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  1. A. Ahmed (2010). Out of the Closet. Analysis 71 (1):77-85.
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  2. D. S. Bree (1982). Counterfactuals and Causality. Journal of Semantics 1 (2):147-185.
    There are three parts to this paper. In the first part the difference between hypothetical and counterfactual conditionals is examined. Both Adams's argument that indicative and subjunctive conditionals differ in the degree to which they are justified and Lewis's contention that counterfactuals differ from hypotheticals in that they fail to contrapose are both shown to be unfounded. Standard tests confirm Karttunen's claim that the difference lies not in the truth conditions but in the falsity of the antecedent being presupposed and (...)
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  3. Nancy Cartwright & J. Reiss, Uncertainty in Econometrics: Evaluating Policy Counterfactuals.
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  4. Wayne A. Davis (1980). Jackson on Counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):62 – 65.
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  5. Morteza Dehghani, Rumen Iliev & Stefan Kaufmann (2012). Causal Explanation and Fact Mutability in Counterfactual Reasoning. Mind and Language 27 (1):55-85.
    Recent work on the interpretation of counterfactual conditionals has paid much attention to the role of causal independencies. One influential idea from the theory of Causal Bayesian Networks is that counterfactual assumptions are made by intervention on variables, leaving all of their causal non-descendants unaffected. But intervention is not applicable across the board. For instance, backtracking counterfactuals, which involve reasoning from effects to causes, cannot proceed by intervention in the strict sense, for otherwise they would be equivalent to their consequents. (...)
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  6. David Galles & Judea Pearl (1998). An Axiomatic Characterization of Causal Counterfactuals. Foundations of Science 3 (1):151-182.
    This paper studies the causal interpretation of counterfactual sentences using a modifiable structural equation model. It is shown that two properties of counterfactuals, namely, composition and effectiveness, are sound and complete relative to this interpretation, when recursive (i.e., feedback-less) models are considered. Composition and effectiveness also hold in Lewis's closest-world semantics, which implies that for recursive models the causal interpretation imposes no restrictions beyond those embodied in Lewis's framework. A third property, called reversibility, holds in nonrecursive causal models but not (...)
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  7. William K. Goosens (1979). Causal Chains and Counterfactuals. Journal of Philosophy 76 (9):489-495.
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  8. Eric Hiddleston (2005). A Causal Theory of Counterfactuals. Noûs 39 (4):632–657.
    I develop an account of counterfactual conditionals using “causal models”, and argue that this account is preferable to the currently standard account in terms of “similarity of possible worlds” due to David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. I diagnose the attraction of counterfactual theories of causation, and argue that it is illusory.
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  9. Daniel Hunter & Reed Richter (1978). Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Paradox. Synthese 39 (2):249 - 261.
    In their development of causal decision theory, Allan Gibbard and William Harper advocate a particular method for calculating the expected utility of an action, a method based upon the probabilities of certain counterfactuals. Gibbard and Harper then employ their method to support a two-box solution to Newcomb’s paradox. This paper argues against some of Gibbard and Harper’s key claims concerning the truth-values and probabilities of counterfactuals involved in expected utility calculations, thereby disputing their analysis of Newcomb’s Paradox. If we are (...)
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  10. Frank Jackson (1977). A Causal Theory of Counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):3 – 21.
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  11. Robert Northcott (2009). On Lewis, Schaffer and the Non-Reductive Evaluation of Counterfactuals. Theoria 75 (4):336-343.
    Jonathan Schaffer (2004 ) proposes an ingenious amendment to David Lewis's semantics for counterfactuals. This amendment explicitly invokes the notion of causal independence, thus giving up Lewis's ambitions for a reductive counterfactual account of causation. But in return, it rescues Lewis's semantics from extant counterexamples. I present a new counterexample that defeats even Schaffer's amendment. Further, I argue that a better approach would be to follow the causal modelling literature and evaluate counterfactuals via an explicit postulated causal structure. This alternative (...)
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  12. Judea Pearl, The Logic of Counterfactuals in Causal Inference.
  13. Katrin Schulz (2011). “If You'd Wiggled A, Then B Would've Changed”. Synthese 179 (2):239-251.
    This paper deals with the truth conditions of conditional sentences. It focuses on a particular class of problematic examples for semantic theories for these sentences. I will argue that the examples show the need to refer to dynamic, in particular causal laws in an approach to their truth conditions. More particularly, I will claim that we need a causal notion of consequence. The proposal subsequently made uses a representation of causal dependencies as proposed in Pearl (2000) to formalize a causal (...)
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  14. Jiji Zhang (2013). A Lewisian Logic of Causal Counterfactuals. Minds and Machines 23 (1):77-93.
    In the artificial intelligence literature a promising approach to counterfactual reasoning is to interpret counterfactual conditionals based on causal models. Different logics of such causal counterfactuals have been developed with respect to different classes of causal models. In this paper I characterize the class of causal models that are Lewisian in the sense that they validate the principles in Lewis’s well-known logic of counterfactuals. I then develop a system sound and complete with respect to this class. The resulting logic is (...)
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  15. Jiji Zhang, Wai-Yin Lam & Rafael De Clercq (2013). A Peculiarity in Pearl's Logic of Interventionist Counterfactuals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (5):783-794.
    We examine a formal semantics for counterfactual conditionals due to Judea Pearl, which formalizes the interventionist interpretation of counterfactuals central to the interventionist accounts of causation and explanation. We show that a characteristic principle validated by Pearl’s semantics, known as the principle of reversibility, states a kind of irreversibility: counterfactual dependence (in David Lewis’s sense) between two distinct events is irreversible. Moreover, we show that Pearl’s semantics rules out only mutual counterfactual dependence, not cyclic dependence in general. This, we argue, (...)
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