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  1. Julie Tetel Andresen (1992). The Behaviorist Turn in Recent Theories of Language. Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):1 - 19.
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  2. Alejandro Arango (forthcoming). Animal Groups and Social Ontology: An Argument From the Phenomenology of Behavior. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    Through a critical engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the concepts of nature, life, and behavior, and with contemporary accounts of animal groups, this article argues that animal groups exhibit sociality and that sociality is a fundamental ontological condition. I situate my account in relation to the superorganism and selfish individual accounts of animal groups in recent biology and zoology. I argue that both accounts are inadequate. I propose an alternative account of animal groups and animal sociality through a Merleau-Pontian inspired (...)
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  3. Andre Ariew (1999). Innateness is Canalization: In Defense of a Developmental Account of Innateness. In Philosophy of Science. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA S19-S27.
    Lorenz proposed in his (1935) articulation of a theory of behavioral instincts that the objective of ethology is to distinguish behaviors that are “innate” from behaviors that are “learned” (or “acquired”). Lorenz’s motive was to open the investigation of certain “adaptive” behaviors to evolutionary theorizing. Accordingly, since innate behaviors are “genetic”, they are open to such investigation. By Lorenz’s light an innate/acquired or learned dichotomy rested on a familiar Darwinian distinction between genes and environments. Ever since Lorenz, ascriptions of innateness (...)
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  4. Robert Aunger & Valerie Curtis (2008). Kinds of Behaviour. Biology and Philosophy 23 (3):317-345.
    Sciences able to identify appropriate analytical units for their domain, their natural kinds, have tended to be more progressive. In the biological sciences, evolutionary natural kinds are adaptations that can be identified by their common history of selection for some function. Human brains are the product of an evolutionary history of selection for component systems which produced behaviours that gave adaptive advantage to their hosts. These structures, behaviour production systems, are the natural kinds that psychology seeks. We argue these can (...)
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  5. Dermot Barnes-Holmes (2005). Behavioral Pragmatism Is A-Ontological, Not Antirealist: A Reply to Tonneau. Behavior and Philosophy 33:67 - 79.
    Tonneau attributes an antirealist position to my writing. In my reply I argue that my position is not antirealist, but a-ontological. I subsequently consider the implications of Tonneau's core arguments in light of my a-ontological position and find that his claims do not apply to my work. Finally, I suggest an a-ontological approach to the realism controversy.
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  6. Dermot Barnes-Holmes (2003). For the Radical Behaviorist Biological Events Are Not Biological and Public Events Are Not Public. Behavior and Philosophy 31:145 - 150.
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  7. Irwin Goldstein (1996). Ontology, Epistemology, and Private Ostensive Definition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):137-147.
    People see five kinds of views in epistemology and ontology as hinging on there being words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions, through direct acquaintance with his own sensations: skepticism about other minds, 2. skepticism about an external world, 3. foundationalism, 4. dualism, and 5. phenomenalism. People think Wittgenstein refuted these views by showing, they believe, no word is learnable only by private ostensive definition. I defend these five views from Wittgenstein’s attack.
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  8. Christoph Jäger & Eva Bänninger-Huber (2015). Looking Into Meta-Emotions. Synthese 192 (3):787-811.
    There are many psychic mechanisms by which people engage with their selves. We argue that an important yet hitherto neglected one is self-appraisal via meta-emotions. We discuss the intentional structure of meta-emotions and explore the phenomenology of a variety of examples. We then present a pilot study providing preliminary evidence that some facial displays may indicate the presence of meta-emotions. We conclude by arguing that meta-emotions have an important role to play in higher-order theories of psychic (...)
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  9. Christian List & Franz Dietrich (forthcoming). Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective. Economics and Philosophy.
    Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘ revealed preference ’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best (...)
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  10. Mark B. Mendelsohn (1975). Nonautonomous Free Man. Behaviorism 3 (1):117-119.
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  11. Desh Raj Sirswal (2010). Philosophical Mind Studies. In Philosophical Mind Studies.
    I have posted four my article published at different journals in India. This is an open resource to do our work well. -/- GILBERRT RYLE ON DESCARTES’ MYTH Philosophical Mind Studies, Dec 13, 2010 (Published). -/- Ryle’s Dispositional Analysis of Mind and its Relevance Philosophical Mind Studies, Dec 13, 2010 (Published). -/- The Official Doctrine and its Relevance Today Philosophical Mind Studies, Dec 13, 2010 (Published). -/- The Concept of the Self in David Hume and the Buddha Philosophical Mind Studies, (...)
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