 | 1 — 100 / 279 |  |
Material to categorize
- Maria Aloni (2005). A Formal Treatment of the Pragmatics of Questions and Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (5):505 - 539.
- Maria Aloni (2005). Individual Concepts in Modal Predicate Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):1 - 64.
- Horacio Arlo-Costa, Full Belief, Supposition, and Personal Probablility.
- Philip Atkins (forthcoming). A Pragmatic Solution to Ostertag's Puzzle. Philosophical Studies:-.
- Murat Aydede (1998). Fodor on Concepts and Frege Puzzles. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):289-294.
- Lynne Rudder Baker, How to Have Self-Directed Attitudes.
- Mark Balaguer (1998). Attitudes Without Propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):805-26.
- David Beisecker (1999). The Importance of Being Erroneous: Prospects for Animal Intentionality. Philosophical Topics 27 (1):281-308.
- John Bigelow (1980). Believing in Sentences. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):11 – 18.
- John C. Bigelow (1978). Believing in Semantics. Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (1):101--144.
- Maria Bittner, Conditionals as Attitude Reports.
- Steven E. Boër (2007). Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution. Springer.
- Steven E. Boer (1995). Propositional Attitudes and Compositional Semantics. Philosophical Perspectives 9:341-380.
- Steven E. Boër (1994). Propositional Attitudes and Formal Ontology. Synthese 98 (2):187 - 242.
- Steven E. Boër & William G. Lycan (1980). Who, Me? Philosophical Review 89 (3):427-466.
- Adrian Brasoveanu & Donka F. Farkas, Say Reports, Assertion Events and Meaning Dimensions.
- David M. Braun (1998). Understanding Belief Reports. Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
- David M. Braun (1991). Proper Names, Cognitive Contents, and Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 62 (3):289 - 305.
- Berit Brogaard (2008). Knowledge-the and Propositional Attitude Ascriptions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):147-190.
- Curtis Brown (1993). Belief States and Narrow Content. Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67.
- Howard Burdick (1991). A Notorious Affair Called Exportation. Synthese 87 (3):363 - 377.
- Tyler Burge (1977). Kaplan, Quine, and Suspended Belief. Philosophical Studies 31 (3):197 - 203.
- J. A. Burgess (1997). Supervaluations and the Propositional Attitude Constraint. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1):103-119.
- Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever (2001). Believing in Words. Synthese 127 (3):279 - 301.
- Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore (1997). On an Alleged Connection Between Indirect Speech and the Theory of Meaning. Mind and Language 12 (3&4):278–296.
- Roderick Chisholm (1976). Knowledge and Belief: 'De Dicto' and 'de Re'. Philosophical Studies 29 (1):1 - 20.
- Lenny Clapp & Robert J. Stainton (2002). `Obviously Propositions Are Nothing': Russell and the Logical Form of Belief Reports. In Georg Peter & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Logical Form and Language. Oxford University Press.
- D. S. Clarke (2010). Contextual Aspects of Belief Ascriptions: A Response to Buckareff. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):263-267.
- Sean Crawford (2008). Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes: Quine Revisited. Synthese 160 (1):75 - 96.
- M. J. Cresswell (2006). Arabic Numerals in Propositional Attitude Sentences. Analysis 66 (289):92–93.
- M. J. Cresswell (1980). Quotational Theories of Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (1):17 - 40.
- Eleonora Cresto (2008). A Model for Structural Changes of Belief. Studia Logica 88 (3):431 - 451.
- Mark Crimmins (2002). Thing Talk Moonlighting. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):83 - 98.
- Charles B. Cross (2008). Nonbelief and the Desire-as-Belief Thesis. Acta Analytica 23 (2):115-124.
- Jill G. de Villiers & Peter A. de Villiers (2002). Why Not LF for False Belief Reasoning? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):682-683.
- John Divers & Daniel Elstein (2012). Manifesting Belief in Absolute Necessity. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):109-130.
- John Divers & Alexander Miller (1994). Best Opinion, Intention-Detecting and Analytic Functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):239-245.
- Eli Dresner (2010). Language and the Measure of Mind. Mind and Language 25 (4):418-439.
- Christina E. Erneling & D. Johnson (2005). Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.
- Neil Feit (2001). Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29 - 55.
- G. W. Fitch (1984). Two Aspects of Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1):87-101.
- Graeme Forbes, Content and Theme in Attitude Ascriptions.
- Bas C. Fraassen (1979). Propositional Attitudes in Weak Pragmatics. Studia Logica 38 (4):365 - 374.
- Heimir Geirsson (1998). True Belief Reports and the Sharing of Beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (January):331-342.
- Grant Gillett (1991). McGinn on Ascriptions of Content. Inquiry 34 (3 & 4):401 – 410.
- Mitchell S. Green & Christopher R. Hitchcock (1994). Reflections on Reflection: Van Fraassen on Belief. Synthese 98 (2):297 - 324.
- P. M. S. Hacker (1998). Davidson on the Ontology and Logical Form of Belief. Philosophy 73 (1):81-96.
- Patricia Hanna (2004). What Kripke's Puzzle Doesn't Tell Us About Language, Meaning or Bellief. Philosophia 31 (3-4):355-382.
- Patricia Hanna (2001). Linguistic Competence and Kripke's Puzzle. Philosophia 28 (1-4):171-189.
- Allan Hazlett (2010). The Myth of Factive Verbs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):497-522.
