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  1. P. Sven Arvidson (2008). Attentional Capture and Attentional Character. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):539-562.
    Attentional character is a way of thinking about what is relevant in a human life, what is meaningful and how it becomes so. This paper introduces the concept of attentional character through a redefinition of attentional capture as achievement. It looks freshly at the attentional capture debate in the current cognitive sciences literature through the lens of Aron Gurwitsch’s gestalt-phenomenology. Attentional character is defined as an initially limited capacity for attending in a given environment and is located within the sphere (...)
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  2. P. Sven Arvidson (2006). The Sphere of Attention: Context and Margin. Springer.
    For the first time, this book classifies how attention shifts, and argues that self-awareness, reflection, and even morality, are best thought of as dynamic...
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  3. P. Sven Arvidson (2004). Experimental Evidence for Three Dimensions of Attention. In Lester Embree (ed.), GurwitschS Relevancy for Cognitive Science. Springer. 151--168.
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  4. P. Sven Arvidson (2003). A Lexicon of Attention: From Cognitive Science to Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (2):99-132.
    This article tries to create a bridge of understanding between cognitive scientists and phenomenologists who work on attention. In light of a phenomenology of attention and current psychological and neuropsychological literature on attention, I translate and interpret into phenomenological terms 20 key cognitive science concepts as examined in the laboratory and used in leading journals. As a preface to the lexicon, I outline a phenomenology of attention, especially as a dynamic three-part structure, which I have freely amended from the work (...)
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  5. P. Sven Arvidson (1998). Bringing Context Into Focus: Parallels in the Psychology of Attention and the Philosophy of Science. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 29 (1):50-91.
    In the experimental psychology of attention, the phenomenon of attentional context has been underappreciated, while focal attention has taken center stage. Similar problems of context are found in certain realist arguments in .the philosophy of science. Through the lens of Aron Gurwitsch's phenomenology of attention, this paper discusses and evaluates the ways in which context is or is not brought into focus in experimental psychology and the philosophy of science. It concludes that recent developments in both realms show promise. Also (...)
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  6. P. Sven Arvidson (1997). Looking Intuit: A Phenomenological Analysis of Intuition and Attention. In R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.), Intuition: The Inside Story. Routledge.
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  7. P. Sven Arvidson (1996). Toward a Phenomenology of Attention. Human Studies 19 (1):71-84.
    There is a considerable amount of research being done on attention by cognitive psychologists. I claim that in the process of measuring and mapping consciousness, these researchers have missed important phenomenological findings. After a synopsis and illustration of the nature of attention as described by Aron Gurwitsch, I critique the assumptions of current psychological research on this topic. Included is discussion of the metaphor of attention as a beam or spotlight, the concept of selective attention as the standard accomplishment, and (...)
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  8. P. Sven Arvidson (1992). The Field of Consciousness: James and Gurwitsch. Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society 28 (4):833-856.
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  9. I. M. Bentley (1904). The Psychological Meaning of Clearness. Mind 13 (50):242-253.
  10. Alfred Binet (1886). Attention in Perception. Mind 11 (44):599-600.
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  11. Ned Block (2010). Attention and Mental Paint1. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
    Much of recent philosophy of perception is oriented towards accounting for the phenomenal character of perception—what it is like to perceive—in a non-mentalistic way—that is, without appealing to mental objects or mental qualities. In opposition to such views, I claim that the phenomenal character of perception of a red round object cannot be explained by or reduced to direct awareness of the object, its redness and roundness—or representation of such objects and qualities. Qualities of perception that are not captured by (...)
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  12. Ned Block & Susanna Siegel (2013). Attention and Perceptual Adaptation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):205-206.
  13. Richard A. Block & Dan Zakay (2001). Retrospective and Prospective Timing: Memory, Attention and Consciousness. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press. 59--76.
  14. Andrea Borsato (2013). Über Das Unbemerkbare in der Wahrnehmung. Eine Phänomenologische Auseinandersetzung Mit Dem Standpunkt der Analytischen Philosophie Zum Thema ,Aufmerksamkeit'. Husserl Studies 29 (2):113-141.
