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  1. Timo Airaksinen (1987). Berkeley and the Justification of Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (2):235-256.
    This paper analyzes berkeley's philosophy in the light of modern epistemology and philosophy of mind. It is shown that our knowledge of spatio-Temporal bodies cannot be certain. Certainty is restricted to the realm of sensory ideas themselves. But there is hardly any reason to be interested in ideas as such. Berkeley is a common sense thinker who wants to know the world and its scientific laws. Bodies are constructed on the basis of both real and imaginary ideas. This topic is (...)
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  2. D. M. Armstrong (1954). Berkeley's Puzzle About the Water That Seems Both Hot and Cold. Analysis 15 (2):44 - 46.
  3. Jeffrey Barnouw (2008). The Two Motives Behind Berkeley's Expressly Unmotivated Signs : Sure Perception and Personal Providence. In Stephen H. Daniel (ed.), New Interpretations of Berkeley's Thought. Humanity Books
  4. S. Seth Bordner (2011). Berkeley's "Defense" of "Commonsense". Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (3):315-338.
    Berkeley scholars can hardly resist dealing with the question of how his philosophical system relates to commonsense. It is an irresistible question because it first appears to have a sensational answer. On the one hand, Berkeley claims to "side in all things with the Mob," and on the other, his denial of the existence of matter seems as contrary to commonsense as any philosophical view can be. The articles, chapters, books and conference papers on this one aspect of Berkeley's philosophy (...)
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  5. George Botterill (2007). God and First Person in Berkeley. Philosophy 82 (1):87-114.
    Berkeley claims idealism provides a novel argument for the existence of God. But familiar interpretations of his argument fail to support the conclusion that there is a single omnipotent spirit. A satisfying reconstruction should explain the way Berkeley moves between first person singular and plural, as well as providing a powerful argument, once idealism is accepted. The new interpretation offered here represents the argument as an inference to the best explanation of a shared reality. Consequently, his use of the first (...)
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  6. Harry M. Bracken (2004). Berkeley and Skepticism : Berkeley's Diagnosis of Skepticism, and His Proposed Cure. In Maia Neto, José Raimundo & Richard H. Popkin (eds.), Skepticism in Renaissance and Post-Renaissance Thought: New Interpretations. Humanity Books
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  7. S. C. Brown (1971). Berkeley on the Unity of the Self. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 5:64-87.
    That the legacy of Berkeley's philosophy has been a largely sceptical one is perhaps rather surprising. For he himself took it as one of his objectives to undermine scepticism. He roundly denied that there were ‘any principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down’ . Yet Hume was to write of Berkeley that ‘most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism, Bayle not excepted’. And it has become something of a (...)
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  8. Anthony Brueckner (2011). Idealism and Scepticism. Theoria 77 (4):368-371.
    It is argued that contrary to appearances, Berkeleyan Idealism lacks anti-sceptical force. The problem stems from the way in which the idealist draws the appearance/reality distinction.
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  9. M. F. Burnyeat (1982). Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed. Philosophical Review 91 (1):3-40.
  10. M. F. Burnyeat (1982). Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 13:19-50.
  11. Eric Bush (1977). Berkeley, Truth, and the World. Inquiry 20 (1-4):205 – 225.
    There is a structural similarity between an influential argument of Berkeley 's against causal realism and a traditional, and recently revived, argument against the correspondence theory of truth. Both arguments chide the realist for positing a relation between his conceptions of reality and a world independent of those conceptions. Man could have no epistemic access to such a relation, it is said, for, by the realist's own admission, he has access to only one of the relata - his conceptions. I (...)
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  12. Sébastian Charles (2004). Berkeley no país das Luzes: ceticismo e solipsismo no século XVIII. Doispontos 1 (2).
    A influência do ceticismo nos século XVI e XVII é por demais evidente para ser posta em questão. De Montaigne a Bayle, parece que o cético foi o promotor tanto de uma refutação radical dos princípios metafísicos escolásticos e depois cartesianos quanto de uma crítica feroz às autoridades religiosas e políticas. Ora, esse papel parece ter se amenizado no Século das Luzes, ou melhor, se deslocado - somente as dimensões críticas do social continuaram pertinentes. Pretende-se mostrar aqui o pressuposto de (...)
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  13. Maxime Chastaing (1953). Berkeley, défenseur du sens commun et théoricien de la connaissance d'autrui. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 143:219 - 243.
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  14. Jaimir Conte (2008). A Oposição de Berkeley Ao Ceticismo. Cadernos de História de Filosofia da Ciência 18 (2):3225-355.