- Scott Hendricks (2006). The Frame Problem and Theories of Belief. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):317-33.
- Richard Holton (1994). Attitude Ascriptions and Intermediate Scope. Mind 103 (410):123-130.
- John F. Horty (1993). Frege on the Psychological Significance of Definitions. Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):223 - 263.
- Henry Jackman, Prototypes, Belief Ascriptions, and Ambiguity.
- Henry Jackman, Belief Ascriptions, Prototypes and Ambiguity.
- Pierre Jacob (1987). Thoughts and Belief Ascriptions. Mind and Language 2 (4):301-325.
- Rockney Jacobsen (1997). Self-Quotation and Self-Knowledge. Synthese 110 (3):419-445.
- Tomis Kapitan (1994). Exports and Imports: Anaphora in Attitudinal Ascriptions. Philosophical Perspectives 8:273-292.
- Tomis Kapitan (1993). Keeping a Happy Face on Exportation. Philosophical Studies 70 (3):337 - 345.
- Tomis Kapitan (1992). I and You, He and She. Analysis 52 (2):125 - 128.
- Philipp Koralus (forthcoming). Descriptions, Ambiguity, and Representationalist Theories of Interpretation. Philosophical Studies.
- Angelika Kratzer, Decomposing Attitude Verbs.
- Igal Kvart (1986). Beliefs and Believing. Theoria 52 (3):129-45.
- Hugh LaFollette & Niall Shanks (1993). Belief and the Basis of Humor. American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (4):329 - 339.
- Joe Lau (1997). Possible Worlds Semantics for Belief Sentences. In Logica Yearbook.
- David Lewis (1979). Attitudes de Dicto and de Se. Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
- Gert Jan Lokhorst (1988). Ontology, Semantics and Philosophy of Mind in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Formal Reconstruction. Erkenntnis 29 (1):35 - 75.
- John Macfarlane (2006). The Things We (Sorta Kinda) Believe. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):218–224.
- Emar Maier (2009). Iterated de Re: A New Puzzle for the Relational Report Semantics. In Arndt Riester & Torgrim Solstad (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn Und Bedeutung 13.
- Emar Maier (2009). Presupposing Acquaintance: A Unified Semantics for de Dicto , de Re and de Se Belief Reports. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (5):429--474.
- Michael McDermott (2009). A Science of Intention. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):252-273.
- Thomas J. McKay (1991). Representingde Re Beliefs. Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (6):711 - 739.
- Michael McKinsey (1999). The Semantics of Belief Ascriptions. Noûs 33 (4):519-557.
- Marc A. Moffett (2003). Knowing Facts and Believing Propositions: A Solution to the Problem of Doxastic Shift. Philosophical Studies 115 (1):81-97.
- Friederike Moltmann, Attitudinal Objects.
- Daniel Nolan, Fictionalist Attitudes About Fictional Matters.
- Andrés Páez, The Epistemic Value of Explanation.
- Sarah Patterson (1990). The Explanatory Role of Belief Ascriptions. Philosophical Studies 59 (3):313-32.
- Michael W. Pelczar (2004). The Indispensability of Farbung. Synthese 138 (1):49 - 77.
- Carlo Penco, Kripke's Puzzle About Belief. teaching material.
- Jaroslav Peregrin, Constructions and Concepts.
- David Pickles (1995). Holton on Attitude Ascriptions and Intermediate Scope. Mind 104 (415):577-582.
- A. Pietarinen (2012). Intentional Identity Revisited. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):147-188.
- Manuel Rebuschi & Tero Tulenheimo (2011). Between de Dicto and de Re: De Objecto Attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):828-838.
- François Recanati (2000). Relational Belief Reports. Philosophical Studies 100 (3):255-272.
- Lisbeth Rechtin & William L. Todd (1974). Propositional Attitudes and Self-Reference. Philosophia 4 (April-July):271-295.
- Marga Reimer (1995). A Defense of De Re Belief Reports. Mind and Language 10 (4):446-463.
- M. Richard (2006). Meaning and Attitude Ascriptions. Philosophical Studies 128 (3).
- Michael Rieppel (2011). Stoic Disagreement and Belief Retention. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):243-262.
- Mark Risjord (1996). Meaning, Belief, and Language Acquisition. Philosophical Psychology 9 (4):465-475.
- Gregory Salmieri, How We Choose Our Beliefs.
- Jennifer M. Saul (1999). The Road to Hell: Intentions and Propositional Attitude Ascription. Mind and Language 14 (3):356–375.
- Jonathan Schaffer (2009). Knowing the Answer Redux: Replies to Brogaard and Kallestrup. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):477-500.
- Jonathan Schaffer (2008). The Contrast-Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions. Social Epistemology 22 (3):235-245.
- Mark Schroeder, Attitudes and Epistemics.
- Michael Scott & Philip Brown (forthcoming). Pragmatic Antirealism: A New Antirealist Strategy. Philosophical Studies.
- Gabriel Segal, Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Ascriptions.
- Theodore Sider & David Braun (2006). Review: Kripke's Revenge. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 128 (3):669 - 682.
- Mark Siebel (2003). Illocutionary Acts and Attitude Expression. Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (3):351-366.
- Joel Smith (2006). Which Immunity to Error? Philosophical Studies 130 (2):273-83.
 | 1 — 100 / 279 |  |
|
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
Email
|
RSS feed
|
|