    Was wir nicht bemerken können, das können wir auch nicht wahrnehmen: Diese im Rahmen der gegenwärtigen analytischen Philosophie des Geistes weitverbreitete Ansicht wurde neulich von M. Tye und A. Noë verteidigt. Wir werden uns hier mit einigen empirischen Beispielen auseinandersetzen, die u.E. mit dieser Idee kaum in Einklang zu bringen sind und stattdessen den Gedanken nahelegen, dass die Grenzen des Wahrnehmbaren über die Grenzen sowohl des primär Bemerkbaren als auch des sekundär Bemerkbaren hinausgehen. Auf diesem Weg gelangen wir dann zur (...)
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  15. Francis H. Bradley (1886). Is There Any Special Activity of Attention? Mind 11 (43):305-323.
  16. Ingar Brinck (2005). Critical Review of John Campbell: Reference and Consciousness. Theoria 3:266-276.
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  17. Ben Bronner (2013). Representationalism and the Determinacy of Visual Content. Philosophical Psychology:1-13.
    DETERMINACY is the claim that covert shifts in visual attention sometimes affect the determinacy of visual content (capital letters will distinguish the claim from the familiar word, 'determinacy'). Representationalism is the claim that visual phenomenology supervenes on visual representational content. Both claims are popular among contemporary philosophers of mind, and DETERMINACY has been employed in defense of representationalism. I claim that existing arguments in favor of DETERMINACY are inconclusive. As a result, DETERMINACY-based arguments in support of representationalism are not strong (...)
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  18. Deborah Brown (2007). Augustine and Descartes on the Function of Attention in Perceptual Awareness. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind 4:153-175.
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  19. J. Campbell (2004). Reference as Attention. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):265-76.
  20. J. Campbell (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    John Campbell investigates how consciousness of the world explains our ability to think about the world; how our ability to think about objects we can see depends on our capacity for conscious visual attention to those things. He illuminates classical problems about thought, reference, and experience by looking at the underlying psychological mechanisms on which conscious attention depends.
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  21. John Campbell (forthcoming). An Object-Dependent Perspective on Joint Attention. In Axel Seemann (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments in Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience. The MIT Press.
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  22. John Campbell (2000). Wittgenstein on Attention. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):35-47.
  23. John Campbell (1998). Joint Attention and the First Person. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind: Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Supplement. Cambridge University Press. 123-136..
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  24. John Campbell (1997). Sense, Reference and Selective Attention. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (71):55-98.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1997), 55-74, with a reply by Michael Martin.
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  25. Peter Carruthers & Vincent Picciuto (2011). Should Damage to the Machinery for Social Perception Damage Perception. Cognitive Neuroscience 2 (2):116-17.
    We argue that Graziano and Kastner are mistaken to claim that neglect favors their self-directed social perception account of consciousness. For the latter should not predict that neglect would result from damage to mechanisms of social perception. Neglect is better explained in terms of damage to attentional mechanisms.
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  26. Ron Chrisley & J. Parthemore (2007). Synthetic Phenomenology:Exploiting Embodiment to Specify the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):44-58.
    Not all research in machine consciousness aims to instantiate phenomenal states in artefacts. For example, one can use artefacts that do not themselves have phenomenal states, merely to simulate or model organisms that do. Nevertheless, one might refer to all of these pursuits -- instantiating, simulating or modelling phenomenal states in an artefact -- as 'synthetic phenomenality'. But there is another way in which artificial agents (be they simulated or real) may play a crucial role in understanding or creating consciousness: (...)
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  27. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Gurwitsch's Phenomenal Holism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):559-578.
    Aron Gurwitsch made two main contributions to phenomenology. He showed how to import Gestalt theoretical ideas into Husserl’s framework of constitutive phenomenology. And he explored the light this move sheds on both the overall structure of experience and on particular kinds of experience, especially perceptual experiences and conscious shifts in attention. The primary focus of this paper is the overall structure of experience. I show how Gurwitsch’s Gestalt theoretically informed phenomenological investigations provide a basis for defending what I will call (...)
