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  1. Han Thomas Adriaenssen (2011). An Early Critic of Locke: The Anti-Scepticism of Henry Lee. Locke Studies 11:17-47.
    Although Henry Lee is often recognized to be an important early critic of Locke's 'way of ideas', his Anti-Scepticism (1702) has hardly received the scholarly attention it deserves. This paper seeks to fill that lacuna. It argues that Lee's criticism of Locke's alleged representationalism was original, and that it was quite different from the more familiar kind of criticism that was launched against Locke's theory of ideas by such thinkers as John Sergeant and Thomas Reid. In addition, the paper offers (...)
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  2. Kristoffer Ahlstrom (2011). Dream Skepticism and the Conditionality Problem. Erkenntnis 75 (1):45-60.
    Recently, Ernest Sosa (2007) has proposed two novel solutions to the problem of dream skepticism. In the present paper, I argue that Sosa’s first solution falls prey to what I will refer to as the conditionality problem, i.e., the problem of only establishing a conditional—in this case, if x, then I am awake, x being a placeholder for a condition incompatible with dreaming—in a context where it also needs to be established that we can know that the antecedent holds, and (...)
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  3. Henry E. Allison (2005). Hume's Philosophical Insouciance. Hume Studies 31 (2):317-346.
    This paper argues that Hume’s central concern in T 1.4.7 is to find a way to rely upon his cognitive faculties in spite of what he has learned about them in the preceding sections of part 4. The trouble is that having identified the understanding with “the general and more establish’d properties of the imagination” (T 1.4.7.6; SBN 267), Hume finds that these properties cannot function apart from other “seemingly trivial” ones, which calls into question the trustworthiness of his cognitive (...)
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  4. Claudio Almeida (2012). Epistemic Closure, Skepticism and Defeasibility. Synthese 188 (2):197-215.
    Those of us who have followed Fred Dretske's lead with regard to epistemic closure and its impact on skepticism have been half-wrong for the last four decades. But those who have opposed our Dretskean stance, contextualists in particular, have been just wrong. We have been half-right. Dretske rightly claimed that epistemic status is not closed under logical implication. Unlike the Dretskean cases, the new counterexamples to closure offered here render every form of contextualist pro-closure maneuvering useless. But there is a (...)
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  5. Jean-Robert Armogathe (2009). Part Five: Skepticism in Early Cartesianism. Early German Reactions to Huet's Censura. In Maia Neto, José Raimundo, Gianni Paganini & John Christian Laursen (eds.), Skepticism in the Modern Age: Building on the Work of Richard Popkin. Brill.
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  6. Sorin Bangu (2006). Underdetermination and the Argument From Indirect Confirmation. Ratio 19 (3):269–277.
    In this paper I criticize one of the most convincing recent attempts to resist the underdetermination thesis, Laudan’s argument from indirect confirmation. Laudan highlights and rejects a tacit assumption of the underdetermination theorist, namely that theories can be confirmed only by empirical evidence that follows from them. He shows that once we accept that theories can also be confirmed indirectly, by evidence not entailed by them, the skeptical conclusion does not follow. I agree that Laudan is right to reject this (...)
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  7. Dorit Bar-On (1990). Scepticism: The External World and Meaning. Philosophical Studies 60 (3):207 - 231.
    In this paper, I compare and contrast two kinds of scepticism, Cartesian scepticism about the external world and Quinean scepticism about meaning. I expose Quine's metaphysical claim that there are no facts of the matter about meaning as a sceptical response to a sceptical problem regarding the possibility of our knowledge of meanings. I argue that this sceptical response is overkill; for the sceptical problem about our knowledge of meanings may receive a treatment similar to the naturalistic treatment Quine himself (...)
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  8. James Beebe (2010). Constraints on Sceptical Hypotheses. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):449 - 470.
    I examine the conditions which hypotheses must satisfy if they are to be used to raise significant sceptical challenges. I argue that sceptical hypotheses do not have to be logically, metaphysically or epistemically possible: they need only to depict scenarios subjectively indistinguishable from the actual world and to show how subjects can believe what they do while not having knowledge. I also argue that sceptical challenges can be raised against a priori beliefs, even if those beliefs are necessarily true. I (...)
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  9. Giulia Belgioioso (2009). The Hyperbolic Way to the Truth From Balzac to Descartes : "Toute Hyperbole Tend Là, de Nous Amener à la Vérité Par l'Excès de la Vérité, C'est-à-Dire Par la Mensonge". In Maia Neto, José Raimundo, Gianni Paganini & John Christian Laursen (eds.), Skepticism in the Modern Age: Building on the Work of Richard Popkin. Brill.
