About this topic
Summary This category is about whether or not computers, robots, and software agents can literally be said to think.  Humans think, chimps think, dogs think, cats and birds think. But do computers?  Is your computer thinking now?  Perhaps only specially programmed computers think?  Or perhaps only computers with special hardware can think -- hardware that resembles the neurons of the brain, for example. If computers can be made to think, then does that mean that humans are a kind of robot and their brains a kind of computer -- a neurocomputer, say?  One of the deeper issues here is that the term "thinking" is ambiguous in at least two ways: It can include being conscious of one's environment (surroundings), one's personal feelings and thoughts, etc., or it can mean cogitate, learn, plan, and solve problems, where these latter terms pick out mental events that may or may not be conscious.   
Key works The idea that machines could think occurred to the very first computer builders and programmers.  See, e.g., Alan Turing's great paper Turing 1950.  The term "artificial intelligence" (AI) goes back to a summer conference in held 1956 at Dartmouth College in New Hampshire.  Many AI pioneers took it for granted that within a decade or two computers would be as intelligent as humans.  A central paper from this time is McCarthy & Hayes 1969.  Another crucial paper is Putnam's Putnam 1960.  But the optimism proved to be unjustified.  The decades came and went without machines achieving human-level intelligence.  Soon several philosophers and other researchers argued that computers would never think and that human brains and minds were completely different from computers.  The most important paper in this push-back was John Searle's famous paper: Searle 1980, where he argues that machines cannot think at all because they lack the proper semantical connection to the world.  Summaries and replies to Searle's paper accompany it in the same journal issue (Searle 1980).  Also, a summary of Searle's anti-AI argument and many replies to it can be found in Dietrich 1994.  Another form of attack on AI came from Lucas 1961, who argued that Godel's famous Incompleteness Theorems showed that machines could not think.  This theme was reinvigorated by Roger Penrose in his well-known book Penrose 1989.  Yet another form of attack on AI came from Fodor 1987.  All of these attacks on AI spawned a large literature trying to refute them, agreeing with them, or amending them. To this day, it is not known whether or not machines (computers) can think, nor if humans are machines.  Nevertheless, the effort to build intelligent machines continues, and this is probably the best way to answer the question.
Introductions See Searle 1980 and the associated replies for a good introduction to the issues surrounding Searle's attack on AI. For some good history of AI, which raises many important issues, see Pamela McCorduck's McCorduck 2004 and Daniel Crevier's AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence (1993).  
  Show all references
Related categories
Subcategories:See also:
1253 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 1253
Material to categorize
  1. John Anderson (1930). Cattell Group Intelligence Tests. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 8:235.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. John E. Anderson (1920). Intelligence Tests of Yale Freshmen. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 17 (17):469-469.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. F. C. Becker (1913). E La Mettrie's Man a Machine. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 10 (21):582.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. John Beloff (1994). Minds and Machines: A Radical Dualist Perspective. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (1):32-37.
    The article begins with a discussion about what might constitute consciousness in entities other than oneself and the implications of the mind-brain debate for the possibility of a conscious machine. While referring to several other facets of the philosophy of mind, the author focuses on epiphenomenalism and interactionism and presents a critique of the former in terms of biological evolution. The interactionist argument supports the relevance of parapsychology to the problem of consciousness and the statistical technique of meta-analysis is cited (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Benjamin Bennett (2011). The Thinking Machine. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1:7-26.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Dong Biao (2008). The Yan'an New Philosophy Association: An Ambitious Intellectual Machine of the CCP [J]. Modern Philosophy 3:011.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. John Biro (2007). Intelligence, behavior and internal processing/Inteligência, comportamento e processamento interno. Manuscrito 30 (2):291-315.
    Ned Block has recently adduced some new arguments to show that “psychologism is true and thus a natural behaviorist analysis of intelligence that is incompatible with psychologism is false”. He introduces a thought experiment in which a machine is programmed to exhibit intelligent-seeming behavior and appeals to our intuition that such a machine is nevertheless not really inteligent; he traces that intuition to the fact that the machine is being thought of as operating with internal processes that, first, lack a (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Russell Blackford (2011). Editorial: Of Minds and Machines. Journal of Evolution and Technology 22 (1):i-ii.
