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  1. Michael Joseph Fletcher (2011). The Cognitive Significance of Kant's Third Critique. Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
    This dissertation aims at forging an archetectonic link between Kant's first and third Critiques within a cognitive-semantic framework. My aim is to show how the major conceptual innovations of Kant’s third Critique can be plausibly understood in terms of the theoretical aims of the first, (Critique of Pure Reason). However, unlike other cognition-oriented approaches to Kant's third Critique, which take the point of contact between the first and third Critique's to be the first Critique's Transcendental Analytic, I link these two (...)
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  2. A. N. Prior (1971). Objects of Thought. Oxford,Clarendon Press.
    Divided into two parts, the first concentrates on the logical properties of propositions, their relation to facts and sentences, and the parallel objects of commands and questions. The second part examines theories of intentionality and discusses the relationship between different theories of naming and different accounts of belief.
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Naturalism and Intentionality
  1. Mark Alfano (forthcoming). Nietzsche, Naturalism, and the Tenacity of the Intentional. Journal of Nietzsche Studies.
    In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche demands that “psychology shall be<br>recognized again as the queen of the sciences.” While one might cast a dubious glance at the “again,” many of Nietzsche’s insights were indeed psychological, and many of his arguments invoke psychological premises. In Genealogy, he criticizes the “English psychologists” for the “inherent psychological absurdity” of their theory of the origin of good and bad, pointing out the implausibility of the claim that the utility of unegoistic<br>actions would be forgotten. Tabling (...)
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  2. Daniel Anderson Arnold (2012). Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind. Columbia University Press.
    Aiming to complicate this story, Dan Arnold confronts a significant obstacle to popular attempts at harmonizing classical Buddhist and modern scientific thought: since most Indian Buddhists believe that the mental continuum is uninterrupted ..
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  3. Marc Artiga (2014). Prinz's Naturalistic Theory of Intentional Content. Critica 46 (136):69-86.
    This paper addresses Prinz's naturalistic theory of conceptual content, which he has defended in several works (Prinz, 2000; 2002; 2006). More precisely, I present in detail and critically assess his account of referential content, which he distinguishes from nominal or cognitive content. The paper argues that Prinz's theory faces four important difficulties, which might have significant consequences for his overall empiricist project.
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  4. George Bealer (1996). Materialism and the Logical Structure of Intentionality. In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
    After a brief history of Brentano's thesis of intentionality, it is argued that intentionality presents a serious problem for materialism. First, it is shown that, if no general materialist analysis (or reduction) of intentionality is possible, then intentional phenomena would have in common at least one nonphysical property, namely, their intentionality. A general analysis of intentionality is then suggested. Finally, it is argued that any satisfactory general analysis of intentionality must share with this analysis a feature which entails the existence (...)
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  5. George Bealer (1996). Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
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  6. Ansgar Beckermann (1996). Is There a Problem About Intentionality? Erkenntnis 45 (1):1-24.
    The crucial point of the mind-body-problem appears to be that mental phenome- na (events, properties, states) seem to have features which at first sight make it impossible to integrate these phenomena into a naturalistic world view, i.e. to identify them with, or to reduce them to, physical phenomena.1 In the contemp- orary discussion, there are mainly two critical features which are important in this context. The first of these is the feature of intentional states, e.g. beliefs and desires, to have (...)
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  7. Ansgar Beckermann (1988). Why Tropistic Systems Are Not Genuine Intentional Systems. Erkenntnis 29 (July):125-142.
  8. Thomas W. Bestor (1991). Naturalizing Semantics: New Insights or Old Folly? Inquiry 34 (September):285-310.
    Those who naturalize semantics concentrate on avoiding difficulties in getting the right sort of cause for the biological item which is to possess semantic properties (to be ?true of or to be ?about? some physical item). Using an analogy with sense?data, I argue that the real difficulties will be trying to get any proposed neural representation to be the right sort of effect of natural processes. The idea of a biological item which can be a semantic ?primitive? is as bankrupt (...)
