the Paradox of Fiction Exist? Erkenntnis 79 (4):779-796.
    Many philosophers have attempted to provide a solution to the paradox of fiction, a triad of sentences that lead to the conclusion that genuine emotional responses to fiction are irrational. We suggest that disagreement over the best response to this paradox stems directly from the formulation of the paradox itself. Our main goal is to show that there is an ambiguity regarding the word ‘exist’ throughout the premises of the paradox. To reveal this ambiguity, we display the diverse existential commitments (...)
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  42. Monique Lisa Wonderly (2016). On Being Attached. Philosophical Studies 173 (1):223-242.
    We often use the term “attachment” to describe our emotional connectedness to objects in the world. We become attached to our careers, to our homes, to certain ideas, and perhaps most importantly, to other people. Interestingly, despite its import and ubiquity in our everyday lives, the topic of attachment per se has been largely ignored in the philosophy literature. I address this lacuna by identifying attachment as a rich “mode of mattering” that can help to inform certain aspects of agency (...)
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  43. Edoardo Zamuner (2011). A Theory of Affect Perception. Mind and Language 26 (4):436-451.
    What do we see when we look at someone's expression of fear? I argue that one of the things that we see is fear itself. I support this view by developing a theory of affect perception. The theory involves two claims. One is that expressions are patterns of facial changes that carry information about affects. The other is that the visual system extracts and processes such information. In particular, I argue that the visual system functions to detect the affects of (...)
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  44. Edoardo Zamuner (2008). “Face Value. Perception and Knowledge Others’ Happiness”. In Lisa Bortolotti (ed.), The Philosophy of Happiness. Palgrave
    Happiness, like other basic emotions, has visual properties that create the conditions for happiness to be perceived in others. This is to say that happiness is perceivable. Its visual properties are to be identified with those facial expressions that are characteristic of happiness. Yet saying that something is perceivable does not suffice for us to conclude that it is perceived. We therefore need to show that happiness is perceived. Empirical evidence suggests that the visual system functions to perceive happiness as (...)
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  45. Edoardo Zamuner (2008). Knowledge and Self-Knowledge of Emotions. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    This thesis addresses two questions. One concerns the metaphysics of emotions and asks what kinds of mental states emotions are. The other asks how the metaphysics of emotions bears on first and third-personal knowledge of emotions. There are two prevailing views on the nature of emotions. They are the perception and cognitive views. The perception view argues that emotions are bodily feelings. The cognitive view, by contrast, contends that emotions are some sorts of evaluative judgments. I show that both views (...)
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  46. Edoardo Zamuner (2005). The Content of Emotions. In Y. Gustafsson, L. Hertzberg, T. Kettunen, C. Kronqvist & M. McEachrane (eds.), Proceedings of the Conference “Emotions, Others and the Self”. Åbo Akademi University
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