    One of Berkeley’s main goals in the Principles and in the Three Dialogues, as expressly stated in the full titles these two works, as well as in the Philosophical Commen-taries, is the refutation of skepticism. This article aims to elucidate what Berkeley means by skepticism and to indicate which principles or doctrines, according to him, are at the root of the skeptics’ doubts. An attempt is made to show how Berkeley elaborated his opposition to skepticism. Finally, it is suggested that (...)
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  15. Kucharski Dariusz (2010). Scepticism and its Refutation in George Berkeley's and Thomas Reid's Philosophies (Sceptycyzm I Dyskusja Z Nim W Filozofii George'a Berkeleya I Thomasa Reida). Studia Philosophiae Christianae 46 (2).
  16. Robert Frederick (1987). Berkeley and the Argument From Conceiving. Philosophy Research Archives 13:481-487.
    In both the Principles and the Dialogues Berkeley argues that physical objects cannot exist independently of minds. In this paper I suggest an interpretation of the argument in the Dialogues that shows that his argument either relies on an invalid inference or begs the question. I conclude that his attempt to defeat scepticism by making physical objects mind-dependent is unsuccessful.
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  17. Daniel Garber (1982). Locke, Berkeley, and Corpuscular Scepticism. In Colin Murray Turbayne (ed.), Berkeley: Critical and Interpretive Essays. University of Minnesota Press
  18. Jody Graham (1997). Common Sense and Berkeley's Perception by Suggestion. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (3):397 – 423.
    Significant attention has been paid to Berkeley's account of perception; however, the interpretations of Berkeley's account of perception by suggestion are either incomplete or mistaken. In this paper I begin by examining a common interpretation of suggestion, the 'Propositional Account'. I argue that the Propositional Account is inadequate and defend an alternative, non-propositional, account. I then address George Pitcher's objection that Berkeley's view of sense perception forces him to adopt a 'non-conciliatory' attitude towards common sense. I argue that Pitcher's charge (...)
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  19. Robert A. Imlay (1992). Berkeley and Scepticism. Hume Studies 18 (2):501-510.
  20. A. David Kline (1987). Berkeley's Theory of Common Sense. International Studies in Philosophy 19 (3):21-31.
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  21. E. J. Lowe (2006). Radical Externalism or Berkeley Revisited? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):78-94.
    Ted Honderich's 'Radical Externalism' concerning the nature of consciousness is a refreshing, and in many ways very appealing, approach to a long- standing and seemingly intractable philosophical conundrum. Although I sympathize with many of his motivations in advancing the theory and share his hostility for certain alternative approaches that are currently popular, I will serve him better by playing devil's advocate than by simply recording my points of agreement with him. If his theory is a good one, it should be (...)
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  22. Konrad Marc-Wogau (1968). The Argument From Illusion and Berkeley's Idealism. In C. B. Martin & David M. Armstrong (eds.), Theoria. University of Notre Dame Press 340-352.
  23. Lex Newman (2002). Berkeley's Thought. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 111 (2):314-318.
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  24. Douglas Odegard (1981). Berkeleian Idealism and the Dream Argument. Idealistic Studies 11 (2):93-99.
  25. George Pappas (2003). Idealism, Skepticism, Common Sense. In Jorge J. E. Gracia, Gregory M. Reichberg & Bernard N. Schumacher (eds.), The Classics of Western Philosophy: A Reader's Guide. Blackwell Pub. 270.
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  26. George Pappas (1999). Berkeley and Scepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):133 - 149.
    In both the Principles and the Three Dialogues, Berkeley claims that he wants to uncover those principles which lead to scepticism; to refute those principles; and to refute scepticism itself. This paper examines the principles Berkeley says have scepticial consequences, and contends that only one of them implies scepticism. It is also argued that Berkeley's attempted refutation of scepticism rests not on his acceptance of the esse est percipi principle, but rather on the thesis that physical objects and their sensible (...)
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  27. George S. Pappas (2007). Berkeley's Assessment of Locke's Epistemology. In Stephen H. Daniel (ed.), Philosophica.
    In this essay, the author analyses Berkeley’s conformity and inference argument against Locke’s theory of percep tion. Both arguments are not as decisive as traditionally has been perceived and fail to engage in Locke’s actual position. The main reason for this is that Berkeley does not see that Locke’s position is compatible with the non-inferential nature of perceptual knowledge.
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  28. George S. Pappas (1991). Berkeley and Common Sense Realism. History of Philosophy Quarterly 8 (1):27 - 42.
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  29. George S. Pappas (1986). Common Sense in Berkeley and Reid in Sens Commun. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 40 (158):292-303.
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  30. George Sotiros Pappas (2000). Berkeley's Thought. Cornell University Press.
    He assesses the validity of this self-description and considers why Berkeley might have chosen to align himself with a commonsense position.Pappas shows how ...