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  10. Jose Benardete (1982). Sceptical Essays. Review of Metaphysics 36 (2):463-464.
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  11. José Luis Bermúdez (2008). Cartesian Skepticism: Arguments and Antecedents. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
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  12. José Luis Bermúdez (2000). The Originality of Cartesian Skepticism: Did It Have Ancient or Mediaeval Antecedents? History of Philosophy Quarterly 17 (4):333 - 360.
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  13. José Luis Bermúdez (1998). Levels of Scepticism in the First Meditation. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 6 (2):237-245.
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  14. José Luis Bermúdez (1997). Scepticism and Science in Descartes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):743-772.
    Recent work on Descartes has drastically revised the traditional conception of Descartes as a paradigmatic rationalist and foundationalist. The traditional picture, familar from histories of philosophy and introductory lectures, is of a solitary meditator dedicated to the pursuit of certainty in a unified science via a rigourous process of logical deduction from indubitable first principles. But the Descartes that has emerged from recent studies strikes a more subtle balance between metaphysics, physics, epistemology and the philosophy of science. There is much (...)
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  15. José Luis Bermúdez (1995). Skepticism and Subjectivity. International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2):141-158.
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  16. Alexander Bird (2001). Scepticism and Contrast Classes. Analysis 61 (2):97–107.
    1. Contextualism seeks to acknowledge the power of sceptical arguments while permitting to be true at least some of the assertions of knowledge and justification we commonly make. It seems to me now just as if I am in an office in Edinburgh. According to the sceptic the claim that I am in fact in an office in Edinburgh is unjustified, since there is no reason I can give for this belief that is not also consistent with (or undermined by) (...)
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  17. Carolyn Black (1999). Naturalistic Responses to Skepticism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 57:67-79.
    One of the many philosophical responses to scepticism is naturalism. It is explored how and to what extent it is successful in discussing these questions as they pertain external world scepticism. One interesting feature of naturalism is that it shares with scepticism the view that we lack proof and knowledge of an external world. The naturalist, however, unlike many sceptics and their more traditional disputants, doesn't think it matters. The first part of the paper contains a description of the naturalistic (...)
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  18. Constance Blackwell (2009). Part Four: Sources of Cartesian Doubt. Aristotle's Perplexity Becomes Descartes's Doubt : Metaphysics 3, 1 and Methodical Doubt in Benito Pereira and René Descartes. [REVIEW] In Maia Neto, José Raimundo, Gianni Paganini & John Christian Laursen (eds.), Skepticism in the Modern Age: Building on the Work of Richard Popkin. Brill.
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  19. Richard J. Blackwell (1962). The History of Scepticism From Erasmus to Descartes. The Modern Schoolman 39 (4):391-393.
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  20. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2006). A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):381–390.
    The most prominent arguments for scepticism in modern epistemology employ closure principles of some kind. To begin my discussion of such arguments, consider Simple Knowledge Closure (SKC): (SKC) (Kxt[p] ∧ (p → q)) → Kxt[q].1 Assuming its truth for the time being, the sceptic can use (SKC) to reason from the two assumptions that, firstly, we don’t know ¬sh and that, secondly, op entails ¬sh to the conclusion that we don’t know op, where ‘op’ and ‘sh’ are shorthand for ‘ordinary (...)
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  21. C. De Boer (1931). Sceptical Notes on the Sense-Datum. Journal of Philosophy 28 (19):505 - 519.
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  22. James Bogen & Morton Beckner (1979). An Empirical Refutation of Cartesian Scepticism. Mind 88 (351):351-369.
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  23. O. K. Bouwsma (1945). Des Cartes' Skepticism of the Senses. Mind 54 (216):313-322.
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  24. Harry M. Bracken (2004). Scepticism in the Enlightenment. International Studies in Philosophy 36 (1):252-254.
  25. Janet Broughton (1984). Skepticism and the Cartesian Circle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (4):593 - 615.
    I argue that descartes thinks he can be metaphysically certain about each premise in the argument for god's existence, Even before he draws the argument's final conclusion that all his distinct ideas are metaphysically certain. The certainty of the personal premises is secured in the second meditation. The certainty of the causal premises, I argue, Arises from their central role in generating reasons for doubt of the kind that interest descartes.
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  26. A. L. Brueckner (2000). Klein on Closure and Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):139-151.
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  27. Anthony Brueckner (2008). Reply to Coffman on Closure and Skepticism. Synthese 162 (2):167–171.
