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Summary Berkeley's immaterialism introduces a strict dichotomy between ideas and spirits (what we would call minds). While he spends much of The Principles and Three Dialogues discussing the nature of ideas, he does little to provide an explanation of the nature of spirits - and, in particular, how we gain knowledge of them.  An especially troublesome area is the epistemology of other minds. Berkeley explains that we learn about our own minds by means of inward reflection, and that the existence of God's mind is evinced by the mechanisms of nature that we observe around us. However, other minds are under-discussed - particularly in light of the so-called 'likeness principle' in section 8 of The Principles which tells us that we can't perceive minds like we do other objects.  In later editions of The Principles, Berkeley introduces the term 'notion' and suggests that while we can't gain perceptual knowledge of minds we can at least possess notional knowledge of their existence. However, the term 'notion' is also somewhat problematic. 
Key works Berkeley first discusses the nature of spirit in Woolhouse & Berkeley 1988. A. A. Luce suggests that we gain knowledge of other minds by means of analogy with our own in Luce 1945. Canonical discussions include Bennett 1971 and Winkler 1989.  Recent journal papers on the epistemology of mind in Berkeley include Falkenstein 1990 and Lee 2012.  Recent books covering Berkeley's epistemology of mind include Roberts 2007 and Kail 2014, which includes a useful chapter on the nature of spirit. 
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  1. Bertil Belfrage (2011). Berkeley's Way Towards Constructivism, 1707-1709. In Timo Airaksinen & Bertil Belfrage Airaksinen (eds.), Berkeley's Lasting Legacy: 300 Years Later. Cambridge Scholars
    George Berkeley opens the Principles (Part I) with "a Survey of the Objects of Human Knowledge" including such ideas "as are perceiv'd by attending to the Passions and Operations of the Mind." Scholars have rejected this passage as being "philosophically impossible," not seriously meant, just a reference to John Locke's ideas of reflection, or not at all about "ideas." It is true, in a few unpublished manuscripts Berkeley used the term "ideas" for image-pictures of particular things (the Old Paradigm). But, (...)
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  2. Talia Mae Bettcher (2008). Berkeley on Self-Consciousness. In Stephen H. Daniel (ed.), New Interpretations of Berkeley's Thought. Humanity Books
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  3. C. Branka Arsi (2003). The Passive Eye Gaze and Subjectivity in Berkeley. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
  4. James W. Cornman (1971). A Reconstruction of Berkeley: Minds and Physical Objects as Theoretical Entities. Ratio 13 (1):76.
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  5. James W. Cornman (1970). Theoretical Terms, Berkeleian Notions, and Minds. In Colin Murray Turbayne (ed.), A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge / George Berkeley, with Critical Essays. Bobbs-Merrill
  6. Charles Byron Cross, Berkeley On Other Minds.
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  7. Phillip Cummins (1982). Hylas' Parity Argument. In Colin M. Turbayne (ed.), Berkeley: Critical and Interpretive Essays.
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  8. Stephen H. Daniel (2013). Berkeley's Doctrine of Mind and the “Black List Hypothesis”: A Dialogue. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):24-41.
    Clues about what Berkeley was planning to say about mind in his now-lost second volume of the Principles seem to abound in his Notebooks. However, commentators have been reluctant to use his unpublished entries to explicate his remarks about spiritual substances in the Principles and Dialogues for three reasons. First, it has proven difficult to reconcile the seemingly Humean bundle theory of the self in the Notebooks with Berkeley's published characterization of spirits as “active beings or principles.” Second, the fact (...)
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  9. Lorne Falkenstein (1990). Berkeley's Argument for Other Minds. History of Philosophy Quarterly 7 (4):431 - 440.
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  10. Daniel E. Flage (2014). Can Berkeley Have It Both Ways? The Philosophers' Magazine 66 (3):55-60.
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  11. David S. Forth (1971). Berkeley and Buber: An Epistemological Comparison. Dialogue 10 (4):690-707.
