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  1. Kent Bach (1992). Paving the Road to Reference. Philosophical Studies 67 (3):295--300.
  2. Edison Barrios (2013). Meaning Shift and the Purity of 'I'. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):263-288.
    In this paper I defend the “Standard View” of the semantics of ‘I’—according to which ‘I’ is a pure, automatic indexical—from a challenge posed by “deferred reference” cases, in which occurrences of ‘I’ are (allegedly) not speaker-referential, and thus non-automatic. In reply, I offer an alternative account of the cases in question, which I call the “Description Analysis” (DA). According to DA, seemingly deferred-referential occurrences of the first person pronoun are interpreted as constituents of a definite description, whose operator scopes (...)
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  3. Steven J. Bartlett (ed.) (1992). Reflexivity: A Source-Book in Self-Reference. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co..
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  4. J. M. Bell (1973). What is Referential Opacity? Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1):155 - 180.
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  5. Wylie Breckenridge & Ofra Magidor (2012). Arbitrary Reference. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):377-400.
    Two fundamental rules of reasoning are Universal Generalisation and Existential Instantiation. Applications of these rules involve stipulations (even if only implicitly) such as ‘Let n be an arbitrary number’ or ‘Let John be an arbitrary Frenchman’. Yet the semantics underlying such stipulations are far from clear. What, for example, does ‘n’ refer to following the stipulation that n be an arbitrary number? In this paper, we argue that ‘n’ refers to a number—an ordinary, particular number such as 58 or 2,345,043. (...)
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  6. Ray Buchanan (2013). Reference, Understanding, and Communication. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1):1-16.
  7. Tyler Burge (1978). Self-Reference and Translation. In Guenther-Reutte & Guenther (eds.), Translation and Meaning. Duckworth.
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  8. Tyler Burge (1974). Demonstrative Constructions, Reference, and Truth. Journal of Philosophy 71 (7):205-223.
  9. Herman Cappelen & Douglas G. Winblad (1999). &Quot;reference" Externalized and the Role of Intuitions in Semantic Theory. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):337-50.
  10. Joseph S. Fulda (1993). Computer-Generated Art, Music, and Literature: Philosophical Conundrums. SIGART Bulletin 4 (1):6-7.
    Considers the question of the authorship of the works in the title from a /philosophical/, as opposed to legal, standpoint, using the sense-reference dichotomy, intension-extension dichotomy, and procedural knowledge-declarative knowledge dichotomy. Reaches no conclusion.
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  11. Irwin Goldstein (2000). Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States. Philosophy 75 (291):89-104.
    By what types of properties do we specify twinges, toothaches, and other kinds of mental states? Wittgenstein considers two methods. Procedure one, direct, private acquaintance: A person connects a word to the sensation it specifies through noticing what that sensation is like in his own experience. Procedure two, outward signs: A person pins his use of a word to outward, pre-verbal signs of the sensation. I identify and explain a third procedure and show we in fact specify many kinds of (...)
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  12. Irwin Goldstein (1985). Learning the Word `Toothache'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (2):337-338.
    That every sensation type be marked by a distinctive outward sign is not a prerequisite for having names for different kinds of sensations. The paper is part of a challenge to the widely accepted Wittgensteinian thesis that it is a requirement for our having names for mental states that we tie psychological words to outward signs of the mental states.
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  13. Ilhan Inan (2008). Rigid General Terms and Essential Predicates. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):213 - 228.
    What does it mean for a general term to be rigid? It is argued by some that if we take general terms to designate their extensions, then almost no empirical general term will turn out to be rigid; and if we take them to designate some abstract entity, such as a kind, then it turns out that almost all general terms will be rigid. Various authors who pursue this line of reasoning have attempted to capture Kripke’s intent by defining a (...)
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  14. John-Michael Kuczynski (2004). A Non-Russellian Analysis of the Referential-Attributive Distinction. Pragmatics and Cognition 12 (2):253-294.
    Kripke made a good case that “…the phi…” is not semantically ambiguous between referential and attributive meanings, and many semanticists agree with Kripke. Russell says that “…the phi…” is always to be analyzed attributively. Agreeing with Kripke that “…the phi…” is not ambiguous, many semanticists have tried to give a Russellian analysis of the referential-attributive distinction: the gross deviations between what is communicated by “…the phi..”, on the one hand, and what Russell’s theory says it literally means, on the other, (...)
