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  1. Sara Bernstein (2016). Overdetermination Underdetermined. Erkenntnis 81 (1):17-40.
    Widespread causal overdetermination is often levied as an objection to nonreductive theories of minds and objects. In response, nonreductive metaphysicians have argued that the type of overdetermination generated by their theories is different from the sorts of coincidental cases involving multiple rock-throwers, and thus not problematic. This paper pushes back. I argue that attention to differences between types of overdetermination discharges very few explanatory burdens, and that overdetermination is a bigger problem for the nonreductive metaphysician than previously thought.
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  2. M. Brand & Douglas N. Walton (eds.) (1976). Action Theory. Reidel.
    INTRODUCTION BY THE EDITORS Gilbert Ryle, in his Concept of Mind (1949), attacked volitional theories of human actions; JL Austin, in his "If and Cans" ...
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  3. Esteban Céspedes (2011). Towards a Spatial Theory of Causation. Philosophy Pathways (162).
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  4. Donald Davidson (1967). Causal Relations. Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):691-703.
  5. Douglas Ehring (1997). Causation and Persistence: A Theory of Causation. Oxford University Press.
    Ehring shows the inadequacy of received theories of causation, and, introducing conceptual devices of his own, provides a wholly new account of causation as the persistence over time of individual properties, or "tropes.".
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  6. Christopher Read Hitchcock (1995). The Mishap at Reichenbach Fall: Singular Vs. General Causation. Philosophical Studies 78 (3):257 - 291.
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  7. Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (2007). Is There a Problem of Action at a Temporal Distance? SATS 8 (1).
    It has been claimed that the only way to avoid action at a temporal distance in a temporal continuum is if effects occur simultaneously with their causes, and that in fact Newton’s second law of motion illustrates that they truly are simultaneous. Firstly, I point out that this interpretation of Newton’s second law is problematic because in classical mechanics ‘acceleration’ denotes a vector quantity. It is controversial whether vectors themselves are changes as opposed to properties of a change, and therefore (...)
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  8. Alex Kaiserman (forthcoming). Causes and Counterparts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    It follows from David Lewis's counterpart-theoretic analysis of modality and his counterfactual theory of causation that causal claims are relativized to a set of counterpart relations. Call this Shlewis's view. I show how Shlewis's view can provide attractively unified solutions to similar modal and causal puzzles. I then argue that Shlewis's view is better motivated, by his own lights, than the view Lewis actually held, and also better motivated than a similar approach which relativizes causal claims to sets of ‘contrast (...)
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  9. Geert Keil (2014). Wie fängt (man) eine Handlung an? In Anne-Sophie Spann & Daniel Wehinger (eds.), Vermögen und Handung. Der dispositionale Realismus und unser Selbstverständnis als Handelnde. Mentis 135-157.
    Das Verb „anfangen“ lässt sich sowohl mit einem Akteur an Subjektstelle als auch subjektlos verwenden. Sogenannte subjektlose Sätze wie „Es fängt zu regnen an“ haben freilich ein grammatisches Subjekt, aber auf die Rückfrage „Wer oder was fängt zu regnen an?“ ist die einzig mögliche Antwort „Es“ unbefriedigend. Das grammatische Subjekt fungiert in solchen Sätzen lediglich als synkategorematischer Ausdruck. Menschliche Akteure können in gehaltvollerem Sinn etwas anfangen, zum Beispiel Streit, oder, wie es bei Kant heißt, „eine Reihe von Begebenheiten“. Mit dem (...)
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  10. Geert Keil (2013). Making Causal Counterfactuals More Singular, and More Appropriate for Use in Law. In Benedikt Kahmen Markus Stepanians (ed.), Causation and Responsibility: Critical Essays. De Gruyter 157-189.
    Unlike any other monograph on legal liability, Michael S. Moore’s book CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY contains a well-informed and in-depth discussion of the metaphysics of causation. Moore does not share the widespread view that legal scholars should not enter into metaphysical debates about causation. He shows respect for the subtleties of philosophical debates on causal relata, identity conditions for events, the ontological distinctions between events, states of affairs, facts and tropes, and the counterfactual analysis of event causation, and he considers all (...)
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  11. Geert Keil (2004). Kausalität zwischen Physik und deskriptiver Metaphysik. Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 29 (3):287-294.
    The short paper continues a debate on free will, causation and laws of nature between the author and the German philosopher Peter Rohs (opened in a previous issue of the same journal). Both Keil and Rohs are libertarians, but they disagree on a number of metaphysical issues. Keil maintains that causation is a relation between changes, i.e. time-consuming events, not between instantaneous states. Against Davidson’s “principle of the nomological character of causality”, Keil holds that no exceptionless laws subsuming cause-effect pairs (...)
