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  1. Horacio Arlo-Costa, Bayesian Epistemology and Epistemic Conditionals: On the Status of the Export-Import Laws.
    The notion of probability occupies a central role in contemporary epistemology and cognitive science. Nevertheless, the classical notion of probability is hard to reconcile with the central notions postulated by the epistemological tradition.
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  2. Horacio Arlo-Costa & Arthur Paul Pedersen, Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change.
    This article elaborates on foundational issues in the social sciences and their impact on the contemporary theory of belief revision. Recent work in the foundations of economics has focused on the role external social norms play in choice. Amartya Sen has argued in [Sen93] that the traditional rationalizability approach used in the theory of rational choice has serious problems accommodating the role of social norms. Sen's more recent work [Sen96, Sen97] proposes how one might represent social norms in the theory (...)
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  3. Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (2008). Probabilistic Dynamic Belief Revision. Synthese 165 (2):179 - 202.
    We investigate the discrete (finite) case of the Popper–Renyi theory of conditional probability, introducing discrete conditional probabilistic models for knowledge and conditional belief, and comparing them with the more standard plausibility models. We also consider a related notion, that of safe belief, which is a weak (non-negatively introspective) type of “knowledge”. We develop a probabilistic version of this concept (“degree of safety”) and we analyze its role in games. We completely axiomatize the logic of conditional belief, knowledge and safe belief (...)
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  4. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giacomo Bonanno (1997). The Logic of Belief Persistence. Economics and Philosophy 13 (1):39-59.
    The principle of belief persistence, or conservativity principle, states that ’\Nhen changing beliefs in response to new evidence, you should continue to believe as many of the old beliefs as possible' (Harman, 1986, p. 46). In particular, this means that if an individual gets new information, she has to accommodate it in her new belief set (the set of propositions she believes), and, if the new information is not inconsistent with the old belief set, then (1) the individual has to (...)
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  5. Giacomo Bonanno (2005). A Simple Modal Logic for Belief Revision. Synthese 147 (2):193 - 228.
    We propose a modal logic based on three operators, representing intial beliefs, information and revised beliefs. Three simple axioms are used to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the qualitative part of Bayes’ rule. Some theorems of this logic are derived concerning the interaction between current beliefs and future beliefs. Information flows and iterated revision are also discussed.
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  6. Richard Bradley (2009). Revising Incomplete Attitudes. Synthese 171 (2):235 - 256.
    Bayesian models typically assume that agents are rational, logically omniscient and opinionated. The last of these has little descriptive or normative appeal, however, and limits our ability to describe how agents make up their minds (as opposed to changing them) or how they can suspend or withdraw their opinions. To address these limitations this paper represents the attitudinal states of non-opinionated agents by sets of (permissible) probability and desirability functions. Several basic ways in which such states of mind can be (...)
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  7. G. Crocco, Luis Fariñas del Cerro & Andreas Herzig (eds.) (1995). Conditionals: From Philosophy to Computer Science. Oxford University Press.
    This book looks at the ways in which conditionals, an integral part of philosophy and logic, can be of practical use in computer programming. It analyzes the different types of conditionals, including their applications and potential problems. Other topics include defeasible logics, the Ramsey test, and a unified view of consequence relation and belief revision. Its implications will be of interest to researchers in logic, philosophy, and computer science, particularly artificial intelligence.
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  8. D. Gabbay & P. Smets (eds.) (1998). Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, Vol 3. Kluwer Academic Pub.
    HANDBOOK OF DEFEASIBLE REASONING AND UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS EDITORS: DOV M. ... and A. Hunter Volume 3: Belief Change Edited by D. Dubois and H. Prade HANDBOOK OF DEFEASIBLE REASONING AND ...
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  9. Maria Carla Galavotti (2003). Harold Jeffreys' Probabilistic Epistemology: Between Logicism and Subjectivism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):43-57.
