This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related

Contents
49 found
Order:
  1. Carnap's Formal Philosophy of Science.Hans P. Halvorson - forthcoming - In Christian Damböck & Georg Schiemer (eds.), Rudolf Carnap Handbuch. Metzler Verlag.
  2. An Introduction to Philosophy of Science.Adam Tamas Tuboly - forthcoming - In Christian Damböck & Georg Schiemer (eds.), Rudolf Carnap Handbuch. J.B. Metzer Verlag.
  3. The Chicago Years (1936-1951).Adam Tamas Tuboly - forthcoming - In Christian Damböck & Georg Schiemer (eds.), Rudolf Carnap Handbuch. J.B. Metzer Verlag.
  4. Taking models seriously and being a linguistic realist.Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo & Gilson Olegario da Silva - 2022 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 26 (1):73-94.
    Carnap's conception of linguistic frameworks is widespread; however, it is not entirely clear nor consensual to pinpoint what is the influence of his stance within the traditional realist/anti-realist debate. In this paper, we place Carnap as a proponent of a scientific realist stance, by presenting what he called “linguistic realism”. Some possible criticisms are considered, and a case study is offered with wave function realism, a popular position in the philosophy of quantum mechanics.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. Two Constants in Carnap’s View on Scientific Theories.Sebastian Lutz - 2021 - In Sebastian Lutz & Adam Tamas Tuboly (eds.), Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences: From Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy of Physics. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 354-378.
    The received view on the development of the correspondence rules in Carnap’s philosophy of science is that at first, Carnap assumed the explicit definability of all theoretical terms in observational terms and later weakened this assumption. In the end, he conjectured that all observational terms can be explicitly defined in in theoretical terms, but not vice versa. I argue that from the very beginning, Carnap implicitly held this last view, albeit at times in contradiction to his professed position. To establish (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Conceptual re-engineering: from explication to reflective equilibrium.Georg Brun - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):925-954.
    Carnap and Goodman developed methods of conceptual re-engineering known respectively as explication and reflective equilibrium. These methods aim at advancing theories by developing concepts that are simultaneously guided by pre-existing concepts and intended to replace these concepts. This paper shows that Carnap’s and Goodman’s methods are historically closely related, analyses their structural interconnections, and argues that there is great systematic potential in interpreting them as aspects of one method, which ultimately must be conceived as a component of theory development. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  7. Analysis of (')Pseudoproblems(').Moritz Cordes - 2019 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22 (1):137-159.
    Pseudoproblems, pseudoquestions, pseudosentences (etc.) constitute an iridescent group of concepts which were prominently used by the Vienna Circle (including Wittgenstein). In the course of an explication this paper presents a compilation of the many different meanings that were given to these expressions. This includes the more prominent Viennese approaches as well as a more recent one by Roy Sorensen. A novel proposal concerning the use ofthe term is made, suggesting that nothing is just a pseudoproblem, but only relative to a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. Carnapian explications, experimental philosophy, and fruitful concepts.Steffen Koch - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (6):700-717.
    It seems natural to think that Carnapian explication and experimental philosophy can go hand in hand. But what exactly explicators can gain from the data provided by experimental philosophers remains controversial. According to an influential proposal by Shepherd and Justus, explicators should use experimental data in the process of ‘explication preparation’. Against this proposal, Mark Pinder has recently suggested that experimental data can directly assist an explicator’s search for fruitful replacements of the explicandum. In developing his argument, he also proposes (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  9. The Impact of Heinrich Rickert's Ideas about Chaos on Rudolf Carnap.Oleksandr Kulyk - 2019 - Wschodnioeuropejskie Czasopismo Naukowe 12 (8):43-45.
    This research aims to address the hypothesis of the possible influence of Rickert’s ideas about chaos on the philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. This paper considers arguments in favor of the hypothesis and those against it. I show that pieces of evidence exist, proving that Rickert’s interpretation of chaos influenced Rudolf Carnap when he was working on Der logische Aufbau der Welt. I argue that Carnap’s pre-Aufbau unpublished manuscript Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit demonstrates this influence. This study opens new vistas in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Hitting a Moving Target: Gödel, Carnap, and Mathematics as Logical Syntax.Gregory Lavers - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (2):219-243.
    From 1953 to 1959 Gödel worked on a response to Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics. The drafts display Gödel’s familiarity with Carnap’s position from The Logical Syntax of Language, but they received a dismissive reaction on their eventual, posthumous, publication. Gödel’s two principal points, however, will here be defended. Gödel, though, had wished simply to append a few paragraphs to show that the same arguments apply to Carnap’s later views. Carnap’s position, however, had changed significantly in the intervening years, and to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  11. Reichenbach Falls—And Rises? Reconstructing the Discovery/Justification Distinction.Monica Aufrecht - 2017 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (2):151-176.
