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  1. Evandro Agazzi (1981). Intentionality and Artificial Intelligence. Epistemologia 4:195.
  2. Dorit Bar-On & Mitchell Green (2010). Lionspeak: Communication, Expression, and Meaning. In James R. O'Shea & Eric Rubenstein (eds.), Self, Language, and World: Problems From Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg. Ridgeview Publishing Co.. 89--106.
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  3. Yitzhak Benbaji & Menachem Fisch (2005). Factuality Without Realism: Normativity and the Davidsonian Approach to Meaning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):505-530.
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  4. Akeel Bilgrami (2005). Self-Knowledge, Intentionality, and Normativity. Iyyun 54 (January):5-24.
  5. Jes Bjarup (1988). Kripke's Case: Some Remarks on Rules, Their Interpretation and Application. Rechtstheorie 19:39-49.
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  6. Max Black (1958). Notes on the Meaning of 'Rule'. Theoria 24 (3):139-161.
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  7. Ray Buchanan (2012). Meaning, Expression, and Evidence. Thought 1 (2):152-157.
    Grice's (1957) analysis of non-natural meaning generated a huge industry, where new analyses were put forward to respond to successively more complex counterexamples. Davis (2003) offers a novel and refreshingly simple analysis of meaning in terms of the expression of belief, where (roughly) an agent expresses the belief that p just in case she performs a publicly observable action with the intention that it be an indication that she occurrently believes that p. I argue that Davis's analysis fails to capture (...)
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  8. H. G. Callaway (1990). Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 33 (2):251-59..
    This is my expository and critical review of Jerry Fodor's Psychosemantics. See also Callaway 1992, Meaning Holism and Semantic Realism.
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  9. Francisco Calvo Garzón (2000). State Space Semantics and Conceptual Similarity: Reply to Churchland. Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):77-95.
    Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore [(1992) Holism: a shopper's guide, Oxford: Blackwell; (1996) in R. McCauley (Ed.) The Churchlands and their critics , Cambridge: Blackwell] have launched a powerful attack against Paul Churchland's connectionist theory of semantics--also known as state space semantics. In one part of their attack, Fodor and Lepore argue that the architectural and functional idiosyncrasies of connectionist networks preclude us from articulating a notion of conceptual similarity applicable to state space semantics. Aarre Laakso and Gary Cottrell [(1998) (...)
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  10. Louis Caruana, Realism and Rule-Following.
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  11. Mason Daniel Cash (2000). Intentionality in Action: Looking for "Life" in All the Wrong Places. Dissertation, University of Alberta (Canada)
    Here I outline an "embodied action" approach to Cognitive Science, whose central assumption is that human beings are essentially embodied, embedded in a world and situated in a social context. I present a naturalized account of intentionality from this perspective. ;I give a normative account of language-use, as the performance of speech acts as moves within shared norm-governed practices. I then show how the normative practice of giving reasons for actions licenses us to attribute intentional states to people as reasons (...)
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  12. William J. Clancey (1993). Notes on "Epistemology of a Rule-Based Expert System". Philosophical Explorations.
    In the 1970s, we conceived of a rule explanation as supplying the causal and social context that justifies a rule, an objective documentation for why a rule is correct. Today we would call such descriptions post-hoc design rationales, not proving the rules? correctness, but providing a means for later interpreting why the rule was written and facilitating later improvements.
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  13. Jeffrey Clarke (1998). The Question of Meaning. Dialogue 37 (3):646-647.
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  14. Cornelius J. Connolly (1929). A Catholic View of Holism. New Scholasticism 3 (1):108-109.
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  15. Seth Crook (2002). Stephen Clark's Green Holism. Heythrop Journal 43 (4):444–462.
    S.R.L. Clark is a prominent defender of environmental holism and an advocate of the better treatment of other species. Not coincidentally, he is also a defender of a Neoplatonic Theism which holds that the presuppositions of reason have theistic implications and the point of the world is to exemplify beauty, or all the forms of beauty. Here I examine certain aspects of his view. I do so because I’m drawn to his main holist conclusion: we should live according to those (...)
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  16. Sam Cumming (2009). Meaning and Argument. John Wiley & Sons.