    Harold Jeffreys' ideas on the interpretation of probability and epistemology are reviewed. It is argued that with regard to the interpretation of probability, Jeffreys embraces a version of logicism that shares some features of the subjectivism of Ramsey and de Finetti. Jeffreys also developed a probabilistic epistemology, characterized by a pragmatical and constructivist attitude towards notions such as ‘objectivity’, ‘reality’ and ‘causality’. 1 Introductory remarks 2 The interpretation of probability 3 Jeffreys' probabilistic epistemology.
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  10. Sven Ove Hansson, Ten Philosophical Problems in Belief Revision.
    The paper introduces ten open problems in belief revision theory, related to the representation of the belief state, to different notions of degrees of belief, and to the nature of change operations. It is argued that these problems are all issues in philosopical logic, in the strong sense of requiring inputs from both logic and philosophy for their solution.
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  11. Sven Ove Hansson (2006). Coherence in Epistemology and Belief Revision. Philosophical Studies 128 (1):93 - 108.
    A general theory of coherence is proposed, in which systemic and relational coherence are shown to be interdefinable. When this theory is applied to sets of sentences, it turns out that logical closure obscures the distinctions that are needed for a meaningful analysis of coherence. It is concluded that references to “all beliefs” in coherentist phrases such as “all beliefs support each other” have to be modified so that merely derived beliefs are excluded. Therefore, in order to avoid absurd conclusions, (...)
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  12. Gilbert Harman, Epistemology as Methodology.
    What is distinctive about my views in epistemology? One thing is that my concern with epistemology is a concern with methodology. Furthermore, I reject psychologism about logic and reject the idea that deductive rules like modus ponens are in any way rules of inference. I accept a kind of methodological conservatism and reject methodological theories that appeal to special foundations, analytic truth, or a priori justification. Although I believe that there are significant practical aspects of theoretical reasoning, I reject the (...)
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  13. Stephan Hartmann & L. Bovens (2001). Belief Expansion, Contextual Fit and the Reliability of Information Sources. In AkmanV (ed.), Modeling and Using Context,. Springer.
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  14. Franz Huber (2013). Belief Revision I: The AGM Theory. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):604-612.
    Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I I will first present the AGM theory of belief revision (Alchourrón & Gärdenfors & Makinson 1985). Then I will focus on the problem of iterated belief revisions.
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  15. Franz Huber (2013). Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):613-621.
    Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I, I have first presented the AGM theory of belief revision. Then I have focused on the problem of iterated belief revisions. In part II, I will first present ranking theory (Spohn 1988). Then I will show how it solves the problem of iterated belief revisions. I will conclude by sketching two areas of future research.
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  16. Mark Kaplan (1983). Decision Theory as Philosophy. Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.
    Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the (...)
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  17. Kevin Kelly, The Learning Power of Belief Revision.
    Belief revision theory aims to describe how one should change one’s beliefs when they are contradicted by newly input information. The guiding principle of belief revision theory is to change one’s prior beliefs as little as possible in order to maintain consistency with the new information. Learning theory focuses, instead, on learning power: the ability to arrive at true beliefs in a wide range of possible environments. The goal of this paper is to bridge the two approaches by providing a (...)
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  18. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1994). A Critique of Van Fraassen's Voluntaristic Epistemology. Synthese 98 (2):325-348.
    Van Fraassen's epistemology is forged from two commitments, one to a type of Bayesianism and the other to what he terms voluntarism. Van Fraassen holds that if one is going to follow a rule in belief-revision, it must be a Bayesian rule, but that one does not need to follow a rule in order to be rational. It is argued that van Fraassen's arguments for rejecting non-Bayesian rules is unsound, and that his voluntarism is subject to a fatal dilemma arising (...)
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  19. Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz, Belief Change for Introspective Agents. Spinning Ideas, Electronic Essays Dedicated to Peter Gärdenfors on His Fiftieth Birthday.
