Related categories
Siblings:See also:
30 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
  1. Richard E. Aquila (1975). Perceptions and Perceptual Judgments. Philosophical Studies 28 (July):17-31.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. David M. Armstrong (1963). Max Deutscher and Perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (August):246-249.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Use of 'Look'. Philosophy Compass.
    The article provides the state of the art on the debate about whether the logical form of ‘look’ statements commits us to any particular theory of perceptual experience. The debate began with Frank Jackson’s (1977) argument that ‘look’ statements commit us to a sense-datum theory of perception. Thinkers from different camps have since then offered various rejoinders to Jackson’s argument. Others have provided novel arguments from considerations of the semantics of ‘look’ to particular theories of perception. The article closes with (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. R. Clark (1973). Sensuous Judgments. Noûs 7 (March):45-56.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  5. Jack S. Crumley (1991). Appearances Can Be Deceiving. Philosophical Studies 64 (3):233 - 251.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6. Max Deutscher (1963). David Armstrong and Perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (May):80-88.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Santiago Echeverri (2011). Epistemic Responsibility and Perceptual Experience. In David Lauer, Christophe Laudou, Robin Celikates & Georg W. Bertram (eds.), Expérience Et Réflexivité: Perspectives au-Delà de L’Empirisme Et de L’Idéalisme. L'harmattan
    Any theory of perceptual experience should elucidate the way humans exploit it in activities proper to responsible agents, like justifying and revising their beliefs. In this paper I examine the hypothesis that this capacity requires the positing of a perceptual awareness involving a pre-doxastic actualization of concepts. I conclude that this hypothesis is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for empirical rationality. This leaves open the possibility to introduce a doxastic account, according to which the epistemic function of perception is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Todd Ganson (2013). Are Color Experiences Representational? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):1-20.
    The dominant view among philosophers of perception is that color experiences, like color judgments, are essentially representational: as part of their very nature color experiences possess representational contents which are either accurate or inaccurate. My starting point in assessing this view is Sydney Shoemaker’s familiar account of color perception. After providing a sympathetic reconstruction of his account, I show how plausible assumptions at the heart of Shoemaker’s theory make trouble for his claim that color experiences represent the colors of things. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Kathrin Glüer (2009). In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience. Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.
    Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing 'phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  10. Alan H. Goldman (1976). Appearing as Irreducible in Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (December):147-164.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11. J. Carlos Gómez Muñoz (1983). Creer para ver: Sobre la teoría de la creencia en Ortega / Believing for Seeing: On the Theory of Belief in Ortega. Logos (18):75-96.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Russell B. Goodman (1974). Is Seeing Believing? Proceedings of the New Mexico-West Texas Philosophical Society 40 (April):45.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Gary Hatfield (2002). Perception as Unconscious Inference. In Dieter Heyer & Rainer Mausfeld (eds.), Perception and the Physical World: Psychological and Philosophical Issues in Perception. John Wiley and Sons Ltd 113--143.
    In this chapter I examine past and recent theories of unconscious inference. Most theorists have ascribed inferences to perception literally, not analogically, and I focus on the literal approach. I examine three problems faced by such theories if their commitment to unconscious inferences is taken seriously. Two problems concern the cognitive resources that must be available to the visual system (or a more central system) to support the inferences in question. The third problem focuses on how the conclusions of inferences (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  14. John Heil (1982). Seeing is Believing. American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (July):229-240.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   40 citations  
  15. Wolfgang Huemer (2011). Die Struktur des Wahrnehmungserlebnisses im Spannungsfeld zwischen phänomenologischen und epistemischen Aspekten. XXII. Deutscher Kongress Für Philosophie, 11. - 15. September 2011, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.
    Die Philosophie der Wahrnehmung der letzten Jahrzehnte ist stark geprägt von der Begrifflichkeitsdebatte. Dabei ist allerdings eine dialektische Pattstellung zu erkennen: während die Begrifflichkeitsthese für gewöhnlich mit der epistemischen Rolle er Wahrnehmung begründet wird, verweisen Argumente für die Nichtbegrifflichkeitsthese zumeist auf die qualitative Reichhaltigkeit und die erlebnismäßig gegebenen, also phänomenologischen Aspekte der Wahrnehmung. Um diese Pattstellung zu überwinden, skizziere ich in diesem Beitrag Überlegungen für ein Argument für die Begrifflichkeitsthese, das wesentliche auf den phänomenologischen Aspekten der Wahrnehmung beruht.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. David Kelley (1980). The Specificity of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (March):401-405.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. J. Barry Maund (1977). On the Distinction Between Perceptual and Ordinary Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (December):209-219.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Norman P. Melchert (1973). A Note on the Belief Theory of Perception. Philosophical Studies 24 (November):427-429.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Paul K. Moser (1986). Perception and Belief: A Regress Problem. Philosophy of Science 53 (March):120-126.
    Some philosophers, such as N. R. Hanson, have suggested that one's perceiving an object entails one's having a particular perceptual belief, and not just some belief or other, about that object. This article constructs an argument showing that such a view generates an infinite regress of required perceptual beliefs.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. John O. Nelson (1964). An Examination of D M Armstrong's Theory of Perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (April):154-160.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. George S. Pappas (1977). Perception Without Belief. Ratio 19 (December):142-161.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22. George Pitcher (1971). A Theory Of Perception. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   25 citations  
  23. Anthony Pitson (1990). Perception: Belief and Experience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):55-76.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. C. G. Prado (1968). Armstrong and Perception. Theoria 34 (3):256-258.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Jake Quilty-Dunn (2015). Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Dual-Component View. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.
    According to a classic but nowadays discarded philosophical theory, perceptual experience is a complex of nonconceptual sensory states and full-blown propositional beliefs. This classical dual-component theory of experience is often taken to be obsolete. In particular, there seem to be cases in which perceptual experience and belief conflict: cases of known illusions, wherein subjects have beliefs contrary to the contents of their experiences. Modern dual-component theories reject the belief requirement and instead hold that perceptual experience is a complex of nonconceptual (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Ronald W. Ruegsegger (1982). Judging, Taking, and Believing: Three Candidates for the Propositional Attitude in Perception. Philosophy Research Archives 1460:535-559.
    In an earlier essay I argued that perception involves an assentive propositional attitude. This essay completes the argument by examining the three most familiar propositional attitudes in order to determine which is best suited to perception. In Part I, I examine the contention of C.A. Campbell that perception involves judging, and I conclude that judging is too deliberative to be the assentive attitude in perception. On the other hand, in Part II, a study of David Armstrong’s and and George Pitcher’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Susanna Siegel (2015). XV—Epistemic Charge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3 pt 3):277-306.
    It is often assumed that while beliefs redound on the rational standing of a subject, perceptions do not. An irrational belief detracts from the rationality of believers, according to this assumption, but perceptions cannot do the same. I argue that perceptual experiences can have a rational standing, and that their epistemic status can be modulated by other psychological states that help produce them. Drawing on a metaphor from electricity, I call the epistemic status that perceptual experiences can have ‘epistemic charge'.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Susanna Siegel (2010). Do Visual Experiences Have Contents? In Bence -Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford
    This paper defends the Content View: the thesis that all visual experiences have contents.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  29. A. D. Smith (2001). Perception and Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):283-309.
    An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingent.There are two main issues to address. The first is that ‘collateral’ beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  30. R. Ziedins (1966). Knowledge, Belief and Perceptual Experiences. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44 (May):70-88.