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Aspects of Perception, Misc

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto, University of Toronto at Scarborough)
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  1. Reshef Agam-Segal (2012). How to Investigate the Grammar of Aspect- Perception: A Question in Wittgensteinian Method. Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):85-105.
    I argue that the typical Wittgensteinian method of philosophical investigation cannot help elucidate the grammar of aspect-seeing. In the typical Wittgensteinian method, we examine meaning in use: We practice language, and note the logical ramifications. I argue that the effectiveness of this method is hindered in the case of aspect-seeing by the fact that aspect-seeing involves an aberrant activity of seeing: Whereas it is normally nonsense to say that we choose what to see (decide to see the White House red, (...)
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  2. Reshef Agam-Segal (2012). Reflecting on Language From “Sideways-On”: Preparatory and Non-Preparatory Aspects-Seeing. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (6).
    Aspect-seeing, I claim, involves reflection on concepts. It involves letting oneself feel how it would be like to conceptualize something with a certain concept, without committing oneself to this conceptualization. I distinguish between two kinds of aspect-perception: -/- 1. Preparatory: allows us to develop, criticize, and shape concepts. It involves bringing a concept to an object for the purpose of examining what would be the best way to conceptualize it. -/- 2. Non-Preparatory: allows us to express the ingraspability of certain (...)
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  3. Murat Aydede (2014). How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.
    A lot of qualitatively very different sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant. The Felt-Quality Views that conceive of sensory affect as having an introspectively available common phenomenology or qualitative character face the “heterogeneity problem” of specifying what that qualitative common phenomenology is. In contrast, according to the Attitudinal Views, what is common to all pleasant or unpleasant sensations is that they are all “wanted” or “unwanted” in a certain sort of way. The commonality is explained not on the basis of (...)
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  4. Pawel Grabarczyk (forthcoming). How to Talk (Precisely) About Visual Perception. The Case of the Duck/Rabbit. In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. The Legacy of Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. De Guyter.
    In Remarks on the philosophy of psychology Wittgenstein uses ambiguous illusions to investigate the problematic relation of perception and interpretation. I use this problem as a starting point for developing a conceptual framework capable of expressing problems associated with visual perception in a precise manner. I do this by discerning between subjective and objective meaning of the term “to see” and by specifying the beliefs which are to be ascribed to the observer when we assert that she sees a given (...)
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  5. Johannes Haag (2008). Sinnliche Ideen. Descartes über sinnliche und begriffliche Aspekte der Wahrnehmung. In Perler Dominik & Wild Markus (eds.), Sehen und Begreifen. Wahrnehmungstheorien in der Frühen Neuzeit. de Gruyter. 95-121.
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  6. Jason Leddington (2012). Look-Blindness. Analysis 72 (2):244-251.
    In Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts 2009, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Michael Tye claims that seeing can occur independently of seeing-that. Call this The Independence Claim (TIC). Tye supports this ‘general point’ by appeal to cases of ‘ubiquitous error’ (2009: 95). In this article, I show that this strategy fails: it is guilty of a certain blindness to how things look.
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  7. Fiona Macpherson (forthcoming). The Space of Sensory Modalities. In D. Stokes S. Biggs & M. Matthen (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities.
    Is there a space of the sensory modalities? Such a space would be one in which we can represent all the actual, and at least some of the possible, sensory modalities. The relative position of the senses in this space would indicate how similar and how different the senses were from each other. The construction of such a space might reveal unconsidered features of the actual and possible senses, help us to define what a sense is, and provide grounds that (...)
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  8. Glen A. Mazis (1989). Merleau Ponty, Inhabitation and the Emotions. In Henry Pietersma (ed.), Merleau Ponty: Critical Essays. Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology.
  9. Casey O'Callaghan (2014). Audible Independence and Binding. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer Studies in Brain and Mind.
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  10. Casey O'Callaghan (2010). Experiencing Speech. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):305-332.
  11. Henry Pietersma (ed.) (1989). Merleau Ponty: Critical Essays. Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology.
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  12. Edoardo Zamuner (2011). A Theory of Affect Perception. Mind and Language 26 (4):436-451.
    What do we see when we look at someone's expression of fear? I argue that one of the things that we see is fear itself. I support this view by developing a theory of affect perception. The theory involves two claims. One is that expressions are patterns of facial changes that carry information about affects. The other is that the visual system extracts and processes such information. In particular, I argue that the visual system functions to detect the affects of (...)
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