The use of sensitivity analysis is routine in some fields of empirical econometrics, although econometric theorists have generally taken a critical attitude towards it. This paper presents a framework in which arguments for and against such analysis can be evaluated. It appears that sensitivity is not necessarily a bad, nor sturdiness necessarily a good.

Davis argues that Suppe's semantic conception provides a better understanding of the problem of theory?data confrontations. Applying his semantic methodology to the LSE (London School of Economics) approach of econometrics, he concludes that the LSE approach fails to address the issue of bridging the theory?data gap. This paper suggests two other versions of the semantic view of theories in the philosophy of science, due to Suppes and van Fraassen, and argues that the LSE approach can be construed under these two (...) versions of the semantic view in terms of structure and representation. (shrink)

There has been considerable discussion lately of the concept of open systems, which has revealed that different participants are using the terms ?openness? and ?closure? in different ways. The purpose of this paper is to address issues of meaning that arise in this particular discourse, with a view to clarifying both conflicts in usage and the underlying issues involved. We explore the different meanings of openness and closure extant in the literature, as applied at the ontological and epistemological levels, focusing (...) on our own use of the terms in relation to that which prevails in neoclassical economics on the one hand and to the use made of them by Tony Lawson and other critical realists on the other. (shrink)

The philosophy of science literature has played an increasing role in discussion of econometric methodology in recent years, and the Hendry methodology in particular has received much attention. Despite this, the encompassing principle has been overlooked in the methodological literature. This paper addresses this by examining the major methodological implications of the principle.

Analytic induction (AI) is an interpretation of scientific method that emerged in early twentieth-century sociology and still has some influence today. Among the studies often cited as examples are Becker’s articles on marijuana use. While these have been given less attention than the work of Lindesmith on opiate addiction and Cressey on financial trust violation, Becker’s work has distinctive features. Furthermore, it raises some important and interesting issues that relate not only to AI but to social scientific explanation more generally. (...) These concern, for example, the presence and nature of causal systems in the social world, the relationship between historical and generalizing approaches, the character and role of social scientific theories, and how they are generated. In this article Becker’s research is examined in detail, and these issues explored through comparisons with the work of Lindesmith and Cressey. (shrink)

Economists disagree about whether they should aim to provide explanations, about what they should aim to explain, and about how they should go about explaining. This essay will address all three of these controversies. I shall argue (1) that explanation is a central task in economics, (2) that one should adopt an explicitly causal model of explanation, (3) that economists cannot avoid explaining individual choices and they should attempt to explain the paths that take the economy from one equilibrium to (...) another, and (4) that explanations in economics cite reasons as well as causes. Most of these points apply across different schools of economics, but “economics” in this paper should thus be read as “mainstream economics.”. (shrink)

The frequency of historical materialist explanations in evolutionary social sciences is very low even though historical materialism and evolutionism have great many shared aims towards explaining the long term social change. David Laibman in his Deep History (2007) picks up some of the standard questions of evolutionary social theory and aims at advancing the conception of historical materialism so as to develop a Marxist theory of history from an evolutionary point of view. The contribution of Laibman’s work is to show (...) that historical and materialist explanations are present both in Marxian and evolutionary interpretations of history, and moreover, the traditional borders of historical materialism can be enlarged so as to embrace evolutionary methodology in explaining social change. The unbalanced research methodology of Laibman’s work, however, reduces the evolutionary depth of his contribution. The two main shortcomings of Laibman’s work are discussed under the titles of “The Audience Problem” and “The Evolutionary Problem”. (shrink)