  20. Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1999). DDL Unlimited: Dynamic Doxastic Logic for Introspective Agents. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):353-385.
  21. Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1998). Conditionals and the Ramsey Test. In D. Gabbay & P. Smets (eds.), Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, Vol 3.
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  22. Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1995). The Ramsey Test Revisited. In G. Crocco, L. Fariñas del Cerro & A. Herzig (eds.), Conditionals: From Philosophy to Computer Science. Oxford University Press. 131-182.
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  23. Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz (1992). Belief Revision, Epistemic Conditionals and the Ramsey Test. Synthese 91 (3):195 - 237.
    Epistemic conditionals have often been thought to satisfy the Ramsey test (RT): If A, then B is acceptable in a belief state G if and only if B should be accepted upon revising G with A. But as Peter Gärdenfors has shown, RT conflicts with the intuitively plausible condition of Preservation on belief revision. We investigate what happens if (a) RT is retained while Preservation is weakened, or (b) vice versa. We also generalize Gärdenfors' approach by treating belief revision (...)
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  24. Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz (1989). On Probabilistic Representation of Non-Probabilistic Belief Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (1):69 - 101.
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  25. Lydia Mechtenberg (2004). The Stability Theory of Knowledge and Belief Revision: Comments on Rott. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):495 - 507.
    In this commentary on Rotts paper Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge, I discuss two problems of the stability theory of knowledge which are pointed out by Rott. I conclude that these problems offer no reason for rejecting the stability theory, but might be grounds for deviating from the standard AGM account of belief revision which Rott presupposes.
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  26. Andrés Páez, The Epistemic Value of Explanation.
    In this paper I defend the idea that there is a sense in which it is meaningful and useful to talk about objective understanding, and that to characterize that notion it is necessary to formulate an account of explanation that makes reference to the beliefs and epistemic goals of the participants in a cognitive enterprise. Using the framework for belief revision developed by Isaac Levi, I analyze the conditions that information must fulfill to be both potentially explanatory and epistemically (...)
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  27. John L. Pollock & Anthony S. Gillies (2000). Belief Revision and Epistemology. Synthese 122 (1-2):69-92.
    Postulational approaches attempt to understand the dynamics of belief revision by appealing to no more than the set of beliefs held by an agent and the logical relations between them. It is argued there that such an approach cannot work. A proper account of belief revision must also appeal to the arguments supporting beliefs, and recognize that those arguments can be defeasible. If we begin with a mature epistemological theory that accommodates this, it can be seen that the belief revision (...)
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  28. John Pollock & Anthony Gillies (2000). ``Belief Revision and Epistemology&Quot. Synthese 122:69--92.
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  29. Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl (eds.) (1994). Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala. Kluwer.
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  30. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Sten Lindström (1994). How to Model Relational Belief Revision. In Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala. Kluwer.
    This is a short version of Lindström & Rabinowicz 1991.In earlier papers, we proposed a generalization of the AGM approach to belief revision. The proposal was to view belief revision as a relation rather than as a function on theories (or belief sets). Going relational means that one allows for several equally reasonable revisions of a theory with a given proposition. In the present paper, we show that the relational approach is the natural result of generalizing in a certain way (...)
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  31. Hans Rott (1999). Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):387-412.
    In this paper I discuss the foundations of a formal theory of coherent and conservative belief change that is (a) suitable to be used as a method for constructing iterated changes of belief, (b) sensitive to the history of earlier belief changes, and (c) independent of any form of dispositional coherence. I review various ways to conceive the relationship between the beliefs actually held by an agent and her belief change strategies (that also deal with potential belief sets), show the (...)
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  32. Robert Stalnaker (2009). Iterated Belief Revision. Erkenntnis 70 (2):189 - 209.
    This is a discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to potential new information, but also for revising one’s revision rules in response to potential new information. The emphasis in the paper is on foundational questions about the nature of and motivation for various constraints, and about the methodology of the evaluation of putative counterexamples to proposed (...)