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  12. Geert Keil (2003). Kausalitat und Freiheit -- Antwort auf Peter Rohs. Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 28 (3):261-272.
    The short paper is a reply to a review of the author’s book HANDELN UND VERURSACHEN (Frankfurt am Main 2000). The reviewer, Peter Rohs, has focused upon the issues of causation, laws of nature and free will. Both Rohs and the author are libertarians, but they disagree on a number of metaphysical issues. The author maintains that causation is a relation between changes, i. e. time-consuming events, not between instantaneous states. Against Davidson’s “principle of the nomological character of causality”, he (...)
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  13. Geert Keil & Max Kistler (2006). La cause d'un événement éléments d'une métaphysique descriptive de la causalité entre événements. Philosophie 89 (1):21.
    La philosophie contemporaine connaît une demi-douzaine de théories de la causalité. À l'époque de Kant et de Hume leur nombre a été moindre, à l'avenir on peut s'attendre à ce que leur nombre continue d'augmenter. Parmi les affirmations faites par ces théories sur la nature de la causalité, certaines sont compatibles entre elles, mais beaucoup ne le sont pas. Par conséquent, ou bien quelques-unes de ces théories sont fausses, ou bien elles ne portent pas sur le même objet. Dans ce (...)
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  14. Jaegwon Kim (1976). Events as Property Exemplifications. In M. Brand & D. Walton (eds.), Action Theory. D. Reidel 310-326.
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  15. Jaegwon Kim (1973). Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event. Journal of Philosophy 70 (8):217-236.
  16. Jaegwon Kim (1971). Causes and Events: Mackie on Causation. Journal of Philosophy 68 (14):426-441.
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  17. Ken Levy (2000). Hume, the New Hume, and Causal Connections. Hume Studies 26 (1):41-75.
    In this article, I weigh in on the debate between "Humeans" and "New Humeans" concerning David Hume's stance on the existence of causal connections in "the objects." According to New Humeans, Hume believes in causal connections; according to Humeans, he does not. -/- My argument against New Humeans is that it is too difficult to reconcile Hume's repeated claims that causal connections are inconceivable with any belief that they these inconceivable somethings still exist. Specifically, Hume either assumes or does not (...)
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  18. David Lewis (1986). Events. In Philosophical Papers Vol. II. OUP 241-269.
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  19. David Lewis (1986). Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford University Press.
  20. Martin Lin, Time, Causation, and Abstract Objects.
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  21. E. J. Lowe (2001). Event Causation and Agent Causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):1-20.
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  22. Olivier Massin (2009). The Metaphysics of Forces. Dialectica 64 (4):555-589.
    This paper defends the view that Newtonian forces are real, symmetrical and non-causal relations. First, I argue that Newtonian forces are real; second, that they are relations; third, that they are symmetrical relations; fourth, that they are not species of causation. The overall picture is anti-Humean to the extent that it defends the existence of forces as external relations irreducible to spatio-temporal ones, but is still compatible with Humean approaches to causation (and others) since it denies that forces are a (...)
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  23. Uwe Meixner (2004). Causation in a New Old Key. Studia Logica 76 (3):343 - 383.
    I argue (1) that it is not philosophically significant whether causation is linguistically represented by a predicate or by a sentence connective; (2) that there is no philosophically significant distinction between event- and states-of-affairs-causation; (3) that there is indeed a philosophically significant distinction between agent- and event-causation, and that event-causation must be regarded as an analog of agent-causation. Developing this point, I argue that event-causation's being in the image of agent-causation requires, mainly, (a) that the cause is temporally prior to (...)
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  24. D. H. Mellor (1995). The Facts of Causation. Routledge.
    The Facts of Causation grapples with one of philosophy's most enduring issues. Causation is central to all of our lives. What we see and hear causes us to believe certain facts about the world. We need that information to know how to act and how to cause the effects we desire. D. H. Mellor, a leading scholar in the philosophy of science and metaphysics, offers a comprehensive theory of causation. Many questions about causation remain unsettled. In science, the indeterminism of (...)
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  25. Peter Menzies (1989). A Unified Account of Causal Relata. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1):59 – 83.
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  26. L. A. Paul (2000). Aspect Causation. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):235-256.
    While skiing, Suzy falls and breaks her right wrist. The next day, she writes a philosophy paper. Her right wrist is broken, so she writes her paper using her left hand. (Assume, as seems plausible, that she isn’t dexterous enough to write it any other way, e.g., with her right foot.) She writes the paper, sends it off to a journal, and it is subsequently published. Is Suzy’s accident a cause of the publication of the paper?2 Of course not. Below, (...)
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  27. Johannes Persson (2010). Activity-Based Accounts of Mechanism and the Threat of Polygenic Effects. Erkenntnis 72 (1):135 - 149.
    Accounts of ontic explanation have often been devised so as to provide an understanding of mechanism and of causation. Ontic accounts differ quite radically in their ontologies, and one of the latest additions to this tradition proposed by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver reintroduces the concept of activity. In this paper I ask whether this influential and activity-based account of mechanisms is viable as an ontic account. I focus on polygenic scenarios—scenarios in which the causal truths depend on (...)
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  28. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1998). Mellor's Facts and Chances of Causation. Analysis 58 (3):175–181.
    Mellor´s theory of causation has two components, one according to which causes raise their effects´ chances, and one according to which causation links facts. I argue that these two components are not independent from each other and, in particular, that Mellor´s thesis that causation links facts requires his thesis that causes raise their effects´ chances, since without the latter thesis Mellor cannot stop the slingshot argument, an argument that is a threat to any theory postulating facts as the relata of (...)
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  29. Carolina Sartorio (2006). Disjunctive Causes. Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):521-538.
    There is an initial presumption against disjunctive causes. First of all, for some people causation is a relation between events. But, arguably, there are no disjunctive events, since events are particulars and thus they have spatiotemporal locations, while it is unclear what the spatiotemporal location of a disjunctive event could be.1 More importantly, even if one believes that entities like facts can enter in causal relations, and even if there are disjunctive facts, it is still hard to see how disjunctive (...)
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  30. Jonathan Schaffer, The Metaphysics of Causation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Questions about the metaphysics of causation may be usefully divided as follows. First, there are questions about the nature of the causal relata, including (1.1) whether they are in spacetime immanence), (1.2) how fine grained they are individuation), and (1.3) how many there are adicity). Second, there are questions about the metaphysics of the causal relation, including (2.1) what is the difference between causally related and causally unrelated sequences connection), (2.2) what is the difference between sequences related as cause to (...)
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  31. Jonathan Schaffer (2005). Contrastive Causation. Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.
    Causation is widely assumed to be a binary relation: c causes e. I will argue that causation is a quaternary, contrastive relation: c rather than C* causes e rather than E*, where C* and E* are nonempty sets of contrast events. Or at least, I will argue that treating causation as contrastive helps resolve some paradoxes.
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  32. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2012). Against the Contrastive Account of Singular Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (1):115-143.
    For at least three decades, philosophers have argued that general causation and causal explanation are contrastive in nature. When we seek a causal explanation of some particular event, we are usually interested in knowing why that event happened rather than some other specified event. And general causal claims, which state that certain event types cause certain other event types, seem to make sense only if appropriate contrasts to the types of events acting as cause and effect are specified. In recent (...)
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  33. Nathanael Stein (2014). Causes and Categories. Noûs 50 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Philosophers discussing causation take on, as one of their responsibilities, the task of specifying an ontology of causation. Both standard and non-standard accounts of that ontology make two assumptions: that the ontological category of causal relata admits a unique specification, and that cause and effect are of the same ontological type. These assumptions are rarely made explicit, but there is in fact little reason to think them true. It is argued here that, if the question has any interest, there are (...)
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  34. Helen Steward (1997). The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States. Oxford University Press.
    Helen Steward puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the sorts of things there are in the mind--events, processes, and states. She offers a fresh investigation of these three categories, clarifying the distinctions between them, and argues that the category of state has been very widely and seriously misunderstood.
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  35. Ryan Wasserman, Is Causation Extensional?
    It is widely assumed that causation is an extensional relation: if c causes e and c = d, then d causes e. Similarly, if c causes e and e = f, then c causes f. Moving to the formal mode we have: The Extensionality Thesis (ET): (i) If „c causes e‟ is true and „c‟ and „d‟ co-refer, then „d causes e‟ is true; and (ii) If „c causes e‟ is true and „e‟ and „f‟ co-refer, then „c causes f‟ (...)
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  36. Ann Whittle (2016). A Defense of Substance Causation. Journal of the American Philosophical Association (1):1-20.
    That there is no substance causation is often treated as the default position. My aim in this paper is primarily one of burden shifting: opponents of substance causation must do more to defend their position. After outlining the thesis I wish to defend, I present a simple argument for substance causation, arguing that opponents of substance causation owe us an explanation of why this argument is unsound. I end by answering objections to the view that substances can be causes.
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