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  1. Guy Axtell (2011). From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue Responsibilism. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press
    Evidentialism as its leading proponents describe it has two distinct senses, these being evidentialism as a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification, and as a prescriptive ethics of belief—an account of what one ‘ought to believe’ under different epistemic circumstances. These two senses of evidentialism are related, but in the work of leading evidentialist philosophers, in ways that I think are deeply problematic. Although focusing on Richard Feldman’s ethics of belief, this chapter is critical of evidentialism in both senses. However, I (...)
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  2. Giacomo Bonanno, James Delgrande & Hans Rott (2012). Guest Editors' Introduction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):1-5.
    The contributions to the Special Issue on Multiple Belief Change, Iterated Belief Change and Preference Aggregation are divided into three parts. Four contributions are grouped under the heading "multiple belief change" (Part I, with authors M. Falappa, E. Fermé, G. Kern-Isberner, P. Peppas, M. Reis, and G. Simari), five contributions under the heading "iterated belief change" (Part II, with authors G. Bonanno, S.O. Hansson, A. Nayak, M. Orgun, R. Ramachandran, H. Rott, and E. Weydert). These papers do not only pick (...)
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  3. Georg Brun & Hans Rott (2013). Interpreting Enthymematic Arguments Using Belief Revision. Synthese 190 (18):4041-4063.
    This paper is about the situation in which an author (writer or speaker) presents a deductively invalid argument, but the addressee aims at a charitable interpretation and has reason to assume that the author intends to present a valid argument. How can he go about interpreting the author’s reasoning as enthymematically valid? We suggest replacing the usual find-the-missing-premise approaches by an approach based on systematic efforts to ascribe a belief state to the author against the background of which the argument (...)
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  4. Leandra Bucher & Paul D. Thorn (2014). Minimality Criteria in Spatial Belief Revision. In Paul Bello, Marcello Guarini, Marjorie McShane & Brian Scassellati (eds.), Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society 1952-8.
    Agents typically revise their beliefs when confronted with evidence that contradicts those beliefs, selecting from a number of possible revisions sufficient to reestablish consistency. In cases where an individual’s beliefs concern spatial relations, belief revision has been fruitfully treated as a decision about which features of an initially constructed spatial mental model to modify. A normative claim about belief revision maintains that agents should prefer minimal belief revisions. Yet recent studies have rebutted the preceding claim, where minimality is understood to (...)
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  5. Gustavo Cevolani (2014). Truth Approximation, Belief Merging, and Peer Disagreement. Synthese 191 (11):2383-2401.
    In this paper, we investigate the problem of truth approximation via belief merging, i.e., we ask whether, and under what conditions, a group of inquirers merging together their beliefs makes progress toward the truth about the underlying domain. We answer this question by proving some formal results on how belief merging operators perform with respect to the task of truth approximation, construed as increasing verisimilitude or truthlikeness. Our results shed new light on the issue of how rational (dis)agreement affects the (...)
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  6. Gustavo Cevolani (2013). Truth Approximation Via Abductive Belief Change. Logic Journal of the Igpl 21 (6):999-1016.
    We investigate the logical and conceptual connections between abductive reasoning construed as a process of belief change, on the one hand, and truth approximation, construed as increasing (estimated) verisimilitude, on the other. We introduce the notion of ‘(verisimilitude-guided) abductive belief change’ and discuss under what conditions abductively changing our theories or beliefs does lead them closer to the truth, and hence tracks truth approximation conceived as the main aim of inquiry. The consequences of our analysis for some recent discussions concerning (...)
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  7. Gustavo Cevolani & Francesco Calandra (2010). Approaching the Truth Via Belief Change in Propositional Languages. In M. Suàrez, M. Dorato & M. Rèdei (eds.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer 47--62.
    Starting from the sixties of the past century theory change has become a main concern of philosophy of science. Two of the best known formal accounts of theory change are the post-Popperian theories of verisimilitude (PPV for short) and the AGM theory of belief change (AGM for short). In this paper, we will investigate the conceptual relations between PPV and AGM and, in particular, we will ask whether the AGM rules for theory change are effective means for approaching the truth, (...)
