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  1. Kelly Alberts (1987). Intentionality and First Person Reference. Philosophy Research Archives 13:613-636.
    Roderick Chisholm contrasts semantic theories that presuppose “the primacy of the intentional” with those that presuppose “the primacy of the linguistic”. In The First Person he attempts to develop an analysis of first person singular reference that presupposes the primacy of the intentional. In this paper I attempt to develop a semantics of first person singular reference (what I call ‘I-reference’) that presupposes the primacy of the linguistic. I do three things in the paper. First, I criticize Chisholm’s (and Frege’s) (...)
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  2. Marina Paola Banchetti-Robino (2008). Hiroshi Kojima's Phenomenological Ontology. Philosophy East and West 58 (2):163-189.
    : In his book Monad and Thou: Phenomenological Ontology of the Human Being, Japanese philosopher Hiroshi Kojima proposes to redefine the I-Thou relation, first extensively investigated by Martin Buber, and to reconcile the notions of ‘individuality’ and ‘community’ in terms of his new phenomenological ontology of the human being as monad. In this essay, Kojima’s ideas are examined concerning the monad and intersubjectivity, and it is shown how these ideas can be extended and brought to bear on issues concerning human (...)
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  3. Paul Boswell (forthcoming). Making Sense of Unpleasantness: Evaluationism and Shooting the Messenger. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    Unpleasant sensations possess a unique ability to make certain aversive actions seem reasonable to us. But what is it about these experiences that give them that ability? According to some recent evaluationist accounts, it is their representational content: unpleasant sensations represent a certain event as bad for one. Unfortunately evaluationism seems unable to make sense of our aversive behavior to the sensations themselves, for it appears to entail that taking a painkiller is akin to shooting the messenger, and is every (...)
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  4. D. P. Burte, Comparative Study of Phenomenology and Sankhya.
    Phenomenology, as propounded by Edmond Husserl, is an important movements in the modern western philosophy, while sÅÙkhya and its application yoga are the ancient Indian philosophical disciplines or dar±ana. This is a comparative study of phenomenology with sÅÙkhya and yoga. As per my present understanding this project is now completed. I have organized the outcome of my study in the following four papers preceded by prolegomena: Prolegomena to the comparative study of Phenomenology and SaÙkhya 1, Consciousness in Phenomenology and SÅÙkhya (...)
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  5. Tony Cheng (2015). Self, Action and Passivity. Philosophical Writings 44 (1):01-19.
    In a series of works Hubert Dreyfus argues that phenomenological considerations can show the falsity of John McDowell’s claim that ours actions are permeated with rationality. Dreyfus changes the details of his objections several times in this debate, but I shall argue that there is an implicit false assumption lurking in his thinking throughout his exchanges with McDowell. Originally Dreyfus proposed a distinction between “detached rule-following” and “situation-specific way of coping,” and later he replaces it with the distinction between “subjectivity” (...)
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  6. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2001). Die Intentionalitätstheorie Anton Martys. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):175-214.
    The point of departure for Anton Marty's theory of intentionality is Franz Brentano's ontology of intentionality as outlined in the unpublished manuscript of his logic-lectures from the second half of the 1880's. This rich ontology comprises immanent objects, immanent propositional contents and states of affairs. The late Marty rejects all immanent entities in Brentano's sense and explains intentionality in terms of counterfactualconditionals.However,contraryto the late Brentano,he insists on the indispensability of the category of states of affairs . Consequently Marty can formulate (...)
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  7. Roberto Cordeschi (1988). Intentional Psychology and Computational Models. In K. Leidlmair & O. Neumaier (eds.), Wozu Künstliche Intelligenz? (Conceptus-Studien 5). VWGÖ
  8. Tim Crane (2008). Reply to Nes. Analysis 68 (299):215–218.
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  9. Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (2005). Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):429-452.
    A proposal for the biological grounding of intrinsic teleology and sense-making through the theory of autopoiesis is critically evaluated. Autopoiesis provides a systemic language for speaking about intrinsic teleology but its original formulation needs to be elaborated further in order to explain sense-making. This is done by introducing adaptivity, a many-layered property that allows organisms to regulate themselves with respect to their conditions of viability. Adaptivity leads to more articulated concepts of behaviour, agency, sense-construction, health, and temporality than those given (...)
