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  1. Outi Benson (2013). The Experience of Agency in the Feeling of Being Suicidal. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (7-8):7-8.
    Based on a qualitative study with 124 participants we explore what is in ordinary language referred to as 'suicidal feelings'. We identify four interrelated aspects of this experience, which together suggest that 'suicidal feelings' is in fact a 'feeling of being suicidal', an existential feeling. Although each experience is unique in its presentation, it is also the case that people who are suicidal tend to experience a combination of the following: 1) loss of consistency and/ or coherence in their sense (...)
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  2. George Bondor (ed.) (2011). Sensuri Ale Corpului: Actele Celui de-Al 2-Lea Colocviu Al Centrului de Hermeneutică, Fenomologie Și Filosofie Practică, 28-29 Octombrie 2010, Universitatea "A. [REVIEW] Editura Universității "Alexandru Ioan Cuza".
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  3. Havi Carel (2013). Bodily Doubt. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (7-8):7-8.
    In this paper I explore the tacit underlying sense of bodily certainty that characterizes normal everyday embodied experience. I then propose illness as one instance in which this certainty breaks down and is replaced by bodily doubt. I characterize bodily doubt as radically modifying our experience in three ways: loss of continuity, loss of transparency, and loss of faith in one's body. I then discuss the philosophical insights that arise from the experience of bodily doubt. The paper uses a Humean (...)
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  4. Phil Dwyer (2000). The Bodily Nature of Consciousness. Dialogue 39 (1):186-188.
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  5. Alexis Elder (2013). Proprioception, Anosognosia, and the Richness of Conscious Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):3-4.
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  6. Przemysław Nowakowski (2010). Fantom ciała jako cielesna samoświadomość. Avant 1 (1).
    According to Peter Halligan, […] it is important to consider that the experience of our body is largely the product of a continuously updated „phantom” generated by the brain. (Halligan 2002, 266). Next, he adds: I will argue (not withstanding pathology to the physical body) that the prevalent common sense assumption of phantom experience as pathological is wrongheaded and largely based on a long-standing and pernicious folk assumption that the physical body is necessary for experience of a body. (Halligan 2002, (...)
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  7. Kanʼichirō Ōmiya (ed.) (2007). Matou: Hyōsō No Tawamure No Kanata Ni. Suiseisha.
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  8. Michael Staudigl (ed.) (2012). Gelebter Leib-Verkörpertes Leben: Neue Beiträge Zur Phänomenologie der Leiblichkeit. Königshausen & Neumann.
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Bodily Awareness
  1. István Aranyosi (forthcoming). Margins of Me: A Personal Story (Chapter 1 of The Peripheral Mind). In The Peripheral Mind. Philosophy of Mind and the Peripheral Nervous System. OUP.
    The author presents an autobiographical story of serious peripheral motor nerve damage resulting from chemotoxicity induced as a side effect of Hodgkin’s Lymphoma treatment. The first-person, phenomenological account of the condition naturally leads to philosophical questions about consciousness, felt presence of oneself all over and within one’s body, and the felt constitutiveness of peripheral processes to one’s mental life. The first-person data only fit well with a philosophical approach to the mind that takes peripheral, bodily events and states at their (...)
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  2. Ignacio Ávila (2014). Evans on Bodily Awareness and Perceptual Self‐Location. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):269-287.
    In Chapter 7 of The Varieties of Reference Evans implicitly outlines a view to the effect that bodily awareness plays no role in perceptual self-location or in the specification of our perceptual perspective of the world. In this paper I discuss this story and offer an alternative proposal. Then I explore some consequences of this account for our understanding of the elusiveness of the self in perceptual experience.
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  3. Tim Bayne & Neil Levy (2005). Amputees by Choice: Body Integrity Identity Disorder and the Ethics of Amputation. Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):75–86.
    In 1997, a Scottish surgeon by the name of Robert Smith was approached by a man with an unusual request: he wanted his apparently healthy lower left leg amputated. Although details about the case are sketchy, the would-be amputee appears to have desired the amputation on the grounds that his left foot wasn’t part of him – it felt alien. After consultation with psychiatrists, Smith performed the amputation. Two and a half years later, the patient reported that his life had (...)
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  4. Elizabeth A. Behnke (2009). Bodily Protentionality. Husserl Studies 25 (3):185-217.