    This special issue of JET deals with questions relating to our radically enhanced future selves or our possible “mind children” – conscious beings that we might bring about through the development of advanced computers and robots. Our mind children might exceed human levels of cognition, and avoid many human limitations and vulnerabilities. In a call for papers earlier this year, the editors asked how far we ought to go with processes that might ultimately convert humans to some sort of post-biological (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. K. H. Bläsius & Hans-jürgen Bürckert (1989). Deduction Systems in Artificial Intelligence.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. E. K. Blum (1965). Enumeration of Recursive Sets By Turing Machine. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 11 (3):197-201.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Margaret A. Boden (1982). Artificial Intelligence and Biological Reductionism. University of Sussex.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. David L. Boyer (1983). J. R. Lucas, Kurt Godel, and Fred Astaire. Philosophical Quarterly 33 (131):147-159.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Alan Bundy (1981). Mental Machines Rule Ok. Dept. Of Artificial Intelligence, University of Edinburgh.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. N. F. Bunnin (1980). Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man. Philosophical Books 21 (1):46-48.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Ludovic Burel-Regular (2002). A Girl And A Machine. Multitudes 8.
    Long restricted to ’reproductive’ activity- and thus considered economically ’inactive’- women were judged lacking in the capacity to create economic value. She appears today at the very heart of the production of knowledge, wealth, language and affect. Today, whilst capital aims its valorisation directly at the interior of circuits of creation , it remains incapable of subsuming it.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Arthur W. Burks, From ENIAC to the Stored Program Computer : Two Revolutions in Computers.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Cyril Burt (1961). Intelligence and Attainment Tests. The Eugenics Review 53 (1):41.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Cyril Burt (1939). The Latest Revision of the Binet Intelligence Tests. The Eugenics Review 30 (4):255.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Cyril Burt (1923). Intelligence Tests and Their Use. The Eugenics Review 15 (1):350.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Robert G. Burton (1993). Natural and Artificial Minds. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Raúl Carnota & Ricardo Rodríguez (2011). AGM Theory and Artificial Intelligence. In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science. Springer 1--42.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Harold D. Carrier (1999). Artificial Intelligence and Metaphor Making: Some Philosophic Considerations. Knowledge, Technology & Policy 12 (1):45-59.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. John L. Casti (1995). If d'Arcy Had Only Had a Computer:How Computers Have Changed the Face of Science. Complexity 1 (3):5-8.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. P. Ceruzzi (1999). Talking Back to the Machine: Computers and Human Aspiration. Knowledge, Technology & Policy 12 (3):115-116.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. K. Chalvet-Monfray, P. Auger, L. P. Belzunces, C. Fléché & P. Sabatier (1996). Modelling Based Method for Pharmacokinetic Hypotheses Test. Acta Biotheoretica 44 (3-4):335-348.
    The aim of this work is to propose methods to test mechanism of synergy of toxic agents in bees. A synergy between prochloraz, an imidazole fungicide, and deltamethrin, a pyrethroid insecticide, was demonstrated experimentally. The hypothesis is that prochloraz modifies the penetration or the metabolism of deltamethrin. This hypothesis is tested using a pharmacokinetic box model. A previous experimental work showed that bee instantaneous mortalities were higher, from the time t 1 to the time t 2 after spraying, in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. A. Clark (1988). J. Haugeland, "Artificial Intelligence". Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151):249.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. J. J. Clarke (1972). Turing Machines and the Mind-Body Problem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (February):1-12.
  28. Andrew Clifton, The Introspection Game - or, Does the Tin Man Have a Heart?
    Eliminative functionalism is the view that mental attributes, of humans and other machines, consist ultimately in behavioural abilities or dispositions. Hence, ‘Strong AI’: if a machine consistently acts as if it were fully conscious, then conscious it is. From these assumptions, optimistic futurists have derived a variety of remarkable visions of our ‘post-human’ future; from widely-recognised ‘robot rights’ to ‘mind uploading’, immortality, ‘apotheosis’ and beyond. It is argued here, however, that eliminative functionalism is false; for at least on our present (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Jonathan Cohen (1955). Can There Be Artificial Minds? Analysis 16 (2):36 - 41.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. L. Jonathan Cohen & A. D. Booth (1970). Machine Translation. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (79):187.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. C. L. Constance (1932). Correlation by Calculating Machine. Journal of Experimental Psychology 15 (4):458.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Jack Copeland (1996). On Alan Turing's Anticipation of Connectionism. Synthese 108 (3):361-377.
