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  1. Robert Merrihew Adams (1973). Berkeley's “Notion” of Spiritual Substance. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 55 (1):47-69.
  2. Bertil Belfrage (2011). Berkeley's Way Towards Constructivism, 1707-1709. In Timo Airaksinen & Bertil Belfrage Airaksinen (eds.), Berkeley's Lasting Legacy: 300 Years Later. Cambridge Scholars.
    George Berkeley opens the Principles (Part I) with "a Survey of the Objects of Human Knowledge" including such ideas "as are perceiv'd by attending to the Passions and Operations of the Mind." Scholars have rejected this passage as being "philosophically impossible," not seriously meant, just a reference to John Locke's ideas of reflection, or not at all about "ideas." It is true, in a few unpublished manuscripts Berkeley used the term "ideas" for image-pictures of particular things (the Old Paradigm). But, (...)
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  3. Talia Mae Bettcher (2008). Berkeley on Self-Consciousness. In Stephen H. Daniel (ed.), New Interpretations of Berkeley's Thought. Humanity Books.
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  4. James W. Cornman (1971). A Reconstruction of Berkeley: Minds and Physical Objects as Theoretical Entities. Ratio 13.
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  5. James W. Cornman (1970). Theoretical Terms, Berkeleian Notions, and Minds. In Colin Murray Turbayne (ed.), A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge / George Berkeley, with Critical Essays. Bobbs-Merrill.
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  6. Phillip Cummins (1982). Hylas' Parity Argument. In Colin M. Turbayne (ed.), Berkeley: Critical and Interpretive Essays.
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  7. Stephen H. Daniel (2013). Berkeley's Doctrine of Mind and the “Black List Hypothesis”: A Dialogue. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):24-41.
    Clues about what Berkeley was planning to say about mind in his now-lost second volume of the Principles seem to abound in his Notebooks. However, commentators have been reluctant to use his unpublished entries to explicate his remarks about spiritual substances in the Principles and Dialogues for three reasons. First, it has proven difficult to reconcile the seemingly Humean bundle theory of the self in the Notebooks with Berkeley's published characterization of spirits as “active beings or principles.” Second, the fact (...)
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  8. Lorne Falkenstein (1990). Berkeley's Argument for Other Minds. History of Philosophy Quarterly 7 (4):431 - 440.
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  9. David S. Forth (1971). Berkeley and Buber: An Epistemological Comparison. Dialogue 10 (04):690-707.
  10. Melissa Frankel (2009). Berkeley, Meaning and Minds: Remarks on Glezakos' Comments. Philosophia 37 (3):409-413.
    This is a response to Stavroula Glezakos’ commentary on my paper, in which I address three main points: (1) whether Berkeley is entitled to argue via inference to the best explanation, (2) whether Berkeley’s likeness principle might be too strict, and (3) whether the texts support my reading.
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  11. Melissa Frankel (2009). Something-We-Know-Not-What, Something-We-Know-Not-Why: Berkeley, Meaning and Minds. Philosophia 37 (3):381-402.
    It is sometimes suggested that Berkeley adheres to an empirical criterion of meaning, on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies an idea (i.e., an immediate object of perceptual experience). This criterion is thought to underlie his rejection of the term ‘matter’ as meaningless. As is well known, Berkeley thinks that it is impossible to perceive matter. If one cannot perceive matter, then, per Berkeley, one can have no idea of it; if one can have no idea (...)
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  12. Stavroula Glezakos (2009). Comments on Melissa Frankel's “Something-We-Know-Not-What, Something-We-Know-Not Why: Berkeley, Meaning and Minds”. Philosophia 37 (3):403-407.
  13. S. A. Grave (1964). The Mind and its Ideas: Some Problems in the Interpretation of Berkeley. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):199 – 210.
  14. Denis Grey (1954). Berkeley on Other Selves: A Study in Fugue. Philosophical Quarterly 4 (14):28-44.
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  15. Denis Grey (1952). The Solipsism of Bishop Berkeley. Philosophical Quarterly 2 (9):338-349.
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  16. W. H. Hay (1953). Berkeley's Argument From Nominalism. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 7 (23-24):19-27.
    Reprinted in Colin Murray Turbayne, ed., 'A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge / George Berkeley, with Critical Essays' (Bobbs-Merrill, 1970): 37-46.
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  17. Jeremy E. Henkel (2011). How to Avoid Solipsism While Remaining an Idealist: Lessons From Berkeley and Dharmakīrti. Comparative Philosophy 3 (1).
    This essay examines the strategies that Berkeley and Dharmakīrti utilize to deny that idealism entails solipsism. Beginning from similar arguments for the non-existence of matter, the two philosophers employ markedly different strategies for establishing the existence of other minds. This difference stems from their responses to the problem of intersubjective agreement. While Berkeley’s reliance on his Cartesian inheritance does allow him to account for intersubjective agreement without descending into solipsism, it nevertheless prevents him from establishing the existence of other finite (...)
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  18. Laurent Jaffro (2004). Le cogito de Berkeley. Archives de Philosophie 1:85-111.
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  19. A. C. Lloyd (1985). The Self in Berkeley's Philosophy. In John Foster & Howard Robinson (eds.), Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration. Oxford University Press.
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  20. Charles J. McCracken (1986). Berkeley's Notion of Spirit. History of European Ideas 7 (6):597-602.
  21. George W. Miller (1965). The Commonplace Book and Berkeley's Concept Of The Self. Southern Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):23-32.
  22. Tim Mooney, Irish Cartesian and Proto-Phenomenologist: The Case of Berkeley.
    Comparatively recent scholarship suggests that George Berkeley cannot be seen solely or even chiefly as a British empiricist who is reacting to the materialistic implications of Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding. C.J. McCracken has shown how Berkeley is influenced by Malebranche’s theses concerning the dependence of bodies on God, without himself doubting the evidence of the senses. McCracken also shows how Berkeley reconstructs and reapplies Malebranche’s fideism.1 Harry Bracken has argued, most notably, that Berkeley espouses certain theses that set him (...)
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  23. Sami M. Najm (1966). Knowledge of the Self in Berkeley's Philosophy. International Philosophical Quarterly 6 (2):248-269.
    Given berkeley's view of ideas and spirits and his reference to notions of spirits, Actions, Relations, And ideas, I argue that (a) the doctrine of the notion is his account of knowledge of the self, (b) to have a notion of something is to comprehend it non-Perceptually and actively, And (c) berkeley ultimately holds the self is substantial and knowable. By intuition and principled knowledge we know the self "exists". Notional knowledge is not intuition. The former and principled knowledge presuppose (...)
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  24. George S. Pappas (1980). Ideas, Minds, and Berkeley. American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (3):181 - 194.
    A number of commentators on the work of berkeley have maintained that berkeleyan minds are related to ideas by the relation of inherence. Thus, Ideas are taken to inhere in minds in something like the way that accidents were supposed to inhere in substances for the aristotelian. This inherence account, As I call it, Is spelled out in detail and critically evaluated. Ultimately it is rejected despite its considerable initial plausibility.
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  25. Warren E. Steinkraus (1972). Berkeley and Inferred Friends. Dialogue 11 (04):592-595.
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  26. Richard J. Van Iten (1962). Berkeley's Alleged Solipsism. Revue International de Philosophie 16 (61-62):447-452.
    Reprinted in Colin Murray Turbayne, ed., 'A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge / George Berkeley, with Critical Essays' (Bobbs-Merrill, 1970): 47-56.
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