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  8. Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa (2011). Verisimilitude and Belief Change for Conjunctive Theories. Erkenntnis 75 (2):183-202.
    Theory change is a central concern in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. In this paper, we investigate the relationships between two ongoing research programs providing formal treatments of theory change: the (post-Popperian) approach to verisimilitude and the AGM theory of belief change. We show that appropriately construed accounts emerging from those two lines of epistemological research do yield convergences relative to a specified kind of theories, here labeled “conjunctive”. In this domain, a set of plausible conditions are identified which (...)
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  9. Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa (2012). "Merely a Logician's Toy?" Belief Revision Confronting Scientific Theory Change. [REVIEW] Metascience 21 (2):463-466.
    Review of Olsson, Erik J. and Enqvist, Sebastian , Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science.
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  10. Gustavo Cevolani, Roberto Festa & Theo A. F. Kuipers (2013). Verisimilitude and Belief Change for Nomic Conjunctive Theories. Synthese 190 (16):3307-3324.
    In this paper, we address the problem of truth approximation through theory change, asking whether revising our theories by newly acquired data leads us closer to the truth about a given domain. More particularly, we focus on “nomic conjunctive theories”, i.e., theories expressed as conjunctions of logically independent statements concerning the physical or, more generally, nomic possibilities and impossibilities of the domain under inquiry. We define both a comparative and a quantitative notion of the verisimilitude of such theories, and identify (...)
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  11. Irena Cronin (forthcoming). Transformative Experience L. A. PAUL Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; 189 Pp.; £18.99. [REVIEW] Dialogue:1-2.
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  12. Charles B. Cross (2000). A Characterization of Imaging in Terms of Popper Functions. Philosophy of Science 67 (2):316-338.
    Despite the results of David Lewis, Peter Gärdenfors, and others, showing that imaging and classical conditionalization coincide only in the most trivial probabilistic models of belief revision, it turns out that imaging on a proposition A can always be described via Popper function conditionalization on a proposition that entails A. This result generalizes to any method of belief revision meeting certain minimal requirements. The proof is illustrated by an application of imaging in the context of the Monty Hall Problem.
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  13. Howard Darmstadter (2015). Why We Can't Agree. Philosophy Now (107):26.
    We all have internal models (or maps) that represent the world. But all models/maps distort. Given the complexity of the world and the psychological limits to our representational ability, we must do with simplified models that work in those situations that are most important for us. But since our wants and situations differ, so will our models. When we encounter people with different models, we may try to convert them, but such conversion is unlikely if their models serve their wants (...)
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  14. Susannah Kate Devitt, Homeostatic Epistemology : Reliability, Coherence and Coordination in a Bayesian Virtue Epistemology.
    How do agents with limited cognitive capacities flourish in informationally impoverished or unexpected circumstances? Aristotle argued that human flourishing emerged from knowing about the world and our place within it. If he is right, then the virtuous processes that produce knowledge, best explain flourishing. Influenced by Aristotle, virtue epistemology defends an analysis of knowledge where beliefs are evaluated for their truth and the intellectual virtue or competences relied on in their creation. However, human flourishing may emerge from how degrees of (...)
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  15. Sebastian Enqvist (2009). Interrogative Belief Revision in Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):527 - 548.
    The well known AGM framework for belief revision has recently been extended to include a model of the research agenda of the agent, i.e. a set of questions to which the agent wishes to find answers (Olsson & Westlund in Erkenntnis , 65 , 165–183, 2006 ). The resulting model has later come to be called interrogative belief revision . While belief revision has been studied extensively from the point of view of modal logic, so far interrogative belief revision has (...)
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  16. A. Fuhrmann & Hans Rott (eds.) (1996). Logic, Action, and Information: Essays on Logic in Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence. W. De Gruyter.
    Janusz Czelakowski Elements of Formal Action Theory 1. Elementary Action Systems 1.1 Introductory Remarks. In contemporary literature one may distinguish ...
