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  1. Richard E. Aquila (1975). Perceptions and Perceptual Judgments. Philosophical Studies 28 (July):17-31.
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  2. David M. Armstrong (1963). Max Deutscher and Perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (August):246-249.
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  3. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Use of 'Look'. Philosophy Compass.
    The article provides the state of the art on the debate about whether the logical form of ‘look’ statements commits us to any particular theory of perceptual experience. The debate began with Frank Jackson’s (1977) argument that ‘look’ statements commit us to a sense-datum theory of perception. Thinkers from different camps have since then offered various rejoinders to Jackson’s argument. Others have provided novel arguments from considerations of the semantics of ‘look’ to particular theories of perception. The article closes with (...)
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  4. R. Clark (1973). Sensuous Judgments. Noûs 7 (March):45-56.
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  5. Jack S. Crumley (1991). Appearances Can Be Deceiving. Philosophical Studies 64 (3):233 - 251.
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  6. Max Deutscher (1963). David Armstrong and Perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (May):80-88.
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  7. Santiago Echeverri (2011). Epistemic Responsibility and Perceptual Experience. In David Lauer, Christophe Laudou, Robin Celikates & Georg W. Bertram (eds.), Expérience et réflexivité: perspectives au-delà de l’empirisme et de l’idéalisme. L'Harmattan.
    Any theory of perceptual experience should elucidate the way humans exploit it in activities proper to responsible agents, like justifying and revising their beliefs. In this paper I examine the hypothesis that this capacity requires the positing of a perceptual awareness involving a pre-doxastic actualization of concepts. I conclude that this hypothesis is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for empirical rationality. This leaves open the possibility to introduce a doxastic account, according to which the epistemic function of perception is (...)
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  8. Todd Ganson (2013). Are Color Experiences Representational? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):1-20.
    The dominant view among philosophers of perception is that color experiences, like color judgments, are essentially representational: as part of their very nature color experiences possess representational contents which are either accurate or inaccurate. My starting point in assessing this view is Sydney Shoemaker’s familiar account of color perception. After providing a sympathetic reconstruction of his account, I show how plausible assumptions at the heart of Shoemaker’s theory make trouble for his claim that color experiences represent the colors of things. (...)
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  9. Kathrin Glüer (2009). In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience. Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.
    Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing 'phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. (...)
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  10. Alan H. Goldman (1976). Appearing as Irreducible in Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (December):147-164.
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  11. J. Carlos Gómez Muñoz (1983). Creer para ver: Sobre la teoría de la creencia en Ortega / Believing for Seeing: On the Theory of Belief in Ortega. Logos (18):75-96.
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  12. Russell B. Goodman (1974). Is Seeing Believing? Proceedings of the New Mexico-West Texas Philosophical Society 40 (April):45.
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  13. John Heil (1982). Seeing is Believing. American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (July):229-240.
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  14. David Kelley (1980). The Specificity of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (March):401-405.
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  15. J. Barry Maund (1977). On the Distinction Between Perceptual and Ordinary Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (December):209-219.
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  16. Norman P. Melchert (1973). A Note on the Belief Theory of Perception. Philosophical Studies 24 (November):427-429.
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  17. Paul K. Moser (1986). Perception and Belief: A Regress Problem. Philosophy of Science 53 (March):120-126.
    Some philosophers, Such as n r hanson, Have suggested that one's perceiving an object entails one's having a particular perceptual belief, And not just some belief or other, About that object. This article constructs an argument showing that such a view generates an infinite regress of required perceptual beliefs.
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  18. John O. Nelson (1964). An Examination of D M Armstrong's Theory of Perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (April):154-160.
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  19. George S. Pappas (1977). Perception Without Belief. Ratio 19 (December):142-161.
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  20. George Pitcher (1971). A Theory Of Perception. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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  21. Anthony Pitson (1990). Perception: Belief and Experience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):55-76.
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  22. C. G. Prado (1968). Armstrong and Perception. Theoria 34:256-258.
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  23. Ronald W. Ruegsegger (1982). Judging, Taking, and Believing: Three Candidates for the Propositional Attitude in Perception. Philosophy Research Archives 1460.
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  24. Susanna Siegel (2010). Do Visual Experiences Have Contents? In Bence -Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford.
    This paper defends the Content View: the thesis that all visual experiences have contents.
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  25. A. D. Smith (2001). Perception and Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):283-309.
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  26. R. Ziedins (1966). Knowledge, Belief and Perceptual Experiences. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44 (May):70-88.
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