    ABSTRACTThe distinction between ‘context of discovery’ and ‘context of justification’ in philosophy of science appears simple at first but contains interesting complexities. Paul Hoyningen-Huene has catalogued some of these complexities and suggested that the core usefulness of the ‘context distinction’ is in distinguishing between descriptive and normative perspectives. Here, I expand on Hoyningen-Huene’s project by tracing the label ‘context of discovery and context of justification’ to its origin. I argue that, contrary to initial appearances, Hans Reichenbach’s initial context distinction from (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Rudolf Carnap’s Incorporation of the Geisteswissenschaften in the Aufbau.Fons Dewulf - 2017 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (2):199-225.
    This article investigates the various ways in which Rudolf Carnap incorporated contemporary epistemological problems concerning the Geisteswissenschaften in Der logische Aufbau der Welt. I argue that Carnap defends a nonreductive incorporation of the Geisteswissenschaften within the unity of science. To this end Carnap aims to solve the problem of individuality, which was the focus of attention for important philosophers of the Geisteswissenschaften such as Wilhelm Dilthey, Heinrich Rickert, and Wilhelm Windelband. At the same time, Carnap argues that his constitutional method, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13. What Was the Syntax‐Semantics Debate in the Philosophy of Science About?Sebastian Lutz - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):319-352.
    The debate between critics of syntactic and semantic approaches to the formalization of scientific theories has been going on for over 50 years. I structure the debate in light of a recent exchange between Hans Halvorson, Clark Glymour, and Bas van Fraassen and argue that the only remaining disagreement concerns the alleged difference in the dependence of syntactic and semantic approaches on languages of predicate logic. This difference turns out to be illusory.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  14. Carnap on unified science.Ansten Klev - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 59:53-67.
    Unified science is a recurring theme in Carnap's work from the time of the Aufbau until the end of the 1930's. The theme is not constant, but knows several variations. I shall extract three quite precise formulations of the thesis of unified science from Carnap's work during this period: from the Aufbau, from Carnap's so-called syntactic period, and from "Testability and Meaning" and related papers. My main objective is to explain these formulations and to discuss their relation, both to each (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. X - Phi and Carnapian Explication.Joshua Shepherd & James Justus - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):381-402.
    The rise of experimental philosophy has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conceptual content remains unclear. We show how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap’s underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. This clarifies and extends x-phi’s positive philosophical import, and also exhibits explication’s broad appeal. But there is a potential problem: Carnap’s account of explication was limited to empirical and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  16. Explicating Explication: Carnap’s Ideal [Review of Carnap’s Ideal of Explication and Naturalism]. [REVIEW]Adam Tamas Tuboly - 2015 - The Berlin Review of Books (10).
    Carnap’s Ideal of Explication and Naturalism is the second book on Rudolf Carnap’s philosophy edited by Pierre Wagner for Palgrave Macmillan’s series The History of Analytic Philosophy. The collection of essays is important for several reasons both for philosophers and historians of philosophy, but some parts of it will also be valuable to anyone interested in general scientific methodologies. I shall first survey the theme in order to locate the collection within the recent philosophical discussion then I will consider the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. A Classic Statement of Logical Empiricism. [REVIEW]Adam Tamas Tuboly - 2015 - The Berlin Review of Books 2015.
    Eino Kaila’s recently translated Human Knowledge: A Classic Statement of Logical Empiricism from 1939 is an important document both in the history of analytic philosophy and the history of logical empiricism in particular. Kaila discusses all the relevant topics that featured in the discussions of the Vienna Circle in the early 1930s and provides a neat summary with his own historical narrative and critical remarks.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Carnap’s conventionalism in geometry.Stefan Lukits - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1):123-138.
    Against Thomas Mormann's argument that differential topology does not support Carnap's conventionalism in geometry we show their compatibility. However, Mormann's emphasis on the entanglement that characterizes topology and its associated metrics is not misplaced. It poses questions about limits of empirical inquiry. For Carnap, to pose a question is to give a statement with the task of deciding its truth. Mormann's point forces us to introduce more clarity to what it means to specify the task that decides between competing hypotheses (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. La filosofía de la ciencia y el lenguaje: relaciones cambiantes, alcances y límites.Pablo Lorenzano - 2011 - Arbor 187 (747):69-80.