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  17. Emmanuel J. Genot (2011). The Best of All Possible Worlds. In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer
    Erik J. Olsson and David Westlund have recently argued that the standard belief revision representation of an epistemic state is defective. In order to adequately model an epistemic state one needs, in addition to a belief set K and an entrenchment relation E, a research agenda A, i.e. a set of questions satisfying certain corpus-relative preconditions the agent would like to have answers to. Informally, the preconditions guarantee that the set of potential answers represent a partition of possible expansions of (...)
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  18. Emmanuel J. Genot (2009). Extensive Questions. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5378:131--145.
    Olsson and his collaborators have proposed an extension of Belief Revision Theory where an epistemic state is modeled as a triple S=⟨K_,E,A_⟩ , where A_ is a research agenda, i.e. a set of research questions. Contraction and expansion apply to states, and affect the agenda. We propose an alternative characterization of the problem of agenda updating, where research questions are viewed as blueprints for research strategies. We offer a unified solution to this problem, and prove it equivalent to Olsson’s own. (...)
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  19. Konstantinos Georgatos (2013). Iterated Contraction Based on Indistinguishability. In Sergei Artemov & Anil Nerode (eds.), LFCS 2013. Springer 194–205.
    We introduce a class of set-theoretic operators on a tolerance space that models the process of minimal belief contraction, and therefore a natural process of iterated contraction can be defined. We characterize the class of contraction operators and study the properties of the associated iterated belief contraction.
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  20. Konstantinos Georgatos (2008). Belief Update Using Graphs. In David Wilson & Chad H. Lane (eds.), FLAIRS 21. AAAI Press 649-654.
    The purpose of this paper is to introduce a form of update based on the minimization of the geodesic distance on a graph. We provide a characterization of this class using set- theoretic operators and show that such operators bijectively correspond to geodesic metrics. As distance is generated by distinguishability, our framework is appropriate in contexts where distance is generated by threshold, and therefore, when measurement is erroneous.
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  21. Nina Gierasimczuk (2009). Bridging Learning Theory and Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Synthese 169 (2):371-384.
    This paper discusses the possibility of modelling inductive inference (Gold 1967) in dynamic epistemic logic (see e.g. van Ditmarsch et al. 2007). The general purpose is to propose a semantic basis for designing a modal logic for learning in the limit. First, we analyze a variety of epistemological notions involved in identification in the limit and match it with traditional epistemic and doxastic logic approaches. Then, we provide a comparison of learning by erasing (Lange et al. 1996) and iterated epistemic (...)
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  22. David Godden (2012). Rethinking the Debriefing Paradigm: The Rationality of Belief Perseverance. Logos and Episteme 3:51-74.
    By examining particular cases of belief perseverance following the undermining of their original evidentiary grounds, this paper considers two theories of rational belief revision: foundation and coherence. Gilbert Harman has argued for coherence over foundationalism on the grounds that the foundations theory absurdly deems most of our beliefs to be not rationally held. A consequence of the unacceptability of foundationalism is that belief perseverance is rational. This paper defends the intuitive judgement that belief perseverance is irrational by offering a competing (...)
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  23. Nikos Gorogiannis & Mark D. Ryan (2002). Implementation of Belief Change Operators Using BDDs. Studia Logica 70 (1):131 - 156.
    While the theory of belief change has attracted a lot of interest from researchers, work on implementing belief change and actually putting it to use in real-world problems is still scarce. In this paper, we present an implementation of propositional belief change using Binary Decision Diagrams. Upper complexity bounds for the algorithm are presented and discussed. The approach is presented both in the general case, as well as on specific belief change operators from the literature. In an effort to gain (...)
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  24. SvenOve Hansson (2000). Coherentist Contraction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (3):315-330.
    A model of coherentist belief contraction is constructed. The outcome of belief contraction is required to be one of the coherent subsets of the original belief set, and a set of plausible properties is proposed for this set of coherent subsets. The contraction operators obtained in this way are shown to coincide with well-known belief base operations. This connection between coherentist and foundationalist approaches to belief change has important implications for the philosophical interpretation of models of belief change.
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  25. Mark Jago (2006). Resource-Bounded Belief Revision and Contraction. In P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer 141--154.
