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  1. David B. Annis (1981). Swain's Causal Theory of Knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):149-156.
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  2. Brian Besong (2014). The Prudent Conscience View. International Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):127-141.
    Moral intuitionism, which claims that some moral seemings are justification-conferring, has become an increasingly popular account in moral epistemology. Defenses of the position have largely focused on the standard account, according to which the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming is determined by its phenomenal credentials alone. Unfortunately, the standard account is a less plausible version of moral intuitionism because it does not take etiology seriously. In this paper, I provide an outline and defense of a non-standard account of moral (...)
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  3. L. S. Carrier (1976). The Causal Theory of Knowledge. Philosophia 6 (2):237-257.
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  4. Christian Coseru (2009). Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Perhaps no other classical philosophical tradition, East or West, offers a more complex and counter-intuitive account of mind and mental phenomena than Buddhism. While Buddhists share with other Indian philosophers the view that the domain of the mental encompasses a set of interrelated faculties and processes, they do not associate mental phenomena with the activity of a substantial, independent, and enduring self or agent. Rather, Buddhist theories of mind center on the doctrine of no-self (Pāli anatta, Skt.[1] anātma), which postulates (...)
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  5. Francis W. Dauer (1980). Hume's Skeptical Solution and the Causal Theory of Knowledge. Philosophical Review 89 (3):357-378.
  6. D. Goldstick (1972). A Contribution Towards the Development of the Causal Theory of Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):238-248.
    1 Cf. D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind (London, 1968), Chapter 9; 'A Causal Theory of Knowledge' by Alvin I. Goldman, The Journal of Philosophy , Vol. LXIV, No. 12, June 22, 1967. A striking parallelism would appear to exist between 'the causal theory of knowledge' and the orthodox Stoic doctrine regarding the kataleptike phantasia . See, for example, Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.248 (reprinted in Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta , edited by H. F. A. von Arnim, Leipzig, 1921, (...)
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  7. D. Goldstick (1972). A Contribution Towards the Development of the Causal Theory of Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):238 – 248.
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  8. Wolfgang Grassl (1981). Knowing That One Knows and the Causal Theory of Knowledge. International Studies in Philosophy 13 (1):43-59.
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  9. A. J. Holland (1977). Can Mannison Avoid a Causal Theory of Knowledge? Philosophical Quarterly 27 (107):158-161.
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  10. Heine A. Holmen (2011). Ethics and the Nature of Action. Dissertation, University of Oslo
  11. Christoph Jäger (2011). Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem. Theoria 77 (3):201-213.
    Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson have recently proposed a novel solution to the value problem in epistemology, i.e., to the question of how to account for the apparent surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief. Their “conditional probability solution” maintains that even simple process reliabilism can account for the added value of knowledge, since forming true beliefs in a reliable way raises the objective probability that the subject will have more true belief of a similar kind in the future. (...)
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  12. Christoph Jäger (2004). Skepticism, Information, and Closure: Dretske's Theory of Knowledge. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):187 - 201.
    According to Fred Dretske's externalist theory of knowledge a subject knows that p if and only if she believes that p and this belief is caused or causally sustained by the information that p. Another famous feature of Dretske's epistemology is his denial that knowledge is closed under known entailment. I argue that, given Dretske's construal of information, he is in fact committed to the view that both information and knowledge are closed under known entailment. Hence, if it is true (...)
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  13. Joshua, The Implication of the Precision of SPRs.
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  14. Neil McDonnell (2015). The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):162-170.
    Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called ‘deviant’ causal chains. For each such theory, counterexamples are formed using odd or co-incidental causal chains to establish that the theory is committed to unpalatable claims about some intentional action, about a case of veridical perception or about the acquisition of genuine knowledge. In this paper I will argue that three well-known examples of a deviant causal chain have something in common: they each violate Yablos proportionality (...)
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  15. Mirza Mehmedovic (2016). Possible Worlds, Zombies, and Truth Machines. Giornale di Metafisica 1:262-283.
    The subject of zombies is one of the most discussed and controversial topics of philosophy of mind. In this paper I will first examine the main argument of zombies, providing a summary of the current discussion. Then I will introduce a thought experiment, an epistemic window on a metaphysical scenario. By the thought experiment I will argue that zombies are logically impossible. Further I will discuss another recent epistemic window. Finally I will provide some other logical consideration to prove that (...)
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  16. Christophe Menant (2009). Sensorimotor Process with Constraint Satisfaction. Grounding of Meaning (2009). Dissertation, Hamburg EUCogII Conference
    There is an increasing agreement in the cognitive sciences community that our sensations are closely related to our actions. Our actions impact our sensations from the environment and the knowledge we have of it. Cognition is grounded in sensori-motor coordination. In the perspective of implementing such a performance in artificial systems, there is a need for a model of sensori-motor coordination. We propose here such a model as based on the generation of meaningful information by a system submitted to a (...)
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  17. Timothy R. O'Donnell, Evidence of Falsehood.
    It has been largely assumed from the start that truth, the first premise of the Tripartite theory of Knowledge, is necessary for a mental state of knowing. And this has intuitively made sense. Examples that demonstrate the logic of this premise are wide-spread and easily found. Yet, if one tries to establish the necessity of this condition for oneself, one may discover, a logical flaw in this premise. In theory truth is necessary, however, in practice it is not truth that (...)
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  18. R. Skipper & M. R. Hyman (forthcoming). Marketing and Logical Deduction. Journal of Marketing:89--92.
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  19. Mark Steiner (1973). Platonism and the Causal Theory of Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 70 (3):57-66.
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