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  1. Gustaf Arrhenius (1999). An Impossibility Theorem in Population Axiology with Weak Ordering Assumptions. Philosophical Studies 49:11-21.
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  2. Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2005). Millian Superiorities. Utilitas 17 (2):127-146.
    Suppose one sets up a sequence of less and less valuable objects such that each object in the sequence is only marginally worse than its immediate predecessor. Could one in this way arrive at something that is dramatically inferior to the point of departure? It has been claimed that if there is a radical value difference between the objects at each end of the sequence, then at some point there must be a corresponding radical difference between the adjacent elements. The (...)
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  3. Robert Audi (1998). The Axiology of Moral Experience. Journal of Ethics 2 (4):355-375.
    This paper clarifies the nature of moral experience, examines its evidential role in supporting moral judgments, and argues that moral experiences can be among the things having intrinsic value. Moral experience is compared with aesthetic experience and contrasted with its close relative, non-moral experience combined with moral beliefs. The concluding sections explore the case for the organicity of intrinsic value and the kind of role such value can play in grounding moral obligation.
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  4. Archie J. Bahm (1980). Axiology, the Science of Values ; Ethics, the Science of Oughtness. World Books.
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  5. Lawrence C. Becker (1972). Axiology, Deontology, and Agent Morality: The Need for Coordination. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 6 (3):213-220.
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  6. John B. Berthrong (2008). Riding the Third Wave: T U Weiming's Confucian Axiology. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 7 (4):423-435.
    Weiming) has assisted in defining the New Confucian movement, a philosophical discourse that depends on axiological themes and traits based on an exegesis and defense of the revival and reform of traditional Confucian discourse inherited from the Classical and Neo-Confucian waves in East Asia. Thomas A. Metzger’s discussion of the profound difference between modern Western post-Enlightenment discourse and New Confucian discourse challenges many of Du’s primary assumptions. My conclusion is that Du is both a citizen of the modern Western academy (...)
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  7. David Brax (2008). Pleasure in the Motivational System: Towards an Empirically Responsible Theory of Value. In Martin Jönsson (ed.), Proceedings of the Lund-Rutgers Conference. Lund University.
    Theories about value struggles with the problem how toaccount for the motivational force inherent to value judgments. Whereasthe exact role of motivation in evaluation is the subject of somecontroversy, it’s arguably a truism that value has something to do withmotivation. In this paper, I suggest that given that the role of motivationin ethical theory is left quite unspecific by the “truisms” or “platitudes”governing evaluative concepts, a scientific understanding of motivationcan provide a rich source of clues for how we might go (...)
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  8. Franz Brentano (1990). L'origine de la Connaissance Morale (1889). Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 95 (1):3 - 32.
  9. Franz Brentano (1889/1969). The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong. Routledge.
    First published in 1969. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  10. Franz Brentano (1889). Vom Ursprung Sittlicher Erkenntnis. Duncker & Humblot.
    Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Ein Vortrag. Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittl, Erkenntnis, 1 I. Die Einladung zu einem Vortrage, welche die Iuristische Gesellschaft Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis Ein Vortrag Seite Wert der Geschichte und ...
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  11. John Broome (1991). Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Wiley-Blackwell.
  12. Campbell Brown (2007). Two Kinds of Holism About Values. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):456–463.
    I compare two kinds of holism about values: G.E. Moore's 'organic unities', and Jonathan Dancy's 'value holism'. I propose a simple formal model for representing evaluations of parts and wholes. I then define two conditions, additivism and invariabilism, which together imply a third, atomism. Since atomism is absurd, we must reject one of the former two conditions. This is where Moore and Dancy part company: whereas Moore rejects additivism, Dancy rejects invariabilism. I argue that Moore's view is more plausible. Invariabilism (...)
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  13. Robert S. Brumbaugh (1977). Robert Hartman's Formal Axiology: An Extension. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 11 (4):259-263.
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  14. C. A. Campbell (1935). Moral and Non-Moral Values: A Study in the First Principles of Axiology. Mind 44 (175):273-299.