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  17. Wayne A. Davis (2013). Meaning, Expression, and Indication: Reply to Buchanan. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):62-66.
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  18. Sara Dellantonio, Social Externalism and Psychological Explanations - The Problem of the Semantic Features of Contents.
    It starts to rain and I open the umbrella or, if I don"t have one, I ask my colleague, who is walking with me, if he has an umbrella in the bag. Why do I do so? There are many ways to answer this question, but if I adopt the strategy to explain the causes of my acting or speaking by looking for the reasons that I have for doing it (for instance, I notice that it is raining and I (...)
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  19. Richard Double (1981). On a Wittgensteinian Objection to Kripke's Dualism Argument. Philosophy Research Archives 1414.
    In 'kripke's argument against the identity theory' michael levin argues that the private language argument can be used to undermine saul kripke's cartesian claim to be able to imagine mental states and brain states existing apart, and, thus, refute his argument for dualism. in this paper it is argued that levin's use of the private language argument relies implicitly upon the descriptivist theory of mental language, to which kripke has provided a plausible alternative, "viz"., the causal theory of reference. thus, (...)
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  20. Richard Eldridge (1984). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Review of Metaphysics 37 (4):859-861.
  21. Michael Esfeld, Belief and Meaning. Essays at the Interface.
    This paper recalls the motivation for a normative account of the conceptual content of our beliefs, namely the problem of rule-following. It employs Brandom’s social, inferential semantics as a paradigmatic example of such an account of conceptual content. The conceptual content of our beliefs – and the meaning of the sentences that we use – is normative in the sense that it is determined by social, normative practices. Nevertheless, a description of content and meaning is possible. The paper argues that (...)
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  22. Michael Esfeld (1999). Holism in Cartesianism and in Today's Philosophy of Physics. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 30 (1):17-36.
    The aim of this paper is to contribute to a more balanced judgement than the widespread impression that the changes which are called for in today's philosophy of physics and which centre around the concept of holism amount to a rupture with the framework of Cartesian philosophy of physics. I argue that this framework includes a sort of holism: As a result of the identification of matter with space, any physical property can be instantiated only if there is the whole (...)
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  23. Michael Joseph Fletcher (2011). The Cognitive Significance of Kant's Third Critique. Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
    This dissertation aims at forging an archetectonic link between Kant's first and third Critiques within a cognitive-semantic framework. My aim is to show how the major conceptual innovations of Kant’s third Critique can be plausibly understood in terms of the theoretical aims of the first, (Critique of Pure Reason). However, unlike other cognition-oriented approaches to Kant's third Critique, which take the point of contact between the first and third Critique's to be the first Critique's Transcendental Analytic, I link these two (...)
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  24. Gl, Against Content Normativity.
  25. Kathrin Glüer-Pagin, Rules of Meaning and Practical Reasoning.
    Can there be rules of language which serve both to determine meaning and to guide speakers in ordinary linguistic usage, i.e. in the production of speech acts? We argue that the answer is no. We take the guiding function of rules to be the function of serving as reasons for actions, and the question of guidance is then considered within the framework of practical reasoning. It turns out that those rules that can serve as reasons for linguistic utterances cannot be (...)
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  26. Warren Goldfarb (1985). Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules. Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):471-488.
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  27. Paul Gregory, Kripke on Private Language.
  28. Richard A. Healey (1991). Holism and Nonseparability. Journal of Philosophy 88 (8):393-421.
  29. David Holdcroft (1982). Expression and Meaning. Philosophical Books 23 (1):46-49.
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  30. John Humphrey, Brief Overview of Key Parts and Key Notions in Kripke's Book.
    The alleged paradox begins with a sceptical inquiry about my right to claim that my past usage of '+' (i.e., my past usage of the plus sign) was used to denote the function plus rather than the function quus. The definition of quus is: x quus y = x + y, if x, y < 57; otherwise, x quus y = 5. (Kripke uses an encircled plus sign to represent the quus sign. I can't reproduce that sign here so I'll (...)
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  31. John Humphrey, Some Oddities in Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.