  12. Melissa Frankel (2009). Berkeley, Meaning and Minds: Remarks on Glezakos' Comments. Philosophia 37 (3):409-413.
    This is a response to Stavroula Glezakos’ commentary on my paper, in which I address three main points: (1) whether Berkeley is entitled to argue via inference to the best explanation, (2) whether Berkeley’s likeness principle might be too strict, and (3) whether the texts support my reading.
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  13. Melissa Frankel (2009). Something-We-Know-Not-What, Something-We-Know-Not-Why: Berkeley, Meaning and Minds. Philosophia 37 (3):381-402.
    It is sometimes suggested that Berkeley adheres to an empirical criterion of meaning, on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies an idea (i.e., an immediate object of perceptual experience). This criterion is thought to underlie his rejection of the term ‘matter’ as meaningless. As is well known, Berkeley thinks that it is impossible to perceive matter. If one cannot perceive matter, then, per Berkeley, one can have no idea of it; if one can have no idea (...)
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  14. E. J. Furlong (1964). An Ambiguity in Berkeley's Principles. Philosophical Quarterly 14 (57):334-344.
  15. Stavroula Glezakos (2009). Comments on Melissa Frankel's “Something-We-Know-Not-What, Something-We-Know-Not Why: Berkeley, Meaning and Minds”. Philosophia 37 (3):403-407.
  16. S. A. Grave (1964). The Mind and its Ideas: Some Problems in the Interpretation of Berkeley. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):199 – 210.
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  17. Denis Grey (1954). Berkeley on Other Selves: A Study in Fugue. Philosophical Quarterly 4 (14):28-44.
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  18. Denis Grey (1952). The Solipsism of Bishop Berkeley. Philosophical Quarterly 2 (9):338-349.
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  19. Alan Hausman (1968). Solipsism and Berkeley's Alleged Realism. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 22 (3):403-412.
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  20. W. H. Hay (1953). Berkeley's Argument From Nominalism. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 7 (23-24):19-27.
    Reprinted in Colin Murray Turbayne, ed., 'A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge / George Berkeley, with Critical Essays' (Bobbs-Merrill, 1970): 37-46.
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  21. Jeremy E. Henkel (2011). How to Avoid Solipsism While Remaining an Idealist: Lessons From Berkeley and Dharmakīrti. Comparative Philosophy 3 (1):58-73.
    This essay examines the strategies that Berkeley and Dharmakīrti utilize to deny that idealism entails solipsism. Beginning from similar arguments for the non-existence of matter, the two philosophers employ markedly different strategies for establishing the existence of other minds. This difference stems from their responses to the problem of intersubjective agreement. While Berkeley’s reliance on his Cartesian inheritance does allow him to account for intersubjective agreement without descending into solipsism, it nevertheless prevents him from establishing the existence of other finite (...)
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  22. Michael Jacovides (2009). How Berkeley Corrupted His Capacity to Conceive. Philosophia 37 (3):415-429.
    Berkeley’s capacity to conceive of mind-independent bodies was corrupted by his theory of representation. He thought that representation of things outside the mind depended on resemblance. Since ideas can resemble nothing than ideas, and all ideas are mind dependent, he concluded that we couldn’t form ideas of mind-independent bodies. More generally, he thought that we had no inner resembling proxies for mind-independent bodies, and so we couldn’t even form a notion of such things. Because conception is a suggestible faculty, Berkeley’s (...)
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  23. Laurent Jaffro (2004). Le cogito de Berkeley. Archives de Philosophie 1:85-111.
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  24. P. J. E. Kail (2014). Berkeley's a Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press.
    George Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge is a crucial text in the history of empiricism and in the history of philosophy more generally. Its central and seemingly astonishing claim is that the physical world cannot exist independently of the perceiving mind. The meaning of this claim, the powerful arguments in its favour, and the system in which it is embedded, are explained in a highly lucid and readable fashion and placed in their historical context. Berkeley's philosophy is, in part, a (...)
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  25. Sukjae Lee (2012). Berkeley on the Activity of Spirits. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (3):539-576.
