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  1. Laura Alonso I. Alemany & Paul Égré (eds.) (2004). Proceedings of the 9th Esslli Student Session.
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  2. Maria Aloni (2005). A Formal Treatment of the Pragmatics of Questions and Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (5):505 - 539.
    This article discusses pragmatic aspects of our interpretation of intensional constructions like questions and prepositional attitude reports. In the first part, it argues that our evaluation of these constructions may vary relative to the identification methods operative in the context of use. This insight is then given a precise formalization in a possible world semantics. In the second part, an account of actual evaluations of questions and attitudes is proposed in the framework of bi-directional optimality theory. Pragmatic meaning selections are (...)
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  3. Maria Aloni (2005). Individual Concepts in Modal Predicate Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):1 - 64.
    The article deals with the interpretation of propositional attitudes in the framework of modal predicate logic. The first part discusses the classical puzzles arising from the interplay between propositional attitudes, quantifiers and the notion of identity. After comparing different reactions to these puzzles it argues in favor of an analysis in which evaluations of de re attitudes may vary relative to the ways of identifying objects used in the context of use. The second part of the article gives this analysis (...)
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  4. Peter Alward (2005). A Neo-Hintikkan Theory of Attitude Ascriptions. Kriterion 19:1-11.
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  5. Horacio Arlo-Costa, Full Belief, Supposition, and Personal Probablility.
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  6. Philip Atkins (2013). A Pragmatic Solution to Ostertag's Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):359-365.
    Gary Ostertag (Philos Stud 146:249–267, 2009) has presented a new puzzle for Russellianism about belief reports. He argues that Russellians do not have the resources to solve this puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena. I argue to the contrary that the puzzle can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s (Frege’s puzzle, 1986) pragmatic account of belief reports, provided that the account is properly understood. Specifically, the puzzle can be solved so long as Salmon’s guises are not identified with sentences.
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  7. Murat Aydede (1998). Fodor on Concepts and Frege Puzzles. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):289-294.
    ABSTRACT. Fodor characterizes concepts as consisting of two dimensions: one is content, which is purely denotational/broad, the other the Mentalese vehicle bearing that content, which Fodor calls the Mode of Presentation (MOP), understood "syntactically." I argue that, so understood, concepts are not interpersonally sharable; so Fodor's own account violates what he calls the Publicity Constraint in his (1998) book. Furthermore, I argue that Fodor's non-semantic, or "syntactic," solution to Frege cases succumbs to the problem of providing interpersonally applicable functional roles (...)
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  8. Lynne Rudder Baker, How to Have Self-Directed Attitudes.
    Self-directed and self-evaluative attitudes are often connected to one’s social position. Before investigating the dependence relations between individual self-evaluation and social positioning, however, there is a prior question to answer: What are the conditions under which an individual can have any self-directed attitudes at all? In order to be the subject of self-directed or selfevaluative attitudes, I shall argue, an individual must have linguistic and social relations. I’ll discuss the first-person perspective, self-concepts and their acquisition—all from a radically nonCartesian, externalist (...)
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  9. Mark Balaguer (1998). Attitudes Without Propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):805-26.
    This paper develops a novel version of anti-platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing `that'-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the form `x believes that p' and `σ means that p'. Briefly, the view is that (a) platonists are right that `that'-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but (b) there are no such things as propositions, and hence, (c) `that'-clause-containing sentences (...)
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  10. Robert W. Beard (1966). On the Church Frege Analysis of Belief Sentences. Logique Et Analyse 9:252-262.
    The author attempts to show how an adequate theory of belief sentences can be formulated within the church-frege framework. it is argued that ordinary substitution of identicals is adequate within belief contexts provided that certain criteria for identity of senses are not adopted. a criterion that avoids these difficulties is then put forward.
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  11. David Beisecker (1999). The Importance of Being Erroneous: Prospects for Animal Intentionality. Philosophical Topics 27 (1):281-308.
    The question of animal belief (or animal intentionality) often degenerates into a frustrating and unproductive exchange. Foes of animal intentionality point out that non-linguistic animals couldn’t possibly possess the kinds of mental states we linguistic beings enjoy. They claim that linguistic ability enables us to become sensitive to intensional contexts or to the states of mind of others in a way that is unavailable to the non-linguistic, and that would be necessary for proper attributions of intentionality. To attribute mental states (...)
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  12. John Bigelow (1980). Believing in Sentences. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):11 – 18.
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  13. John C. Bigelow (1978). Believing in Semantics. Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (1):101--144.
