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  1. Fred Ablondi (2012). Hutcheson, Perception, and the Sceptic's Challenge. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):269-281.
    Francis Hutcheson's theory of perception, as put forth in his Synopsis of Metaphysics, bears a striking similarity to that of John Locke. In particular, Hutcheson and Locke both have at the centre of their theories the notion of ideas as representational entities acting as the direct objects of all of our perceptions. On first consideration, one might find this similarity wholly unremarkable, given the popularity of Locke's Essay. But the Essay was published in 1689 and the Synopsis in 1742, and (...)
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  2. Timo Airaksinen & Bertil Belfrage (eds.) (2011). Berkeley's Lasting Legacy: 300 Years Later. Cambridge Scholars Pub..
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  3. Henry E. Allison (1973). Kant's Critique of Berkeley. Journal of the History of Philosophy 11 (1).
  4. Margaret Atherton (1996). Lady Mary Shepherd's Case Against George Berkeley. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (2):347 – 366.
  5. Margaret Atherton (1991). Corpuscles, Mechanism, and Essentialism in Berkeley and Locke. Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 (1):47-67.
  6. M. R. Ayers (1982). Berkeley's Immaterialism and Kant's Transcendental Idealism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 13:51-69.
  7. Teppei Baba (2008). Is Berkeley's Theory of Ideas A Variant of Locke's? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 16:9-15.
    I try to show that Berkeley's theory of ideas is not a variant of Locke's. We can find such an interpretation of Berkeley in Thomas Reid. So, we could call this interpretation a 'traditional interpretation'. This traditional interpretation has an influence still now, for example, Tomida interprets Berkeley in this line (Tomida2002). We will see that this traditional interpretation gives a serious problem to Berkeley (section 1). And I am going to present an argument against this traditional interpretation (section 2).
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  8. Winston H. F. Barnes (1940). Did Berkeley Misunderstand Locke? Mind 49 (193):52-57.
  9. Jonathan Bennett (2003). Learning From Six Philosophers: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Volume 2. Clarendon Press (Paperback).
    Jonathan Bennett engages with the thought of six great thinkers of the early modern period: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume. While not neglecting the historical setting of each, his chief focus is on the words they wrote. What problem is being tackled? How exactly is the solution meant to work? Does it succeed? If not, why not? What can we learn from its success or its failure? These questions reflect Bennett's dedication to engaging with philosophy as philosophy, not as (...)
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  10. Hans Peter Benschop (1997). Berkeley, Lee and Abstract Ideas. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 5 (1):55 – 66.
  11. David Berman (ed.) (2014). George Berkeley (Routledge Revivals): Eighteenth-Century Responses: Volume I. Routledge.
    The material reprinted in this two-volume set, first published in 1989, covers the first eighty-five years in responses to George Berkeley’s writings. David Berman identifies several key waves of eighteenth-century criticism surrounding Berkeley’s philosophies, ranging from hostile and discounted, to valued and defended. The first volume includes an account of the life of Berkeley by J. Murray and key responses from 1711 to 1748, whilst the second volume covers the years between 1745 and 1796. This fascinating reissue illustrates the breadth (...)
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  12. David Berman (ed.) (2014). George Berkeley (Routledge Revivals): Eighteenth-Century Responses: Volume Ii. Routledge.
    The material reprinted in this two-volume set, first published in 1989, covers the first eighty-five years in responses to George Berkeley’s writings. David Berman identifies several key waves of eighteenth-century criticism surrounding Berkeley’s philosophies, ranging from hostile and discounted, to valued and defended. The first volume includes an account of the life of Berkeley by J. Murray and key responses from 1711 to 1748, whilst the second volume covers the years between 1745 and 1796. This fascinating reissue illustrates the breadth (...)
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  13. David Berman (2005). Berkeley and Irish Philosophy. Thoemmes Continuum.
    George Berkeley -- On missing the wrong target -- Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment in Irish philosophy -- The culmination and causation of Irish philosophy -- Francis Hutcheson on Berkeley and the Molyneux problem -- The impact of Irish philosophy on the American Enlightenment -- Irish ideology and philosophy -- An early essay concerning Berkeley's immaterialism -- Mrs. Berkeley's annotations in An account of the life of Berkeley (1776) -- Some new Bermuda Berkeleiana -- The good bishop : new letters -- Beckett (...)
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  14. David Berman (ed.) (1989). George Berkeley: Eighteenth-Century Responses. Garland Pub..
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  15. Daniele Bertini (2008). Berkeley and Gentile. Idealistic Studies 37 (1):43-50.
    My purpose is to compare Berkeley’s and Gentile’s idealism, interpreting Berkeley’s Treatise, §§22–23, and Gentile’s reading of this passage. The Italian philosopher finds in Berkeley’s master argument the original source of the true idealistic way of thinking, but he believes that Berkeley has not been sufficiently consistent in deducing all the consequences from his new principle. This criticism is the ground of Gentile’s actual idealism. Comparing the two positions is very instructive both to elucidate the general issue of idealism and (...)