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  9. Jonathan Birch (2014). Propositional Content in Signalling Systems. Philosophical Studies 171 (3):493-512.
    Skyrms, building on the work of Dretske, has recently developed a novel information-theoretic account of propositional content in simple signalling systems. Information-theoretic accounts of content traditionally struggle to accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation, and I show that Skyrms’s account is no exception. I proceed to argue, however, that a modified version of Skyrms’s account can overcome this problem. On my proposed account, the propositional content of a signal is determined not by the information that it actually carries, but by the (...)
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  10. Margaret A. Boden (1970). Intentionality and Physical Systems. Philosophy of Science 32 (June):200-214.
    Intentionality is characteristic of many psychological phenomena. It is commonly held by philosophers that intentionality cannot be ascribed to purely physical systems. This view does not merely deny that psychological language can be reduced to physiological language. It also claims that the appropriateness of some psychological explanation excludes the possibility of any underlying physiological or causal account adequate to explain intentional behavior. This is a thesis which I do not accept. I shall argue that physical systems of a specific sort (...)
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  11. Thomas D. Bontly (2001). Should Intentionality Be Naturalized? In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. 43-60.
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  12. Noam Chomsky (1995). Language and Nature. Mind 104 (413):1-61.
  13. Earl Conee (1995). Supervenience and Intentionality. In Elias E. Savellos & Ümit D. Yalçin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Needham Heights: Cambridge.
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  14. Earl Conee (1995). Supervenience: New Essays. Needham Heights: Cambridge.
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  15. Christian Coseru (2009). Naturalism and Intentionality: A Buddhist Epistemological Approach. Asian Philosophy 19 (3):239-264.
    In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of _svasa(m)dotvitti_ ('self-awareness', 'self-cognition') following similar attempts in the domains of phenomenology and analytic epistemology. First, I examine the extent to which work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and intentionality, could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. Second, I argue against a foundationalist reading of the causal account of perception offered by (...)
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  16. Michael Devitt (1994). The Methodology of Naturalistic Semantics. Journal of Philosophy 91 (10):545-72.
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  17. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2004). From Metaphysical to Substantive Naturalism: A Case Study. Synthese 138 (2):149-173.
    This paper addresses two related questions. First, what is involved in giving a distinctively realist and naturalist construal of an area of discourse, that is, in so much as stating a distinctively realist and naturalist position about, for example, content or value? I defend a condition that guarantees the realism and naturalism of any position satisfying it, at least in the case of positions on content, but perhaps in other cases as well. Second, what sorts of considerations render a distinctively (...)
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  18. Frances Egan (2003). Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
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  19. Frances Egan (2003). Naturalistic Inquiry: Where Does Mental Representation Fit In? In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing. 89--104.
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  20. Frances Egan (1994). Aworld Withoutmind: Comments on Terence Horgan's “Naturalism and Intentionality”. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):327 - 338.
  21. Andreas Elpidorou (2012). Where is My Mind? Mark Rowlands on the Vehicles of Cognition. Avant 3 (1):145-160.
    Do our minds extend beyond our brains? In a series of publications, Mark Rowlands has argued that the correct answer to this question is an affirmative one. According to Rowlands, certain types of operations on bodily and worldly structures should be considered to be proper and literal parts of our cognitive and mental processes. In this article, I present and critically evaluate Rowlands' position.
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  22. Berent Enc (1982). Intentional States of Mechanical Devices. Mind 91 (April):161-182.
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  23. Philippe Gagnon (2011). L’irréductibilité de la connaissance et l’intentionnalité en contexte de découverte abductive. Laval Théologique et Philosophique 67 (2):227-258.
    Knowledge is still an enigma, with its ability to inductively bring out a pattern without restricting itself to an empirical count of situations experienced. Instead of seeing the concept as a weakened object representing an external reality, it is suggested to view knowledge as the bridging of a distance with an ability for the knower to stay connected with outward reality. Attempts at defining an external and quantitative criterion of truth are questioned, as many human performances are not likely to (...)