    This paper concerns the semantics of belief-sentences. I pass over ontologically lavish theories which appeal to impossible worlds, or other points of reference which contain more than possible worlds. I then refute ontologically stingy, quotational theories. My own theory employs the techniques of possible worlds semantics to elaborate a Fregean analysis of belief-sentences. In a belief-sentence, the embedded clause does not have its usual reference, but refers rather to its own semantic structure. I show how this theory can accommodate quantification (...)
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  14. Maria Bittner, Conditionals as Attitude Reports.
    Most theories of conditionals and attitudes do not analyze either phenomenon in terms of the other. A few view attitude reports as a species of conditionals (e.g. Stalnaker 1984, Heim 1992). Based on evidence from Kalaallisut, this paper argues for the opposite thesis: conditionals are a species of attitude reports. The argument builds on prior findings that conditionals are modal topic-comment structures (e.g. Haiman 1978, Bittner 2001), and that in mood-based Kalaallisut English future (e.g. Ole will win) translates into a (...)
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  15. Steven E. Boer (1995). Propositional Attitudes and Compositional Semantics. Philosophical Perspectives 9:341-380.
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  16. Steven E. Boër (1994). Propositional Attitudes and Formal Ontology. Synthese 98 (2):187 - 242.
    This paper develops — within an axiomatic theory of properties, relations, and propositions which accords them well-defined existence and identity conditions — a sententialist-functionalist account of belief as a symbolically mediated relation to a special kind of propositional entity, theproxy-encoding abstract proposition. It is then shown how, in terms of this account, the truth conditions of English belief reports may be captured in a formally precise and empirically adequate way that accords genuinely semantic status to familiar opacity data.
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  17. Steven E. Boër & William G. Lycan (1980). Who, Me? Philosophical Review 89 (3):427 - 466.
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  18. Paolo Bonardi (2013). Semantic Relationism, Belief Reports and Contradiction. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):273-284.
    In his book Semantic Relationism, Kit Fine propounds an original and sophisticated semantic theory called ‘semantic relationism’ or ‘relational semantics’, whose peculiarity is the enrichment of Kaplan’s, Salmon’s and Soames’ Russellian semantics (more specifically, the semantic content of simple sentences and the truth-conditions of belief reports) with coordination, “the very strongest relation of synonymy or being semantically the same”. In this paper, my goal is to shed light on an undesirable result of semantic relationism: a report like “Tom believes that (...)
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  19. Joao Branquinho (2008). On the Persistence of Indexical Belief. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:21-30.
    This paper is devoted to an examination of the topic of cognitive dynamics as introduced by David Kaplan in his essay ‘Demonstratives’. I discuss two approaches to cognitive dynamics: the directly referential approach, which I take as best represented in Kaplan’s views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans’s views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that both Kaplan’s account and Evans’s account are on the whole defective (...)
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  20. Adrian Brasoveanu & Donka F. Farkas, Say Reports, Assertion Events and Meaning Dimensions.
    In this paper, we study the parameters that come into play when assessing the truth conditions of say reports and contrast them with belief attributions. We argue that these conditions are sensitive in intricate ways to the connection between the interpretation of the complement of say and the properties of the reported speech act. There are three general areas this exercise is relevant to, besides the immediate issue of understanding the meaning of say: (i) the discussion shows the need to (...)
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  21. David M. Braun (1991). Proper Names, Cognitive Contents, and Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 62 (3):289 - 305.
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  22. Berit Brogaard (2009). What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):439 - 467.
    Reductionists about knowledge-wh hold that "s knows-wh" (e.g. "John knows who stole his car") is reducible to "there is a proposition p such that s knows that p, and p answers the indirect question of the wh-clause." Anti-reductionists hold that "s knows-wh" is reducible to "s knows that p, as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh-clause." I argue that both of these positions are defective. I then offer a new analysis of knowledge-wh as a special kind (...)
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  23. Berit Brogaard (2008). Knowledge-the and Propositional Attitude Ascriptions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):147-190.
    Determiner phrases embedded under a propositional attitude verb have traditionally been taken to denote answers to implicit questions. For example, 'the capital of Vermont' as it occurs in 'John knows the capital of Vermont' has been thought to denote the proposition which answers the implicit question 'what is the capital of Vermont?' Thus, where 'know' is treated as a propositional attitude verb rather than an acquaintance verb, 'John knows the capital of Vermont' is true iff John knows that Montpelier is (...)
