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  1. Matthew Stuart Piper (2012). You Can't Eat Causal Cake with an Abstract Fork: An Argument Against Computational Theories of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (11-12):154-90.
    Two of the most important concepts in contemporary philosophy of mind are computation and consciousness. This paper explores whether there is a strong relationship between these concepts in the following sense: is a computational theory of consciousness possible? That is, is the right kind of computation sufficient for the instantiation of consciousness. In this paper, I argue that the abstract nature of computational processes precludes computations from instantiating the concrete properties constitutive of consciousness. If this is correct, then not only (...)
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Searle's Biological Naturalism
  1. David M. Armstrong (1991). Searle's Neo-Cartesian Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Issues 1:67-71.
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  2. Andrew Beards (1994). John Searle and Human Consciousness. Heythrop Journal 35 (3):281-295.
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  3. Robert G. Burton (1995). Searle on Rediscovering the Mind. Man and World 28 (2):163-174.
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  4. Alan D. Code (1991). Aristotle, Searle, and the Mind-Body Problem. In Ernest Lepore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  5. Corbin Collins (1997). Searle on Consciousness and Dualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1):15-33.
    In this article, I examine and criticize John Searle's account of the relation between mind and body. Searle rejects dualism and argues that the traditional mind-body problem has a 'simple solution': mental phenomena are both caused by biological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain. More precisely, mental states and events are macro-properties of neurons in much the same way that solidity and liquidity are macro-properties of molecules. However, Searle also maintains that the mental is (...)
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  6. Kevin J. Corcoran (2001). The Trouble with Searle's Biological Naturalism. Erkenntnis 55 (3):307-324.
    John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Min is a sustained attempt to locate the mind and the mental firmly in the realm of the physical. Consciousness ,claims Searle, is just an ordinary biological feature of the world ... More specifically,``[t]he mental state of consciousness is just an ordinary biological, that is, physical featureof the brain''. Searle is adamant: ``Consciousness,to repeat, is a natural biological phenomenon''.
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  7. Daniel C. Dennett (1993). Review of Searle, the Rediscovery of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Explorations 90 (4):93-205.
    Everyone agrees that consciousness is a very special phenomenon, unique in several ways, but there is scant agreement on just how special it is, and whether or not an explanation of it can be accommodated within normal science. John Searle's view, defended with passion in this book, is highly idiosyncratic: what is special about consciousness is its "subjective ontology," but normal science can accommodate subjective ontology alongside (not within) its otherwise objective ontology. Once we clear away some widespread confusions about (...)
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  8. Brian J. Garrett (1995). Non-Reductionism and John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):209-215.
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  9. Jeffrey Hershfield (1997). Searle's Regimen for Rediscovering the Mind. Dialogue 36 (2):361-374.
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  10. David Hodgson (1994). Why Searle has Not Rediscovered the Mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):264-274.
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  11. Ted Honderich (2001). Mind the Guff. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (4):62-78.
    (I) John Searle's conception of consciousness in the 'Mind the Gap' issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies remains short on content, no advance on either materialism or traditional dualism. Still, it is sufficiently contentful to be self-contradictory. And so his Biological Subjectivity on Two Levels, like materialism and dualism, needs replacing by a radically different conception of consciousness -- such as Consciousness as Existence. (II) From his idea that we can discover 'gaps', seeming absences of causal circumstances, in our (...)
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  12. Ted Honderich (1995). Consciousness, Neural Functionalism, Real Subjectivity. American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):369-381.
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  13. Dale Jacquette (2002). Searle's Antireductionism. Facta Philosophica 4:143-66.
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  14. Timothy A. Kenyon (1998). Searle Rediscovers What Was Not Lost. Dialogue 37 (1):117-130.
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  15. Jaegwon Kim (1995). Mental Causation in Searle's Biological Naturalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):189-194.
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  16. Ernest LePore (ed.) (1991). John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  17. James P. Moreland (1998). Searle's Biological Naturalism and the Argument From Consciousness. Faith and Philosophy 15 (1):68-91.
    In recent years, Robert Adams and Richard Swinburne have developed an argument for God’s existence from the reality of mental phenomena. Call this the argument from consciousness (AC). My purpose is to develop and defend AC and to use it as a rival paradigm to critique John Searle’s biological naturalism. The article is developed in three steps. First, two issues relevant to the epistemic task of adjudicating between rival scientific paradigms (basicality and naturalness) are clarified and illustrated. Second, I present (...)
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  18. Thomas Natsoulas (1991). Ontological Subjectivity. Journal of Mind and Behavior 175:175-200.
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  19. Georg Northoff & K. Musholt (2006). How Can Searle Avoid Property Dualism? Epistemic-Ontological Inference and Autoepistemic Limitation. Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):589-605.
    Searle suggests biological naturalism as a solution to the mind-brain problem that escapes traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism. We reconstruct Searle's argument and demonstrate that it needs additional support to represent a position truly located between dualism and materialism. The aim of our paper is to provide such an additional argument. We introduce the concept of "autoepistemic limitation" that describes our principal inability to directly experience our own brain as a brain from (...)
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  20. Daniel D. Novotny (2007). Searle on the Unity of the World. Axiomathes 17 (1):41-51.
    According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are compatible and true.
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  21. Audun Ofsti (1994). Analyomen 1. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  22. Audun Ofsti (1994). Searle, Leibniz and 'the First Person': A Note on the Epilogue of Intentionality. In Analyomen 1. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  23. Frederick A. Olafson (1994). Brain Dualism. Inquiry 37 (2):253-265.
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  24. Sam Page (2004). Searle's Realism Deconstructed. Philosophical Forum 35 (3):249-274.
