Bare Dispositions Edited by Matthew Tugby (Nottingham University)

Related categories
Siblings:
10 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  • Troy Cross, Goodbye, Humean Supervenience.
    Reductionists about dispositions must either say the natural properties are all dispositional or individuate properties hyperintensionally. Lewis stands in as an example of the sort of combination I think is incoherent: properties individuated by modal profile + categoricalism.

    Please don't cite without permission.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • Toby Handfield (2008). Unfinkable Dispositions. Synthese 160 (2).
    This paper develops two ideas with respect to dispositional properties: (1) Adapting a suggestion of Sungho Choi, it appears the conceptual distinction between dispositional and categorical properties can be drawn in terms of susceptibility to finks and antidotes. Dispositional, but not categorical properties, are not susceptible to intrinsic finks, nor are they remediable by intrinsic antidotes. (2) If correct, this suggests the possibility that some dispositions—those which lack any causal basis—may be insusceptible to any fink or antidote. Since finks and (...)
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com   | Scholar | More..
  • Toby Handfield (2005). Armstrong and the Modal Inversion of Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):452–461.
    D. M. Armstrong has objected that the Dispositionalist theory of laws and properties is modally inverted, for it entails that properties are constituted by relations to non-actual possibilia. I contend that, if this objection succeeds against Dispositionalism, then Armstrong's nomic necessitation relation is also modally inverted. This shows that at least one of Armstrong's reasons for preferring a nomic necessitation theory is specious.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: home.iprimus.com.au blackwell-synergy.com   | Scholar | More..
  • R. Harré (1970). Powers. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):81-101.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org bjps.oxfordjournals.org   | Scholar | More..
  • Jonathan D. Jacobs, Pure Powers and Powerful Qualities.
    I explore two alternative accounts of properties within an essentialist or Neo-Aristotelian framework, the Pure Powers view and the Powerful Qualities view. Both are, unfortunately, easily misunderstood, and so I attempt to clarify precisely what the views are. I raise worries for the Pure Powers view, primarily that it cannot account for the qualitative nature of our phenomenal experience. I then offer a restatement of the Powerful Qualities view, which I shall call the Truthmaker view, in order to avoid some (...)
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • Jennifer Mckltrick (2003). The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare Dispositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):349–369.
    Many philosophers hold that all dispositions must have independent causal bases. I challenge this view, hence defending the possibility of bare dispositions. In part 1, I explain more fully what I mean by "disposition," "causal basis," and "bare disposition." In part 2, I consider the claim that the concept of a disposition entails that dispositions are not bare. In part 3, I consider arguments, due to Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, that dispositions necessarily have distinct causal bases. In part 4, I (...)
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: interscience.wiley.com jstor.org   | Scholar | More..
  • Peter Menzies (forthcoming). Critical Notice of Alexander Bird, Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Analysis.
    This book advocates dispositional essentialism, the view that natural properties have dispositional essences.1 So, for example, the essence of the property of being negatively charged is to be disposed to attract positively charged objects. From this fact it follows that it is a law that all negatively charged objects will attract positively 10 charged objects; and indeed that this law is metaphysically necessary. Since the identity of the property of being negatively charged is determined by its being related in a (...)
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • George Molnar (1999). Are Dispositions Reducible? Philosophical Quarterly 50 (194):1-17.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org blackwell-synergy.com   | Scholar | More..
  • Ian J. Thompson (1988). Real Dispositions in the Physical World. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):67-79.
    The role of dispositions in the physical world is considered. It is shown that not only can classical physics be reasonably construed as the discovery of real dispositions, but also quantum physics. This approach moreover allows a realistic understanding of quantum processes.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: links.jstor.org jstor.org bjps.oxfordjournals.org   | Scholar | More..
  • Fred Wilson (1985). Dispositions Defined: Harré and Madden on Analyzing Disposition Concepts. Philosophy of Science 52 (4):591-607.
    If one proposes to analyze dispositions by means of statements involving only the 'if-then' of material implication--that is, for example, to define 'x is soluble' by means of 'x is in water ⊃ x dissolves'--then one faces the problem first raised by Carnap, the match which is never put in water and which therefore turns out to be not only soluble but also both soluble and insoluble. I have elsewhere argued that if one refers to appropriate laws, then one can (...)
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | More..