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  33. Johan van Benthem, Jelle Gerbrandy & Barteld Kooi (2009). Dynamic Update with Probabilities. Studia Logica 93 (1):67-96.
    Current dynamic-epistemic logics model different types of information change in multi-agent scenarios. We generalize these logics to a probabilistic setting, obtaining a calculus for multi-agent update with three natural slots: prior probability on states, occurrence probabilities in the relevant process taking place, and observation probabilities of events. To match this update mechanism, we present a complete dynamic logic of information change with a probabilistic character. The completeness proof follows a compositional methodology that applies to a much larger class of dynamic-probabilistic (...)
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  34. Sylvia Wenmackers, Danny E. P. Vanpoucke & Igor Douven (2012). Probability of Inconsistencies in Theory Revision. European Physical Journal B 85 (1):44 (15).
    We present a model for studying communities of epistemically interacting agents who update their belief states by averaging (in a specified way) the belief states of other agents in the community. The agents in our model have a rich belief state, involving multiple independent issues which are interrelated in such a way that they form a theory of the world. Our main goal is to calculate the probability for an agent to end up in an inconsistent belief state due to (...)
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AGM Belief Revision Theory
  1. Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson (1985). On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.
    This paper extends earlier work by its authors on formal aspects of the processes of contracting a theory to eliminate a proposition and revising a theory to introduce a proposition. In the course of the earlier work, Gardenfors developed general postulates of a more or less equational nature for such processes, whilst Alchourron and Makinson studied the particular case of contraction functions that are maximal, in the sense of yielding a maximal subset of the theory (or alternatively, of one of (...)
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  2. Krzysztof R. Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.) (2008). New Perspectives on Games and Interactions. Amsterdam University Press.
    This volume is a collection of papers presented at the colloquium, and it testifies to the growing importance of game theory as a tool that can capture concepts ...
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  3. Giacomo Bonanno (2008). Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework. In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press.
    The theory of belief revision deals with (rational) changes in beliefs in response to new information. In the literature a distinction has been drawn between belief revision and belief update (see [6]). The former deals with situations where the objective facts describing the world do not change (so that only the beliefs of the agent change over time), while the letter allows for situations where both the facts and the doxastic state of the agent change over time. We focus on (...)
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  4. Yves Bouchard (ed.) (2002). Perspectives on Coherentism. Editions du Scribe.
  5. Leandra Bucher & Paul D. Thorn (2014). Minimality Criteria in Spatial Belief Revision. In Paul Bello, Marcello Guarini, Marjorie McShane & Brian Scassellati (eds.), Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. 1952-8.
    Agents typically revise their beliefs when confronted with evidence that contradicts those beliefs, selecting from a number of possible revisions sufficient to reestablish consistency. In cases where an individual’s beliefs concern spatial relations, belief revision has been fruitfully treated as a decision about which features of an initially constructed spatial mental model to modify. A normative claim about belief revision maintains that agents should prefer minimal belief revisions. Yet recent studies have rebutted the preceding claim, where minimality is understood to (...)
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  6. Eugenio Bulygin (2008). What Can One Expect From Logic in the Law? (Not Everything, but More Than Something: A Reply to Susan Haack). Ratio Juris 21 (1):150-156.
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  7. Jake Chandler (2013). Transmission Failure, AGM-Style. Erkenntnis 78 (2):383-398.
    This article provides a discussion of the principle of transmission of evidential support across entailment from the perspective of belief revision theory in the AGM tradition. After outlining and briefly defending a small number of basic principles of belief change, which include a number of belief contraction analogues of the Darwiche-Pearl postulates for iterated revision, a proposal is then made concerning the connection between evidential beliefs and belief change policies in rational agents. This proposal is found to be suffcient to (...)
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  8. Charles B. Cross (1990). Belief Revision, Non-Monotonic Reasoning, and the Ramsey Test. In Kyburg Henry E., Loui Ronald P. & Carlson Greg N. (eds.), Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning. Kluwer. 223--244.