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  10. John Divers & Alexander Miller (1994). Best Opinion, Intention-Detecting and Analytic Functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):239-245.
  11. Andreas Dorschel (1997). Über die Intentionalität von Emotionen. International Studies in Philosophy 29 (4):11-21.
    Intentionality is a key feature of emotions; we understand them as directed towards objects. Intentional objects need not be real objects. Furthermore, objects of emotions can be distinguished from their causes. At the same time, objects and causes may be related, and, for some emotions, have to be related if the emotions are to count as warranted. Psychoanalysis and comparable cures tend to ignore these relationships. That does not necessarily preclude therapeutic success. Yet being based on said ignorance renders such (...)
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  12. Santiago Echeverri (2014). Explaining Reference: A Plea for Semantic Psychologism. In Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio & Anne Meylan (eds.), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel. University of Geneva 550-580.
    ‘Modest’ and ‘full-blooded’ conceptions of meaning disagree on whether we should try to provide explanations of reference. In this paper, I defend a psychological brand of the full-blooded program. As I understand it, there are good reasons to provide a psychological explanation of referential abilities. This explanation is to be framed at an intermediary level of description between the personal level and the explanations provided by neuroscience. My defense of this program has two parts: First, I display the explanatory insufficiency (...)
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  13. Andreas Elpidorou (2012). Where is My Mind? Mark Rowlands on the Vehicles of Cognition. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (1):145-160.
    Do our minds extend beyond our brains? In a series of publications, Mark Rowlands has argued that the correct answer to this question is an affirmative one. According to Rowlands, certain types of operations on bodily and worldly structures should be considered to be proper and literal parts of our cognitive and mental processes. In this article, I present and critically evaluate Rowlands' position.
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  14. Chris Fraser (2008). Wc-Wtl, the Background, and Intentionality. In Bo Mou (ed.), Searle's Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement. Brill 27--63.
    John Searle’s “thesis of the Background” is an attempt to articulate the role of nonintentional capacities---know-how, skills, and abilities---in constituting intentional phenomena. This essay applies Searle’s notion of the Background to shed light on the Daoist notion of w’u-w’ei---“non-action” or non-intentional action---and to help clarify the sort of activity that might originally have inspired the w’u-w’ei ideal. I draw on Searle’s work and the original Chinese sources to develop a defensible conception of a w’u-w’ei-like state that may play an intrinsically (...)
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  15. Gabor Forrai George Kampis (ed.) (2005). Intentionality: Past and Future. Rodopi NY.
  16. T. L. Hurst, Turing Machines and the Chinese Room.
    This paper looks at the Turing test, Turing machines and Searle's 1980 thought experiment "The Chinese Room". It concludes that the Chinese Room scenario does not support his assertion that a modern computer is neither capable of understanding, nor the "right stuff" to support intent.
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  17. Peter King (2010). Mediaeval Intentionality and Pseudo-Intentionality. Quaestio 10 (1):25-44.
    Wilfrid Sellars charged that mediaeval philosophers confused the genuine intentionality of thinking with what he called the “pseudo-intentionality” of sensing. I argue that Sellars’s charge rests on importing a form of mind/body dualism that was foreign to the Middle Ages, but that he does touch on a genuine difficulty for mediaeval theories, namely whether they have the conceptual resources to distinguish between intentionality as a feature of consciousness and mere discriminative responses to the environment. In the end, it seems, intentionality (...)
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  18. Krista Lawlor (2007). A Notional Worlds Approach to Confusion. Mind and Language 22 (2):150–172.
    People often become confused, mistaking one thing for another, or taking two things to be the same. How should we assign semantic values to confused statements? Recently, philosophers have taken a pessimistic view of confusion, arguing that understanding confused belief demands significant departure from our normal interpretive practice. I argue for optimism. Our semantic treatment of confusion can be a lot like our semantic treatment of empty names. Surprisingly, perhaps, the resulting semantics lets us keep in place more of our (...)
