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  1. Frederick R. Adams, Fodor's Asymmetrical Causal Dependency Theory of Meaning.
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  2. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1997). Fodor's Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437.
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  3. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1994). 'X' Means X: Fodor/Warfield Semantics. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 4 (2):215-31.
    In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield (...)
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  4. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1993). Fodorian Semantics, Pathologies, and "Block's Problem". Minds and Machines 3 (1):97-104.
    In two recent books, Jerry Fodor has developed a set of sufficient conditions for an object “X” to non-naturally and non-derivatively mean X. In an earlier paper we presented three reasons for thinking Fodor's theory to be inadequate. One of these problems we have dubbed the “Pathologies Problem”. In response to queries concerning the relationship between the Pathologies Problem and what Fodor calls “Block's Problem”, we argue that, while Block's Problem does not threatenFodor's view, the Pathologies Problem does.
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  5. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1992). 'X' Means X: Semantics Fodor-Style. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 2 (2):175-83.
    InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean something X. The conditions are designed to reduce meaning to purely non-intentional natural relations. They are also designed to solve what Fodor has dubbed the “disjunction problem”. More recently, inA Theory of Content and Other Essays, Fodor has modified his list of sufficient conditions for naturalized meaning in light of objections to his earlier list. We look at his new set of conditions and give his (...)
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  6. Adams, Frederick & Kenneth Aizawa (1994). Fodorian Semantics. In Steven Stich & Ted Warfield (eds.), Mental Representation. Blackwell.
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  7. Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine (1991). The Nomic and the Robust. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  8. Murat Aydede (1997). Has Fodor Really Changed His Mind on Narrow Content? Mind and Language 12 (3-4):422-58.
    In his latest book, The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor notoriously rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I argue that Fodor's change in view is only apparent and that his previous position (1985-1991) is extensionally equivalent to his "new" position (1994). I show that, despite what he says narrow content is for in his (1994), Fodor himself has previously never appealed to (...)
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  9. Lynne Rudder Baker (1991). Has Content Been Naturalized? In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
    The Representational Theory of the Mind (RTM) has been forcefully and subtly developed by Jerry A. Fodor. According to the RTM, psychological states that explain behavior involve tokenings of mental representations. Since the RTM is distinguished from other approaches by its appeal to the meaning or "content" of mental representations, a question immediately arises: by virtue of what does a mental representation express or represent an environmental property like coto or shoe? This question asks for a general account of the (...)
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  10. Lynne Rudder Baker (1989). On a Causal Theory of Content. Philosophical Perspectives 3:165-186.
    The project of explaining intentional phenomena in terms of nonintentional phenomena has become a central task in the philosophy of mind.' Since intentional phenomena like believing, desiring, intending have content essentially, the project is one of showing how semantic properties like content can be reconciled with nonsemantic properties like cause. As Jerry A. Fodor put it, The worry about representation is above all that the semantic (and/or the intentional) will prove permanently recalcitrant to integration in the natural order; for example (...)
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  11. Paul Bernier (1993). Narrow Content, Context of Thought, and Asymmetric Dependence. Mind and Language 8 (3):327-42.
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  12. Mark H. Bickhard (1998). A Process Model of the Emergence of Representation. In G. L. Farre & T. Oksala (eds.), Emergence, Complexity, Hierarchy, Organization, Selected and Edited Papers From the Echo Iii Conference. Acta Polytechnica Scandinavica. 3-7.
    Two challenges to the very possibility of emergence are addressed, one metaphysical and one logical. The resolution of the metaphysical challenge requires a shift to a process metaphysics, while the logical challenge highlights normative emergence, and requires a shift to more powerful logical tools -- in particular, that of implicit definition. Within the framework of a process metaphysics, two levels of normative emergence are outlined: that of function and that of representation.
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  13. Paul A. Boghossian (1991). Naturalizing Content. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  14. M. J. Cain (1999). Fodor's Attempt to Naturalize Mental Content. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (197):520-26.
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  15. H. G. Callaway (1990). Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 33 (2):251-59..
    This is my expository and critical review of Jerry Fodor's Psychosemantics. See also Callaway 1992, Meaning Holism and Semantic Realism.
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  16. H.-R. Cram (1992). Fodor's Causal Theory of Representation. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):56-70.
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  17. Daniel C. Dennett (1988). Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Explorations 85:384-389.
