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  1. David M. Armstrong (1964). Vesey on Bodily Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (August):247-248.
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  2. David M. Armstrong (1963). Vesey on Sensations of Heat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (December):359-362.
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  3. David M. Armstrong (1962). Bodily Sensations. Routledge.
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  4. Luca Barlassina & Albert Newen (2013). The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1).
    In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's (2004) pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural (...)
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  5. Ned Block (2005). Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press. 137-142.
    Representationism1, as I use the term, says that the phenomenal character of an experience just is its representational content, where that representational content can itself be understood and characterized without appeal to phenomenal character. Representationists seem to have a harder time handling pain than visual experience. (I say 'seem' because in my view, representationists cannot actually handle either type of experience successfully, but I will put that claim to one side here.) I will argue that Michael Tye's (2004) heroic attempt (...)
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  6. Richard Combes (1991). Disembodying 'Bodily' Sensations. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 107 (2):107-131.
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  7. David A. Conway (1973). Sensations and Bodily Position: A Conclusive Argument? Philosophical Studies 24 (September):353-354.
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  8. Frederique de Vignemont (2007). Habeas Corpus: The Sense of Ownership of One's Own Body. Mind and Language 22 (4):427-449.
    What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.
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  9. Eva-Maria Engelen (2012). Das Gefühl des Lebendigseins Als Einfache Form Phänomenalen Bewusstseins. Ein Aristotelischer Theorieansatz. In Marienberg Sabine & Fingerhut Jörg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive / Gefühle des Lebendigseins. De Gruyter.
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  10. Eva-Maria Engelen (2012). Das Gefühl des Lebendigseins Als Einfache Form Phänomenalen Bewusstseins. Ein Aristotelischer Theorieansatz. In Joerg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive / Gefühle des Lebendigseins. De Gruyter.
    This paper works out which conceptual and theoretical preconditions have to be met, among others, in order for a living creature to be able to have a feeling of being alive beyond the mere capacity for sensation. For the emergence of such a feeling, which can be equated with a rudimentary phenomenal consciousness (1.), it is not enough for the organism to be alive (2. a.). Rather it has to be able to conceive its body as a unit and to (...)
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  11. Todd Ganson & Dorit Ganson (2010). Everyday Thinking About Bodily Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):523-534.
    In the opening section of this paper we spell out an account of our na ve view of bodily sensations that is of historical and philosophical significance. This account of our shared view of bodily sensations captures common ground between Descartes, who endorses an error theory regarding our everyday thinking about bodily sensations, and Berkeley, who is more sympathetic with common sense. In the second part of the paper we develop an alternative to this account and discuss what is at (...)
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  12. Richard J. Hall (2008). If It Itches, Scratch! Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):525 – 535.
    Many bodily sensations are connected quite closely with specific actions: itches with scratching, for example, and hunger with eating. Indeed, these connections have the feel of conceptual connections. With the exception of D. M. Armstrong, philosophers have largely neglected this aspect of bodily sensations. In this paper, I propose a theory of bodily sensations that explains these connections. The theory ascribes intentional content to bodily sensations but not, strictly speaking, representational content. Rather, the content of these sensations is an imperative: (...)
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  13. Terry Horgan & John Tienson, The Phenomenology of Embodied Agency.
    For the last 20 years or so, philosophers of mind have been using the term ‘qualia’, which is frequently glossed as standing for the “what-it-is-like” of experience. The examples of what-it-is-like that are typically given are feelings of pain or itches, and color and sound sensations. This suggests an identification of the experiential what-it-islike with such states. More recently, philosophers have begun speaking of the “phenomenology“ of experience, which they have also glossed as “what-it-is-like”. Many say, for example, that any (...)
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  14. John Hyman (2006). Reply to Wyller. Philosophy 81 (317):531-534.
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  15. Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang (2011). Self-Consciousness and Immunity. Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):78-99.
    Sydney Shoemaker, developing an idea of Wittgenstein’s, argues that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. Although we might be liable to error when “I” (or its cognates) is used as an object, we are immune to error when “I” is used as a subject (as when one says, “I have a toothache”). Shoemaker claims that the relationship between “I” as-subject and the mental states of which it is introspectively aware is tautological: when, say, we (...)
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  16. Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang (2010). Mental Ownership and Higher-Order Thought: Response to Rosenthal. Analysis 70 (3):496-501.
  17. Joseph M. Magee (2003). Unmixing the Intellect: Aristotle on the Cognitive Powers and Bodily Organs. Greenwood Press.
    Analyzes Aristotle's doctrine of the intellect and sensation.
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  18. María G. Navarro (2012). Review of 'Cuerpo vivido'. [REVIEW] Revista de Hispanismo Filosófico 17:283-286.
    Agustín Serrano de Haro edita y presenta en el volumen colectivo Cuerpo vivido una selección de textos memorables en torno a lo que en 1925 fue denominado programáticamente por Ortega y Gasset una “topografía de nuestra intimidad”. La reflexión fenomenológica acerca del intracuerpo fue un tema que ha preocupado y preocupa de manera notoria a los filósofos cuyos trabajos reúne este colectivo: Ortega y Gasset, José Gaos, Joaquín Xirau, Leopoldo-Eulogio Palacios y Agustín Serrano de Haro. Pese a ello, tal vez (...)
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  19. Stuart Rachels (2000). Is Unpleasantness Intrinsic to Unpleasant Experiences? Philosophical Studies 99 (2):187-210.
    Unpleasant experiences include backaches, moments of nausea, moments of nervousness, phantom pains, and so on. What does their unpleasantness consist in? The unpleasantness of an experience has been thought to consist in: (1) its representing bodily damage; (2) its inclining the subject to fight its continuation; (3) the subject's disliking it; (4) features intrinsic to it. I offer compelling objections to (1) and (2) and less compelling objections to (3). I defend (4) against five challenging objections and offer two reasons (...)
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  20. Louise Richardson (2013). Bodily Sensation and Tactile Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):134-154.
  21. Merrill Ring (1982). Sensations and Kinaesthetic Knowledge. Philosophy Research Archives, No. NO 1485:111-168.
    When Wittgenstein said psychology contains conceptual confusions and experimental results, one item he had in mind was the psycho-physiological theory of kinaesthesis, which offers an account of how we know limb movement and position. The aim of this essay is to develop and evaluate the objections to that theory which have been produced by Wittgenstein, Melden and Anscombe. That project involves specifying clearly what is involved in the theory, resolving various disagreements between the critics, showing the pattern of the objections, (...)
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  22. Howard L. Rolston (1965). Kinaesthetic Sensations Revisited. Journal of Philosophy 62 (February):96-100.
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  23. C. Strang (1961). The Perception of Heat. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:239-252.
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  24. David Vender (2010). Reid's Discovery of the Sense of Balance. Journal of Scottish Thought 3:23 - 40.
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  25. Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1967). Margolis on the Location of Bodily Sensations. Analysis 27 (April):174-176.
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  26. Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1964). Armstrong on Bodily Sensations. [REVIEW] Philosophy 39 (April):177-181.
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  27. Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1964). Bodily Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (August):232-247.
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  28. Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1963). Armstrong on Sensations of Heat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (August):250-254.
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  29. Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1961). The Location of Bodily Sensations. Mind 70 (January):25-35.
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