    This investigation explores the methodological implications of choosing an unusual example for phenomenological description (here, a bodily awareness practice allowing spontaneous bodily shifts to occur at the leading edge of the living present); for example, the matters themselves are not pregiven, but must first be brought into view. Only after preliminary clarifications not only of the practice concerned, but also of the very notions of the “body” and of “protentionality” is it possible to provide both static and genetic descriptions of (...)
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  5. Berm (2005). The Phenomenology of Bodily Awareness. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  6. Berm (2001). Bodily Self-Awareness and the Will: Reply to Power. Minds and Machines 11 (1):139-142.
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  7. José Luis Bermúdez (2005). The Phenomenology of Bodily Awareness. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie Lynn Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  8. Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.) (1995). The Body and the Self. MIT Press.
  9. Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle (1998). Senses of Touch: Human Dignity and Deformity From Michelangelo to Calvin. Brill.
    From posture to piety, from manicure to magic, the book discovers touch in a critical period of its historical development, in anatomy and society.
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  10. Bill Brewer (1995). Bodily Awareness and the Self. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Cambridge, Mass: Mit Press. 291-€“303.
    In The Varieties of Reference (1982), Gareth Evans claims that considerations having to do with certain basic ways we have of gaining knowledge of our own physical states and properties provide "the most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self" (220). In this chapter, I start with a discussion and evaluation of Evans' own argument, which is, I think, in the end unconvincing. Then I raise the possibility of a more direct application of similar considerations in defence of (...)
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  11. Peter Brugger (2006). From Phantom Limb to Phantom Body: Varieties of Extracorporeal Awareness. In Günther Knoblich, Ian M. Thornton, Marc Grosjean & Maggie Shiffrar (eds.), Human Body Perception From the Inside Out. Oxford University Press. 171-209.
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  12. Peter Brugger, Bigna Lenggenhager & Melita J. Giummarra (2013). Xenomelia: A Social Neuroscience View of Altered Bodily Self-Consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology 4.
    Xenomelia, the "foreign limb syndrome", is characterized by the non-acceptance of one or more of one’s own extremities and the resulting desire for elective limb amputation or paralysis. Formerly labeled 'body integrity identity disorder' (BIID), the condition was originally considered a psychological or psychiatric disorder, but a brain-centered Zeitgeist and a rapidly growing interest in the neural underpinnings of bodily self-consciousness has shifted the focus towards dysfunctional central nervous system circuits. The present article outlays both mind-based and brain-based views highlighting (...)
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  13. Glenn Carruthers (2009). Is the Body Schema Sufficient for the Sense of Embodiment? An Alternative to de Vignmont's Model. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):123-142.
    De Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body that is part of the body schema. This model should be taken as a model of the sense of embodiment. I argue that the body schema lacks the theoretical resources needed to explain this phenomenology. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that a deficient sense of embodiment is not associated with a deficient body schema. The data de Vignemont (...)
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  14. Glenn Carruthers (2008). Reply to Tsakiris and Fotopoulou "Is My Body the Sum of Online and Offline Body Representations. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1321):1323.
    I thank Tsakiris and Fotopoulou for their insightful commentary on my target article. In particular I welcome the opportunity to revisit how the online/offline representation of the body distinction is drawn. Tsakiris and Fotopoulou raise three major points of concern with my model. First they argue that the sense of embodiment is not sufficient for self recognition. Second they show that the relationship between online and offline representations of the body cannot be the simple ‘serial construction’ relationship I (...)
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  15. Glenn Carruthers (2008). Types of Body Representation and the Sense of Embodiment. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1302):1316.
    The sense of embodiment is vital for self recognition. An examination of anosognosia for hemiplegia—the inability to recognise that one is paralysed down one side of one’s body—suggests the existence of ‘online’ and ‘offline’ representations of the body. Online representations of the body are representations of the body as it is currently, are newly constructed moment by moment and are directly “plugged into” current perception of the body. In contrast, offline representations of the body are representations of what the body (...)
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  16. Cheryl K. Chen (2011). Bodily Awareness and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):21-38.
    Abstract: Some first person statements, such as ‘I am in pain’, are thought to be immune to error through misidentification (IEM): I cannot be wrong that I am in pain because—while I know that someone is in pain—I have mistaken that person for myself. While IEM is typically associated with the self-ascription of psychological properties, some philosophers attempt to draw anti-Cartesian conclusions from the claim that certain physical self-ascriptions are also IEM. In this paper, I will examine whether some physical (...)