    This paper propounds a new reading of Berkeley's account of the activity of finite spirits. Against existing interpretations, the paper argues that Berkeley does not hold that we causally contribute to the movement of our bodies. In contrast, our volitions to move our bodies are but occasions for God to cause their movement. In answer to the question of wherein then consists our activity, the paper proposes that our activity consists in the dual powers to produce (1) our volitions ? (...)
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  26. A. C. Lloyd (1985). The Self in Berkeley's Philosophy. In John Foster & Howard Robinson (eds.), Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration. Oxford University Press
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  27. Charles J. McCracken (1986). Berkeley's Notion of Spirit. History of European Ideas 7 (6):597-602.
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  28. George W. Miller (1965). The Commonplace Book and Berkeley's Concept Of The Self. Southern Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):23-32.
  29. Tim Mooney, Irish Cartesian and Proto-Phenomenologist: The Case of Berkeley.
    Comparatively recent scholarship suggests that George Berkeley cannot be seen solely or even chiefly as a British empiricist who is reacting to the materialistic implications of Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding. C.J. McCracken has shown how Berkeley is influenced by Malebranche’s theses concerning the dependence of bodies on God, without himself doubting the evidence of the senses. McCracken also shows how Berkeley reconstructs and reapplies Malebranche’s fideism.1 Harry Bracken has argued, most notably, that Berkeley espouses certain theses that set him (...)
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  30. Timothy Mooney (2005). Berkeley as Proto-Phenomenologist. Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society:213-236.
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  31. Sami M. Najm (1968). Knowledge of Other Selves in Berkeley's Philosophy. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):370.
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  32. Sami M. Najm (1966). Knowledge of the Self in Berkeley's Philosophy. International Philosophical Quarterly 6 (2):248-269.
    Given berkeley's view of ideas and spirits and his reference to notions of spirits, Actions, Relations, And ideas, I argue that (a) the doctrine of the notion is his account of knowledge of the self, (b) to have a notion of something is to comprehend it non-Perceptually and actively, And (c) berkeley ultimately holds the self is substantial and knowable. By intuition and principled knowledge we know the self "exists". Notional knowledge is not intuition. The former and principled knowledge presuppose (...)
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  33. George S. Pappas (1980). Ideas, Minds, and Berkeley. American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (3):181 - 194.
    A number of commentators on the work of berkeley have maintained that berkeleyan minds are related to ideas by the relation of inherence. Thus, Ideas are taken to inhere in minds in something like the way that accidents were supposed to inhere in substances for the aristotelian. This inherence account, As I call it, Is spelled out in detail and critically evaluated. Ultimately it is rejected despite its considerable initial plausibility.
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  34. John Russell Roberts (2007). A Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley. Oxford University Press.
    George Berkeley notoriously claimed that his immaterialist metaphysics was not only consistent with common sense but that it was also integral to its defense. Roberts argues that understanding the basic connection between Berkeley's philosophy and common sense requires that we develop a better understanding of the four principle components of Berkeley's positive metaphysics: The nature of being, the divine language thesis, the active/passive distinction, and the nature of spirits. Roberts begins by focusing on Berkeley's view of the nature of being. (...)
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  35. Warren E. Steinkraus (1972). Berkeley and Inferred Friends. Dialogue 11 (4):592-595.
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  36. Richard J. Van Iten (1962). Berkeley's Alleged Solipsism. Revue International de Philosophie 16 (61-62):447-452.
    Reprinted in Colin Murray Turbayne, ed., 'A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge / George Berkeley, with Critical Essays' (Bobbs-Merrill, 1970): 47-56.
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  37. Mr Blake K. Winter, Berkeley's Arguments on Realism and Idealism.
    We analyse Berkeley's argument that realism cannot be defined, and show that his epistemological assumptions lead to the inevitable conclusion that solipsism is the only definable metaphysics. We conclude with a discussion of what this means for the realism/idealism debate, and also with a discussion of the possibility for apodictic evidence in this matter.
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