    In Word and Object, Quine acknowledged the "practical indispensability" in daily life of the intentional idioms of belief and desire but disparaged such talk as an "essentially dramatic idiom" rather than something from which real science could be made in any straightforward way.Endnote 1 Many who agree on little else have agreed with Quine about this, and have gone on to suggest one or another indirect way for science to accommodate folk psychology: Sellars, Davidson, Putnam, Rorty, Stich, the Churchlands, Schiffer (...)
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  18. Charles E. M. Dunlop (2004). Mentalese Semantics and the Naturalized Mind. Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):77-94.
    In a number of important works, Jerry Fodor has wrestled with the problem of how mental representation can be accounted for within a physicalist framework. His favored response has attempted to identify nonintentional conditions for intentionality, relying on a nexus of casual relations between symbols and what they represent. I examine Fodor's theory and argue that it fails to meet its own conditions for adequacy insofar as it presupposes the very phenomenon that it purports to account for. I conclude, however, (...)
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  19. G. L. Farre & T. Oksala (eds.) (1998). Emergence, Complexity, Hierarchy, Organization, Selected and Edited Papers From the ECHO III Conference. Acta Polytechnica Scandinavica.
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  20. William C. Fish (2000). Asymmetry in Action. Ratio 13 (2):138-145.
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  21. Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
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  22. Jerry A. Fodor (1990). A Theory of Content II. In , A Theory of Content. MIT Press.
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  23. Jerry A. Fodor (1990). A Theory of Content I. In , A Theory of Content. MIT Press.
  24. Jerry A. Fodor (1990). A Theory of Content and Other Essays. MIT Press.
  25. Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Meaning and the World Order. In Psychosemantics. MIT Press.
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  26. Jay L. Garfield (1991). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning In the Philosophy of Mind, by J. Fodor. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):235-240.
  27. Martha I. Gibson (1996). Asymmetric Dependencies, Ideal Conditions, and Meaning. Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):235-59.
    Jerry Fodor has proposed a causal theory of meaning based on the notion of a certain asymmetric dependency between the causes of a symbol's tokens. This theory is held to be an improvement on Dennis Stampe's causal theory of meaning and Fred Dretske's information theoretic account, because it allegedly solves what Fodor calls the “disjunction problem”, and does so without recourse to the kind of optimal (ideal) conditions to which Stampe and Dretske appeal. A series of counterexamples is proposed to (...)
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  28. Antoni Gomila (1994). Analyomen 1. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  29. Antoni Gomila (1994). Punctuate Minds and Fodor's Theory of Content. In Analyomen 1. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  30. Mark Greenberg, Setting Asymmetric Dependence Straight.
    Fodor’s asymmetric-dependence theory of content is probably the best known and most developed causal or informational theory of mental content. Many writers have attempted to provide counterexamples to Fodor’s theory. In this paper, I offer a more fundamental critique. I begin by attacking Fodor’s view of the dialectical situation. Fodor’s theory is cast in terms of laws covering the occurrence of an individual thinker’s mental symbols. I show that, contrary to Fodor’s view, we cannot restrict consideration to hypothetical cases in (...)
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  31. Todd Jones (1991). Staving Off Catastrophe: A Critical Notice of Jerry Fodor's Psychosemantics. Mind and Language 6 (1):58-82.
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  32. Jussi Jylkkä (2009). Why Fodor's Theory of Concepts Fails. Minds and Machines 19 (1):25-46.
    Fodor’s theory of concepts holds that the psychological capacities, beliefs or intentions which determine how we use concepts do not determine reference. Instead, causal relations of a specific kind between properties and our dispositions to token a concept are claimed to do so. Fodor does admit that there needs to be some psychological mechanisms mediating the property–concept tokening relations, but argues that they are purely accidental for reference. In contrast, I argue that the actual mechanisms that sustain the reference determining (...)
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  33. Uriah Kriegel (2013). Two Notions of Mental Representation. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. 161-179.
    The main thesis of this paper is twofold. In the first half of the paper, (§§1-2), I argue that there are two notions of mental representation, which I call objective and subjective. In the second part (§§3-7), I argue that this casts familiar tracking theories of mental representation as incomplete: while it is clear how they might account for objective representation, they at least require supplementation to account for subjective representation.