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  17. Jonathan Cole, Natalie Depraz & Shaun Gallagher, Unity and Disunity in Bodily Awareness: Phenomenology and Neuroscience. Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness Workshop.
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  18. David A. Conway (1973). Sensations and Bodily Position: A Conclusive Argument? Philosophical Studies 24 (September):353-354.
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  19. Frédérique de Vignemont (2011). A Self for the Body. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):230-247.
    Abstract: What grounds the experience of our body as our own? Can we rationally doubt that this is our own body when we feel sensations in it? This article shows how recent empirical evidence can shed light on issues on the body and the self, such as the grounds of the sense of body ownership and the immunity to error through misidentification of bodily self-ascriptions. In particular, it discusses how bodily illusions (e.g., the Rubber Hand Illusion), bodily disruptions (e.g., somatoparaphrenia), (...)
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  20. Frederique de Vignemont (2007). Habeas Corpus: The Sense of Ownership of One's Own Body. Mind and Language 22 (4):427-449.
    What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.
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  21. Eva-Maria Engelen (2012). Das Gefühl des Lebendigseins Als Einfache Form Phänomenalen Bewusstseins. Ein Aristotelischer Theorieansatz. In Marienberg Sabine & Fingerhut Jörg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive / Gefühle des Lebendigseins. De Gruyter.
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  22. Eva-Maria Engelen (2012). Das Gefühl des Lebendigseins Als Einfache Form Phänomenalen Bewusstseins. Ein Aristotelischer Theorieansatz. In Joerg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive / Gefühle des Lebendigseins. De Gruyter.
    This paper works out which conceptual and theoretical preconditions have to be met, among others, in order for a living creature to be able to have a feeling of being alive beyond the mere capacity for sensation. For the emergence of such a feeling, which can be equated with a rudimentary phenomenal consciousness (1.), it is not enough for the organism to be alive (2. a.). Rather it has to be able to conceive its body as a unit and to (...)
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  23. Harry Farmer & Manos Tsakiris (2012). The Bodily Social Self: A Link Between Phenomenal and Narrative Selfhood. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):125-144.
    The Phenomenal Self (PS) is widely considered to be dependent on body representations, whereas the Narrative Self (NS) is generally thought to rely on abstract cognitive representations. The concept of the Bodily Social Self (BSS) might play an important role in explaining how the high level cognitive self-representations enabling the NS might emerge from the bodily basis of the PS. First, the phenomenal self (PS) and narrative self (NS), are briefly examined. Next, the BSS is defined and its potential for (...)
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  24. Ellen Fridland (2011). The Case for Proprioception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):521-540.
    In formulating a theory of perception that does justice to the embodied and enactive nature of perceptual experience, proprioception can play a valuable role. Since proprioception is necessarily embodied, and since proprioceptive experience is particularly integrated with one’s bodily actions, it seems clear that proprioception, in addition to, e.g., vision or audition, can provide us with valuable insights into the role of an agent’s corporal skills and capacities in constituting or structuring perceptual experience. However, if we are going to have (...)
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  25. Shaun Gallagher (2012). The Body in Social Context: Some Qualifications on the'Warmth and Intimacy'of Bodily Self-Consciousness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):91-121.
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  26. Shaun Gallagher (2003). Bodily Self-Awareness and Object Perception. Theoria Et Historia Scientarum 7 (1):53--68.
    Gallagher, S. 2003. Bodily self-awareness and object perception. _Theoria et Historia Scientiarum: International Journal for Interdisciplinary_ _Studies_, 7 (1) - in press.
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  27. Vittorio Gallese & Corrado Sinigaglia (2011). How the Body in Action Shapes the Self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (7-8):117-143.
    In the present paper we address the issue of the role of the body in shaping our basic self-awareness. It is generally taken for granted that basic bodily self-awareness has primarily to do with proprioception. Here we challenge this assumption by arguing from both a phenomenological and a neurophysiological point of view that our body is primarily given to us as a manifold of action possibilities that cannot be reduced to any form of proprioceptive awareness. By discussing the notion of (...)
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  28. Edward Harcourt (2008). Wittgenstein and Bodily Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):299-333.