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  28. Austen Clark, Preattentive Precursors to Phenomenal Properties.
    What are the relations between preattentive feature-placing and states of perceptual awareness? For the purposes of this paper, states of "perceptual awareness" are confined to the simplest possible exemplars: states in which one is aware of some aspect of the appearance of something one perceives. Subjective contours are used as an example. Early visual processing seems to employ independent, high-bandwidth, preattentive feature "channels", followed by a selective process that directs selective attention. The mechanisms that yield subjective contours are found very (...)
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  29. Austen Clark (2011). Cross-Modal Cuing and Selective Attention. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press, Usa. 375.
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  30. Austen Clark (2006). Attention and Inscrutability: A Commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 127:167-193.
  31. Paul Coates (2004). Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness, and Theory of Attention. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-25.
    The problem of the richness of visual experience is that of finding principled grounds for claims about how much of the world a person actually sees at any given moment. It is argued that there are suggestive parallels between the two-component analysis of experience defended by Wilfrid Sellars, and certain recently advanced information processing accounts of visual perception. Sellars' later account of experience is examined in detail, and it is argued that there are good reasons in support of the claim (...)
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  32. Max Coltheart (1999). Trains, Planes, and Brains: Attention and Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):152-153.
    O'Brien & Opie believe that some mental representations are evoked by stimuli to which a person is attending, and other mental representations are evoked by stimuli to which attention was not paid. I argue that this is the classical view of consciousness; yet this is the view which they wish to challenge.
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  33. Thomas Crowther (2010). The Agential Profile of Perceptual Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):219-242.
    Reflection on cases involving the occurrence of various types of perceptual activity suggests that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can be partly determined by agential factors. I discuss the significance of these kinds of case for the dispute about phenomenal character that is at the core of recent philosophy of perception. I then go on to sketch an account of how active and passive elements of phenomenal character are related to one another in activities like watching and looking at (...)
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  34. Thomas Crowther (2009). Watching, Sight, and the Temporal Shape of Perceptual Activity. Philosophical Review 118 (1):1-27.
    There has been relatively little discussion, in contemporary philosophy of mind, of the active aspects of perceptual processes. This essay presents and offers some preliminary development of a view about what it is for an agent to watch a particular material object throughout a period of time. On this view, watching is a kind of perceptual activity distinguished by a distinctive epistemic role. The essay presents a puzzle about watching an object that arises through elementary reflection on the consequences of (...)
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  35. R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.) (1997). Intuition: The Inside Story. Routledge.
    NATURALLY. DEVELOPED. THOUGHT. Figure i these two construcrs to define a sprctrum of modes of thought, ranging ftom analytical (inrensive checking and nattow focus) to intuitive (minimal checking and btoad focus). He develops the ...
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  36. F. de Brigard (2010). Consciousness, Attention and Commonsense. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):189-201.
    In a recent paper, Christopher Mole (2008) argued in favour of the view that, according to our commonsense psychology, while consciousness is necessary for attention, attention isn’t necessary for consciousness. In this paper I offer an argument against this view. More precisely, I offer an argument against the claim that, according to our commonsense psychology, consciousness is necessary for attention. However, I don’t claim it follows from this argument that commonsense has it the other way around, viz. that consciousness isn’t (...)
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  37. Felipe de Brigard & J. Prinz (2010). Attention and Consciousness. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews 1 (1):51-59.
    For the past three decades there has been a substantial amount of scientific evidence supporting the view that attention is necessary and sufficient for perceptual representations to become conscious (i.e., for there to be something that it is like to experience a representational perceptual state). This view, however, has been recently questioned on the basis of some alleged counterevidence. In this paper we survey some of the most important recent findings. In doing so, we have two primary goals. The first (...)
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  38. Natalie Depraz (2004). Where is the Phenomenology of Attention That Husserl Intended to Perform? A Transcendental Pragmatic-Oriented Description of Attention. Continental Philosophy Review 37 (1):5-20.