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  25. Daniel E. Palmer (1998). Searle on Consciousness: Or How Not to Be a Physicalist. Ratio 11 (2):159-169.
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  26. Arthur S. Reber (1997). Caterpillars and Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):437-49.
    The dominant position in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) is computationalism where the operative principle is that cognition in general and consciousness in particular can be captured by identification of the proper set of computations. This position has been attacked from several angles, most effectively, in my opinion, by John Searle in his now famous Chinese Room thought experiment. I critique this Searlean perspective on the grounds that, while it is probably correct in its essentials, it does not go (...)
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  27. Sabat (1999). Consciousness, Emergence and Naturalism. Teorema 18 (1):139-153.
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  28. John R. Searle (2007). Biological Naturalism. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
    “Biological Naturalism” is a name I have given to an approach to what is traditionally called the mind-body problem. The way I arrived at it is typical of the way I work: try to forget about the philosophical history of a problem and remind yourself of what you know for a fact. Any philosophical theory has to be consistent with the facts. Of course, something we think is a fact may turn out not to be, but we have to start (...)
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  29. John R. Searle (2002). Consciousness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    One of the most important and influential philosophers of the last 30 years, John Searle has been concerned throughout his career with a single overarching question: how can we have a unified and theoretically satisfactory account of ourselves and of our relations to other people and to the natural world? In other words, how can we reconcile our common-sense conception of ourselves as conscious, free, mindful, rational agents in a world that we believe comprises brute, unconscious, mindless, meaningless, mute physical (...)
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  30. John R. Searle (2002). Why I Am Not a Property Dualist. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (12):57-64.
    I have argued in a number of writings[1] that the philosophical part (though not the neurobiological part) of the traditional mind-body problem has a fairly simple and obvious solution: All of our mental phenomena are caused by lower level neuronal processes in the brain and are themselves realized in the brain as higher level, or system, features. The form of causation is.
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  31. John R. Searle (2000). Mental Causation, Conscious and Unconscious: A Reply to Anthonie Meijers. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2):171-177.
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  32. John R. Searle (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. MIT Press.
    The title of The Rediscovery of the Mind suggests the question "When was the mind lost?" Since most people may not be aware that it ever was lost, we must also then ask "Who lost it?" It was lost, of course, only by philosophers, by certain philosophers. This passed unnoticed by society at large. The "rediscovery" is also likely to pass unnoticed. But has the mind been rediscovered by the same philosophers who "lost" it? Probably not. John Searle is an (...)
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  33. Ramakant Sinari (2001). Reflections on John Searle's Philosophy of Consciousness. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 18 (3):91-106.
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  34. Barry Smith (2014). Document Acts. In Anita Konzelmann-Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Contributions to Social Ontology. Springer. 19-31.
    The theory of document acts is an extension of the more traditional theory of speech acts advanced by Austin and Searle. It is designed to do justice to the ways in which documents can be used to bring about a variety of effects in virtue of the fact that, where speech is evanescent, documents are continuant entities. This means that documents can be preserved in such a way that they can be inspected and modified at successive points in time and (...)
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  35. Barry Smith (2003). John Searle: From Speech Acts to Social Reality. In , John Searle. Cambridge University Press. 1--33.
    We provide an overview of Searle's contributions to speech act theory and the ontology of social reality, focusing on his theory of constitutive rules. In early versions of this theory, Searle proposed that all such rules have the form 'X counts as Y in context C' formula – as for example when Barack Obama (X) counts as President of the United States (Y) in the context of US political affairs. Crucially, the X and the Y terms are here identical. A (...)
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  36. Barry Smith & John Searle (2003). The Construction of Social Reality: An Exchange. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 62 (2):285-309.
    Part 1 of this exchange consists in a critique by Smith of Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality focusing on Searle’s use of the formula ‘X counts as Y in context C’. Smith argues that this formula works well for social objects such as dollar bills and presidents where the corresponding X terms (pieces of paper, human beings) are easy to identify. In cases such as debts and prices and money in a banks computers, however, the formula fails, because these (...)
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  37. Barry Smith & John Searle (2000). L’Ontologie de la Realité Sociale. In P. Livet & R. Ogien (eds.), L’Enquête ontologique, du mode de l'existence des objets sociaux. Editions EHESS.
    Part 1 of this exchange consists in a critique by Smith of Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality focusing on Searle’s use of the formula ‘X counts as Y in context C’. Smith argues that this formula works well for social objects such as dollar bills and presidents where the corresponding X terms (pieces of paper, human beings) are easy to identify. In cases such as debts and prices and money in a banks computers, however, the formula fails, because these (...)
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  38. Frederick M. Stoutland (1994). Searle's Consciousness: A Review of John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 35 (4):245-254.
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  39. Charles Taliaferro (2005). The Give and Take of Biological Naturalism: John Searle and the Case for Dualism. Philosophia Christi 7 (2):447-462.
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  40. Ted A. Warfield (1999). Searle's Causal Powers. Analysis 59 (1):29-32.
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  41. Marc-Denis Weitze (1997). Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  42. Marc-Denis Weitze (1997). Searle, Edelman Und Die Evolution Des Bewusstseins: Mit Neurobiologischen Argumenten. In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
  43. Leo Zaibert & Barry Smith (2007). The Varieties of Normativity: An Essay on Social Ontology. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology. Springer.
    For much of the first fifty years of its existence, analytic philosophy shunned discussions of normativity and ethics. Ethical statements were considered as pseudo-propositions, or as expressions of pro- or con-attitudes of minor theoretical significance. Nowadays, in contrast, prominent analytic philosophers pay close attention to normative problems. Here we focus our attention on the work of Searle, at the same time drawing out an important connection between Searle’s work and that of two other seminal figures in this development: H.L.A. Hart (...)
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