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  24. Mattia Gallotti (2012). A Naturalistic Argument for the Irreducibility of Collective Intentionality. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):3-30.
    According to many philosophers and scientists, human sociality is explained by our unique capacity to “share” attitudes with others. The conditions under which mental states are shared have been widely debated in the past two decades, focusing especially on the issue of their reducibility to individual intentionality and the place of collective intentions in the natural realm. It is not clear, however, to what extent these two issues are related and what methodologies of investigation are appropriate in each case. In (...)
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  25. Steven F. Geisz (2009). Turning Representation Inside Out: An Adverbial Approach to the Metaphysics of Language and Mind. Philosophical Forum 40 (4):437-471.
    In order to resolve problems about the normative aspects of representation without having to (1) provide a naturalized theory of intentional/semantic properties, (2) accept non-natural intentional/semantic properties into our worldview, or (3) eliminate intentionality, this article questions a basic assumption about the metaphysics of representation: that representation involves representation-objects. An alternative, nonreifying approach to the metaphysics of representation is introduced and developed in detail. The argumentative strategy is as follows. First, an adverbial view of linguistic representation is introduced. Two potential (...)
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  26. Grant Gillett (1997). Husserl, Wittgenstein and the Snark: Intentionality and Social Naturalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):331-349.
    The Snark is an intentional object. I examine the general philosophical characteristics of thoughts of objects from the perspective of Husserl's, hyle, noesis, and noema and show how this meets constraints of opacity, normativity, and possible existence as generated by a sensitive theory of intentionality. Husserl introduces terms which indicate the normative features of intentional content and attempts to forge a direct relationship between the norms he generates and the actual world object which a thought intends. I then attempt to (...)
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  27. Mark Greenberg (2005). A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):299-320.
    In this paper, I propose a new way of understanding the space of possibilities in the field of mental content. The resulting map assigns separate locations to theories of content that have generally been lumped together on the more traditional map. Conversely, it clusters together some theories of content that have typically been regarded as occupying opposite poles. I make my points concrete by developing a taxonomy of theories of mental content, but the main points of the paper concern not (...)
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  28. John J. Haldane (1989). Naturalism and the Problem of Intentionality. Inquiry 32 (September):305-22.
    To the memory of Ian McFetridge 1948?1988 The general concern of the essay is with the question of whether cognitive states can be accounted for in naturalistic (i.e. physicalist) terms. An argument is presented to the effect that they cannot. This turns on the idea that cognitive states involve modes of presentation the identity and individuation conditions of which are ineliminably both intentional and intensional and consequently they cannot be accounted for in terms of physico?causal powers. In connection with this (...)
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  29. John Heil (2004). Natural Intentionality. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
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  30. Terence E. Horgan (1994). Naturalism and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):301-26.
    I argue for three principle claims. First, philosophers who seek to integrate the semantic and the intentional into a naturalistic metaphysical worldview need to address a task that they have thus far largely failed even to notice: explaining into- level connections between the physical and the intentional in a naturalistically acceptable way. Second, there are serious reasons to think that this task cannot be carried out in a way that would vindicate realism about intentionality. Third, there is much to be (...)
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  31. Amir Horowitz (1990). Intentional and Physical Relations. Manuscrito 13 (1):55-67.
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  32. Jaegwon Kim (2003). Chisholm's Legacy on Intentionality. Metaphilosophy 34 (5):649-662.
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  33. Gyula Klima (2013). Three Myths of Intentionality Versus Some Medieval Philosophers. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):359-376.
    This paper argues that three characteristic modern positions concerning intentionality – namely, (1) that intentionality is ‘the mark of the mental’; (2) that intentionality concerns a specific type of objects having intentional inexistence; and (3) that intentionality somehow defies logic – are just three ‘modern myths’ that medieval philosophers, from whom the modern notion supposedly originated, would definitely reject.
