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  1. Bernard Berofsky (2012). Nature's Challenge to Free Will. Oxford University Press, USA.
    Bernard Berofsky addresses that metaphysical picture directly.Nature's Challenge to Free Willoffers an original defense of Humean Compatibilism.
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  2. Alex Broadbent (2012). Causes of Causes. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):457-476.
    When is a cause of a cause of an effect also a cause of that effect? The right answer is either Sometimes or Always . In favour of Always , transitivity is considered by some to be necessary for distinguishing causes from redundant non-causal events. Moreover transitivity may be motivated by an interest in an unselective notion of causation, untroubled by principles of invidious discrimination. And causal relations appear to add up like transitive relations, so that the obtaining of the (...)
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  3. Alex Broadbent (2011). Defining Neglected Disease. Biosocieties 6 (1):51-70.
    In this article I seek to say what it is for something to count as a neglected disease. I argue that neglect should be defined in terms of efforts at prevention, mitigation and cure, and not solely in terms of research dollars per disability-adjusted life-year. I further argue that the trend towards multifactorialism and risk factor thinking in modern epidemiology has lent credibility to the erroneous view that the primary problem with neglected diseases is a lack of research. A more (...)
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  4. Marc Burock, Determinism and Causation Examples.
    In studying causation, many examples are presented assuming that determinism holds in the world of the example such as the notoriously difficult to resolve preemptive and preventative situations. We show that for deterministic examples that this conditional preemptive situation is either (i)vacuously true, (ii)contradictory, or (iii) implies indeterminism. Along the way we formulate a specific block space-time definition of determinism, and suggest that commonsense causation theories need focus on unphysical quantities and indeterminism.
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  5. Christopher Clarke (forthcoming). The Explanatory Virtue of Abstracting Away From Idiosyncratic and Messy Detail. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Some explanations are relatively abstract: they abstract away from the idiosyncratic or messy details of the case in hand. The received wisdom in philosophy is that this is a virtue for any explanation to possess. I argue that the apparent consensus on this point is illusory. When philosophers make this claim, they differ on which of four alternative varieties of abstractness they have in mind. What’s more, for each variety of abstractness there are several alternative reasons to think that the (...)
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  6. Oisín Deery (2013). Absences and Late Preemption. Theoria 79 (1):309-325.
    I focus on token, deterministic causal claims as they feature in causal explanations. Adequately handling absences is difficult for most causal theories, including theories of causal explanation. Yet so is adequately handling cases of late preemption. The best account of absence-causal claims as they appear in causal explanations is Jonathan Schaffer's quaternary, contrastive account. Yet Schaffer's account cannot handle preemption. The account that best handles late preemption is James Woodward's interventionist account. Yet Woodward's account is inadequate when it comes to (...)
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  7. Ezio Di Nucci (forthcoming). Action, Deviance, and Guidance. Abstracta.
    I argue that we should give up the fight to rescue causal theories of action from fundamental challenges such as the problem of deviant causal chains; and that we should rather pursue an account of action based on the basic intuition that control identifies agency. In Section 1 I introduce causalism about action explanation. In Section 2 I present an alternative, Frankfurt’s idea of guidance. In Section 3 I argue that the problem of deviant causal chains challenges causalism in two (...)
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  8. Alexander Gebharter, Addendum to "A Formal Framework for Representing Mechanisms?".
    In (Gebharter 2014) I suggested a framework for modeling the hierarchical organization of mechanisms. In this short addendum I want to highlight some connections of my approach to the statistics and machine learning literature and some of its limitations not mentioned in the paper.
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  9. Alexander Gebharter (2015). Erratum To: Solving the Flagpole Problem. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (2):425-425.
  10. Alexander Gebharter (2014). A Formal Framework for Representing Mechanisms? Philosophy of Science 81 (1):138-153.
    In this article I tackle the question of how the hierarchical order of mechanisms can be represented within a causal graph framework. I illustrate an answer to this question proposed by Casini, Illari, Russo, and Williamson and provide an example that their formalism does not support two important features of nested mechanisms: (i) a mechanism’s submechanisms are typically causally interacting with other parts of said mechanism, and (ii) intervening in some of a mechanism’s parts should have some influence on the (...)