    E. J. Coffman defends Peter Klein’s work on epistemic closure against various objections that I raised in an earlier paper. In this paper, I respond to Coffman.
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  28. Anthony Brueckner (2005). Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):384–391.
    Fallibilism about knowledge and justification is a widely held view in epistemology. In this paper, I will try to arrive at a proper formulation of fallibilism. Fallibilists often hold that Cartesian skepticism is a view that deserves to be taken seriously and dealt with somehow. I argue that it turns out that a canonical form of skeptical argument depends upon the denial of fallibilism. I conclude by considering a response on behalf of the skeptic.
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  29. Anthony Brueckner (1994). Review: Skepticism and Foundationalism. [REVIEW] Noûs 28 (4):533 - 547.
  30. Anthony Brueckner (1992). Problems with the Wright Route to Skepticism. Mind 101 (402):309-317.
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  31. Anthony Brueckner (1985). ``Skepticism and Epistemic Closure&Quot. Philosophical Topics 13:89--117.
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  32. Anthony L. Brueckner (1994). Knowledge of Content and Knowledge of the World. Philosophical Review 103 (2):327-343.
    In "Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism,"' Kevin Falvey and Joseph Owens argue that externalism with respect to mental content does not engender skepticism about knowledge of content. They go on to argue that even when externalism is freed from epistemological difficulties, the thesis cannot be used against Cartesian skepticism about knowledge of the external world. I would like to raise some questions about these claims.
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  33. Anthony L. Brueckner (1985). Transmission for Knowledge Not Established. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (139):193-195.
    In "Nozick on Scepticism", Graeme Forbes attempts to establish a Transmission Principle for knowledge which has been challenged by a number of anti-sceptical philosophers (such as Nozick). This principle (or something like it) seems to be required by Cartesian sceptical arguments, so if it could be refuted, this would apparently rid us of such scepticism. I do not believe that Nozick or anyone else has refuted the principle, yet I will argue that Forbes has certainly failed to establish it.
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  34. Reid Buchanan (2002). Natural Doubts: Williams's Diagnosis of Scepticism. Synthese 131 (1):57 - 80.
    Michael Williams believes that scepticism about the externalworld seems compelling only because the considerations that underpin it are thoughtto be ``mere platitudes'''' about e.g., the nature and source of human knowledge, and hence,that if it shown through a ``theoretical diagnosis'''' that it does not rest upon suchplatitudes, but contentious theoretical considerations that we are no means bound toaccept, we can simply dismiss the absurd sceptical conclusion. Williams argues thatscepticism does presuppose two extremely contentious doctrines, however, he admits thatif (...)
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  35. John Burkey (1990). Descartes, Skepticism, and Husserl's Hermeneutic Practice. Husserl Studies 7 (1):1-27.
    In the preceding pages, Husserl's objections to the content of Descartes'Meditations on First Philosophy have been reconstructed over the line ofargument in that work. The tone of his interpretation moved from ambivalence to outfight rejection. Husserl's ambivalence manifested itself intwo of the three meditations to which he pays significant attention. We sawthe much heralded methodological strategy of the First Meditation, uponclose examination, is not endorsed by Husserl, that he finds reason toprotest (...)
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  36. Luigi Caranti (2006). Kant's Criticism of Descartes in the “Reflexionen Zum Idealismus” (1788–1793). Kant-Studien 97 (3):318-342.
    Kant devotes to the problem of Cartesian skepticism a constant attention throughout his philosophical career. His first attempt to refute the skeptic goes back to the 1755 Nova Delucidatio, while other arguments, both in the pre-critical and in the critical period, follow one another in a rather erratic effort to remove the “scandal” of philosophy, that is, our inability to prove the existence of the external world beyond doubt. This on-going struggle against the skeptic does not end with the 1787 (...)
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  37. Toni Vogel Carey (2002). Taming the Skeptical Dragon. Philosophy Now 35:7-9.
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  38. Wolfgang Carl (1997). Apperception and Spontaneity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (2):147 – 163.
    The interest contemporary philosophy takes in Kant's notion of apperception is restricted to his criticism of the Cartesian Ego and to his refutation of scepticism, but there is a profound lack of concern for the notion itself and for the act of spontaneity in particular which is connected with the use of the word T. Starting from a comparison of Wittgenstein's account of this use with Kant's considerations it is argued that the latter aims at a theory of formal conditions (...)
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  39. F. F. Centore (1981). Hume, Reid and Scepticism. Philosophical Studies 28:212-220.
