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Summary According to Berkeley's Passivity Argument, we can infer from the fact that we are passive in sensory perception that there exists some other mind (God) which causes our sensory perceptions. 
Key works The term 'Passivity Argument' was introduced by Bennett 1965. More recent treatments include Stoneham 2002, sect. 5.2 and Dicker 2011, ch. 12. Ksenjek & Flage 2012 examine the question of what sort of being the argument purports to establish, and the relationship of this being to the Judeo-Christian God.
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  1. Margaret Atherton (1995). Berkeley Without God. In Robert G. Muehlmann (ed.), Berkeley's Metaphysics: Structural, Interpretive, and Critical Essays. The Pennsylvania State University Press.
  2. M. R. Ayers (1987). Divine Ideas and Berkeley's Proofs of God's Existence. In Ernest Sosa (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley. D. Reidel.
  3. Jonathan Bennett (1965). Berkeley and God. Philosophy 40 (153):207 - 221.
  4. Douglas M. Jesseph (2005). Berkeley, God, and Explanation. In Christia Mercer (ed.), Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
    This paper analyzes Berkeley's arguments for the existence of God in the Principles of Human Knowledge, Three Dialogues, and Alciphron. Where most scholarship has interpreted Berkeley as offering three quite distinct attempted proofs of God's existence, I argue that these are all variations on the strategy of inference to the best explanation. I also consider how this reading of Berkeley connects his conception of God to his views about causation and explanation.
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  5. Ekaterina Y. Ksenjek & Daniel E. Flage (2012). Berkeley, the Author of Nature, and the Judeo-Christian God. History of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (3):281-300.
    Does George Berkeley provide an argument for the existence of the Judeo-Christian God at Principles of Human Knowledge, part I, section 29? The standard answer is that he does. In this paper, we challenge that interpretation. First, we look at section 29 in the context of its preceding sections and argue that the most the argument establishes is that there are at least two minds, that is, that the thesis of solipsism is false. Next, we examine the argument in section (...)
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  6. Paul J. Olscamp (1970). George Berkeley's Unique Arguments About God. Studi Internazionali Di Filosofia 2:29-48.