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  11. Alexander Gebharter (2013). Solving the Flagpole Problem. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):63-67.
    In this paper I demonstrate that the causal structure of flagpole-like systems can be determined by application of causal graph theory. Additional information about the ordering of events in time or about how parameters of the systems of interest can be manipulated is not needed.
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  12. Alexander Gebharter & Marie I. Kaiser (2014). Causal Graphs and Biological Mechanisms. In Marie I. Kaiser, Oliver Scholz, Daniel Plenge & Andreas Hüttemann (eds.), Explanation in the special sciences: The case of biology and history. Springer 55-85.
    Modeling mechanisms is central to the biological sciences – for purposes of explanation, prediction, extrapolation, and manipulation. A closer look at the philosophical literature reveals that mechanisms are predominantly modeled in a purely qualitative way. That is, mechanistic models are conceived of as representing how certain entities and activities are spatially and temporally organized so that they bring about the behavior of the mechanism in question. Although this adequately characterizes how mechanisms are represented in biology textbooks, contemporary biological research practice (...)
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  13. Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz (2014). Editors' Introduction. Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 29 (1):5-7.
  14. Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz (2012). For a Better Understanding of Causality. Metascience 21 (3):643-648.
    For a better understanding of causality Content Type Journal Article Category Essay Review Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s11016-012-9648-3 Authors Alexander Gebharter, Department of Philosophy, Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße 1, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany Gerhard Schurz, Department of Philosophy, Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße 1, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  15. Han Geurdes, On an Intrinsic Quantum Theoretical Structure Inside Einstein's Gravity Field Equations.
    As is well known, Einstein was dissatisfied with the foundation of quantum theory and sought to find a basis for it that would have satisfied his need for a causal explanation. In this paper this abandoned idea is investigated. It is found that it is mathematically not dead at all. More in particular: a quantum mechanical U(1) gauge invariant Dirac equation can be derived from Einstein's gravity field equations. We ask ourselves what it means for physics, the history of physics (...)
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  16. Allen Ginsberg (1984). On a Paradox in Quantum Mechanics. Synthese 61 (3):325 - 349.
  17. Ruth Groff, Causal Mechanisms and the Philosophy of Causation.
  18. Ghislain Guigon (2011). Merely Possible Explanation. Religious Studies 47 (3):359-370.
    Graham Oppy has argued that possible explanation entails explanation in order to object to Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss’s new cosmological argument that it does not improve upon familiar cosmological arguments. Gale and Pruss as well as Pruss individually have granted Oppy’s inference from possible explanation to explanation and argue that this inference provides a reason to believe that the strong principle of sufficient reason is true. In this article, I shall undermine Oppy’s objection to the new cosmological argument by (...)
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  19. Ghislain Guigon (2009). Bringing About and Conjunction: A Reply to Bigelow on Omnificence. Analysis 69 (3):452-458.
    Church and Fitch have argued that from the verificationationist thesis “for every proposition, if this proposition is true, then it is possible to know it” we can derive that for every truth there is someone who knows that truth. Moreover, Humberstone has shown that from the latter proposition we can derive that someone knows every truth, hence that there is an omniscient being. In his article “Omnificence”, John Bigelow adapted these arguments in order to argue that from the assumption "every (...)
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  20. Amit Hagar (forthcoming). Review of M. Thalos' "Without Hierarchy". [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  21. Christopher Read Hitchcock (1995). Salmon on Explanatory Relevance. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):304-320.
    One of the motivations for Salmon's (1984) causal theory of explanation was the explanatory irrelevance exhibited by many arguments conforming to Hempel's covering-law models of explanation. However, the nexus of causal processes and interactions characterized by Salmon is not rich enough to supply the necessary conception of explanatory relevance. Salmon's (1994) revised theory, which is briefly criticized on independent grounds, fares no better. There is some possibility that the two-tiered structure of explanation described by Salmon (1984) may be pressed into (...)
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  22. Christopher Read Hitchcock (1992). Causal Explanation and Scientific Realism. Erkenntnis 37 (2):151 - 178.