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  24. Curtis Brown (1993). Belief States and Narrow Content. Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67.
    The first thesis is that beliefs play a role in explaining behavior. This is reasonably uncontroversial, though it has been controverted. Why did I raise my arm? Because I wanted to emphasize a point, and believed that I could do so by raising my arm. The belief that I could emphasize a point by raising my arm is central to the most natural explanation of my action.
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  25. Ray Buchanan (2012). Is Belief a Propositional Attitude? Philosophers' Imprint 12 (1).
    According to proponents of the face-value account, a beliefreport of the form ‘S believes that p’ is true just in case the agentbelieves a proposition referred to by the that-clause. As againstthis familiar view, I argue that there are cases of true beliefreports of the relevant form in which there is no proposition that thethat-clause, or the speaker using the that-clause, can plausibly betaken as referring to. Moreover, I argue that given the distinctiveway in which the face-value theory of belief-reports (...)
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  26. Tyler Burge (1977). Kaplan, Quine, and Suspended Belief. Philosophical Studies 31 (3):197 - 203.
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  27. J. A. Burgess (1997). Supervaluations and the Propositional Attitude Constraint. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1):103-119.
    For the sentences of languages that contain operators that express the concepts of definiteness and indefiniteness, there is an unavoidable tension between a truth-theoretic semantics that delivers truth conditions for those sentences that capture their propositional contents and any model-theoretic semantics that has a story to tell about how indetifiniteness in a constituent affects the semantic value of sentences which imbed it. But semantic theories of both kinds play essential roles, so the tension needs to be resolved. I argue that (...)
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  28. Mihnea D. I. Capraru (2013). A New Source of Data About Singular Thought. Philosophia 41 (4):1159-1172.
    Philosophers have justified extant theories of singular thought in at least three ways: they have invoked wide-ranging theories motivated by data from other philosophical areas, they have elicited direct intuitions about which thoughts are singular, and they have subjected propositional attitude reports to tests such as Russellian substitution and Quinean exportation. In these ways, however, we haven’t yet been able to tell what it takes to have singular thoughts, nor have we been able to tell which of our thoughts they (...)
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  29. Lenny Clapp & Robert J. Stainton (2002). `Obviously Propositions Are Nothing': Russell and the Logical Form of Belief Reports. In Georg Peter & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Logical Form and Language. Oxford University Press. 409--420.
  30. D. S. Clarke (2010). Contextual Aspects of Belief Ascriptions: A Response to Buckareff. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):263-267.
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  31. M. J. Cresswell (2006). Arabic Numerals in Propositional Attitude Sentences. Analysis 66 (289):92–93.
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  32. M. J. Cresswell (1980). Quotational Theories of Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (1):17 - 40.
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  33. Maxwell J. Cresswell & Arnim Von Stechow (1982). "De Re" Belief Generalized. Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (4):503 - 535.
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  34. Eleonora Cresto (2008). A Model for Structural Changes of Belief. Studia Logica 88 (3):431 - 451.
    The paper suggests a way of modeling belief changes within the tradition of formal belief revision theories. The present model extends the scope of traditional proposals, such as AGM, so as to take care of “structural belief changes” – a type of radical shifts that is best illustrated with, but not limited to, instances of scientific discovery; we obtain AGM expansions and contractions as limiting cases. The representation strategy relies on a non-standard use of a semantic machinery. More precisely, the (...)
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  35. Mark Crimmins (2002). Thing Talk Moonlighting. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):83 - 98.
    It is controversial whether the truth conditions of attitude sentences are opaque. It is not, or shouldn't be controversial, however, that conditions of apt or unexceptionable usage are opaque. A framework for expressing such uncontroversial claims of opacity is developed, and within this framework it is argued that opacity resides at a locutionary level — that it is a matter of expressed content (which might not be truth-conditional). The same claim is made for a related pattern in attitude talk which (...)
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  36. Charles B. Cross (2008). Nonbelief and the Desire-as-Belief Thesis. Acta Analytica 23 (2):115-124.
    I show the incompatibility of two theses: (a) to desire the truth of p amounts to believing a certain proposition about the value of p’s truth; (b) one cannot be said to desire the truth of p if one believes that p is true. Thesis (a), the Desire-As-Belief Thesis, has received much attention since the late 1980s. Thesis (b) is an epistemic variant of Socrates’ remark in the Symposium that one cannot desire what one already has. It turns out that (...)
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  37. Samuel Cumming (2013). From Coordination to Content. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (4).