    Oddity One : Kripke claims that Wittgenstein has invented "a new form of scepticism", one which inclines Kripke "to regard it as the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date, one that only a highly unusual cast of mind could have produced" (K, p. 60). However, Kripke also claims that there are analogies (and sometimes the analogies look very much like identities) between Wittgenstein's sceptical argument and the work of at least three and maybe four (...)
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  32. B. J. (1980). Expression and Meaning. Review of Metaphysics 33 (4):803-804.
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  33. Henry Jackman, Temporal Externalism, Use and Meaning.
    Our ascriptions of content to utterances in the past attribute to them a level of determinacy that extends beyond what could supervene upon the usage up to the time of those utterances. If one accepts the truth of such ascriptions, one can either (1) argue that future use must be added to the supervenience base that determines meaning, or (2) argue that such cases show that meaning does not supervene upon use at all. The following will argue against authors such (...)
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  34. Anthony Jaffey, Consciousness: A Quasi-Identity Approach.
    Abstract: The article considers how the relationship between consciousness and neural events in the brain should be viewed. The approach is that conscious experiences – perceptions, feelings and mental images – are the subjective versions of the neural events. It is the conscious experiences that are the essence of intentionality and meaning; the neural events do the causative work. From this viewpoint there are discussions of the neural representations that figure in thinking and their corresponding subjective experiences – in what (...)
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  35. H. Joshi (1987). Concept of Meaning. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 14 (3):309.
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  36. Katarzyna Kobos (2012). Accommodating Abstracta in Naturalist Accounts of Meaning. In Piotr Stalmaszcyzk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis. Ontos Verlag. 295.
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  37. James Levine (2003). The Metaphysicians of Meaning. Dialogue 42 (1):145-147.
  38. Jno T. Lingard (1878). The Rule of Three in Metaphysics. Mind 3 (12):571-572.
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  39. Eric Lormand, Pshaw!
    Since my proposed framework for meaning (in Holist" and Atomist") is neither simply a psychosemantic holism nor simply a psychosemantic atomism, but a marriage in which the two have become one, we might call it a psychosemantic holism-atomism wedlock (PSHAW). In this paper I want to.
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  40. R. L. M. (1971). Explanation and Meaning. Review of Metaphysics 25 (1):136-137.
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  41. N. Malla (1974). The Concept of Meaning. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 1 (4):324-329.
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  42. Jeff E. Malpas (1991). Holism and Indeterminacy. Dialectica 47 (1):47-58.
    SummaryDonald Davidson's account of the interrelation between attitudes, and linguistic and non‐linguistic behaviour is a thoroughly holistic one. The project of radical interpretation itself embodies a holistic approach to the interpretative task. Yet Davidson also accepts a degree of indeterminacy in interpretation. Davidson's commitment to both holism and indeterminacy can give rise to a problem in the Davidsonian position. That problem is explained and a solution proposed. The indeterminacy thesis is thereby clarified, as is the nature of Davidsonian holism.
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  43. Joseph Margolis (1965). Rule-Utiliarianism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):220 – 225.
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  44. Anthonie Meijers (1998). Social Holism and Atomism: An Introduction. Philosophical Explorations 1 (3):166 – 168.
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  45. Nenad Mi??Evi? (1996). Computationalism and the Kripke-Wittgenstein Paradox. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:215 - 229.
  46. Alexander Miller (2000). Horwich, Meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):161-174.
    Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical (...)
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  47. J. N. Mohanty (1984). Intentionality, Causality and Holism. Synthese 61 (1):17 - 33.
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  48. Paul K. Moser & Kevin Flannery (1985). Kripke and Wittgenstein: Intention Without Paradox. Heythrop Journal 26 (3):310–318.
  49. Donnchadh O'Conaill (2013). On Being Motivated. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):579-595.
    Merleau-Ponty’s notion of being motivated or solicited to act has recently been the focus of extensive investigation, yet work on this topic has tended to take the general notion of being motivated for granted. In this paper, I shall outline an account of what it is to be motivated. In particular, I shall focus on the relation between the affective character of states of being motivated and their intentional content, i.e. how things appear to the agent. Drawing on Husserl’s discussion (...)
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  50. Tim Ogden (1993). Philosopers Rule OK? Philosophy Now 8:45-46.
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