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  1. Fred Ablondi (2008). François Lamy, Occasionalism, and the Mind-Body Problem. Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (4):pp. 619-629.
    There is a long-standing view that Malebranche and his fellow occasionalists accepted occasionalism to solve the problem of interaction between immaterial souls and extended bodies. Recently, however, scholars have shown this story to be a myth. Malebranche, Geulincx, La Forge, and Cordemoy adopted occasionalism for a variety of reasons, but none did so because of a need to provide a solution to a perceived mind-body problem. Yet there is one Cartesian for whom the “traditional” reading is largely on the mark. (...)
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  2. Albert G. A. Balz (1934). Clauberg and the Development of Occasionalism. Philosophical Review 43 (1):48-64.
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  3. Albert G. A. Balz (1933). Clauberg and the Development of Occasionalism. Philosophical Review 42 (6):553-572.
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  4. Desmond M. Clarke (1995). Malebranche and Occasionalism: A Reply to Steven Nadler. Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (3):499-504.
    In Malebranche's account of occasional causality, God exercises his general will with respect to every event that merits a causal explanation. Nadler distinguishes two pictures of God's involvement; (1) there are as many distinct acts of God's will as there are causal events to be explained; (2) God's will is exercised once only, when the natural order of causes is created. I argue that Malebranche's concept of God is inconsistent with a real distinction between God and acts of his will, (...)
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  5. Karen Detlefsen (2003). Supernaturalism, Occasionalism, and Preformation in Malebranche. Perspectives on Science 11 (4):443-483.
  6. Daniel Garber (1987). How God Causes Motion: Descartes, Divine Sustenance, and Occasionalism. Journal of Philosophy 84 (10):567-580.
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  7. Nicholas Jolley (2002). Occasionalism and Efficacious Laws in Malebranche. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 26 (1):245–257.
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  8. Sukjae Lee, Passive Natures and No Representations: Malebranche's Two “Local” Arguments for Occasionalism.
    In the last twenty years or so, the study of early modern philosophy seems to have experienced a revival of interest in Nicolas Malebranche. Some might wonder whether “revival” is the right term but I use it intentionally, since it is hardly the case that we for the first time are uncovering an obscure but talented figure from the bin of neglected, underappreciated philosophers. As one commentator has recently noted, Malebranche was hailed by none other than Pierre Bayle as “the (...)
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  9. Sukjae Lee, Occasionalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  10. Sukjae Lee (2008). Necessary Connections and Continuous Creation: Malebranche's Two Arguments for Occasionalism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (4):539-565.
    Malebranche presents two major arguments for occasionalism: the “no necessary connection” argument (NNC) and the “conservation is but continuous creation” argument (CCC). NNC appears prominently in his Search After Truth but virtually disappears and surrenders the spotlight to CCC in his later major work, Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion . This paper investigates the possible reasons and motivations behind this significant shift. I argue that the shift is no surprise if we consider the two ways in which the CCC (...)
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  11. Omar Edward Moad (2005). Al-Ghazali's Occasionalism and the Natures of Creatures. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 58 (2):95 - 101.
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  12. Steven M. Nadler (2005). Cordemoy and Occasionalism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 (1):37-54.
    This is an examination of the nature and extent of Cordemoy's commitment to the doctrine of occasionalism.
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  13. Steven M. Nadler (1998). Louis de la Forge and the Development of Occasionalism: Continuous Creation and the Activity of the Soul. Journal of the History of Philosophy 36 (2):215-231.
  14. Steven M. Nadler (1995). Malebranche's Occasionalism: A Reply to Clarke. Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (3):505-508.
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  15. Steven M. Nadler (1993). Occasionalism and General Will in Malebranche. Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (1):31-47.
    This paper examines a common misreading of the mechanics of Malebranche's doctrine of divine causal agency, occasionalism, and its roots in a related misreading of Malebranche's theories. God, contrary to this misreading, is for Malebranche constantly and actively causally engaged in the world, and does not just establish certain laws of nature. The key is in understanding just what Malebranche means by general volitions'.
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  16. Walter Ott (2008). Causation, Intentionality, and the Case for Occasionalism. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 90 (2):165-187.
    Despite their influence on later philosophers such as Hume, Malebranche's central arguments for occasionalism remain deeply puzzling. Both the famous ‘no necessary connection’ argument and what I call the epistemic argument include assumptions – e.g., that a true cause is logically necessarily connected to its effect – that seem unmotivated, even in their context. I argue that a proper understanding of late scholastic views lets us see why Malebranche would make this assumption. Both arguments turn on the claim that a (...)
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  17. Tad M. Schmaltz (2008). Occasionalism and Mechanism: Fontenelle's Objections to Malebranche. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (2):293 – 313.
  18. Tad M. Schmaltz (1992). Sensation, Occasionalism, and Descartes' Causal Principles. In Phillip D. Cummins & Guenter Zoeller (eds.), Minds, Ideas, and Objects: Essays in the Theory of Representation in Modern Philosophy. Ridgeview Publishing Company.
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  19. David Scott (2000). Occasionalism and Occasional Causation in Descartes' Philosophy. Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (4):503-528.
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  20. Kurt Smith (2012). Occasionalism: Causation Among the Cartesians. By Steven Nadler. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. Xii + 207. Price £37.00.). Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):643-643.
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  21. William F. Vallicella (1999). God, Causation and Occasionalism. Religious Studies 35 (1):3-18.
    The doctrine that there are no logically necessary connections in nature can be used to support both occasionalism, according to which God alone can be a cause, and 'anti-occasionalism', according to which God cannot be a cause. Quentin Smith has recently invoked the 'no logically necessary connections in nature' doctrine in support of the latter. I bring two main objections against his thesis that God (logically) cannot be a cause. The first is that there are good reasons to think that (...)
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