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  15. Thomas L. Carson (2007). Axiology, Realism, and the Problem of Evil. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):349–368.
    Discussions of the problem of evil presuppose and appeal to axiological and metaethical assumptions, but seldom pay adequate attention to those assumptions. I argue that certain theories of value are consistent with theistic answers to the argument from evil and that several other well-known theories of value, such as hedonism, are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with theism. Although moral realism is the subject of lively debate in contemporary philosophy, almost all standard discussions of the problem of evil presuppose (...)
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  16. Alan Carter (2011). Some Groundwork for a Multidimensional Axiology. Philosophical Studies 154 (3):389 - 408.
    By distinguishing between contributory values and overall value, and by arguing that contributory values are variable values insofar as they contribute diminishing marginal overall value, this article helps to establish the superiority of a certain kind of maximizing, value-pluralist axiology over both sufficientarianism and prioritarianism, as well as over all varieties of value-monism, including utilitarianism and pure egalitarianism.
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  17. Alan Carter (2011). Towards a Multidimensional, Environmentalist Ethic. Environmental Values 20 (3):347-374.
    There has been a process of moral extensionism within environmental ethics from anthropocentrism, through zoocentrism, to ecocentrism. This article maps key elements of that process, and concludes that each of these ethical positions fails as a fully adequate, environmentalist ethic, and does so because of an implicit assumption that is common within normative theory. This notwithstanding, each position may well contribute a value. The problem that then arises is how to trade off those values against each other when they conflict. (...)
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  18. Robert E. Carter (1970). The Structure of Value: Foundations of Scientific Axiology. By Robert S. Hartman. Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1967. Pp. Vii, 384. $10.00; Second Edition, Paperback, 1969, $2.85. [REVIEW] Dialogue 8 (04):727-730.
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  19. Ruth Chang (2012). Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability? Philosophical Issues 22 (1):106-126.
    This paper presents an argument against the widespread view that ‘hard choices’ are hard because of the incomparability of the alternatives. The argument has two parts. First, I argue that any plausible theory of practical reason must be ‘comparativist’ in form, that is, it must hold that a comparative relation between the alternatives with respect to what matters in the choice determines a justified choice in that situation. If comparativist views of practical reason are correct, however, the incomparabilist view of (...)
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  20. Ruth Chang (2004). All Things Considered. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):1–22.
    One of the most common judgments of normative life takes the following form: With respect to some things that matter, one item is better than the other, with respect to other things that matter, the other item is better, but all things considered – that is, taking into account all the things that matter – the one item is better than the other. In this paper, I explore how all-things-considered judgments are possible, assuming that they are. In particular, I examine (...)
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  21. Ruth Chang (2001). Against Constitutive Incommensurability or Buying and Selling Friends. Noûs 35 (s1):33 - 60.
    Recently, some of the leading proponents of the view that there is widespread incommensurability among goods have suggested that the incommensurability of some goods is a constitutive feature of the goods themselves. So, for example, a friendship and a million dollars are incommensurable because it is part of what it is to be a friendship that it be incommensurable with money. According to these ‘constitutive incommensurabilists’ incommensurability follows from the very nature of certain goods. In this paper, I examine this (...)
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  22. Ruth Chang (ed.) (1997). Introduction, Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning. Harvard University Press.
    This paper is the introduction to the volume. It gives an argumentative view of the philosophical landscape concerning incommensurability and incomparability. It argues that incomparability, not incommensurability, is the important phenomenon on which philosophers should be focusing and that the arguments for the existence of incomparability are so far not compelling.
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  23. Richard Yetter Chappell, Value Holism.
    This paper considers the relation between the value of a whole (person, society) and its parts (timeslices, individuals), arguing that the contributory value of a part cannot be determined in isolation. For example, the value of an additional life may depend on what other lives there are. This has important implications for population ethics, and especially Parfit's 'repugnant conclusion'.