    This paper consists of three sections. In the first one, some of the main developments in the philosophy of science through the xx century up to the present will be pointed out, and inserted them in the frame of some more general philosophical transformations, such as the so-called “linguistic turn” and “pragmatic turn”, respectively. In the second one, the established connection will be nuanced, from a revision of the work of a “classical” author such as Carnap. Finally, it will be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. Feminism and Carnap's Principle of Tolerance.Y. A. P. Audrey - 2010 - Hypatia 25 (2):437-454.
    The logical empiricists often appear as a foil for feminist theories. Their emphasis on the individualistic nature of knowledge and on the value-neutrality of science seems directly opposed to most feminist concerns. However, several recent works have highlighted aspects of Carnap's views that make him seem like much less of a straightforwardly positivist thinker. Certain of these aspects lend themselves to feminist concerns much more than the stereotypical picture would imply.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  21. Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment.Graham Bird - 2009 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (2):448-451.
  22. Introspection and change in Carnap’s logical behaviourism.Allard Tamminga - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):650-667.
    In the 1930s, Carnap set out to incorporate psychology into the unity of science, by showing that all cognitively meaningful sentences of psychology can be translated into the language of physics. I will argue that Carnap, relying on his notion of protocol languages, defends a physicalistic philosophy of psychology that shows due appreciation to 'introspection' as a strictly subjective, but reliable way to verify sentences about one’s own mind. Second, I will point out that Carnap’s philosophy of psychology not only (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. Review of John Bickle's Philosophy of Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Approach. [REVIEW]Cory Wright - 2004 - Theory and Psychology 14:855–857.
  24. Kant’s Explication and Carnap’s Explication.Giovanni Boniolo - 2003 - International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):289-298.
    In this paper I will compare the concept of explication à la Carnap and the concept of explication à la Kant. This essay should primarily be seen as a comparison of two different philosophical styles, but it is also intended as a vindication of what Kant wrote and what Carnap forgot to read.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  25. Het logische behaviorisme van Rudolf Carnap.Allard Tamminga - 2003 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 65 (3):541 - 565.
    In the 1930s, several members of the Vienna Circle set out to incorporate psychology in the unity of science, by showing that all cognitively significant sentences of psychology can be translated into the language of physics. This epistemological analysis of psychology has become known as logical behaviourism. Carnap was the first logical empiricist to expound this programme in considerable detail. Relying on his particular notion of protocol languages, Carnap develops a view on the philosophy of psychology that not only is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Carnap’s Construction of the World: The _Aufbau_ and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism[REVIEW]Andy Hamilton - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):402-405.
  27. Rudolf Carnap's ‘theoretical Concepts In Science'.Stathis Psillos - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (4):151-172.
    Rudolf Carnap delivered the hitherto unpublished lecture ‘Theoretical Concepts in Science’ at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, at Santa Barbara, California, on 29 December 1959. It was part of a symposium on ‘Carnap’s views on Theoretical Concepts in Science’. In the bibliography that appears in the end of the volume, ‘The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap’, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, a revised version of this address appears to be among Carnap’s forthcoming papers. But although Carnap started (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  28. Metaphysics, Carnap's Remedy and Mach's Science.Alfred Schramm - 1998-1999 - Philosophia Scientiae 3 (2):109 - 120.
    Starting from the question of whether Ernst Mach's well-known notion of "Elemente" (elements) must lead to the verdict that the arch-anti-metaphysician himself may be justly accused of holding an essantially metaphysical position, the idea of metaphysical neutrality is explained in Section I. Section II deals with Quine's verdict on abstract entities, among which Mach's elements would have to be counted if there were no way out of the Quinean test. Such a way out, it is proposed in section III, is (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Scientific Method: A Historical and Philosophical Introduction.Barry Gower - 1996 - New York: Routledge.
    The central theme running throughout this outstanding new survey is the nature of the philosophical debate created by modern science's foundation in experimental and mathematical method. More recently, recognition that reasoning in science is probabilistic generated intense debate about whether and how it should be constrained so as to ensure the practical certainty of the conclusions drawn. These debates brought to light issues of a philosophical nature which form the core of many scientific controversies today. _Scientific Method: A Historical and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  30. Carnap Y la imposibilidad de la semantica.Juan José Acero - 1995 - Theoria 10 (1):59-99.
  31. Carnap's Principle of Tolerance.Alan Richardson & Dan Isaacson - 1994 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68 (1):67 - 83.