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  34. K. Talmont-Kaminski M. Milkowski (ed.) (2013). Regarding the Mind, Naturally: Naturalist Approaches to the Sciences of the Mental. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    Naturalism is currently the most vibrantly developing approach to philosophy, with naturalised methodologies being applied across all the philosophical disciplines. One of the areas naturalism has been focussing upon is the mind, traditionally viewed as a topic hard to reconcile with the naturalistic worldview. A number of questions have been pursued in this context. What is the place of the mind in the world? How should we study the mind as a natural phenomenon? What is the significance of cognitive science (...)
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  35. Geoffrey C. Madell (1989). Physicalism and the Content of Thought. Inquiry 32 (1):107-21.
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  36. C. B. Martin & Karl Pfeifer (1986). Intentionality and the Non-Psychological. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (June):531-54.
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  37. Mohan Matthen (2014). Debunking Enactivism: A Critical Notice of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism. [REVIEW] Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):118-128.
    In this review of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice (...)
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  38. Ruth G. Millikan (2000). Naturalizing Intentionality. In Bernard Elevitch (ed.), Philosophy of Mind, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosopy Documentation Center. 83-90.
    Brentano was surely mistaken, however, in thinking that bearing a relation to something nonexistent marks only the mental. Given any sort of purpose, it might not get fulfilled, hence might exhibit Brentano's relation, and there are many natural purposes, such as the purpose of one's stomach to digest food or the purpose of one's protective eye blink reflex to keep out the sand, that are not mental, nor derived from anything mental. Nor are stomachs and reflexes "of" or"about" anything. A (...)
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  39. Marcin Miłkowski (2004). Filozofia jako inżynieria odwrotna: rzecz o naturalizmie Daniela C. Dennetta. Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 50 (2):75-89.
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  40. Dermot Moran (1996). Brentano's Thesis. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70 (70):1-27.
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  41. Bence Nanay (2013). Success Semantics: The Sequel. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):151-165.
    The aim of this paper is to reinterpret success semantics, a theory of mental content, according to which the content of a belief is fixed by the success conditions of some actions based on this belief. After arguing that in its present form, success semantics is vulnerable to decisive objections, I examine the possibilities of salvaging the core of this proposal. More specifically, I propose that the content of some very simple, but very important, mental states, the immediate mental antecedents (...)
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  42. Raymond J. Nelson (1988). Mechanism and Intentionality: The New World Knot. In Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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  43. Raymond J. Nelson (1988). Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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  44. Philip Nochlin (1953). Reducibility and Intentional Words. Journal of Philosophy 50 (October):625-637.
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  45. Matjaz Potrc (2001). Nonreductive Realism and Preservative Irrealism. Acta Analytica 16 (26):61-74.
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  46. Roland Puccetti (1989). The Heart of the Mind: Intentionality Versus Intelligence. In J. R. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
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  47. Patrick J. Reider, Normative Functionalism in the Pittsburgh School. Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School.
    Sellars, Brandom, and McDowell (whom Maher aptly calls the “Pittsburgh School”) have tremendous influence on the current shape of the analytic tradition. Despite their differing views on philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and epistemology, their shared application of ‘normative functionalism’ highlights important similarities in their approaches to the aforementioned disciplines. Normative functionalism interprets the ability to form judgments, possess concepts, rationally defend or be critical of judgments, and consequently act as an agent, as largely guided (...)
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  48. Erik Rietveld (2012). Bodily Intentionality and Social Affordances in Context. In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction. !e role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
    There are important structural similarities in the way that animals and humans engage in unreflective activities, including unreflective social interactions in the case of higher animals. Firstly, it is a form of unreflective embodied intelligence that is ‘motivated’ by the situation. Secondly, both humans and non-human animals are responsive to ‘affordances’ (Gibson 1979); to possibilities for action offered by an environment. Thirdly, both humans and animals are selectively responsive to one affordance rather than another. Social affordances are a subcategory of (...)
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