    For the most part, attention occurs as a theme adjacent to much more topical and innovatingly operating acts: first, the intentional act, which represents a destitution of the abstract opposition between subject and object and which paves the way for a detailed analysis of our perceptive horizontal subjective life; second, the reductive act, specified in a psycho-phenomenological sense as a reflective conversion of the way I am looking at things; third, the genetic method understood as a genealogy of logic based (...)
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  39. Imogen Dickie (2011). Visual Attention Fixes Demonstrative Reference By Eliminating Referential Luck. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press.
  40. Naomi Eilan (2001). Consciousness, Acquaintance and Demonstrative Thought. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):433–440.
  41. Naomi M. Eilan (2006). On the Role of Perceptual Consciousness in Explaining the Goals and Mechanisms of Vision: A Convergence on Attention? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):67-88.
    The strong sensorimotor account of perception gives self-induced movements two constitutive roles in explaining visual consciousness. The first says that self-induced movements are vehicles of visual awareness, and for this reason consciousness ‘does not happen in the brain only’. The second says that the phenomenal nature of visual experiences is consists in the action-directing content of vision. In response I suggest, first, that the sense in which visual awareness is active should be explained by appeal to the role of attention (...)
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  42. Naomi M. Eilan (1998). Perceptual Intentionality, Attention and Consciousness. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press. 181-202.
    of presence cannot be explained by appeal to the notion of non-representational of experience. world see John Campbell, 'The Role of Physical Objects in Thinking', in Representation: Problems Perceptual Intentionality, and.
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  43. Lester Embree (ed.) (2004). Gurwitsch's Relevancy for Cognitive Science. Springer.
    He died before cognitive science came together in the 1970s, but his positions on many issues - the self, the other, practical action in situations, the lived ...
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  44. Cedric Oliver Evans (1970). The Subject of Consciousness. New York,Humanities P..
    First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  45. Jason Ford (2009). Saving Time: How Attention Explains the Utility of Supposedly Superfluous Representations. Cognitive Critique 1 (1):101-114.
    I contend that Alva Noë’s Enactive Approach to Perception fails to give an adequate account of the periphery of attention. Noë claims that our peripheral experience is not produced by the brain’s representation of peripheral items, but rather by our mastery of sensorimotor skills and contingencies. I offer a two-pronged assault on this account of the periphery of attention. The first challenge comes from Mack and Rock’s work on inattentional blindness, and provides robust empirical evidence for the semantic processing (and (...)
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  46. Jason Ford (2008). Attention and the New Sceptics. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (3):59-86.
    In response to new research into the phenomena of inattentional blindness and change- blindness, several philosophers and vision researchers have proposed a novel form of scepticism: they contend that we do not have the conscious experience that we think we have. I will show that this claim is not supported by the evidence usually cited in support of it, and I expose what I believe to be the underlying error motivating this position: the belief that consciousness is either focal (what (...)
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  47. Jason M. Ford (2005). The Attention Model of Consciousness. Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
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  48. Jason Ford & David Woodruff Smith (2006). Consciousness, Self, and Attention. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. 353-377.
  49. Todd Ganson & Ben Bronner (2013). Visual Prominence and Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):405-418.
    A common objection to representationalism is that a representationalist view of phenomenal character cannot accommodate the effects that shifts in covert attention have on visual phenomenology: covert attention can make items more visually prominent than they would otherwise be without altering the content of visual experience. Recent empirical work on attention casts doubt on previous attempts to advance this type of objection to representationalism and it also points the way to an alternative development of the objection.
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  50. Kathleen Garrison, Scheinost A., Worhunsky Dustin, D. Patrick, Hani Elwafi, Thornhill M., A. Thomas, Evan Thompson, Clifford Saron, Gaëlle Desbordes, Hedy Kober, Michelle Hampson, Jeremy Gray, Constable R., Papademetris R. Todd & Brewer Xenophon (2013). Real-Time fMRI Links Subjective Experience with Brain Activity During Focused Attention. Neuroimage 81:110--118.
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