This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of causal processes—of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe—into a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible causal processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths, the original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc. These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late preëmption and other cases (...) that have proved problematic for causal models. (shrink)

In this essay, I address a novel criticism recently levelled at the Strong Programme by Nick Tosh and Tim Lewens (TL). TL paint Strong Programme theorists as trading on a contrastive form of explanation. With this, TL throw valuable new light on the explanatory methods employed by the Strong Programme. However, as I shall argue, TL run into trouble when they accuse Strong Programme theorists of unduly restricting the contrast space in which legitimate historical and sociological explanations of scientific knowledge (...) might be given. Their attack founders as a result of their failure to properly understand the overall methodological concerns of Strong Programme theorists. After introducing readers to the technique of contrastive explanation and correcting the errors in TL’s interpretation of the Strong Programme, I argue that it is, in fact, TL’s own commitment to scientific realism which places an unacceptable restriction on the explanatory space open to historians and sociologists of science. The happy ending is that the Strong Programme provides more freedom for analysis than does scientific realism, and that careful attention to the methodological benefits of contrastive explanation can help lighten the burden on historians and sociologists of science as they go about their explanatory business. (shrink)

The causal-mechanistic account of explanation (CM) is a very intuitive account of scientific explanations. It guarantees objective explanations because it claims that we explain some set of phenomena by referring to the cause, which produces the phenomena in question. Yet, this intuitive appeal of the CM account comes at a high prize. Not only does one need to presuppose the reality of the cause, but also is one committed to some form of reductionism. The explanans is more fundamental because it (...) produces the phenomena. In this paper I want to propose an alternative to the CM account which does without the metaphysical baggage the CM account has to shoulder, without compromising on the intuitive appeal of the CM account as an account of distinctively scientific explanations. (shrink)

I defend an account of explanatory depth according to which explanations in the non-fundamental sciences can be deeper than explanations in fundamental physics.

The concept of causation plays a central role in many philosophical theories, and yet no account of causation has gained widespread acceptance among those who have investigated its foundations. Theories based on laws, counterfactuals, physical processes, and probabilistic dependence and independence relations (the list is by no means exhaustive) have all received detailed treatment in recent years—and, while no account has been entirely successful, it is generally agreed that the concept has been greatly clarified by the attempts. In this magnificent (...) book, Woodward aims to give a unified account of causation and causal explanation in terms of the notion of a manipulation (or intervention, terms which can be read interchangeably). Not only does he produce in my view the most illuminating and comprehensive account of causation on offer, his theory also opens a great many avenues for future work in the area, and has ramifications for many other areas of philosophy. Making Things Happen ought to be of interest not only to philosophers of causation and philosophers of science, but to any philosopher whose concerns involve assumptions about the nature of causation, laws, or explanation. (shrink)