    Agents need to be able to change their beliefs; in particular, they should be able to contract or remove a certain belief in order to restore consistency to their set of beliefs, and revise their beliefs by incorporating a new belief which may be inconsistent with their previous beliefs. An influential theory of belief change proposed by Alchourron, G¨ardenfors and Makinson (AGM) [1] describes postulates which a rational belief revision and contraction operations should satisfy. The AGM postulates have been perceived (...)
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  26. Brian Kim & Anubav Vasudevan (forthcoming). How to Expect a Surprising Exam. Synthese:1-33.
    In this paper, we provide a Bayesian analysis of the well-known surprise exam paradox. Central to our analysis is a probabilistic account of what it means for the student to accept the teacher's announcement that he will receive a surprise exam. According to this account, the student can be said to have accepted the teacher's announcement provided he adopts a subjective probability distribution relative to which he expects to receive the exam on a day on which he expects not to (...)
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  27. Krista Lawlor (2013). Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation. Inquiry 57 (1):1-27.
    (2014). Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation. Inquiry: Vol. 57, The Nature of Belief, pp. 1-27. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2014.858414.
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  28. Franck Lihoreau & Manuel Rebuschi (eds.) (2014). Epistemology, Context, and Formalism. Springer Science & Business Media.
    Acknowledgements Five out of the 13 contributions to this volume originate from papers which were presented at the international workshop on “Epistemology, Context, Formalism” held at the MSH-Lorraine in Nancy, France, on November the ...
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  29. Sten Lindström (1996). The Ramsey Test and the Indexicality of Conditionals: A Proposed Resolution of Gärdenfors' Paradox. In André Fuhrmann & Hans Rott (eds.), Logic, Action and Information. De Gruyter
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  30. Christopher Mole (2012). Three Philosophical Lessons for the Analysis of Criminal and Military Intelligence. Intelligence and National Security 27 (4):441-58.
    It has recently been suggested that philosophy – in particular epistemology – has a contribution to make to the analysis of criminal and military intelligence. The present article pursues this suggestion, taking three phenomena that have recently been studied by philosophers, and showing that they have important implications for the gathering and sharing of intelligence, and for the use of intelligence in the determining of military strategy. The phenomena discussed are: (1) Simpson's Paradox, (2) the distinction between resiliency and reliability (...)
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  31. Jelica Nejasmic, Leandra Bucher, Paul D. Thorn & Markus Knauff (2014). Construction and Revision of Spatial Mental Models Under High Task Demand. In Paul Bello, Marcello Guarini, Marjorie McShane & Brian Scassellati (eds.), Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society 1066-72.
    Individuals often revise their beliefs when confronted with contradicting evidence. Belief revision in the spatial domain can be regarded as variation of initially constructed spatial mental models. Construction and revision usually follow distinct cognitive principles. The present study examines whether principles of revisions which follow constructions under high task demands differ from principles applied after less demanding constructions. We manipulated the task demands for model constructions by means of the continuity with which a spatial model was constructed. We administered tasks (...)
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  32. Andrés Páez (2013). Una aproximación pragmatista al testimonio como evidencia. In Carmen Vásquez (ed.), Estándares de prueba y prueba científica. Ensayos de epistemología jurídica. Marcial Pons 215-238.
    El testimonio es nuestra mayor fuente de creencias. La gran mayoría de nuestras creencias han sido adquiridas a partir de las palabras de otros y no a través de la observación directa del mundo. Una de las peculiaridades de la mayor parte de las creencias testimoniales es que son aceptadas sin ninguna deliberación consciente. Mientras el testimonio sea consistente con nuestras creencias y la fuente sea confiable, la reacción más corriente es la aceptación automática de la información (Thagard 2004, 2005). (...)
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  33. Bryan Pickel (forthcoming). Frontloading, Supposition, and Contraction. Philosophical Quarterly:pqv112.