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  19. Douglas C. Long (1961). Second Thoughts: A Reply to Mr Ginnane's Thoughts. Mind 70 (July):405-411.
  20. Fiona Macpherson (ed.) (2011). The Admissible Contents of Experience. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content. The book draws together papers by leading international philosophers of mind, including Alex Byrne, Alva Noë, Tim Bayne, Michael Tye, Richard Price and Susanna Siegel Essays address the central questions surrounding the content of perceptual experience Investigates how are we able to determine the admissible (...)
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  21. Patrick Madigan (2009). The History of Intentionality: Theories of Consciousness From Brentano to Husserl. By Ryan Hickerson. [REVIEW] Heythrop Journal 50 (3):555-556.
  22. Wolfe Mays (1984). Husserl and Intentionality. Philosophical Books 25 (1):25-27.
  23. Christophe Menant (2015). Biosemiotics, Aboutness, Meaning and Bio-Intentionality. Proposal for an Evolutionary Approach (2015). Dissertation, Biosemiotics Gatherings 2015. Aalborg University Copenhagen
    The management of meaningful information by biological entities is at the core of biosemiotics [Hoffmeyer 2010]. Intentionality, the ‘aboutness’ of mental states, is a key driver in philosophy of mind. Philosophers have been reluctant to use intentionality for non human animals. Some biologists have been in favor of it. J. Hoffmeyer has been using evolutionary intentionality and Peircean semiotics to discuss a biosemiotic approach to the problem of intentionality [Hoffmeyer 1996, 2012]. Also, recent philosophical studies are bringing new openings on (...)
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  24. Hili Razinsky (2014). The Behavioral Conflict of Emotion. International Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):159-173.
    ABSTRACT: This paper understands mental attitudes such as emotions and desires to be dispositions to behavior. It also acknowledges that people are often ambivalent, i.e., that they may hold opposed attitudes towards something or someone. Yet the first position seems to entail that ambivalence is either tantamount to paralysis or a contradictory notion. I identify the problem as based on a reductive interpretation of the dispositional character of attitudes and of ambivalence. The paper instead defends a post-Davidsonian view of the (...)
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  25. Fiora Salis (2013). Fictional Names and the Problem of Intersubjective Identification. Dialectica 67 (3):283-301.
    The problem of intersubjective identification arises from the difficulties of explaining how our thoughts and discourse about fictional characters can be directed towards the same (or different) characters given the assumption that there are no fictional entities. In this paper I aim to offer a solution in terms of participation in a practice of thinking and talking about the same thing, which is inspired by Sainsbury's name-using practices. I will critically discuss a similar idea that was put forward by Friend (...)
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  26. Susanna Schellenberg (2012). Sameness of Fregean Sense. Synthese 189 (1):163-175.
    This paper develops a criterion for sameness of Fregean senses. I consider three criteria: logical equivalence, intensional isomorphism, and epistemic equipollence. I reject the first two and argue for a version of the third.
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  27. G. F. Schueler (2013). Intentionality. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
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  28. Ori Simchen (2012). Necessary Intentionality: A Study in the Metaphysics of Aboutness. Oxford University Press.
    This book argues that words and thoughts are typically about whatever they are about necessarily rather than contingently. The argument proceeds by articulating a requisite modal background and then bringing this background to bear on cognitive matters, notably the intentionality of cognitive episodes and states. The modal picture that emerges from the first two chapters is a strongly particularist one whereby possibilities reduce to possibilities for particular things (or pluralities thereof) where the latter are determined by the natures of the (...)
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  29. Edward N. Zalta (1988). Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality. The MIT Press.
    This book tackles the issues that arise in connection with intensional logic -- a formal system for representing and explaining the apparent failures of certain important principles of inference such as the substitution of identicals and existential generalization -- and intentional states --mental states such as beliefs, hopes, and desires that are directed towards the world. The theory offers a unified explanation of the various kinds of inferential failures associated with intensional logic but also unifies the study of intensional contexts (...)
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