    It is widely believed that many of the competing accounts of scientific explanation have ramifications which are relevant to the scientific realism debate. I claim that the two issues are orthogonal. For definiteness, I consider Cartwright's argument that causal explanations secure belief in theoretical entities. In Section I, van Fraassen's anti-realism is reviewed; I argue that this anti-realism is, prima facie, consistent with a causal account of explanation. Section II reviews Cartwright's arguments. In Section III, it is argued that causal (...)
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  23. Christopher Hitchcock & James Woodward (2003). Explanatory Generalizations, Part II: Plumbing Explanatory Depth. Noûs 37 (2):181–199.
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  24. Alex Kaiserman (forthcoming). Necessary Connections in Context. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    This paper combines the ancient idea that causes necessitate their effects with Angelika Kratzer’s semantics of modality. On the resulting view, causal claims quantify over restricted domains of possible worlds determined by two contextually determined parameters. I argue that this view can explain a number of otherwise puzzling features of the way we use and evaluate causal language, including the difference between causing an effect and being a cause of it, the sensitivity of causal judgements to normative facts, and the (...)
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  25. Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2011). The Pitfalls of Microphysical Realism. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1156-1164.
    Microphysical realism is the position that the only real entities and properties are found at the most fundamental level of nature. In this article, I challenge microphysical realism concerning properties and natural kinds. One argument for microphysical realism about entities, the “nothing-but argument,” does not apply to properties and kinds. Another argument, the “causal exclusion argument,” cannot be sustained in light of modern physics. Moreover, this argument leads to an objection against microphysical realism, based on the “illusoriness of macroproperties.” Another (...)
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  26. Ken Levy (2000). Hume, the New Hume, and Causal Connections. Hume Studies 26 (1):41-75.
    In this article, I weigh in on the debate between "Humeans" and "New Humeans" concerning David Hume's stance on the existence of causal connections in "the objects." According to New Humeans, Hume believes in causal connections; according to Humeans, he does not. -/- My argument against New Humeans is that it is too difficult to reconcile Hume's repeated claims that causal connections are inconceivable with any belief that they these inconceivable somethings still exist. Specifically, Hume either assumes or does not (...)
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  27. B. Ingemar B. Lindahl (2009). On Causal Attribution. Dissertation, Stockholm University
    This dissertation treats of the problem of attributing the occurrence of an individual event or state to a single cause — a problem commonly understood either as a question of distinguishing the cause from the mere conditions or as a matter of singling out, from several causes, one cause, as the cause. The main purpose of the study is to clarify some basic concepts, and some criteria of ascertainment of the cause, that may be discerned in the literature on causal (...)
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  28. B. Ingemar B. Lindahl (1984). On the Selection of Causes of Death: An Analysis of WHO’s Rules for Selection of the Underlying Cause of Death. In Lennart Nordenfelt & B. Ingemar B. Lindahl (eds.), Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine. D. Reidel Publishing Company 137-152.
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  29. U. Meyer (2012). Explaining Causal Loops. Analysis 72 (2):259-264.
    This article argues that the causal loops that occur in some time-travel scenarios and in certain solutions of the theory of relativity are no more mysterious than the infinitely descending causal chains familiar from Newtonian mechanics.
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  30. Robert Northcott (2008). Weighted Explanations in History. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (1):76-96.
    , whereby some causes are deemed more important than others, are ubiquitous in historical studies. Drawing from influential recent work on causation, I develop a definition of causal-explanatory strength. This makes clear exactly which aspects of explanatory weighting are subjective and which objective. It also sheds new light on several traditional issues, showing for instance that: underlying causes need not be more important than proximate ones; several different causes can each be responsible for most of an effect; small causes need (...)
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  31. Tuomas K. Pernu (2013). The Principle of Causal Exclusion Does Not Make Sense. Philosophical Forum 44 (1):89-95.
    The principle of causal exclusion is based on two distinct causal notions: causal sufficiency and causation simpliciter. The principle suggests that the former has the power to exclude the latter. But that is problematic since it would amount to claiming that sufficient causes alone can take the roles of causes simpliciter. Moreover, the principle also assumes that events can sometimes have both sufficient causes and causes simpliciter. This assumption is in conflict with the first part of the principle that claims (...)