    In Constructing the World, Chalmers observes that our knowledge exceeds the core evidence provided by our senses and introspection. Thus, on the basis of core evidence, one also can know (S) that water covers the majority of the Earth. This knowledge, Chalmers suggests, requires a great deal of apriori knowledge. Chalmers argues that even if one suspends belief in one’s core evidence, one can nevertheless reason from a description of this evidence to an ordinary claim such as S. Chalmers concludes (...)
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  34. Abelard Podgorski (forthcoming). A Reply to the Synchronist. Mind:fzv153.
    On the face of it, in ordinary practices of rational assessment, we criticize agents both for the combinations of attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention, that they possess at particular times, and for the ways that they behave cognitively over time, by forming, reconsidering, and updating those attitudes. Accordingly, philosophers have proposed norms of rationality that are synchronic - concerned fundamentally with our individual time-slices, and diachronic - concerned with our temporally extended behaviour. Recently, however, a number of philosophers (...)
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  35. François Recanati (2015). Replies to the Papers in the Issue "Recanati on Mental Files". Inquiry 58 (4):408-437.
  36. Hans Rott (forthcoming). Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the Concept of Belief. Synthese:1-26.
    Pragmatists have argued that doxastic or epistemic norms do not apply to beliefs, but to changes of beliefs; thus not to the holding or not-holding, but to the acquisition or removal of beliefs. Doxastic voluntarism generally claims that humans acquire beliefs in a deliberate and controlled way. This paper introduces Negative Doxastic Voluntarism according to which there is a fundamental asymmetry in belief change: humans tend to acquire beliefs more or less automatically and unreflectively, but they tend to withdraw beliefs (...)
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  37. Hans Rott (2014). Three Floors for the Theory of Theory Change. In Vít Punčochář Michal Dančák (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2013. College Publications 187-205.
    The theory of theory change due to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson ("AGM") has been widely known as being characterized by two sets of postulates, one being very weak and the other being very strong. Commenting on the three classic constructions of partial meet contraction, safe contraction and entrenchment-based construction, I argue that three intermediate levels can be distinguished that play decisive roles within the AGM theory.
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  38. Hans Rott (2014). Unvergleichbarkeit und unabhängige Bedeutung. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 68 (2):237-241.
    This paper gives critical comments on Wolfgang Spohn's Laws of Belief (2012). I argue, first, that it is important to account for incomparabilities in the plausibilities of possible worlds or propositions, and second, that the meaning of input parameters specifying the degree to which a proposition is to be accepted should be independent of the agent's belief state.
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  39. Hans Rott (2014). Four Floors for the Theory of Theory Change: The Case of Imperfect Discrimination. In Eduardo Fermé João Leite (ed.), Logics in Artificial Intelligence: 13th European Conference (JELIA 2014). Springer 368-382.
    The classical qualitative theory of belief change due to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson has been widely known as being characterised by two packages of postulates. While the basic package consists of six postulates and is very weak, the full package that adds two further postulates is very strong. I revisit two classic constructions of theory contraction, viz., relational possible worlds contraction and entrenchment-based contraction and argue that four intermediate levels can be distinguished that play - or ought to play - (...)
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  40. Hans Rott (2012). Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):173-200.
    This paper presents the model of ‘bounded revision’ that is based on two-dimensional revision functions taking as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence and a reference sentence. The key idea is that the input sentence is accepted as far as (and just a little further than) the reference sentence is ‘cotenable’ with it. Bounded revision satisfies the AGM axioms as well as the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) saying that the set of beliefs accepted after the revision does not depend (...)
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  41. Hans Rott (2009). Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-Seven Iterated Theory Change Operators. In David Makinson Jacek Malinowski & Heinrich Wansing (eds.), Towards Mathematical Philosophy. Springer 269-296.
    Prioritized bases, i.e., weakly ordered sets of sentences, have been used for specifying an agent’s ‘basic’ or ‘explicit’ beliefs, or alternatively for compactly encoding an agent’s belief state without the claim that the elements of a base are in any sense basic. This paper focuses on the second interpretation and shows how a shifting of priorities in prioritized bases can be used for a simple, constructive and intuitive way of representing a large variety of methods for the change of belief (...)
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  42. Hans Rott (2006). The Value of Truth and the Value of Information : On Isaac Levi's Epistemology. In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press 179.