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  16. Martha Brandt Bolton (2008). Berkeley and Mental Representation : Why Not a Lockean Theory of Ideas? In Stephen H. Daniel (ed.), New Interpretations of Berkeley's Thought. Humanity Books.
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  17. Harry M. Bracken (1987). On Some Points in Bayle, Berkeley, and Hume. History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (4):435 - 446.
  18. Harry M. Bracken (1977). Bayle, Berkeley and Hume. Eighteenth-Century Studies 11:227--45.
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  19. M. F. Burnyeat (1982). Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed. Philosophical Review 91 (1):3-40.
  20. G. N. Cantor (1977). Berkeley, Reid, and the Mathematization of Mid-Eighteenth-Century Optics. Journal of the History of Ideas 38.
    Berkeley's "new theory of vision" and, In particular, His sensationalist solution to the problem of judging distance and magnitude were discussed by many eighteenth-Century authors who faced a variety of problem situations. More specifically, Berkeley's theory fed into the debate over whether the phenomena of vision were susceptible to mathematical analysis or were experientially determined. In this paper a variety of responses to berkeley are examined, Concluding with thomas reid's attempt to distinguish physical optics (which can be analyzed geometrically) from (...)
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  21. Sébastian Charles (2004). Berkeley no país das Luzes: ceticismo e solipsismo no século XVIII. Doispontos 1 (2).
    A influência do ceticismo nos século XVI e XVII é por demais evidente para ser posta em questão. De Montaigne a Bayle, parece que o cético foi o promotor tanto de uma refutação radical dos princípios metafísicos escolásticos e depois cartesianos quanto de uma crítica feroz às autoridades religiosas e políticas. Ora, esse papel parece ter se amenizado no Século das Luzes, ou melhor, se deslocado - somente as dimensões críticas do social continuaram pertinentes. Pretende-se mostrar aqui o pressuposto de (...)
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  22. Sébastien Charles (2002). Berkeley's Principles and Dialogues. Background Source Materials Charles J. McCracken Et Ian C. Tipton Collection «Cambridge Philosophical Texts in Context» Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, X, 300 P. [REVIEW] Dialogue 41 (04):807-.
  23. Silvio Seno Chibeni (2013). As posições de Newton, Locke e Berkeley sobre a natureza da gravitação. Scientiae Studia 11 (4):811-839.
    Ao defender, nos Princípios matemáticos de filosofia natural, a existência de uma força de gravitação universal, Newton desencadeou uma onda de dúvidas e objeções filosóficas. Suas próprias declarações sobre a natureza da gravitação não são facilmente interpretáveis como formando um conjunto consistente de opiniões. Por um lado, logo após fornecer as três definições de "quantidades de forças centrípetas" (Defs. 6-8), Newton observa que está tratando tais forças "matematicamente", sem se pronunciar sobre sua realidade física. Mas, por outro lado, no Escólio (...)
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  24. Ewing Y. Chinn (1994). The Anti-Abstractionism of Dignāga and Berkeley. Philosophy East and West 44 (1):55-77.
  25. Grapham P. Conroy (1969). Did Hume Really Follow Berkeley. Philosophy 44 (169):238 - 242.
  26. Vincent M. Cooke (1972). Locke, Berkeley, Hume. International Philosophical Quarterly 12 (4):621-623.
  27. Stephen H. Daniel (2008). Berkeley's Stoic Notion of Spiritual Substance. In , New Interpretations of Berkeley's Thought. Humanity Books.
    For Berkeley, minds are not Cartesian spiritual substances because they cannot be said to exist (even if only conceptually) abstracted from their activities. Similarly, Berkeley's notion of mind differs from Locke's in that, for Berkeley, minds are not abstract substrata in which ideas inhere. Instead, Berkeley redefines what it means for the mind to be a substance in a way consistent with the Stoic logic of 17th century Ramists on which Leibniz and Jonathan Edwards draw. This view of mind, I (...)
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  28. Stephen H. Daniel (2001). Berkeley's Christian Neoplatonism, Archetypes, and Divine Ideas. Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2):239-258.
    Berkeley's doctrine of archetypes explains how God perceives and can have the same ideas as finite minds. His appeal of Christian neo-Platonism opens up a way to understand how the relation of mind, ideas, and their union is modeled on the Cappadocian church fathers' account of the persons of the trinity. This way of understanding Berkeley indicates why he, in contrast to Descartes or Locke, thinks that mind (spiritual substance) and ideas (the object of mind) cannot exist or be thought (...)
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  29. Stephen H. Daniel (2001). Edwards, Berkeley, and Ramist Logic. Idealistic Studies 31 (1):55-72.
    I will suggest that we can begin to see why Edwards and Berkeley sound so much alike by considering how both think of minds or spiritual substances notas things modeled on material bodies but as the acts by which things are identified. Those acts cannot be described using the Aristotelian subject-predicatelogic on which the metaphysics of substance, properties, attributes, or modes is based because subjects, substances, etc. are themselves initially distinguishedthrough such acts. To think of mind as opposed to matter, (...)
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  30. Stephen H. Daniel (2001). The Ramist Context of Berkeley's Philosophy. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (3):487 – 505.