    It is not widely realised that Turing was probably the first person to consider building computing machines out of simple, neuron-like elements connected together into networks in a largely random manner. Turing called his networks unorganised machines. By the application of what he described as appropriate interference, mimicking education an unorganised machine can be trained to perform any task that a Turing machine can carry out, provided the number of neurons is sufficient. Turing proposed simulating both the behaviour of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Jack Copeland (1994). Turing, Wittgenstein, and the Science of the Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):497-519.
  34. J. W. Cornman, G. Cottrell, R. Cummins, A. Cussins, L. Darden, C. Darwin, W. Demopoulos, M. Derthick, H. Gardner & M. S. Gazzaniga (1993). Dreyfus, HL, 3% Dreyfus, SE, 396. In Scott M. Christensen & Dale R. Turner (eds.), Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. L. Erlbaum
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. A. T. C. Cree (1902). The Axe Test. The Classical Review 16 (04):194-195.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Juremir Machado da Silva (2009). Lula, la Machine À Communiquer. Hermes 53:193.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Armand de Callataÿ (1991). Paradigm Shifts in Artificial Intelligence. In P. A. Flach (ed.), Future Directions in Artificial Intelligence. New York: Elsevier Science
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Molisa Derk (2011). An on-Line Graduate Degree in Computers and Society. Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 41 (1):19-22.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Farzad Didehvar & Mohammad Saleh Zareepour, Epistemological Observations About Mind-Machine Equivalence.
    One of the highly contraversial discussions in philosophy of mind is equivalence of human being mind and machines. Here we show that no one could prove that, in certain he is a machine.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Vincent J. Digricoli (1986). Mind and Computer. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):442-451.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Bj Dotzler (1989). Kant and Turing-on the Archaeology of Thought on the Machine. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 96 (1):115-131.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Fred Dretske (1998). Minds, Machines, and Money: What Really Explains Behavior. In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer 157--173.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. K. Dunlap & A. Snyder (1920). Practice Effects in Intelligence Tests. Journal of Experimental Psychology 3 (5):396.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. A. R. E. (1966). Computers and the Human Mind: An Introduction to Artificial Intelligence. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 20 (1):150-150.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Suitbert Ertel (2005). Are ESP Test Results Stochastic Artifacts? Brugger & Taylor's Claims Under Scrutiny. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (3):61-80.
    Peter Brugger & Kirsten Taylor (B&T) regard positive extrasensory perception (ESP) test results as methodical artifacts. In their view, sequences of guessing, e.g. of symbol cards, being non-random, overlap with finite sequences of non-random targets, and surpluses of hits from chance are deemed to be due to correlated non- randomness. The present author's ESP test data obtained from his 'ball drawing test' applied with N = 231 psychology majors were used for testing five hypotheses derived from B&T's (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Thomas Eudaly, Response [to Whitmer's "Intentionality, Artificial Intelligence and the Causal Powers of the Brain"].
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Luis Farinas del Cerro, Andreas Herzig & Jerome Mengin (eds.) (2012). Logics in Artificial Intelligence. Springer.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Solomon Feferman (2009). Gödel, Nagel, Minds, and Machines. Journal of Philosophy 106 (4):201-219.
    Ernest Nagel Lecture, Columbia University, Sept. 27, 2007.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Peter A. Flach (1991). The Dialectics of Artificial Intelligence. In P. A. Flach (ed.), Future Directions in Artificial Intelligence. New York: Elsevier Science
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Bent Flyvbjerg (1992). Dreyfus & Dreyfus: Opretholdelse Af Ikke-Rationaliserede Praksisser. Philosophia 21 (1-2).
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1253