  29. Lukas Heydrich, Sebastian Dieguez, Thomas Grunwald, Margitta Seeck & Olaf Blanke (2011). Corrigendum to “Illusory Own Body Perceptions: Case Reports and Relevance for Bodily Self-Consciousness” [Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 702–710]. [REVIEW] Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):487.
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  30. Lukas Heydrich, Sebastian Dieguez, Thomas Grunwald, Margitta Seeck & Olaf Blanke (2010). Illusory Own Body Perceptions: Case Reports and Relevance for Bodily Self-Consciousness☆. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):702-710.
  31. Nicholas P. Holmes & Charles Spence (2006). Beyond the Body Schema: Visual, Prosthetic, and Technological Contributions to Bodily Perception and Awareness. In Günther Knoblich, Ian M. Thornton, Marc Grosjean & Maggie Shiffrar (eds.), Human Body Perception From the Inside Out. Oxford University Press. 15-64.
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  32. Line Ryberg Ingerslev (2013). My Body as an Object: Self-Distance and Social Experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):163-178.
    In phenomenology the body is often referred to as the lived body which makes the world familiar to me. In this paper, however, I discuss bodily self-consciousness in terms of self-distance. Self-distance is the suggestion that bodily self-consciousness consist in a reflective stance where you conceive of your body as a physical thing, an object in the world as well as the subject of bodily experiences. I argue that we are bodily self-conscious because we experience our own body in more (...)
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  33. S. Ionta, R. Gassert & O. Blanke (2010). Multi-Sensory and Sensorimotor Foundation of Bodily Self-Consciousness - an Interdisciplinary Approach. Frontiers in Psychology 2:383-383.
    Scientific investigations on the nature of the self have so far focused on high-level mechanisms. Recent evidence, however suggests that low-level, bottom-up, mechanisms of multisensory integration play a fundamental role in encoding some specific components of bodily self-consciousness, such as self-location and first-person perspective (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Self-location and the first-person perspective are abnormal in neurological patients suffering from out-of body experiences (Blanke et al., 2004), and can be experimentally manipulated in healthy subjects by multisensory conflicts (Lenggenhager et al., (...)
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  34. Günther Knoblich, Ian M. Thornton, Marc Grosjean & Maggie Shiffrar (eds.) (2006). Human Body Perception From the Inside Out. Oxford University Press.
    This volume will be an invaluable guide for student and professional researchers in visual perception, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience.
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  35. Dorothée Legrand (2007). Subjectivity and the Body: Introducing Basic Forms of Self-Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):577-582.
  36. Dorothée Legrand (2006). The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):89-118.
    A bodily self is characterized by pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness that is.
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  37. Dorothée Legrand & Susanne Ravn (2009). Perceiving Subjectivity in Bodily Movement: The Case of Dancers. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):389-408.
    This paper is about one of the puzzles of bodily self-consciousness: can an experience be both and at the same time an experience of one′s physicality and of one′s subjectivity ? We will answer this question positively by determining a form of experience where the body′s physicality is experienced in a non-reifying manner. We will consider a form of experience of oneself as bodily which is different from both “prenoetic embodiment” and “pre-reflective bodily consciousness” and rather corresponds to a form (...)
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  38. Bigna Lenggenhager, Michael Mouthon & Olaf Blanke (2009). Spatial Aspects of Bodily Self-Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):110-117.
  39. Bigna Lenggenhager, Tej Tadi, Thomas Metzinger & Olaf Blanke (2007). Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness. Science 317 (5841):1096-1099.
    Genes adjacent to species-specific loci are 6.2% older than genes adjacent to other dynamic loci (P < 10−2 by randomization; gray bars in Fig. 3); thus, species-specific genes are not randomly distributed but are found preferentially in the older regions, indicating that the incipient Escherichia and Salmonella lineages continued to participate in recombination at loci unlinked to lineage-specific genes.
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  40. Béatrice Longuenesse (2006). Self-Consciousness and Consciousness of One's Own Body: Variations on a Kantian Theme. Philosophical Topics 34 (1/2):283-309.
  41. Tommy L. Lott (1989). Anscombe on Justifying Claims to Know One's Bodily Position. Philosophical Investigations 12 (October):293-307.
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  42. Michael G. F. Martin (1995). Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Mit Press. 267–289.
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