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  31. Goerge Pappas (1982). Berkeley, Perception, and Common Sense. In Colin M. Turbayne (ed.), Berkeley: Critical and Interpretive Essays. University of Minnesota Press
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  32. Kenneth L. Pearce, How Berkeley's Gardener Knows His Cherry Tree.
    The defense of common sense in Berkeley's Three Dialogues is, first and foremost, a defense of the gardener's claim to know this cherry tree, a claim threatened by both Cartesian and Lockean philosophy. Berkeley's defense of the gardener's knowledge depends on his claim that the being of a cherry tree consists in its being perceived. This is not something the gardener believes; rather, it is a philosophical analysis of the rules unreflectively followed by the gardener in his use of the (...)
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  33. Richard H. Popkin (1951). Berkeley and Pyrrhonism. Review of Metaphysics 5 (2):223 - 246.
  34. Stephen Puryear (2013). Idealism and Scepticism: A Reply to Brueckner. Theoria 79 (1):290-293.
    Anthony Brueckner argues that Berkeleyan idealism lacks anti-sceptical force because of the way Berkeley draws the appearance/reality distinction. But Brueckner's case rests on a misunderstanding of Berkeley's view. Properly understood, Berkeleyan idealism does indeed have anti-sceptical force.
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  35. John Russell Roberts, Reply to Seth Bordner’s “Berkeley’s Defense of Common Sense”.
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  36. Todd Ryan (2004). Berkeley au siecle des lumieres. Immaterialisme et scepticisme au XVIIIe siecle (review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (4):495-496.
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  37. Todd Ryan (2002). Berkeley et Les Philosophes du XVIIe Siecle: Perception et Scepticisme (review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (3):402-404.
    Todd Ryan - Berkeley et Les Philosophes du XVIIe Siecle: Perception et Scepticisme - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.3 402-404 Book Review Berkeley et Les Philosophes du XVIIe Siècle: Perception et Scepticisme Richard Glauser. Berkeley et Les Philosophes du XVIIe Siècle: Perception et Scepticisme. Sprimont: Mardaga, 1999. Pp. 352. Paper, NP. One of the central criticisms Berkeley makes of his materialist opponents is that they are inevitably committed to skepticism concerning both (...)
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  38. Plínio Junqueira Smith (2005). As respostas de Berkeley ao ceticismo. Doispontos 1 (2):35-55.
    O artigo compara alguns aspectos da refutação do ceticismo nos Princípios e nos Três diálogos. Embora normalmente não se veja nenhuma diferença importante entre essas obras, duas hipóteses são defendidas aqui: de um lado, Berkeley desloca o foco de sua crítica das idéias abstratas para a noção de matéria e, de outro, muda sua estratégia de combate, da enunciação imediata da verdade para a lenta elaboração das consequências céticas da noção de matéria. Berkeley’s answers to skepticismThe topic of this paper (...)
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  39. Ian Tipton (1992). Descartes' Demon and Berkeley's World. Philosophical Investigations 15 (2):111-130.
  40. Tero Vaaja (2011). On Certainty, Skepticism and Berkeley's Idealism. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):253-265.
    In this paper, I survey the way Wittgenstein reacts to radical philosophical doubt in his On Certainty. He deems skeptical doubt in some important cases idle, pointless or otherwise negligible. I point out that several passages of On Certainty make it difficult to judge whether Wittgenstein intends to address a skeptic or a metaphysical idealist. Drawing attention to the anti-skeptical nature of Berkeley's idealism, I go on to argue that the question is far from trivial: rather, it affects the way (...)
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  41. Russell Wahl & Jonathan Westphal (1992). Descartes, Leibniz and Berkeley on Whether We Can Dream Marks of the Waking State. Studia Leibnitiana 24 (2):177-181.
    Dans la première méditation, Descartes a conclu, en regard des songes, « qu'il n'y a point d'indices concluants, ni de marques assez certaines par où l'on puisse distinguer nettement la veille d'avec la sommeil [...] » . À la fin de la sixième méditation, il a conclu qu'il y a de tels indices, mais qu'on a besoin de la garantie de Dieu pour savoir si ces indices sont réellement des indices de la veille. Cottingham a proposé une objection générale contre (...)
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  42. Mr Blake K. Winter, Berkeley's Arguments on Realism and Idealism.
    We analyse Berkeley's argument that realism cannot be defined, and show that his epistemological assumptions lead to the inevitable conclusion that solipsism is the only definable metaphysics. We conclude with a discussion of what this means for the realism/idealism debate, and also with a discussion of the possibility for apodictic evidence in this matter.
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  43. David Yandell (1995). Berkeley on Common Sense and the Privacy of Ideas. History of Philosophy Quarterly 12 (4):411 - 423.
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