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  15. Catherine Legg, What Achilles Did and the Tortoise Wouldn't.
    This paper offers an expressivist account of logical form, arguing that in order to fully understand it one must examine what valid arguments make us do (or: what Achilles does and the Tortoise doesn’t, in Carroll’s famed fable). It introduces Charles Peirce’s distinction between symbols, indices and icons as three different kinds of signification whereby the sign picks out its object by learned convention, by unmediated indication, and by resemblance respectively. It is then argued that logical form is represented by (...)
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  16. Franck Lihoreau (ed.) (2011). Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag.
    The essays collected in this volume are all concerned with the connection between fiction and truth. This question is of utmost importance to metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophical logic and epistemology, raising in each of these areas and at their intersections a large number of issues related to creation, existence, reference, identity, modality, belief, assertion, imagination, pretense, etc. All these topics and many more are addressed in this collection, which brings together original essays written from various points of view by (...)
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  17. Tomas Marvan (2003). Interpretability, Perceptual Sensibilities and Triangulation. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):93-107.
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  18. Reinhard Muskens, Coreference.
    In mathematical languages and in predicate logic coreferential terms can be interchanged in any sentence without altering the truth value of that sentence. Replacing 3 + 5 by 12 − 4 in any formula of arithmetic will never lead from truth to falsity or from falsity to truth. But natural languages are different in this respect. While in some contexts it is always allowed to interchange coreferential terms, other contexts do not admit this. An example of the first sort of (...)
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  19. Ángel Pinillos (forthcoming). Coreference and Meaning. Philosophical Studies.
    Sometimes two expressions in a discourse can be about the same thing in a way that makes that very fact evident to the participants. Consider, for example, ‘he’ and ‘John’ in ‘John went to the store and he bought some milk’. Let us call this ‘de jure’ coreference. Other times, coreference is ‘de facto’ as with ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ in a sincere use of ‘Mark Twain is not Samuel Clemens’. Here, agents can understand the speech without knowing that (...)
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  20. David H. Sanford (1990). The Truth About Neptune and the Seamlessness of Truth. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):87 - 93.
    This comment on Steven Boer's “Object-Dependent Thoughts” develops two examples: (1) a counterexample to the "axiom of the seamlessness of truth," namely, that there are no propositions, one true and one false, such that knowing the true one requires believing the false one; (2) a story about the first sighting of Neptune, by John Galle on September 23, 1846, that illustrates how one can understand Galle's remark "That is the planet whose position Leverrier calculated" without believing that there is something (...)
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  21. Scott Soames (2002). Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity. Oxford University Press.
    In this fascinating work, Scott Soames offers a new conception of the relationship between linguistic meaning and assertions made by utterances. He gives meanings of proper names and natural kind predicates and explains their use in attitude ascriptions. He also demonstrates the irrelevance of rigid designation in understanding why theoretical identities containing such predicates are necessary, if true.
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  22. Mark Textor (2008). Samples as Symbols. Ratio 21 (3):344-359.
    Nelson Goodman and, following him, Catherine Z. Elgin and Keith Lehrer have claimed that sometimes a sample is a symbol that stands for the property it is a sample of. The relation between the sample and the property it stands for is called 'exemplification' (Goodman, Elgin) or 'exemplarisation' (Lehrer). Goodman and Lehrer argue that the notion of exemplification sheds light on central problems in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind. However, while there seems to be a phenomenon to be captured, (...)
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  23. Palle Yourgrau (2012). Kripke's Frege. Thought 1 (2):100-107.
    In a recent essay, “Frege's Theory of Sense of Reference: Some Exegetical Notes”, Saul Kripke shows that in addition to being an astute critic of Frege, he is also an insightful interpreter. Kripke's Frege emerges as a closet Russellian, who, like Russell, relies heavily on a doctrine of acquaintance. Is Kripke right? Where exactly does his approach resemble, and where depart from earlier interpretations, and what should one take away about whether or not Frege really was a Russellian and the (...)
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