    Berkeley's doctrines about mind, the language of nature, substance, minima sensibilia, notions, abstract ideas, inference, and freedom appropriate principles developed by the 16th-century logician Peter Ramus and his 17th-century followers (e.g., Alexander Richardson, William Ames, John Milton). Even though Berkeley expresses himself in Cartesian or Lockean terms, he relies on a Ramist way of thinking that is not a form of mere rhetoric or pedagogy but a logic and ontology grounded in Stoicism. This article summarizes the central features of Ramism, (...)
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  31. David (1986). Bayle, Berkeley, and Hume’s Metaphysics. In V. Cauchy (ed.), Philosophy and Culture: Proceedings of the 17th World Congress Of Philosophy, v. 4. Montreal: Editions Montmorency.
  32. G. E. Davie (1965). Berkeley's Impact on Scottish Philosophers. Philosophy 40 (153):222 - 234.
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  33. Philippe Devaux (1954). La place de Berkeley dans la philosophie moderne. Theoria 20 (1-3):1-22.
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  34. Antonio Carlos dos Santos (2011). Berkeley E Mandeville: Religião E Moralidade. Filosofia Unisinos 12 (1):56-69.
  35. Lisa Downing, Occasionalism and Strict Mechanism: Malebranche, Berkeley, Fontenelle.
    The rich connections between metaphysics and natural philosophy in the early modern period have been widely acknowledged and productively mined, thanks in no small part to the work of Margaret Wilson, whose book, Descartes, served as an inspirational example for a generation of scholars. The task of this paper is to investigate one particular such connection, namely, the relation between occasionalist metaphysics and strict mechanism. My focus will be on the work of Nicholas Malebranche, the most influential Cartesian philosopher after (...)
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  36. Dina Emundts (2008). Kant's Critique of Berkeley's Concept of Objectivity. In Daniel Garber & Béatrice Longuenesse (eds.), Kant and the Early Moderns. Princeton University Press.
  37. A. C. Ewing (1957). The Idealist Tradition: From Berkeley to Blanshard. Glencoe, Ill.,Free Press.
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  38. Andrea Falcon (2007). Eriugena, Berkeley, and the Idealist Tradition. Review of Metaphysics 61 (2):417-419.
  39. Edward Douglas Fawcett (1896). From Berkeley to Hegel. The Monist 7 (1):41-81.
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  40. Daniel Flage (1992). Relative Ideas and Notions. In Phillip D. Cummins & Guenter Zoeller (eds.), Minds, Ideas, and Objects: Essays in the Theory of Representation in Modern Philosophy. Ridgeview Publishing Company.
  41. Anthony Flew (1974). Was Berkeley a Precursor of Wittgenstein? In W. B. Todd (ed.), Hume and the Enlightenment: Essays Presented to Ernest Campbell Mossner. Edinburgh University Press.
  42. Antony Flew (1961). Did Hume Ever Read Berkeley? Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):50-51.
  43. Robert Fogelin (1988). Hume and Berkeley on the Proofs of Infinite Divisibility. Philosophical Review 97 (1):47-69.
    Since both berkeley and hume are committed to the view that a line is composed of finitely many fundamental parts, They must find responses to the standard geometrical proofs of infinite divisibility. They both repeat traditional arguments intended to show that infinite divisibility leads to absurdities, E.G., That all lines would be infinite in length, That all lines would have the same length, Etc. In each case, Their arguments rest upon a misunderstanding of the concept of a limit, And thus (...)
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  44. David S. Forth (1971). Berkeley and Buber: An Epistemological Comparison. Dialogue 10 (04):690-707.
  45. Philippe Gagnon (2003). Malebranche Et Berkeley: Les Créatures Et les Raisons Éternelles. Bulletin de la Société de Philosophie du Québec 29 (2):15-16.
  46. Todd Ganson (1999). Berkeley, Reid, and Thomas Brown on the Origins of Our Spatial Concepts. Reid Studies 3 (1):49-62.
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  47. Daniel Garber (1987). Something-I-Know-Not-What: Berkeley on Locke on Substance. In Ernest Sosa (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley. D. Reidel.
  48. Daniel Garber (1982). Locke, Berkeley, and Corpuscular Scepticism. In Colin Murray Turbayne (ed.), Berkeley: Critical and Interpretive Essays. University of Minnesota Press.
  49. Jay L. Garfield (1998). Western Idealism Through Indian Eyes: A Cittamātra Reading of Berkeley, Kant and Schopenhauer. [REVIEW] Sophia 37 (1):10-41.
  50. John Greco (1995). Reid's Critique of Berkeley and Hume: What's the Big Idea? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):279-296.
    Reid thought that the linchpin of his response to\nskepticism was his rejection of the theory of ideas. I\nargue that Reid's assessment of his own work is incorrect;\nthe theory of ideas plays no important role in at least one\nof Berkeley's and Hume's arguments for skepticism, and\nrejecting the theory is therefore neither necessary nor\nsufficient as a reply to that argument. Reid does in fact\nanswer the argument, but with his theory of evidence rather\nthan his rejection of the theory of ideas.
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