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  1. Georg Brun & Hans Rott (2013). Interpreting Enthymematic Arguments Using Belief Revision. Synthese 190 (18):4041-4063.
    This paper is about the situation in which an author (writer or speaker) presents a deductively invalid argument, but the addressee aims at a charitable interpretation and has reason to assume that the author intends to present a valid argument. How can he go about interpreting the author’s reasoning as enthymematically valid? We suggest replacing the usual find-the-missing-premise approaches by an approach based on systematic efforts to ascribe a belief state to the author against the background of which the argument (...)
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  2. Leandra Bucher & Paul D. Thorn (2014). Minimality Criteria in Spatial Belief Revision. In Paul Bello, Marcello Guarini, Marjorie McShane & Brian Scassellati (eds.), Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. 1952-8.
    Agents typically revise their beliefs when confronted with evidence that contradicts those beliefs, selecting from a number of possible revisions sufficient to reestablish consistency. In cases where an individual’s beliefs concern spatial relations, belief revision has been fruitfully treated as a decision about which features of an initially constructed spatial mental model to modify. A normative claim about belief revision maintains that agents should prefer minimal belief revisions. Yet recent studies have rebutted the preceding claim, where minimality is understood to (...)
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  3. Gustavo Cevolani (2013). Truth Approximation Via Abductive Belief Change. Logic Journal of the Igpl 21 (6):999-1016.
    We investigate the logical and conceptual connections between abductive reasoning construed as a process of belief change, on the one hand, and truth approximation, construed as increasing (estimated) verisimilitude, on the other. We introduce the notion of ‘(verisimilitude-guided) abductive belief change’ and discuss under what conditions abductively changing our theories or beliefs does lead them closer to the truth, and hence tracks truth approximation conceived as the main aim of inquiry. The consequences of our analysis for some recent discussions concerning (...)
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  4. Gustavo Cevolani & Francesco Calandra (2010). Approaching the Truth Via Belief Change in Propositional Languages. In M. Suàrez, M. Dorato & M. Rèdei (eds.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer. 47--62.
    Starting from the sixties of the past century theory change has become a main concern of philosophy of science. Two of the best known formal accounts of theory change are the post-Popperian theories of verisimilitude (PPV for short) and the AGM theory of belief change (AGM for short). In this paper, we will investigate the conceptual relations between PPV and AGM and, in particular, we will ask whether the AGM rules for theory change are effective means for approaching the truth, (...)
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  5. Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa (2011). Verisimilitude and Belief Change for Conjunctive Theories. Erkenntnis 75 (2):183-202.
    Theory change is a central concern in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. In this paper, we investigate the relationships between two ongoing research programs providing formal treatments of theory change: the (post-Popperian) approach to verisimilitude and the AGM theory of belief change. We show that appropriately construed accounts emerging from those two lines of epistemological research do yield convergences relative to a specified kind of theories, here labeled “conjunctive”. In this domain, a set of plausible conditions are identified which (...)
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  6. Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa (2012). &Quot;merely a Logician's Toy?&Quot; Belief Revision Confronting Scientific Theory Change. [REVIEW] Metascience 21 (2):463-466.
    Review of Olsson, Erik J. and Enqvist, Sebastian (Eds.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science .
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  7. Gustavo Cevolani, Roberto Festa & Theo A. F. Kuipers (2013). Verisimilitude and Belief Change for Nomic Conjunctive Theories. Synthese 190 (16):3307-3324.
    In this paper, we address the problem of truth approximation through theory change, asking whether revising our theories by newly acquired data leads us closer to the truth about a given domain. More particularly, we focus on “nomic conjunctive theories”, i.e., theories expressed as conjunctions of logically independent statements concerning the physical or, more generally, nomic possibilities and impossibilities of the domain under inquiry. We define both a comparative and a quantitative notion of the verisimilitude of such theories, and identify (...)
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  8. Charles B. Cross (2000). A Characterization of Imaging in Terms of Popper Functions. Philosophy of Science 67 (2):316-338.
    Despite the results of David Lewis, Peter Gärdenfors, and others, showing that imaging and classical conditionalization coincide only in the most trivial probabilistic models of belief revision, it turns out that imaging on a proposition A can always be described via Popper function conditionalization on a proposition that entails A. This result generalizes to any method of belief revision meeting certain minimal requirements. The proof is illustrated by an application of imaging in the context of the Monty Hall Problem.
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  9. Sebastian Enqvist (2009). Interrogative Belief Revision in Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):527 - 548.
    The well known AGM framework for belief revision has recently been extended to include a model of the research agenda of the agent, i.e. a set of questions to which the agent wishes to find answers (Olsson & Westlund in Erkenntnis , 65 , 165–183, 2006 ). The resulting model has later come to be called interrogative belief revision . While belief revision has been studied extensively from the point of view of modal logic, so far interrogative belief revision has (...)
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  10. André Fuhrmann & Hans Rott (eds.) (1996). Logic, Action and Information. de Gruyter.
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  11. Emmanuel J. Genot (2011). The Best of All Possible Worlds. In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer.
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  12. Emmanuel J. Genot (2009). Extensive Questions. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5378:131--145.
    Olsson and his collaborators have proposed an extension of Belief Revision Theory where an epistemic state is modeled as a triple S=⟨K_,E,A_⟩ , where A_ is a research agenda, i.e. a set of research questions. Contraction and expansion apply to states, and affect the agenda. We propose an alternative characterization of the problem of agenda updating, where research questions are viewed as blueprints for research strategies. We offer a unified solution to this problem, and prove it equivalent to Olsson’s own. (...)