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  32. Johannes Persson (2010). Activity-Based Accounts of Mechanism and the Threat of Polygenic Effects. Erkenntnis 72 (1):135 - 149.
    Accounts of ontic explanation have often been devised so as to provide an understanding of mechanism and of causation. Ontic accounts differ quite radically in their ontologies, and one of the latest additions to this tradition proposed by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver reintroduces the concept of activity. In this paper I ask whether this influential and activity-based account of mechanisms is viable as an ontic account. I focus on polygenic scenarios—scenarios in which the causal truths depend on (...)
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  33. Daniele Santoro (2014). Spiegazioni, omissioni e resoconti causali. In Elena Casetta & Valeria Giardino (eds.), Mettere a fuoco il mondo. © ISONOMIA – Epistemologica, University of Urbino 72-85.
    In «Mancanze, omissioni, e descrizioni negative»,55 Achille Varzi esplora le conseguenze di una forma comune di ragionamento causale, quella in cui citiamo mancanze od omissioni nel fornire una spiegazione delle cause degli eventi. Tale forma appare di comune uso nei contesti normativi del diritto, nelle spiegazioni tipiche delle scienze sociali e, più in generale, nel ragionamento ordinario. Ciò che accomuna questi casi è l’idea intuitiva secondo cui le cause possono anche consistere in eventi negativi. L’intuizione non è però metafisicamente innocua, (...)
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  34. Benjamin Smart (2014). On the Classification of Diseases. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 35 (4):251-269.
    Identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for individuating and classifying diseases is a matter of great importance in the fields of law, ethics, epidemiology, and of course, medicine. In this paper, I first propose a means of achieving this goal, ensuring that no two distinct disease-types could correctly be ascribed to the same disease-token. I then posit a metaphysical ontology of diseases—that is, I give an account of what a disease is. This is essential to providing the most effective means (...)
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  35. Helen Steward (2006). Understanding ‘Because’. ProtoSociology 23.
    The article considers the bearing of so-called "slingshot" arguments on the connective "because". It discusses Davidson's famous (1967) slingshot, deployed in support of the thesis that causation cannot be a relation between facts, and also a neater version developed by Stephen Neale in his (1995). The paper challenges the assumption (Anscombe (1969), Lycan (1974), Mellor (1995), Neale (1995)), that Davidson's argument, which actually concerns the connective "The fact that ... caused it to be the case that ..." (FC) might equally (...)
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  36. Eric Swanson (2010). Lessons From The Context Sensitivity of Causal Talk. Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):221-242.
  37. Achille C. Varzi (2007). Omissions and Causal Explanations. In Francesca Castellani & Josef Quitterer (eds.), Agency and Causation in the Human Sciences. Mentis Verlag 155–167.
    In previous work I have argued that talk about negative events should not be taken at face value: typically, what we are inclined to think of as a negative event (John’s failure to go jogging) is just an ordinary, positive event (his going to the movie instead); it is a positive event under a negative description. Here I consider more closely the difficulties that arise in those cases where no positive event seems available to do the job, as with putative (...)
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  38. Achille C. Varzi (2006). Mancanze, omissioni e descrizioni negative. Rivista di Estetica 32 (2):109-127.
    Assuming that events form a genuine ontological category, shall we say that a good inventory of the world ought to include “negative” events—failures, omissions, things that didn’t happen—along with positive ones? I argue that we shouldn’t. Talk of non-occurring events is like talk of non-existing objects and should not be taken at face value. We often speak as though there were such things, but deep down we want our words to be interpreted in such a way as to avoid serious (...)
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  39. Brad Weslake (2013). Proportionality, Contrast and Explanation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):785-797.
    If counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation and if omissions can be causes, then all events have many more causes than common sense tends to recognize. This problem is standardly addressed by appeal to pragmatics. However, Carolina Sartorio [2010] has recently raised what I shall argue is a more interesting problem concerning omissions for counterfactual theories of causation—more interesting because it demands a more subtle pragmatic solution. I discuss the relationship between the idea that causes are proportional to their effects, (...)
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  40. James Woodward & Christopher Hitchcock (2003). Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account. Noûs 37 (1):1–24.
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