    Peter Gärdenfors has proved (Philosophical Review, 1986) that the Ramsey rule and the methodologically conservative Preservation principle are incompatible given innocuous-looking background assumptions about belief revision. Gärdenfors gives up the Ramsey rule; I argue for preserving the Ramsey rule and interpret Gärdenfors's theorem as showing that no rational belief-reviser can avoid reasoning nonmonotonically. I argue against the Preservation principle and show that counterexamples to it always involve nonmonotonic reasoning. I then construct a new formal model of belief revision that does (...)
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  9. Simon D'Alfonso (2011). Supplementing Belief Revision for The Aim of Truthlikeness. The Reasoner 5 (9):143-144.
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  10. Eduardo L. Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson (1999). Selective Revision. Studia Logica 63 (3):331-342.
    We introduce a constructive model of selective belief revision in which it is possible to accept only a part of the input information. A selective revision operator ο is defined by the equality K ο α = K * f(α), where * is an AGM revision operator and f a function, typically with the property ⊢ α → f(α). Axiomatic characterizations are provided for three variants of selective revision.
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  11. André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.) (1991). The Logic of Theory Change. Springer.
    The book presents the results of the joint annual conference of the four Operations Research Societies DGOR, GM\OR, \GOR and SVOR, held in Vienna in 1990.
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  12. Peter Gärdenfors, Sten Lindström, Michael Morreau & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1991). The Negative Ramsey Test. In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer.
    The so called Ramsey test is a semantic recipe for determining whether a conditional proposition is acceptable in a given state of belief. Informally, it can be formulated as follows: (RT) Accept a proposition of the form "if A, then C" in a state of belief K, if and only if the minimal change of K needed to accept A also requires accepting C. In Gärdenfors (1986) it was shown that the Ramsey test is, in the context of some other (...)
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  13. Emmanuel J. Genot (2011). The Best of All Possible Worlds. In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer.
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  14. Theo Kuipers (2011). Basic and Refined Nomic Truth Approximation by Evidence-Guided Belief Revision in AGM-Terms. Erkenntnis 75 (2):223-236.
    Straightforward theory revision, taking into account as effectively as possible the established nomic possibilities and, on their basis induced empirical laws, is conducive for (unstratified) nomic truth approximation. The question this paper asks is: is it possible to reconstruct the relevant theory revision steps, on the basis of incoming evidence, in AGM-terms? A positive answer will be given in two rounds, first for the case in which the initial theory is compatible with the established empirical laws, then for the case (...)
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  15. Jelica Nejasmic, Leandra Bucher, Paul D. Thorn & Markus Knauff (2014). Construction and Revision of Spatial Mental Models Under High Task Demand. In Paul Bello, Marcello Guarini, Marjorie McShane & Brian Scassellati (eds.), Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. 1066-72.
    Individuals often revise their beliefs when confronted with contradicting evidence. Belief revision in the spatial domain can be regarded as variation of initially constructed spatial mental models. Construction and revision usually follow distinct cognitive principles. The present study examines whether principles of revisions which follow constructions under high task demands differ from principles applied after less demanding constructions. We manipulated the task demands for model constructions by means of the continuity with which a spatial model was constructed. We administered tasks (...)
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  16. Raghav Ramachandran, Arthur Ramer & Abhaya C. Nayak (2012). Probabilistic Belief Contraction. Minds and Machines 22 (4):325-351.
    Probabilistic belief contraction has been a much neglected topic in the field of probabilistic reasoning. This is due to the difficulty in establishing a reasonable reversal of the effect of Bayesian conditionalization on a probabilistic distribution. We show that indifferent contraction, a solution proposed by Ramer to this problem through a judicious use of the principle of maximum entropy, is a probabilistic version of a full meet contraction. We then propose variations of indifferent contraction, using both the Shannon entropy measure (...)
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