    Frege's picture of attitude states and attitude reports requires a notion of content that is shareable between agents, yet more fine-grained than reference. Kripke challenged this picture by giving a case on which the expressions that resist substitution in an attitude report share a candidate notion of fine-grained content. A consensus view developed which accepted Kripke's general moral and replaced the Fregean picture with an account of attitude reporting on which states are distinguished in conversation by their (private) representational properties. (...)
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  38. Mats Dahllöf (1995). On the Semantics of Propositional Attitude Reports. Göteborg University, Dept. Of Linguistics.
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  39. Jill G. de Villiers & Peter A. de Villiers (2002). Why Not LF for False Belief Reasoning? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):682-683.
    We argue that natural language has the right degree of representational richness for false belief reasoning, especially the complements under verbs of communication and belief. Language may indeed be necessary synchronically for cross-modular reasoning, but certain achievements in language seem necessary at least diachronically for explicit reasoning about false beliefs.
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  40. John Divers & Daniel Elstein (2012). Manifesting Belief in Absolute Necessity. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):109-130.
    McFetridge (in Logical necessity and other essays . London: Blackwell, 1990 ) suggests that to treat a proposition as logically necessary—to believe a proposition logically necessary, and to manifest that belief—is a matter of preparedness to deploy that proposition as a premise in reasoning from any supposition. We consider whether a suggestion in that spirit can be generalized to cover all cases of absolute necessity, both logical and non-logical, and we conclude that it can. In Sect. 2, we explain the (...)
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  41. John Divers & Alexander Miller (1994). Best Opinion, Intention-Detecting and Analytic Functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):239-245.
  42. Eli Dresner (2010). Language and the Measure of Mind. Mind and Language 25 (4):418-439.
    In his recent book The Measure of Mind Robert Matthews presents the most elaborate and convincing attempt to date to account for the propositional attitudes in measurement theoretic terms. In the first section of this paper I review earlier applications of measurement-theoretic conceptualization to the discussion of the mind, I outline Matthews' own account, and I raise two questions concerning it. Then, in the second section of the paper, I present a unified measurement-theoretic account of both linguistic meaning and the (...)
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  43. Christina E. Erneling & D. Johnson (eds.) (2005). Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.
  44. Neil Feit (2001). Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29 - 55.
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  45. G. W. Fitch (1984). Two Aspects of Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1):87-101.
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  46. Graeme Forbes, Content and Theme in Attitude Ascriptions.
    This paper is about a substitution-failure in attitude ascriptions, but not the one you think. A standard view about the semantic shape of ‘that’-clause attitude ascriptions is that they are fundamentally relational. The attitude verb expresses a binary relation whose extension, if not empty, is a collection of pairs each of which consists in an individual and a proposition, while the ‘that’-clause is a term for a proposition. One interesting problem this view faces is that, within the scope of many (...)
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  47. Bas C. Fraassen (1979). Propositional Attitudes in Weak Pragmatics. Studia Logica 38 (4):365 - 374.
    Sentences attributing beliefs, doubts, wants, and the like (propositional attitudes, in Russell's terminology) have posed a major problem for semantics. Recently the pragmatic description of language has become more systematic. I shall discuss the formalization of pragmatics, and propose an analysis of belief attribution that avoids some main problems apparently inherent in the semantic approach.
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  48. Heimir Geirsson (1998). True Belief Reports and the Sharing of Beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (January):331-342.
    In recent years Russell´s view that there are singular propositions, namely propositions that contain the individuals they are about, has gained followers. As a response to a number of puzzles about attitude ascriptions several Russellians (as I will call those who accept the view that proper names and indexicals only contribute their referents to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which they occur), including David Kaplan and Nathan Salmon, have drawn a distinction between what proposition is believed and how (...)
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  49. Grant Gillett (1991). McGinn on Ascriptions of Content. Inquiry 34 (3 & 4):401 – 410.
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  50. Philip A. Glotzbach (1983). Referential Inscrutablility, Perception, and the Empirical Foundation of Meaning. Philosophy Research Archives 9:535-569.
    W.V.O.Quine’s doctrine of referential inscrutability (RI) is the thesis that, first, linguistic reference must always be determined relative to an interpretation of the discourse and, second, that the empirical evidence always underdetermines our choice of interpretation--at least in principle. Although this thesis is a central result of Quine’s theory of language, it was long unclear just how much force RI actually carried. At best, Quine’s discussions provided localized examples of RI (e.g., ‘gavagai’), supplemented merely by arguments for the (in principle) (...)
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