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  24. Christian Coons (forthcoming). &Quot;the Best Expression of Welfarism&Quot;. In Mark C. Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (Vol. 2). Oxford University Press.
  25. Christian Coons (2014). Hope for Fools: Four Proposals for Meeting Temkin's Challenge. Analysis 74 (2):292-306.
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  26. Christian Coons (2012). Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Personal Value. [REVIEW] Ethics 123 (1):183-188.
  27. Charles J. Dougherty (1992). An Axiology for National Health Insurance. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 20 (1-2):82-91.
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  28. Javier Echeverría (2003). Some Questions From the Point of View of an Axiology of Science. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 81 (1):311-315.
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  29. Rem B. Edwards (1999). Fetz's Misunderstandings of Formal Axiology. Kriterion 13:24-30.
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  30. Nicolas Espinoza (2009). Some New Monadic Value Predicates. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1):31-37.
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  31. Austin Fagothey (1959). The Problem of Being and Value in Contemporary American Axiology. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 33:73-83.
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  32. Guy Fletcher (2010). Brown and Moore's Value Invariabilism Vs Dancy's Variabilism. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):162-168.
    Campbell Brown has recently argued that G.E. Moore's intrinsic value holism is superior to Jonathan Dancy's. I show that the advantage which Brown claims for Moore's view over Dancy's is illusory, and that Dancy's view may be superior.
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  33. Karyn Freedman (1999). Laudan's Naturalistic Axiology. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):537.
    Doppelt (1986,1990), Siegel (1990), and Rosenberg (1996) argue that the pivotal feature of Laudan's normative naturalism, namely his axiology, lacks a naturalistic foundation. In this paper I show that this objection turns on a misunderstanding of Laudan's use of the term 'naturalism'. Specifically, I argue that there are two important senses of naturalism running through Laudan's work. Once these two strands are made explicit, the objection raised by Doppelt and others simply disappears.
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  34. Philippe Gagnon (forthcoming). "Le dernier état d'un finalisme contemporain – À propos d'un inédit majeur de Raymond Ruyer" [The final status of a contemporary finalism–Concerning a major unpublished draft of Raymond Ruyer]. [REVIEW] Laval Théologique et Philosophique.
    This is a critical notice/review essay on *L'embryogenèse du monde et le Dieu silencieux*, a manuscript completed by Raymond Ruyer in the early 1980s. It came out as a monograph in November 2013, with the Éditions Klincksieck in Paris. It offers a presentation in an organized fashion of many aspects of his thought. Ruyer considered that a book about God could only be churned into a series of chapters on the unachievable character of our knowledge in different domains of human (...)
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  35. Philippe Gagnon (2013). "Que reste-t-il de la théologie à l'âge électronique ? Valeur et cybernétique axiologique chez Raymond Ruyer" [What is left of Theology in the Electronic Age? Value and Axiological Cybernetics in Raymond Ruyer]. In Chromatikon IX: Annales de la philosophie en procès — Yearbook of Philosophy in Process, M. Weber & V. Berne (Eds.). 93-120.
    This is the outline: Introduction — La question de la cybernétique et de l'information — Une « pensée du milieu » — Cybernétique et homologie — Une théorie de l'apprentissage — L'information vue de l'autre côté — Champ et domaine unitaire — La thèse des « autres-je » — Le passage par l'axiologie — La rétroaction vraie — L'ontologie de Ruyer — Le bruissement de l'être même.
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  36. Irwin Goldstein (2003). Malicious Pleasure Evaluated: Is Pleasure an Unconditional Good? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):24–31.
    Pleasure is one of the strongest candidates for an occurrence that might be good, in some respect, unconditionally. Malicious pleasure is one of the most often cited alleged counter-examples to pleasure’s being an unconditional good. Correctly evaluating malicious pleasure is more complex than people realize. I defend pleasure’s unconditionally good status from critics of malicious pleasure.
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  37. Irwin Goldstein (2000). Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States. Philosophy 75 (291):89-104.