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  13. Nina Gierasimczuk (2009). Bridging Learning Theory and Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Synthese 169 (2):371-384.
    This paper discusses the possibility of modelling inductive inference (Gold 1967) in dynamic epistemic logic (see e.g. van Ditmarsch et al. 2007). The general purpose is to propose a semantic basis for designing a modal logic for learning in the limit. First, we analyze a variety of epistemological notions involved in identification in the limit and match it with traditional epistemic and doxastic logic approaches. Then, we provide a comparison of learning by erasing (Lange et al. 1996) and iterated epistemic (...)
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  14. Nikos Gorogiannis & Mark D. Ryan (2002). Implementation of Belief Change Operators Using BDDs. Studia Logica 70 (1):131 - 156.
    While the theory of belief change has attracted a lot of interest from researchers, work on implementing belief change and actually putting it to use in real-world problems is still scarce. In this paper, we present an implementation of propositional belief change using Binary Decision Diagrams. Upper complexity bounds for the algorithm are presented and discussed. The approach is presented both in the general case, as well as on specific belief change operators from the literature. In an effort to gain (...)
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  15. SvenOve Hansson (2000). Coherentist Contraction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (3):315-330.
    A model of coherentist belief contraction is constructed. The outcome of belief contraction is required to be one of the coherent subsets of the original belief set, and a set of plausible properties is proposed for this set of coherent subsets. The contraction operators obtained in this way are shown to coincide with well-known belief base operations. This connection between coherentist and foundationalist approaches to belief change has important implications for the philosophical interpretation of models of belief change.
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  16. Mark Jago (2006). Resource-Bounded Belief Revision and Contraction. In P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer. 141--154.
    Agents need to be able to change their beliefs; in particular, they should be able to contract or remove a certain belief in order to restore consistency to their set of beliefs, and revise their beliefs by incorporating a new belief which may be inconsistent with their previous beliefs. An influential theory of belief change proposed by Alchourron, G¨ardenfors and Makinson (AGM) [1] describes postulates which a rational belief revision and contraction operations should satisfy. The AGM postulates have been perceived (...)
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  17. Krista Lawlor (2013). Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation. Inquiry 57 (1):1-27.
    (2014). Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation. Inquiry: Vol. 57, The Nature of Belief, pp. 1-27. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2014.858414.
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  18. Franck Lihoreau & Manuel Rebuschi (eds.) (2014). Epistemology, Context, and Formalism. Springer Science & Business Media.
    Acknowledgements Five out of the 13 contributions to this volume originate from papers which were presented at the international workshop on “Epistemology, Context, Formalism” held at the MSH-Lorraine in Nancy, France, on November the ...
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  19. Sten Lindström (1996). The Ramsey Test and the Indexicality of Conditionals: A Proposed Resolution of Gärdenfors' Paradox. In André Fuhrmann & Hans Rott (eds.), Logic, Action and Information. de Gruyter.
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  20. Christopher Mole (2012). Three Philosophical Lessons for the Analysis of Criminal and Military Intelligence. Intelligence and National Security 27 (4):441-58.
    It has recently been suggested that philosophy – in particular epistemology – has a contribution to make to the analysis of criminal and military intelligence. The present article pursues this suggestion, taking three phenomena that have recently been studied by philosophers, and showing that they have important implications for the gathering and sharing of intelligence, and for the use of intelligence in the determining of military strategy. The phenomena discussed are: (1) Simpson's Paradox, (2) the distinction between resiliency and reliability (...)
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  21. Jelica Nejasmic, Leandra Bucher, Paul D. Thorn & Markus Knauff (2014). Construction and Revision of Spatial Mental Models Under High Task Demand. In Paul Bello, Marcello Guarini, Marjorie McShane & Brian Scassellati (eds.), Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. 1066-72.
    Individuals often revise their beliefs when confronted with contradicting evidence. Belief revision in the spatial domain can be regarded as variation of initially constructed spatial mental models. Construction and revision usually follow distinct cognitive principles. The present study examines whether principles of revisions which follow constructions under high task demands differ from principles applied after less demanding constructions. We manipulated the task demands for model constructions by means of the continuity with which a spatial model was constructed. We administered tasks (...)
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  22. Scott Sturgeon (2007). Normative Judgement. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):569–587.
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  23. P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.) (2006). Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer.
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  24. Jan Westerhoff (2002). Defining Ontological Categories in an Expansion of Belief Dynamics. Logic and Logical Analysis 10 (3):199-210.
    There have been attempts to get some logic out of belief dynamics, i.e. attempts to define the constants of propositional logic in terms of functions from sets of beliefs to sets of beliefs. It is interesting to see whether something similar can be done for ontological categories, i.e. ontological constants. The theory presented here will be a (modest) expansion of belief dynamics: it will not only incorporate beliefs, but also parts of beliefs, so called belief fragments. On the basis of (...)
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  25. Alex Worsnip (2014). Disagreement About Disagreement? What Disagreement About Disagreement? Philosophers' Imprint 14 (18).
    Disagreement is a hot topic in epistemology. A fast-growing literature centers around a dispute between the ‘steadfast’ view, on which one may maintain one’s beliefs even in the light of disagreement with epistemic peers who have all the same evidence, and the ‘conciliationist’ view, on which such disagreement requires a revision of attitudes. In this paper, however, I argue that there is less separating the main rivals in the debate about peer disagreement than is commonly thought. The extreme versions of (...)
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