    The paper aims at a perspicuous representation of Isaac Levi's pragmatist epistemology, spanning from the 1967 classic "Gambling with Truth" to his 2004 book on "Mild Contraction". Based on a formal framework for Levi's notion of inquiry, I analyse his decision-theoretic approach with truth and information as basic cognitive values, and with Shackle measures as emerging structures. Both cognitive values figure prominently in Levi's model of inductive belief expansion, but only the value of information is employed in his model of (...)
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  43. Hans Rott (2004). Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief Into Knowledge. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):469-493.
    In this paper I discuss the relation between various properties that have been regarded as important for determining whether or not a belief constitutes a piece of knowledge: its stability, strength and sensitivity to truth, as well as the strength of the epistemic position in which the subject is with respect to this belief. Attempts to explicate the relevant concepts more formally with the help of systems of spheres of possible worlds (à la Lewis and Grove) must take care to (...)
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  44. Hans Rott (2003). Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief. Part II: Iterated Belief Change Without Dispositional Coherence. Journal of Logic and Computation 13 (1):111-145.
    This paper studies the idea of conservatism with respect to belief change strategies in the setting of unary, iterated belief revision functions (based on the conclusions of Rott, ‘Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief, Part I: Finding the Right Framework’, Erkenntnis 50, 1999, 387–412). Special attention is paid to the case of ‘basic belief change’ where neither the (weak) AGM postulates concerning conservatism with respect to beliefs nor the (stong) supplementary AGM postulates concerning dispositional coherence need to be (...)
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  45. Hans Rott (1999). Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief Part I: Finding the Right Framework. Erkenntnis 50 (2):387-412.
    In this paper I discuss the foundations of a formal theory of coherent and conservative belief change that is suitable to be used as a method for constructing iterated changes of belief, sensitive to the history of earlier belief changes, and independent of any form of dispositional coherence. I review various ways to conceive the relationship between the beliefs actually held by an agent and her belief change strategies , show the problems they suffer from, and (...)
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  46. Hans Rott (1997). Drawing Inferences From Conditionals. In Eva Ejerhed Sten Lindström (ed.), Logic, Action and Cognition. Essays in Philosophical Logic. Kluwer 149-179.
    This paper compares three accounts of what can be inferred from a knowledge base that contains conditionals: Lehmann and Magidor’s Rational Entailment; Pearl’s System Z, later extended and refined in collaboration with Goldszmidt; and the present author’s Nonmonotonic conditional logic for belief revision. We show that although the ideas motivating these systems are strikingly different, they are formally equivalent. An explanation of the surprising parallel is offered in terms of the interpretation of conditionals in the context of nonmonotonic reasoning and (...)
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  47. Hans Rott & Sven Ove Hansson (2014). Safe Contraction Revisited. In Sven Ove Hansson (ed.), David Makinson on Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems (Outstanding Contributions to Logic, Vol. 3). Springer 35-70.
    Modern belief revision theory is based to a large extent on partial meet contraction that was introduced in the seminal article by Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson that appeared in 1985. In the same year, Alchourrón and Makinson published a significantly different approach to the same problem, called safe contraction. Since then, safe contraction has received much less attention than partial meet contraction. The present paper summarizes the current state of knowledge on safe contraction, provides some new results (...)
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  48. Scott Sturgeon (2007). Normative Judgement. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):569–587.
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  49. Rafael R. Testa, Marcelo E. Coniglio & Márcio M. Ribeiro (2015). Paraconsistent Belief Revision Based on a Formal Consistency Operator. CLE E-Prints 15 (8):01-11.
    In this paper two systems of AGM-like Paraconsistent Belief Revision are overviewed, both defined over Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) due to the possibility of defining a formal consistency operator within these logics. The AGM° system is strongly based on this operator and internalize the notion of formal consistency in the explicit constructions and postulates. Alternatively, the AGMp system uses the AGM-compliance of LFIs and thus assumes a wider notion of paraconsistency - not necessarily related to the notion of formal (...)
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  50. P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.) (2006). Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer.
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