    By what types of properties do we specify twinges, toothaches, and other kinds of mental states? Wittgenstein considers two methods. Procedure one, direct, private acquaintance: A person connects a word to the sensation it specifies through noticing what that sensation is like in his own experience. Procedure two, outward signs: A person pins his use of a word to outward, pre-verbal signs of the sensation. I identify and explain a third procedure and show we in fact specify many kinds of (...)
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  38. Irwin Goldstein (1989). Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional Intrinsic Values. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276.
    That all pleasure is good and all pain bad in itself is an eternally true ethical principle. The common claim that some pleasure is not good, or some pain not bad, is mistaken. Strict particularism (ethical decisions must be made case by case; there are no sound universal normative principles) and relativism (all good and bad are relative to society) are among the ethical theories we may refute through an appeal to pleasure and pain. Daniel Dennett, Philippa Foot, R M (...)
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  39. William F. Goodwin (1957). Santayana's Naturalistic Reading of Indian Ontology and Axiology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 18 (2):147-168.
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  40. Daniel Guerrière (1984). Foundations for an Axiology of Life. Journal of Value Inquiry 18 (3):195-205.
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  41. Johan E. Gustafsson (2013). Neither 'Good' in Terms of 'Better' nor 'Better' in Terms of 'Good'. Noûs 48 (1):466-473.
    In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms of the other. According to definitions of ‘good’ in terms of ‘better’, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of ‘better’ without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining ‘better’ in terms of ‘good’, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of (...)
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  42. Johan E. Gustafsson (2013). Indeterminacy and the Small-Improvement Argument. Utilitas 25 (4):433–445.
    In this article, I argue that the small-improvement fails since some of the comparisons involved in the argument might be indeterminate. I defend this view from two objections by Ruth Chang, namely the argument from phenomenology and the argument from perplexity. There are some other objections to the small-improvement argument that also hinge on claims about indeterminacy. John Broome argues that alleged cases of value incomparability are merely examples of indeterminacy in the betterness relation. The main premise of his argument (...)
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  43. Toby Handfield (2013). Rational Choice and the Transitivity of Betterness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):584-604.
    If A is better than B and B is better than C, then A is better than C, right? Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels say: No! Betterness is nontransitive, they claim. In this paper, I discuss the central type of argument advanced by Temkin and Rachels for this radical idea, and argue that, given this view very likely has sceptical implications for practical reason, we would do well to identify alternative responses. I propose one such response, which employs the idea (...)
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  44. Samuel L. Hart (1971). Axiology--Theory of Values. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (1):29-41.
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  45. Robert S. Hartman (1967). Formal Axiology and the Measurement of Values. Journal of Value Inquiry 1 (1):38-46.
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  46. Robert S. Hartman (1962). Axiology as a Science. Philosophy of Science 29 (4):412-433.
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  47. Anthony Hatzimoysis (1997). Ontology and Axiology. Philosophy 72 (280):293 - 296.
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  48. Chris Heathwood (forthcoming). Monism and Pluralism About Value. In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press.
    This essay discusses monism and pluralism about two related evaluative notions: welfare, or what makes people better off, and value simpliciter, or what makes the world better. These are stipulatively referred to as 'axiological value'. Axiological value property monists hold that one of these notions is reducible to the other (or else eliminable), while axiological value property pluralists deny this. Substantive monists about axiological value hold that there is just one basic kind of thing that makes our lives or the (...)
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  49. Chris Heathwood (2013). Organic Unities. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley.
    A short encyclopedia entry on the issue of whether the value of a whole is equal to the sum of the values of its parts.
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  50. Chris Heathwood (2006). Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):539-563.
    Hedonism and the desire-satisfaction theory of welfare ("desire satisfactionism") are typically seen as archrivals in the contest over identifying what makes one's life go best. It is surprising, then, that the most plausible form of hedonism just is the most plausible form of desire satisfactionism. How can a single theory of welfare be a version of both hedonism and desire satisfactionism? The answer lies in what pleasure is: pleasure is, in my view, the subjective satisfaction of desire. This thesis about (...)
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