  40. Roderick M. Chisholm (1973). Empirical Knowledge; Readings From Contemporary Sources. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
    Nelson, L. The impossibility of the "Theory of knowledge."--Moore, G. E. Four forms of skepticism.--Lehrer, K. Skepticism & conceptual change.--Quine, W. V. Epistemology naturalized.--Rozeboom, W. W. Why I know so much more than you do.--Price, H. H. Belief and evidence.--Lewis, C. I. The bases of empirical knowledge.--Malcolm, N. The verification argument.--Firth, R. The anatomy of certainty.--Chisholm, R. M. On the nature of empirical evidence.--Meinong, A. Toward an epistemological assessment of memory.--Brandt, R. The epistemological status of memory beliefs.--Malcolm, N. A definition (...)
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  41. Brad Chynoweth (2010). Descartes' Resolution of the Dreaming Doubt. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):153-179.
    After resolving the dreaming doubt at the end of the Sixth Meditation, Descartes concedes to Hobbes that one could apply the criterion for waking experience in a dream and thus be deceived, but he no longer considers this possibility to have skeptical force. I argue that this is a legitimate response by Descartes since 1) the dreaming doubt in the Sixth Meditation is no longer a global skeptical hypothesis as it is in the First, and 2) the level of certainty (...)
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  42. Avner Cohen (1984). Descartes, Consciousness and Depersonalization: Viewing the History of Philosophy From a Strausian Perspective. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 9 (1):7-28.
    This paper develops particular Strausian-like themes on the formation and structure of the Cartesian problematic. Particularly, my interest is to link the Cartesian ‘invention’ of consciousness (or ‘the mental’) in the philosophy of mind with the issues of representation and ‘the problem of the external world’ in epistemology. The Cartesian novelty becomes clear by comparing Cartesian scepticism with Greek classical scepticism. I end with some speculative clinical (i.e., psychiatric) suggestions on possible roots of the Cartesian invention. Keywords: Consciousness, Externalization, Dualism, (...)
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  43. David Cole, The Return of the Evil Genius.
    Descartes refuted skepticism in 1641. George Berkeley refuted skepticism in 1710. O.K. Bouwsma refuted skepticism in 1949. Hilary Putnam refuted skepticism in 1981. The locus classicus for the form of skepticism refuted is Descartes' Meditations -- which also goes on to set out a famous realist refutation of skepticism. Indeed, Descartes is the principal inventor of the philosophic enterprise of skepticism refutation so central to Modern philosophy and its epistemic preoccupations. What the cited successors of Descartes and many others have (...)
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  44. Earl Conee (2004). Externalism, Internalism, and Skepticism. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):78–90.
  45. John Cottingham (2011). Sceptical Detachment or Loving Submission to the Good? Reason, Faith, and the Passions in Descartes. Faith and Philosophy 28 (1):44-53.
    The paper begins by challenging a received view of Descartes as preoccupied with scepticism and setting out entirely on his own to build up everything from scratch. In reality, his procedure in the Meditations presupposes trust in the mind’s reliable powers of rational intuition. God, the source of those powers, is never fully eclipsed by the darkness of doubt. The second section establishes some common links between the approach taken by Descartes in the Meditations and the ‘faith seeking understanding’ tradition. (...)
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  46. Edward Craig (1985). The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism By Barry Stroud Oxford University Press, 1984, Xiv + 277 Pp., £ 15.00, £6.95 Paper. [REVIEW] Philosophy 60 (234):548-.
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  47. Joe Cruz, Knowing One's Mind.
    In one of the more compelling introductions to philosophy, Bertrand Russell begins with this question: “Is there any knowledge in the world that is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?” (Presumably he means to include women.) “So certain that no reasonable man could doubt it.” And it’s a good question to begin an introduction to philosophy with, because so often, philosophy is in the mode of skepticism, so often it’s in the mode of offering a critical assessment (...)
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  48. E. M. Curley (1978). Descartes Against the Skeptics. Harvard University Press.
  49. Matthew R. Dasti (2012). Parasitism and Disjunctivism in Nyāya Epistemology. Philosophy East and West 62 (1):1-15.
    From the early modern period, Western epistemologists have often been concerned with a rigorous notion of epistemic justification, epitomized in the work of Descartes: properly held beliefs require insulation from extreme skepticism. To the degree that veridical cognitive states may be indistinguishable from non-veridical states, apparently veridical states cannot enjoy high-grade positive epistemic status. Therefore, a good believer begins from what are taken to be neutral, subjective experiences and reasons outward—hopefully identifying the kinds of appearances that properly link up to (...)
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  50. Nancy Daukas (1994). Scepticism and the Framework‐Relativity of Enquiry. Ratio 7 (2):95-110.
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