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  34. Kenneth R. Livingston (1993). What Fodor Means: Some Thoughts on Reading Jerry Fodor's A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):289-301.
    Jerry Fodor's Asymmetric Dependency Theory (ADT) of meaning is discussed in the context of his attempt to avoid holism and the relativism it entails. Questions are raised about the implications of the theory for psychological theories of meaning, and brief suggestions are offered for how to more closely link a theory of meaning to a theory of perception.
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  35. Brian Loar (1991). Can We Explain Intentionality? In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  36. Barry M. Loewer (ed.) (1991). Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  37. J. Christopher Maloney (1990). Mental Misrepresentation. Philosophy of Science 57 (September):445-58.
    An account of the contents of the propositional attitudes is fundamental to the success of the cognitive sciences if, as seems correct, the cognitive sciences do presuppose propositional attitudes. Fodor has recently pointed the way towards a naturalistic explication of mental content in his Psychosemantics (1987). Fodor's theory is a version of the causal theory of meaning and thus inherits many of its virtues, including its intrinsic plausibility. Nevertheless, the proposal may suffer from two deficiencies: (1) It seems not to (...)
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  38. Pat A. Manfredi & Donna M. Summerfield (1992). Robustness Without Asymmetry: A Flaw in Fodor's Theory of Content. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 66 (3):261-83.
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  39. Luciano B. Mariano (1999). Content Naturalized. Philosophical Studies 96 (2):205-38.
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  40. Angela Mendelovici (2013). Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.
    It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation (e.g. those of Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan) have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them.
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  41. Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget (2014). Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories. Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.
    This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal intentionality theories over tracking theories.
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  42. Joseph Mendola (2003). A Dilemma for Asymmetric Dependence. Noûs 37 (2):232-257.
    Accounts of mental content rooted in asymmetric dependence hold, crudely speaking, that the content of a mental representation is the cause of that representation on which all its other causes depend.1 To speak somewhat less crudely, such accounts, hereafter.
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  43. Theo C. Meyering (1997). Fodor's Information Semantics Between Naturalism and Mentalism. Inquiry 40 (2):187-207.
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  44. Erik Myin (1993). Some Problems for Fodor's Theory of Content. Philosophica 50 (2):101-122.
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  45. Steve Palmquist (1992). Unknown. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 19.
    At what stage in its development does a foetus become a living human being? When is it proper to refer to a network of pulsating neurons as a.
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  46. William S. Robinson (1989). Psychosemantics. Review of Metaphysics 42 (3):619-620.
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  47. Robert D. Rupert (2000). Dispositions Indisposed: Semantic Atomism and Fodor's Theory of Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):325-349.
    According to Jerry Fodor’s atomistic theory of content, subjects’ dispositions to token mentalese terms in counterfactual circumstances fix the contents of those terms. I argue that the pattern of counterfactual tokenings alone does not satisfactorily fix content; if Fodor’s appeal to patterns of counterfactual tokenings has any chance of assigning correct extensions, Fodor must take into account the contents of subjects’ various mental states at the times of those tokenings. However, to do so, Fodor must abandon his semantic atomism. And (...)
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  48. Dan Ryder (2009). Problems of Representation II: Naturalizing Content. In Francisco Garzon & John Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
    John is currently thinking that the sun is bright. Consider his occurrent belief or judgement that the sun is bright. Its content is that the sun is bright. This is a truth- evaluable content (which shall be our main concern) because it is capable of being true or false. In virtue of what natural, scientifically accessible facts does John’s judgement have this content? To give the correct answer to that question, and to explain why John’s judgement and other contentful mental (...)
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  49. William E. Seager (1993). Fodor's Theory of Content: Problems and Objections. Phiosophy of Science 60 (2):262-77.
    Jerry Fodor has recently proposed a new entry into the list of information based approaches to semantic content aimed at explicating the general notion of representation for both mental states and linguistic tokens. The basic idea is that a token means what causes its production. The burden of the theory is to select the proper cause from the sea of causal influences which aid in generating any token while at the same time avoiding the absurdity of everything's being literally meaningful (...)
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  50. Barry Smith & Kevin Mulligan (1982). Pieces of a Theory. In , Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology. Philosophia.
    A survey of theories of part, whole and dependence from Aristotle to the Gestalt psychologists, with special attention to Husserl’s Third Logical Investigation “On the Theory of Parts and Wholes”.
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