    I see the perspective of Tolerance as enshrining an attitude toward philosophical work that stresses its continuity with the procedures of conceptual clarification through mathematisation found in the sciences. What I have tried to show is that Carnap's understanding of the philosophical foundations of mathematics is inseparable from his understanding of the business of philosophy of empirical science.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  32. In the tracks of the historicist movement: Re-assessing the Carnap-Kuhn connection.Guy S. Axtell - 1993 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (1):119-146.
    Thirty years after the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, sharp disagreement persists concerning the implications of Kuhn’s "historicist" challenge to empiricism. I discuss the historicist movement over the past thirty years, and the extent to which the discourse between two branches of the historical school has been influenced by tacit assumptions shared with Rudolf Carnap’s empiricism. I begin with an examination of Carnap’s logicism --his logic of science-- and his 1960 correspondence with Kuhn. I focus on (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  33. The evidence against Kronz.Peter Achinstein - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (2):169-175.
    Frederick Kronz constructs interesting examples in an attempt to show deficiencies in my concept of evidence and the advantages in Carnap's positive relevance idea. His discussion raises general questions of importance in developing an adequate account of scientific evidence questions about the relationship between evidence and belief and the role of emphasis in determining evidence. His examples are challenging, but do they work?
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  34. Significato e valutazione nella <Enciclopedia Internazionale della Scienza Unificata>.Alberto Pasquinelli - 1991 - In Il neoilluminismo italiano. Cronache di filosofia (1953-1962). Il Saggiatore. pp. 58-63.
  35. On the Character of Philosophic Problems.Rudolf Carnap - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (1):5-19.
  36. Carnap e o Positivismo Logico.Alberto Pasquinelli - 1983 - Edicoes 70.
  37. Hans Hahn & Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, La concezione scientifica del mondo - Il circolo di Vienna, 1929.Alberto Pasquinelli (ed.) - 1979 - Laterza.
  38. How Carnap built the world in 1928.Anders Wedberg - 1973 - Synthese 25 (3-4):337 - 371.
  39. Introduzione a Carnap.Alberto Pasquinelli - 1972 - Bari,: Laterza.
  40. Linguaggio, scienza e filosofia.Alberto Pasquinelli - 1961 - [Bologna]: Il Mulino.
  41. Über die definierbarkeit und empirische anwendung Von dispositionsbegriffen.Béla Juhos - 1959 - Kant Studien 51 (1-4):272-284.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. The methodological character of theoretical concepts.R. Carnap - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 (1):38--76.
  43. Semantic information.Yehoshua Bar-Hillel & Rudolf Carnap - 1953 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 4 (14):147-157.
  44. Review of Rudolf Carnap: International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, No. 3: Foundations of Logic and Mathematics_; Leonard Bloomfield: _International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, No. 4: Linguistic Aspects of Science[REVIEW]Paul Weiss - 1939 - Ethics 50 (1):119-120.
  45. Testability and Meaning—Continued.Rudolf Carnap - 1937 - Philosophy of Science 4 (1):1-40.
    It is not the aim of the present essay to defend the principle of empiricism against apriorism or anti-empiricist metaphysics. Taking empirism for granted, we wish to discuss, the question what is meaningful. The word ‘meaning’ will here be taken in its empiricist sense; an expression of language has meaning in this sense if we know how to use it in speaking about empirical facts, either actual or possible ones. Now our problem is what expressions are meaningful in this sense. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  46. Testability and meaning (part 2).Rudolf Carnap - 1937 - Philosophy of Science 4 (4):1-40.
  47. The Logicist Foundations of Mathematics.Rudolf Carnap - 1931 - In Paul Benacerraf & Hilary Putnam (eds.), Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings. Cambridge University Press. pp. 41--52.
  48. Carnap versus Godel: On Syntax and Tolerance.S. Awodey & A. W. Carus - unknown
    One thing we have found out about logical empiricism, now that people are examining it more closely again, is that it was more a framework for a number of related views than a single doctrine. The pluralism of different approaches among various adherents to the Vienna and Berlin groups has been much emphasized. Some have gone so far as to suggest that the kind of speculative philosophy now often called "continental" (including, say, phenomenology) can be seen as falling within the (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  49. Carnap, revisionism and "truth and confirmation".J. C. P. Oliveira - unknown
    In recent years, a revisionist process focused on logical positivism can be observed. One aspect of this revisionism -defended by authors like Michael Friedman, John Earman and George Reisch - is the thesis that Carnap’s later thought is compatible with that of Kuhn and even that Carnap anticipates some relevant points of Kuhn’s theory of science. In this paper I discuss one of Carnap’s texts most frequently cited by revisionists in favor of their thesis -"Truth and Confirmation" - trying to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation