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  1. Peter Alward (2004). Mad, Martian, but Not Mad Martian Pain. Sorites 15 (December):73-75.
    Functionalism cannot accommodate the possibility of mad pain—pain whose causes and effects diverge from those of the pain causal role. This is because what it is to be in pain according to functionalism is simply to be in a state that occupies the pain role. And the identity theory cannot accommodate the possibility of Martian pain—pain whose physical realization is foot-cavity inflation rather than C-fibre activation (or whatever physiological state occupies the pain-role in normal humans). After all, what it is (...)
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  2. István Aranyosi (forthcoming). Toward a Well-Innervated Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 4 of The Peripheral Mind). Oxford University Press.
    The “brain in a vat” thought experiment is presented and refuted by appeal to the intuitiveness of what the author informally calls “the eye for an eye principle”, namely: Conscious mental states typically involved in sensory processes can conceivably successfully be brought about by direct stimulation of the brain, and in all such cases the utilized stimulus field will be in the relevant sense equivalent to the actual PNS or part of it thereof. In the second section, four classic problems (...)
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  3. David M. Armstrong (1970). The Nature of Mind. In Clive V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
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  4. David M. Armstrong (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. Routledge.
    This classic work of recent philosophy was first published in 1968, and remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In A Materialist Theory of the Mind , D. M. Armstrong provided insight into the debate surrounding the relationship of the mind and body. He put forth a detailed materialist account of all the main mental phenomena, including perception, sensation, belief, the will, introspection, mental images, and consciousness. This causal analysis of (...)
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  5. Ned Block (ed.) (1978). Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol.
  6. Clive V. Borst (ed.) (1970). The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
  7. David Braddon-Mitchell & K. Jackson (1999). The Divide-and-Conquer Path to Analytic Functionalism. Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):71-89.
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  8. Austen Clark (1986). Psychofunctionalism and Chauvinism. Philosophy of Science 53 (December):535-59.
    The psychofunctionalist claim that psychological terms can be defined through the use of an experimental theory has been criticized on the grounds that it is "chauvinistic": that it denies mentality to any creature of which the selected theory is false. I analyze the "argument from science fiction" that is thought to establish this conclusion, and show that its plausibility rests on a scope ambiguity in formulations of functional definitions. One formulation is indeed chauvinistic, but an alternative rendering is not, and (...)
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  9. Austen Clark (1983). Functionalism and the Definition of Theoretical Terms. Journal of Mind and Behavior 4:339-352.
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  10. James W. Cornman (1968). Mental Terms, Theoretical Terms, and Materialism. Philosophy of Science 35 (March):45-63.
    Some materialists argue that we can eliminate mental entities such as sensations because, like electrons, they are theoretical entities postulated as parts of scientific explanations, but, unlike electrons, they are unnecessary for such explanations. As Quine says, any explanatory role of mental entities can be played by "correlative physiological states and events instead." But sensations are not postulated theoretical entities. This is shown by proposing definitions of the related terms, 'observation term,' and 'theoretical term,' and then classifying the term 'sensation.' (...)
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  11. Anthony Dardis (1993). Sunburn: Independence Conditions on Causal Relevance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):577-598.
    Causally committed properties are properties which require that their instances have a cause (or an effect) of a certain kind. Sunburn, for instance, must be caused by the sun. Causal relevance is a contingent dependency relation between properties of events. The connection between a causally committed property and the property to which it is committed is not contingent. Hence a pair consisting of a causally committed property and the property to which it is committed should not be in the causal (...)
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  12. Ronald P. Endicott (2011). Flat Versus Dimensioned: The What and the How of Functional Realization. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:191-208.
    I resolve an argument over “flat” versus “dimensioned” theories of realization. The theories concern, in part, whether realized and realizing properties are instantiated by the same individual (the flat theory) or different individuals in a part-whole relationship (the dimensioned theory). Carl Gillett has argued that the two views conflict, and that flat theories should be rejected on grounds that they fail to capture scientific cases involving a dimensioned relation between individuals and their constituent parts. I argue on the contrary that (...)
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  13. Irwin Goldstein (1994). Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  14. David R. Hiley (1973). Armstrong's Concept of a Mental State. Southern Journal of Philosophy 11 (1-2):113-118.
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  15. Michael P. Hodges (1979). Armstrong's Causal Analysis and Direct Knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):335-343.
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  16. Terence E. Horgan (1984). Functionalism and Token Physicalism. Synthese 59 (June):321-38.
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  17. Jennifer Hornsby (1984). On Functionalism, and on Jackson, Pargetter, and Prior on Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 46 (July):75-96.
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  18. Frank Jackson (2005). Ramsey Sentences and Avoiding the Sui Generis. In Hallvard Lillehammer & D.H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy (Mind Association Occasional Series). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  19. Frank Jackson, Robert Pargetter & E. W. Prior (1982). Functionalism and Type-Type Identity Theories. Philosophical Studies 42 (September):209-25.
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  20. Andrew Kernohan (1990). Lewis's Functionalism and Reductive Materialism. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):235-46.
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  21. Eric LaRock (2012). An Empirical Case Against Central State Materialism. Philosophia Christi 14 (2):409-428.
    I argue on empirical grounds (1) that consciousness is not nothing but a self-scanning mechanism in the central nervous system; (2) that consciousness is not reducible to an epistemic ability, such as the ability to recognize an object; (3) that mind could not merely be a (material) cause that is apt to bring about a certain range of behaviors; and (4) that recent empirical investigations reveal new problems and new evidence that should compel advocates of causal functionalism (of the sort (...)
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  22. David Lewis (1980). Mad Pain and Martian Pain. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol. 216-222.
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  23. David Lewis (1972). Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (December):249-58.
  24. Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.) (2005). Ramsey's Legacy. Oxford University Press.
    The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically in 1930 at the age of 26, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors offer fresh perspectives on his work and show its (...)
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  25. Colin McGinn (1980). Functionalism and Phenomenalism: A Critical Note. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (March):35-46.
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  26. Andrew Melnyk (2010). Comments on Sydney Shoemaker's 'Physical Realization'. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):113 - 123.
    This paper concerns Sydney Shoemaker's view, presented in his book, Physical Realization (Oxford University Press, 2007), of how mental properties are realized by physical properties. That view aims to avoid the "too many minds" problem to which he seems to be led by his further view that human persons are not token-identical with their bodies. The paper interprets and criticizes Shoemaker's view.
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  27. Andrew Melnyk (2005). Review of Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (07-17).
    This is a review of Jaegwon Kim's Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough (Princeton University Press, 2005). It focuses on (i) his claim that mental properties can be causally efficacious only if they are, in a certain sense, functionally reducible to the physical and (ii) his criticisms of best-explanation arguments for physicalism as advocated by, e.g., Christopher Hill and Brian McLaughlin.
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  28. Marc Moffett (2010). Against A Posteriori Functionalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):83-106.
    There are two constraints on any functionalist solution to the Mind-Body Problem construed as an answer to the question, “What is the relationship between the mental properties and relations (hereafter, simply the mental properties) and physical properties and relations?” The first constraint is that it must actually address the Mind-Body Problem and not simply redefine the debate in terms of other, more tractable, properties (e.g., the species-specific property of having human-pain). Such moves can be seen to be spurious by the (...)
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  29. Thomas Nagel (1970). Armstrong on the Mind. Philosophical Review 79 (July):394-403.
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  30. Joseph Owens (1982). The Failure of Lewis's Functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):159-73.
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  31. Erwin Rogler (2000). On David Lewis' Philosophy of Mind. Protosociology 14:285-311.
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  32. Don Ross & David Spurrett (2004). What to Say to a Skeptical Metaphysician? A Defense Manual for Cognitive and Behavioral Scientists. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):603-627.
    A wave of recent work in metaphysics seeks to undermine the anti-reductionist, functionalist consensus of the past few decades in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. That consensus apparently legitimated a focus on what systems do, without necessarily and always requiring attention to the details of how systems are constituted. The new metaphysical challenge contends that many states and processes referred to by functionalist cognitive scientists are epiphenomenal. It further contends that the problem lies in functionalism itself, and that, to (...)
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  33. Robert D. Rupert (2006). Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessary Effects. Noûs 40 (2):256-83.
    The recent literature on mental causation has not been kind to nonreductive, materialist functionalism (‘functionalism’, hereafter, except where that term is otherwise qualified). The exclusion problem2 has done much of the damage, but the epiphenomenalist threat has taken other forms. Functionalism also faces what I will call the ‘problem of metaphysically necessary effects’ (Block, 1990, pp. 157-60, Antony and Levine, 1997, pp. 91-92, Pereboom, 2002, p. 515, Millikan, 1999, p. 47, Jackson, 1998, pp. 660-61). Functionalist mental properties are individuated partly (...)
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  34. Charles Sayward (1995). Taking Actions Seriously. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (24):51-60.
    Two kinds of functionalism are distinguished: intensional and extensional. The former is argued to be superior to the latter. The former is also defended against two objections independently put forth by Ned Block and John Searle.
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  35. Sydney Shoemaker (1981). Some Varieties of Functionalism. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119.
    Fleshing out Ramsey-sentence functionalism; against Lewis's "mad pain" mixed theory; relating functionalism to the causal theory of properties. Empirical functionalism is chauvinistic so probably false. A terrific, in-depth paper.
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  36. Justin Tiehen (forthcoming). The Role Functionalist Theory of Absences. Erkenntnis:1-15.
    Functionalist theories have been proposed for just about everything: mental states, dispositions, moral properties, truth, causation, and much else. The time has come for a functionalist theory of nothing. Or, more accurately, a role functionalist theory of those absences (omissions, negative events) that are causes and effects.
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  37. Justin Tiehen (2014). Subset Realization and the Problem of Property Entailment. Erkenntnis 79 (2):471-480.
    Brian McLaughlin has objected to Sydney Shoemaker’s subset account of realization, posing what I call the problem of property entailment. Recently, Shoemaker has revised his subset account in response to McLaughlin’s objection. In this paper I argue that Shoemaker’s revised view fails to solve the problem of property entailment, and in fact makes the problem worse. I then put forward my own solution to the problem.
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  38. Justin Tiehen (2012). Ectoplasm Earth. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):167-185.
    What does it mean to say that the mental is nothing over and above the physical? In other words, what exactly is the thesis of physicalism about the mental? The question has not received the philosophical attention it deserves. If that sounds woefully uninformed, it's probably because you are mistaking my restricted thesis of physicalism about the mental for the unrestricted thesis of physicalism simpliciter. Physicalism simpliciter is the doctrine that everything is physical; equivalently, that there is nothing over and (...)
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  39. Justin T. Tiehen (2013). The Cost of Forfeiting Causal Inheritance. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):491-507.
    Jaegwon Kim’s causal inheritance principle says that the causal powers of a mental property instance are identical with the causal powers of its particular physical realizer. Sydney Shoemaker’s subset account of realization is at odds with Kim’s principle: it says that a mental property instance has fewer causal powers than Kim’s principle entails. In this paper, I argue that the subset account should be rejected because it has intolerable consequences for mental causation, consequences that are avoided by accepting causal inheritance. (...)
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  40. Michael Tye (1983). Functionalism and Type Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 44 (September):161-74.
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  41. Raphael van Riel (2012). Pains, Pills and Properties - Functionalism and the First-Order/Second-Order Distinction. Dialectica 66 (4):543-562.
  42. Simon van Rysewyk, Arguing Pain-Brain Relationships in the Fetus.
  43. Daniel A. Weiskopf (2008). Patrolling the Mind's Boundaries. Erkenntnis 68 (2):265 - 276.
    Defenders of the extended mind thesis say that it is possible that some of our mental states may be constituted, in part, by states of the extra-bodily environment. Often they also add that such extended mentation is a commonplace phenomenon. I argue that extended mentation, while not impossible, is either nonexistent or far from widespread. Genuine beliefs as they occur in normal biologically embodied systems are informationally integrated with each other, and sensitive to changes in the person.
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  44. David Yates (2012). Functionalism and the Metaphysics of Causal Exclusion. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (13).
    Given their physical realization, what causal work is left for functional properties to do? Humean solutions to the exclusion problem (e.g. overdetermination and difference-making) typically appeal to counterfactual and/or nomic relations between functional property-instances and behavioural effects, tacitly assuming that such relations suffice for causal work. Clarification of the notion of causal work, I argue, shows not only that such solutions don't work, but also reveals a novel solution to the exclusion problem based on the relations between dispositional properties at (...)
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